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Abstract 
 
War captives are generally thought to have comprised the main portion of the Roman slave 
supply during the Republic. Likewise, the result of mass enslavement through continuous war 
has been interpreted as a principle factor in the agricultural evolution in Italy from the second 
century BC which saw a significant increase in large plantation style farming (latifundia). 
The misconception of a male bias in agricultural labour has put a heavy influence on the need 
for an external supply of slaves rather than through reproduction. However, an analysis of 
documentary evidence suggests that wartime enslavement was more limited. Problems in 
supervising, transporting, and trading large numbers of slaves, as well as competing markets 
elsewhere in the Mediterranean, made immediate absorption of captives as slaves into the 
central Italian economy problematic. Furthermore, the vast majority of wartime enslavements 
occurred following the capture of cities, where larger numbers of civilian prisoners were 
taken, mostly comprising women, children and slaves. 
Ancient sources frequently exaggerated the number of war captives and often neglected to 
elaborate on the fate of those taken in war. Many modern historians have been far too quick 
to assume that prisoners were enslaved, which has given a disproportionate view of the 
importance of the contribution of war captives to the slave supply and their effect upon the 
growing slave population at Rome during the Republic. Such assumptions have left critical 
analysis wanting and, as a result, war captives have been largely neglected by Roman 
historians. This study attempts to address the gap in our analysis of these crucial practices in 
antiquity and to offer an explanation of how the taking of war captives was impacted by 
Rome’s changing socio-political and economic structures during the Republic. 
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Introduction 
 
In his important sociological study on the institution of slavery, Orlando Patterson noted that 
it has often been too easy to exaggerate the role of warfare as a source of slaves.
1
 This 
emphasis stems largely from the fact that many slave populations are thought to have 
originated from enslaved captives. It may be recalled that the Helots of Messenia had been 
subjugated through war by the Spartans, and though Roman vernae were born into slavery, 
their ancestors had at one time been enslaved.
2
 To Roman jurists, the definitive explanation 
for the existence of slavery as a universally accepted practice in contrast with ‘natural law,’ 
was that it stemmed from warfare, also a universal practice. Etymologically, slavery suggests 
that capture in war was of paramount significance. Servus and mancipia, according to the 
Roman jurists, stem from servare ‘to save’ and manu capiuntur ‘to take in hand,’ both of 
which demonstrate the origination of servile status through war.
3
 It is worth noting that in 
English as well as many other European languages, ‘slave’ stems from ‘Slav’ in recognition 
of the fact that many Slavs were enslaved during their uprising against the Holy Roman 
Empire in the tenth century.
4
 
With such an entrenched conceptual foundation, it is easy to conclude that most slaves 
originated from capture in war, and more importantly, that most war captives were enslaved. 
This deduction has certainly been the case of Roman history, where the taking of captives has 
generally been synonymous with their enslavement, despite a lack of evidence to suggest that 
it was in fact the case. The problem lies initially with a disinterest in the fate of captives by 
Roman sources, and secondly with the conclusion, void of empirical evidence, of modern 
historians, that most captives were enslaved. Roman history is not alone in this dilemma. 
Historians of Near Eastern civilizations have often asserted that war was the major source of 
slaves, and similarly historians of Han dynasty China (a contemporary of Rome and common 
comparison) have encountered a disinterest in the fate of captives by their sources, and many 
have come to the same conclusion as Roman historians. More recently these views have been 
                                                 
1
 Patterson 1982, 106. 
2
 See Hornblower 1983, 120-2; Garlan 1987, 11. There was even a tradition circulated amongst the Greeks as 
late as the first century that the Romans were decended from slaves settled at Rome, Dion. Hal. 1.4.2.  
3
 Dig. 1.5.4 (Florentinus Institutes 9.2); Inst. Ius. 1.3.3. For an extended discussion of this etymology see 
Chapter 1. 
4
 Klein 1966 s.v. ‘slave.’ 
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called into question.
5
 For chattel slavery in Rome there still remains a general consensus that, 
during the expansive years of the Roman Republic, war captives constituted the most 
significant source and supply of slaves; only to be replaced by other means of acquisition, 
once rapid expansion ceased from the establishment of the Pax Romana under Augustus, 
when the taking of captives in wars of expansion was no longer commonplace. The premise 
of this study is to analyse the process of enslavement through war, to interpret Rome’s 
evolving policies in taking slaves during its formative years of the early and mid-Republic, 
and to re-evaluate the interpretation of war captives as having been commonly enslaved.  
The prevailing view of Roman slavery, as having derived from the enslavement of enemies, 
has clouded our understanding of the relevance of studying Roman slavery. Jefferson was the 
author of the original draft of The Declaration of Independence and penned the words “that 
all men are created equal,” yet Jefferson was himself a slave owner, and though he held 
considerable reservations concerning slavery, he perceived a clear superiority of white 
Europeans over Africans, which ‘naturally justified’ the enslavement of the later by the 
former.
6
 Supremacism had ‘solved’ for New World slave owners what Aristotle had 
struggled with, namely the identification of a natural slave by physical differentiation. 
Aristotle had identified what he thought to be the characteristics of a natural slave, and he 
accepted that some people fell naturally into this category whereas others were naturally 
masters, but this was not readily apparent by physical features, only through their mental 
aptitude.
7
 In expressing the natural superiority of white Europeans, Jefferson also identified a 
                                                 
5
 For the view of mass enslavement in Mesopotamia as the major source of slaves see Diakanoff 1976, 45-78; 
and likewise for Neo-Sumeria, see Siegel 1947, 11; Snell 2011, 6-8. This traditional view was rejected by 
Gelb 1973, 70-98 and Oded 1979, 74. For the orthodox view of slave acquisition in Han China see Chou ku-
Cheng 1956, 61-7. For scepticism of this widespread interpretation of enslaved captives see Ch’u T’ung-tsu 
1972, 135-41; Pulleyblank 1958, 201-5Wilbur 1943, 96. In fact the replacement of the ‘well field’ system by 
large land owners utilising slave labour is remarkably reminiscent of the Hopkins model (see below). For an 
overview of the Han period agrarian model see Feng 2013, 291f.; Sadao 1986, 256-9. For a general discussion 
of the misinterpretation of the significance of war captives in many slave systems with extensive bibliography 
(including many of the selected citations above) see Patterson 1982, 106-15. 
6
 The contrast between natural, innate freedom and practical servitude was explored by Rousseau in his treatise 
Du Contrat Social, ou principes du droit politique (1762). This was, of course, significantly influential to 
Jefferson. Rousseau’s views concenring ‘social contract’ between subject and ruling factors were heavily 
influenced by Aristotle. The assertion by Rousseau that “man was born free, but everywhere he is in chains” 
reflects the exploitation at the hands of ‘the sovereign’ state rather than the fault of individuals, a point missed 
by Jefferson and a correction of Aristotle who Rousseau felt mistook the effect of slavery for its cause, see 
Williams 2014, 40. 
7
 For Aristotle’s concept of natural slavery see Pol. 1254a-b.  Aristotle remarked on the difficulty of recognising 
non-physical characteristics Pol. 154b39-40 “beauty of the soul is not as easy to see as beauty of the body.” 
See further Brunt 1993, 343-88; Garnsey 1996, 107-10. Aristotle believed non-Greeks were naturally suitable 
as slaves Pol. 1252b5-9; 1255a28-b2; 1285a19-21, for  an analysis of Aristotle’s view of ‘natural slavery’ 
with regards to ‘reason’ see Heath 2008, 243-70; Fisher 1993, 86f. 
Introduction 
3 
 
critical problem of ancient slavery: the enslavement of people who were ‘equal’ to their 
owners. 
In the fourteenth query of his treatise Notes on the State of Virginia, Jefferson provided an 
apologia for American slave ownership by demonstrating the harshness of the Roman slave 
system, and the improved treatment of slaves under the American system. He observed the 
harsh separation of men and women which Cato, ever the miser, extracted money from his 
male slaves for such pauses in separation, and the terrible punishments suffered by Roman 
slaves at the hands of their owners.
8
 Jefferson noted that despite the brutality of Roman 
slavery, slaves could be renowned scholars, such as Terence, Epictetus and Phaedrus, 
whereas he maintained African slaves were incapable of advanced thought. To Jefferson, 
slavery was a ‘white man’s burden,’ as an institution it had ‘progressed’ from the Roman 
system which stole liberty unnaturally. To modern students of history, the lack of racial 
differentiation, despite being exhibited in the reprehensible exploitation of people as slaves, 
illustrates how the course of human history is not necessarily progressive. 
Roman slavery is viewed as unique in the manner and the extent that it acquired slaves, at 
least until the limitation of expansive warfare under the empire. Such a theory portrays 
remoteness to all other slave systems, and has blinded us to the ubiquitous conditions of 
slavery.
9
 It is now believed, despite universal legislation against slavery, that there are more 
slaves living in the world today than any previous time in history, the majority of these are 
trafficked from poor countries and from the most vulnerable levels of western societies.
10
 In 
dispelling the notion that Rome was reliant upon the direct acquisition of war captives 
through their military efforts, it is possible to demonstrate that the history of human 
exploitation has remained relatively unchanged.  
                                                 
8
 Plut. Cat. Mai. 21.2. Jefferson cites the incident of Vedius Pollio who is prevented by the emperor Augustus 
from feeding a slave to his eels for breaking a jug (Cass. Dio 54.23.1-6; Plin. HN 9.39; Sen. Clem. 1.18.9; 
Dial. 3.40.2). 
9
 See for example the denial of enslavement from war by Machiavelli Art of War (book 2) as he compares 
warfare in his day to that of the classical world where captives “remained slaves in perpetuity.” Enslavement 
was common in wars between Christians and Muslims into the 19
th
 century, see for example the account of 
John Smith 1630 The true travels, adventures, and observations, of Captain John Smith, into Europe, Asia, 
Africa, and America, from ann. dom. 1593-1629 (reprinted 1704, 378) who was enslaved after capture by 
Ottomans in 1602. For the Enslavement of Europeans (particularly British) in this period see Colley 2002. 
10
 According to a 2012 survey conducted by the United Nations Labour Organisation over 21 million people 
worldwide are estimated to be living as slaves (ILO Special Action Programme to combat Forced Labour 
Summary of the 2012 Global Estimate of Forced Labour), in the US alone nearly 15,000 people are trafficked 
each year (2005 US Department of State Publication 11252). The issue of modern slavery has only recently 
garnered significant study, see Scarpa 2008, 3-40. 
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The topic of warfare enslavement has characteristically been considered within wider studies 
of slavery; often serving as a means of introducing readers, unacquainted with slavery, to the 
raw and brutal nature of the ancient world’s most odious form of exploitation. Early studies 
on slavery, such as those of Henri Wallon and William Blair portrayed war captives as the 
primary source of slaves, and the main drive behind the growing dependence upon slave 
labour in the Republic.
11
 Eventually, Blair’s inflated concept of the slave population and the 
extent of war captive acquisition was superseded by Beloch’s monumental demographic 
study of the Graeco-Roman world, in which he significantly reduced the plausible number of 
slaves and the number of captives that could be contributed to such a supply.
12
 The study of 
slavery in the ancient world gained significant momentum in the twentieth century with 
considerable contribution by Marxist scholars, a redoubled interest in Anglophone 
scholarship and importantly by the establishment of two major research groups at Besançon 
and Mainz.
13
 
William Westermann was the first to extensively analyse incidents of mass enslavement 
during warfare. In his 1955 publication derived from his Pauly Encyclopädie entry 
‘sklaverei,’ Westermann concluded that the enslavement of war captives was integral to the 
maintenance of the Roman labour supply, particularly during the absence of free males 
performing extended military service.
14
 Keith Hopkins would later expound upon this 
concept and developed a model of the Roman economy which hinged on the eventual 
replacement of yeomen agriculture through slave labour, supplied in part by the warfare that 
made the small farmers absent from their lands.
15
 Hans Volkmann was the first to study 
wartime enslavements as a specific topic. His study was, however, limited and represents an 
extended survey rather than an in-depth analysis, and his organisation of the material, 
geographically instead of chronologically, has prevented identifying any patterns in the 
enslavement process, particularly with regards to the evolving political situation in Rome. 
Volkmann’s study was republished in 1990 by Gerhard Horsmann with an extended 
bibliography and corrigenda, but little additional analysis was offered. To date, the 1973 
dissertation of Wayne Boese remains the only book-length study of the Roman slave trade, 
                                                 
11
 Wallon, 1847 II, 17f; Blair 1833, 16f. 
12
 Beloch 1926, 415-18. 
13
 For a brief historiographical analysis of Marxist scholarship concerning Roman slavery see McKeown 2007, 
52-96. The research groups: Groupe International de Recherche sur l'Esclavage dans l'Antiquité and 
Forschungen zur Antiken Sklaverei. 
14
 Westermann 1955, 57-69. 
15
 Hopkins 1978, 1-98. Reasserted by Katsari 2008, 27. 
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but his discussion regarding the enslavement of war captives was largely derived from 
Westermann, and he generally accepted the fact that the capture of war prisoners constituted 
the principle means of supply for slaves during the Republic. This principle has been the 
orthodox view and has remained relatively unchallenged.
16
 
It has not been until the recent demographic studies that the significance of the war captive 
contribution has been questioned. In 1980 William Harris first paved the way for 
understanding the logistics behind the slave numbers in his article on the Roman slave 
trade.
17
 Then, using modern demographic techniques, Scheidel also identified the 
considerable need for an annual influx of slaves that far exceeded what could be sought 
through warfare.
18
 Whilst Harris and Scheidel have disagreed over the valuation of individual 
sources of supply, they have both agreed that warfare, at least by the end of the Republic, no 
longer supported the need for slaves, albeit with the caveat that the sources of the Empire are 
less explicit in the matter of warfare capture.
19
 For the mid-Republic and earlier, the slave 
supply has largely been ignored and so it has, by default, been accepted that war captives 
were the chief source of supply for slaves; eventually replaced by alternative means, only 
when the slave population grew to an exceptionally large size and when warfare ceased to be 
expansionistic. 
To date, there has been only one specific study upon the enslavement of war captives by the 
Romans by Karl-Wilhelm Welwei, whose analysis of the Punic Wars is typically critical of 
enslavement figures, and questions the validity of many interpretations that war captives were 
enslaved.
20
 However, Welwei’s analysis is confined primarily to the third century BC with 
limited inclusion of post and prior material. The topic of war-time enslavements has been 
                                                 
16
 Bradley, 1984, 7-8; 1987, 43-4; 1994, 13, 32-3; 2004, 299; Brunt 1958, 166; 1971, 707; Hopkins 1978 8-15; 
Nicolet 1976, 214; Ste. Croix 1981, 228-36; White 1970, 368-70. Finley 1980, 82-6 rejected the notion that 
growing wartime enslavements brought about Rome’s slave society, arguing instead that there was already a 
significant population of slaves in Rome, stating “logically, the demand for slaves precedes the supply” (1980, 
86). Westermann 1955, 70 noted that the limited evidence for Roman slave holding prior to the second 
century has clouded our understanding of its rise. This has also led to an interpretation that captures in war 
diminished significantly by comparison in Late Antiquity, however there are numerous examples which 
suggest this was not the case particularly from the third century AD onwards, see Lenski 2011a, 193f.; Harper 
2011, 67f. 
17
 Harris 1980. 
18
 Scheidel 1997, 2005, 2011. 
19
 Harris 1980, 121-2; 1999, 73. Scheidel 1997, 156-7; 2011, 295-7. See also Bradley 1987, 42; Temin 2004, 
530; Thompson 2003, 6-7. This paradigmatic shift was overemphasised as a deliberate strategy by Luttwak 
1976, particularly 1-13. For imperial enslavements see Boese 1973, 104-42; Gonzalez 2002, 65-82. For the 
continuation of warfare beyond the Republic as a contribution to the slave supply see Bradley 1994, 40-1; 
2004, 302f.; Woolf 1993, 181-2. 
20
 Welwei 2000. 
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better addressed by Greek historians, and our understanding of Roman enslavement practices 
can be enhanced by their works, such as Pierre Ducrey’s monograph on prisoners of war, 
Andreas Panagopoulos’ work investigating capture during the Peloponnesian War and 
William Pritchett’s extensive study on Greek warfare.21 These studies considered the ransom, 
release and execution of captives along with enslavement as variant outcomes of the same 
process of handling captives. Such a wider consideration has been lacking in Roman studies 
on the topic.  
This study seeks to establish that the enslavement of war captives occurred less often than has 
been generally perceived, that large-scale enslavements did not occur with any regularity 
until the end of the third century BC, after the slave system of the Romans had been well 
established, and that capture often led to other outcomes apart from slavery. Furthermore, it 
will become apparent that most large scale captures included civilian populations, and 
accordingly women and children represented the majority of those captured. The implication 
of these observations is that Roman slavery was more heavily reliant upon alternative 
supplies of slaves and that there was no consistent strategy by the Romans to fight wars 
directly for the acquisition of slaves.
22
 
 
Methodology 
In order to demonstrate the process of enslavement and the development of the practice 
through warfare, it is necessary to discuss the topic from an early stage in Roman history, and 
thus this study covers examples of enslavement from the monarchy. Evidence for large scale 
enslavements begins to taper off from the second century BC, in part due to the prevalence of 
civil rather than foreign wars which did not accrue slaves and partly because of the nature of 
our sources. The narratives of Livy and Polybius, which provide the backbone of the history 
of Roman enslavement, end in the second half of the century. Thus this study naturally 
concludes with the significant year 146 BC, in which Corinth and Carthage were sacked by 
the Romans. Whilst the narrative portion of this study ceases in 146 BC, there is extensive 
consideration of later evidence, chiefly to illustrate overarching themes in the Roman practice 
of reduction in warfare. 
                                                 
21
 Ducrey 1999; Panagopoulos 1978; Pritchett 1991. See also Garlan 1987, 9. 
22
 Warfare also indirectly affected the slave supply, as result of famine and displacement many slaves may have 
been made. See Garnsey 2003 and Katsari 2008, 37-38 on the lasting deprivation of Macedon. 
Introduction 
7 
 
Whilst the historical scope of this study is limited to the Roman Republic to 146 BC, 
considerable use is made of textual evidence from the archaic to early medieval periods. Most 
of the major sources concerning the period covered in this study were not current with the 
events considered in their histories and biographies; Livy, Dionysius, Dio Cassius, Diodorus 
and Plutarch were all born later than 146 BC. Only Polybius was current with some of the 
events described in his Histories, however, his work becomes increasingly fragmented for the 
period he experienced.
23
 Furthermore, the sources whose accounts give the greatest details 
concerning the process of capture and enslavement, such as Caesar, Sallust and Josephus 
were written during and concerned events of the final century of the Republic and the 
imperial periods. It must be accepted that first-hand accounts of wartime captures and 
enslavements for the early and middle Republican periods are not available to the modern 
historian, at least not preserved litera scripta manet. 
The Histories of Polybius and the Annals of Livy, which provide the most substantial 
evidence for Roman enslavement practices during the Republic, drew upon a plethora of 
earlier writers. Polybius wrote in the later second century BC, as a former hostage of Rome 
and a client and close friend of Scipio Aemilianus his work must be read with an 
understanding of the context in which it was produced. Nevertheless, Polybius was a careful 
and critical historian, he had the advantage of reading both Latin and Greek works and, with 
assistance, consulted Carthaginian sources as well. The objective of Polybius’ history was 
clear, it was an explanation, aimed at a Greek audience, to explain how the Romans rose to 
power and he was often critical of his sources when they proved insufficient for his task. It is 
often in his criticism of his sources that we learn who he was consulting. Livy’s work was an 
extended annalistic history of Rome following in the tradition of most of his sources. Livy 
had the benefit of drawing upon Polybius and he praised the value of Polybius’ work.24 For 
early Roman history both Livy and Polybius utilised the early Roman historians and 
annalists.
25
 Livy also drew on later annalists, and Polybius drew on a number of relevant 
                                                 
23
 Poybius was born c. 200 BC, his Histories end with the year 146 BC and the destruction of Carthage which he 
was present for as an associate of Scipio Aemilianus. The Histories are increasingly fragmentary from book 7 
and particularly so from book 22. 
24
 Liv. 30.45.5; 33.10.10. Livy was also critical of Polybius 36.19.11 (concerning figures) and 39.52.1 (dating). 
25
 Most notably Quintus Fabius Pictor and Lucius Calpurnius Piso Frugi (Censorinus). Although Fabius Pictor 
has been traditionally regarded as an annalist, the surviving portion of his work suggests a different style. His 
scope and subject, however, were very much in the vein of annals. Fabius Pictor wrote in Greek (SEG 26. 
1122) and Livy may have consulted later Latin translations, see Northwood 2007, 97-4; s.v. “Fabius Pictor” 
OCD. Less is known of Calpurnius’ Annales, the only extant fragment of his work is preserved in Aul. Gel. 7. 
9 who praised his archaic Latin prose in a passage concerning an aedile in 303 BC. 
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Greek historians.
26
 Both Livy and Polybius were critical of their sources, but in relation to 
wartime capture and enslavements their disagreement with their sources typically hinged 
upon numbers and nothing more.
27
  
Livy and Polybius were not unique in their historiographical approaches; virtually all of the 
works cited in this thesis drew their information from prior written accounts, some of these 
sources known to us and some unknown. Dio Cassius, whose history mirrors that of Livy’s 
and other historians from the Second Punic War onwards is remarkably dissimilar for events 
prior,
28
 and regardless of the originality of the entirety of his work, he maintained an 
independent opinion regarding the truth of his sources.
29
 While most of the ancient writers 
considered within this study were removed from the time they wrote about, their works were 
supported by what they believed were credible sources and what has been preserved is their 
critical analysis of those sources. Of course historical study of this period faces the patchwork 
of source material, but it is evident that there is a consistent trend in the ambivalence towards 
wartime enslavement, passed from historical account to history and from the ancient to the 
modern historian. 
Throughout this study there is a significant amount of earlier Greek material which serves to 
fill the gaps in our understanding of Roman capture, enslavement and ransom practices. With 
regards to geography and time, ancient Greece provides the best comparative evidence for 
Republican Rome. Pre-Hellenistic Greek literature is of further significant importance as it 
provides the basis of style for later Greek writers during the Hellenistic and Roman periods 
and heavily influenced Latin writers. For the earlier periods covered in this study a significant 
amount of information can be gained through the tradition infused in the language concerning 
slavery and enslavement. As noted above, the etymology of enslavement terms can speak 
volumes to how slavery was perceived and communicated in early Greece and Rome. 
This study will begin with a philological inquiry of key terms followed by an analysis of the 
process of capture, the legal status of captives and their ownership (Chapter 1). From this 
analysis it will emerge that the principle of the right of the victor over those they have 
                                                 
26
 Livy made use of Quintus Valerius Antias, Gaius Licinius Macer and Quintus Claudius Quadrigarius and for 
the Punic Wars Lucius Coelius Antipater who was not a contemporary of Polybius. Polybius’ named sources 
included Phylarchus, Philinus, Theopompus, Timaeus and Aristaenus. 
27
 For example Liv. 22.7.4 prefered the figures given by Fabius Pictor, regarding them as more believable given 
Fabius’ presence at the battle of Trasimene. See also various examples with figure discrepencies in the 
appendix section. 
28
 Libourel 1974, 383-93. 
29
 Dio explicitly remarks on his relating of source material unaltered whilst maintaining his opinion at 53.19.6. 
Zonaras used Dio as his chief source and his history in places simply mirrors that of Dio’s.   
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vanquished was universally accepted in antiquity, and so the right of the victor to ransom, 
execute, or enslave their captives was never questioned. However, some conventions did 
restrict the manner in which this was done and many factors, physical as well as moral, 
limited the execution and enslavement of captives. The legal position of captives was 
essentially tied to their ownership as a form of booty, and decisions taken over their 
‘disposal’ was entirely in the hands of the commanders in the field who were responsible 
with dispensing the state’s property.30 
One of the principle aims of this thesis is to demonstrate the variance in the fate of captives, 
and it has been necessary to review instances of release, massacre and ransom (Chapters 2,3). 
These have been treated individually at length, and it was important to explain the process of 
ransom since the Roman practice under the Republic has not been fully treated before.
31
 The 
negative Roman attitude towards ransom is well testified in the sources, but a thorough 
review shows that this was essentially state policy, whereas in the private sphere ransom was 
accepted, and even considered a matter of civic duty and a source of pride. Prisoner 
exchanges, too, play a significant role in the consequences of capture, and there is 
considerable evidence for large scale exchanges during the First and Second Punic Wars. 
Surprisingly, and contrary to what at first seemed logical, the price of ransom in both the 
Greek and Roman world was actually lower than the average price for slaves. If the largest 
amount of profit was the goal of the military and traders, then it would have made sense to set 
a price of ransom higher than what could be acquired through the sale of a captive as a slave. 
This observation suggests that ransom was a more common outcome than has previously 
been believed.  
Following on from the analysis of alternative outcomes of capture, the enslavement of war 
captives will be investigated (Chapters 4,5,6). These chapters analyse the practice of 
enslavement through a chronological narrative, extending from Romulus to the fall of 
Carthage and Corinth in 146 BC. This section serves as a commentary for the taking of war 
prisoners by the Romans within the context of the evolving socio-political landscape of the 
                                                 
30
 See Chapter 2, where it is argued that the money derived from the sale of captives was generally reserved for 
the state, although a commander could distribute the money to his troops presumably without risk of crimen 
peculatis, see Vogel 1948, 404; Shatzman 1976, 189-95; s.v. ‘manubiae’ RE. For his conclusive remarks on 
the autonomous power of the general in the field see Eckstein 1987, 319. Eckstein, also concludes that there 
was a degree of variance in the Senate exercising control from region to region.  
31
 For both Greek and Roman ransom examples cf. Pritchett 1991, 245-97, (particularly examples in Livy) 283-
4. The topic has only been approached from a legal point of view, cf. Zeigler 1986, 381-93, with particular 
regards to postliminium, see Buckland 1908, 292-304, see Chapter 3. For ransom in Greek historiography with 
bibliography see Ducrey 1999, 239f; Lammert RE s.v ‘λύτρον.’ 
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early and middle Republic. The narrative style of the chapters concerning enslavements has 
been intentional in order to demonstrate that there was no clear political agenda or strategy in 
the talking of captives by the Roman state.  
The study continues with an analysis of the potential trade in war captives (Chapter 7), 
focusing on the markets, traders and transport of enslaved war captives. Both written and 
material evidence for the slave trade is sparse, and it is furthermore difficult to differentiate 
between the presence of captives and slaves derived from other means of supply.
32
 The study 
concludes (Epilogue) with an examination of the overall contribution of war captives to the 
Roman slave supply and will suggest a significant reduction in the interpreted reliance upon 
the war captives for the perpetuance and maintenance of the slave supply. 
 
                                                 
32
 Cf. Thompson 2003, 37-46 for the limited archaeological evidence in the trade of slaves and war captives. For 
‘shackling’ see 217-40. 
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Chapter 1 
Capture, Captives and Commanders 
 
Greek and Roman historians were generally unconcerned with the processes of enslavement 
and with the means by which people were ransomed or released. Examined broadly across 
the corpus of written evidence, ancient writers were seemingly unconcerned with the 
minutiae of capture, captivity and disposal (i.e. release, execution, ransom, enslavement). 
This neglect has contributed heavily to the disinterest of modern historians, who have, as a 
consequence, concerned themselves with the events and mechanics of warfare and its 
ramifications, such as imperialism or slavery. This has been to the disadvantage of the subject 
of capture, specifically the legal questions regarding a captive’s status and their ‘ownership.’ 
This chapter attempts to define the captive in Roman law and consider the justification of 
enslavement with regards to Roman morality. 
 
Terminology for Captives and Capture 
Considering the brevity of most passages relating to the capture of war captives, it is 
important to examine the terminology, which lends a more nuanced understanding of Roman 
war captures. In Latin, a captive taken in war was always referred to as captivus or captus
1
 
and the state of captivity as captivitas.
2
 In English, a captive may be synonymous with a 
prisoner of war, but in Latin a clearer distinction is present, as a prisoner or reus was 
essentially reserved for civilian restraint; someone held for a crime or subject to punishment 
(poena) with an emphasis upon their crime,
3
 whereas captives are clearly identified by their 
                                                 
1
 A feminine form (captiva) was also used, but this always referred to the stock character of the attractive 
captive girl, Hor. Carm. 2.4.6; Liv. 30.12.18; Plaut. Epid. 107; Prop. 2.8.37; Verg. Aen. 12.63, with a single 
exception of Dig. 38.16.1.1, which may simply be an error of copying.  
2
 Such as Flor. 1.18.114; Tac. Ann. 4.25; Ger. 8.1; Sen. Ben.  6.35.5; Q Nat. 6.2.2. 
3
 I.e. a culprit, s.v. ‘reus’ TLL. Poenus in the literature concerning the period covered within this study always 
referred to Phoenicians/Carthaginians. Servi poeni, people reduced to slavery as punishment, is late 
phraseology found only in the Digessta. (e.g. Dig. 16.7pr; 29.2.5.3; 36.1.18.6), see Buckland 1908, 277-8. 
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capture capio/capto.
4
 Similarly in Greek those taken in battle were regularly referred to as 
‘taken by the spear’ δοριάλωτος5 or δορυάλωτος6 from δόρυ (spear shaft) and αίχμάλωτοϛ 
from αἰχμή (spear), the latter being the most common.7 To ‘take’ from the enemy was 
commonly ἁναιρέω, and could be used for the action of taking prisoners.8 Ἀλίσκομαι referred 
to the act of being taken prisoner or to fall into the enemy’s hands.9 Αἰχμαλωτίζω denoted the 
action of ‘taking prisoner,’ but was uncommon in the context of war captives.10 Another 
commonly used term for captives was ἀνδροπόδον, but this will be discussed later in a more 
pertinent context.
11
  
The majority of captures by the Romans followed the fall of cities. In Latin, to sack (rapio or 
diripio)
12
 was synonymous with plundering or pillaging. In English, the sack of a city carries 
the same connotations of violent capture and destruction, with an emphasis on looting from 
which the term derives from the ‘implement’ of burglary.13 Likewise, capture does not 
                                                                                                                                                        
Similarly poenali referred to prisoners punished for crimes rather than held as war captives, Gai. Inst. 4.94; 
4.112; Dig. 2.3.1pr; 2.4.11.pr.  
4
 Capio is very common in relation to captives taken in war e.g. Cic. Att. 9.6.2; Orat. 1.226; Verr. 5.122; Liv. 
9.3.3; 21.60.7; 26.47.1; Plin. Ep. 644. 
5
 For example Hdt. 8.74; 9.4; Eur. Tr. 518; Isoc. Paneg. 4.177; Polyb. 23.10.6. Soph. Aj. 211 uses δουριάλωτος. 
6
 As in Xen. Cyr. 7.5.35; IG 14.1293.57. Often used by Procop. Goth. 2.5.28; 2.21.29; 3.23.21. The term δμώς 
also referred to captives, but is strictly Homeric (e.g. Od. 1.398; Il. 6.323; 19.333), it is a common term for 
slaves in later works, particularly in Euripedes, see Ducrey 1999, 12-14; s.v. ‘δμώς’ LSJ. 
7
 For δόρυ and ἀιχμή derivatives see Ducrey 1999, 16-21. 
8
 The LSJ gives the definition “to seize or carry off.” Examples relative to this study, that pertain specifically to 
the taking of captives: ἀιχμάλώτος (App. Syr. 60; Diod. Sic. 17.70.5; 19.85.3; Dion. Hal. 5.31.1; 11.48.2; 
Joseph. BJ 3.305; Plut. Brut. 45.4; Marc. 13.6; Pomp. 48.6). People could be taken, without expressly stating 
that they were captives (Diod. Sic. 20.26.3; 35.4; 90.4; Polyb. 1.81.3; Zon. 8.1. Cf. Il. 2.374 Pl. Cri. 43c; Rep. 
468a, and less common δορυάλώτος Cass. Dio 72.9.1; 79.20.1; Joseph. AJ.  9.147). Similarly ἅλωσις referred 
to ‘catch,’ in the sense of hunting (Aesch. Ag. 589; Hdt. 1.5; 3.156; Pind. Od. 10.11.42) and ἀγρέω ‘seize,’ but 
was less common (Aesch. Ag. 126; IG 12. 6.33; Sappho 2.14), see Ducrey 1999, 16-20. 
9
 App. BC 4.16.129; Cass. Dio 45.42.5; Il. 2.374; Joseph. AJ 10.106; Pl. Rep. 468a; Cri. 43c. Often the fall of 
cities into the hands of the enemy (e.g. Diod. Sic. 8.13.2; Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 8.21.3; 9.6.7). 
10
 Diod. Sic. 14.37.3; 24.11.1; 26.18.1; Joseph. BJ 4.448. Commonly used in ecclesiastic texts in reference to 
spiritual captivity (ex. Romans 7:23; Corinthians 2 10:5). 
11
 With regards to terms for enslavement, see Chapter 4. 
12
 Also the verbal noun direptio (e.g. Caes. B Civ. 2.11.4; Cic. Ver. 2.3.58; Liv. 5.20.6). Spelling variants 
include derepio (Apul. Met. 9.40.29) and the verbal noun dereptio, which more commonly referred to the 
striping of something: as in the stripping of a pledge (Hor. Od. 1.9.23), bark (Ov. Amor. 1.14.12), lion pelt, 
(Ov. Met.  3.52), foliage (Ov. Met 3.724) goatskin (Ov. Met. 15.304), necklace (Val. Flacc. 6.688) clothes 
(Tac. Ann. 13.57). Or the taking of something from someone such as: standards (Hor. Od. 3.5.21; 4.15.7; Tac. 
Hist. 1.41; 3.33) spoils (Curt. 7.5.24; Verg. Aen. 11.193), stripping of the equites’ horses (Val. Max. 2.9.8) or 
the pulling of someone from something as in: from the saddle (Verg. Aen. 11.743. Cf. Liv. 23.45.8) or a 
wagon (Val. Flacc. 2.160), see Ziolkowski 1993, 71-4. 
13
 From ‘mettre à sac’ (to put in a bag).  
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necessarily indicate a violent affair in English or in Latin.
14
 Typically Latin writers chose to 
describe the taking of cities not as capture, but rather as diripio or rapio. These two terms, 
given the range of their definitions, imply a violent search for loot and often captives. Further 
explanation of the soldiers’ actions, such as the specification of ‘pillaging’ (expilo/expilato) 
or ‘removing the populace’ (vasto or depopulo),15 was not necessary since the audience was 
well aware of the implications of a city being taken direpta. In his analysis of the term 
diripio, Adam Ziolkowski emphasised the brutality implied within the semantics of the word. 
Furthermore, he identified that with diripio, the freedom of the troops to rape and pillage was 
generally implied by the writer.
16
 Cicero, in his defamation of Sextus Clodius, grouped 
diripio with famine, fire and bloodshed. All of which was a result of the terrible treatment of 
the Roman allies by the defendant Clodius.
17
 Likewise, in describing the actions of the 
Roman governor in Syria, Cicero lumps highway-robbery and murder alongside diripio.
18
 
The free-for-all nature of a sack is further implied on a few occasions, as diripio is used to 
describe a sort of grab-bag affair in which goods were presented to be snatched up.
19
  
People could be the object of diripio, in so much as they were subject to abuse in the process 
of plundering,
20
 but they were never explicitly the objects of plunder.
21
 Pillaging was an order 
carried out by soldiers, who stole what they could – or more to the point – what they could 
get away with. Captives, along with raw and coined precious metals and sometimes works of 
art, were the property of the state, which the general oversaw.
22
 In only one instance is the act 
of capture implied by diripio: as Caesar states during the siege of Alesia, the Gauls 
apparently pleaded with Vercingetorix not to be plundered.
23
 After a battle captives were 
                                                 
14
 In the capture of Orongis in 207 BC the soldiers refrained from slaughter and pillage, Liv. 28.3.14; 28.4.4; 
Zon. 9.8; conversely, soldiers sometimes abstained from plunder because they were focused on slaughter in 
revenge, Liv. 28.20.6. 
15
 Tac. Hist. 2.16 “even protected countries were plundered and emptied by the fleet.” Direptos vastatosque 
classe etiam quos cohortes alaeque protegerent. Diripio and burning are always two different actions, cf. 
Ziolkowski 1993, 72 n. 1. 
16
 Ziolkowski 1993, 70-74, limits his examples to instances of diripio within Livy and Tacitus and two 
occasions in which diripio is used by Cato (de sumptu suo =ORF fr. 203; Justin. Epit. 26. 1. 7). Interestingly 
there is only one sexual reference to plunder associated with diripio (Juv. 6.404). The maidens in Tac. Hist. 
3.33 were “pulled-to pieces” rather than raped.  
17
 Cic. Dom. 25. 
18
 Cic. Prov. cons. 9 Igitur in Syria imperatore illo nihil aliud umquam actum est nisi pactiones pecuniarum cum 
tyrannis, decisiones, direptiones, latrocinia, caedes. 
19
 Money was laid out on the shore by Perseus for Cretan soldiers to plunder Liv. 44.45.13. In another instance 
the possessions of Tarquinius Superbus were given to the plebeians Flor. 1.3.1; Liv. 2.5.2; 2.6.3. 
20
 E.g. the abuse of farmers in Sicily under Verres, Cic. Verr. 2.3.32; 2.3.66. 
21
 The sole exception being the ‘snatching up’ of Thaos and Euneus’ own mother, Stat. Theb. 5.722. 
22
 See below. 
23
 Caes. B Gall. 7.8.4. 
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sometimes given to the soldiers, who probably divided them in a free-for-all fashion.
24
 In a 
similar manner, rapio also implied the use of brutality in its insinuation of rape or abduction 
following capture. In describing the abduction of the Sabine women Livy states “At a given 
signal the young Romans darted about to seize (rapio) the maidens.”25  
The verb διαρπάζω, the closest term to diripio/rapio, referred to ‘tearing into pieces,’ with a 
secondary definition of ‘plundering.’26 Free persons were not the object of διαρπάζω, 
however slaves could be, and thus Polybius states both the city of Agrigentum and the slaves 
were plundered διαρπάζω.27 In Greek the term for ‘sack’ was πορθέω, with the distinction of 
destroying a city utterly as ἐκπέρθω or διαπέρθω.28 However, unlike Latin, terms denoting a 
similar process, the physical abuse of free inhabitants, is not implied within the semantic field 
of these terms, as the objects of these were generally inanimate.
29
 Typically πορθέω implied 
the devastation or pillaging of property, especially land, with some poetic exceptions 
regarding the ruin of an individual.
30
 The sacking of a city or the devastation of property did 
not imply that captives were taken in either Greek or Latin, and thus authors made a 
distinction where captives were known to have been taken.
31
 
 
Capture and Enslavement – Legality and Morality 
The institution of slavery was considered part of the ius Gentium (law of nations), and thus an 
institution common to all mankind. Notably, it is the only institution of the ius Gentium 
which was said to be contrary to the ius Naturale (laws of nature).
32
 Slavery and the presence 
of slaves predated the codification of Roman laws and, apart from the acknowledgement of 
                                                 
24
 Caes. B Gall. 7.89.5. 
25
 Liv. 1.9.10 signoque dato iuventus Romana ad rapiendas virgines discurrit. Similarly Cic. Planc. 30; Sall. 
Cat. 51.9. 
26
 App. Pun.55. cf. Xen. Cyn. 6.2 and specifically the act of plundering  in Hdt. 1.88. 
27
 Polyb. 1.19.15. 
28
 Πέρθω was an earlier variant of πορθέω, s.v. ‘πέρθω’ LSJ. Similarly ἐξᾰλᾰπάζω was commonly used by 
Homer, but with the exception of Diod. Sic. 4.32.2; 4.49.7 (directly quoting Homer) this term was obsolete for 
later Greek writers. 
29
 Most often πορθέω was performed on enemy territory (χώρα) and the plundering of objects was implied. An 
exception is possibly Diod. Sic. 12.65.1, where allies, with no further clarification, were considered to have 
been ‘ravished.’ 
30
 Aes. Cho. 691; Sept. 194; 583; Ar. Ach. 164; Eur. Andr. 633; Phoen. 565. 
31
 The distinction between the ‘devastation’ (πορθέω) of the land and the enslavement of the populace is clear in 
Cass. Dio 48.19.1 54.34.6-7; Dem. Ep. 3; Diod. Sic. 11.88.5; 13.31.1; 14.35.7; Lycurg. Leoc. 72; Dion. Hal. 
Ant. Rom. 1.34.2. 
32
 Inst. Ius. 1.2.1; Dig. 1.5.4 (Florentinus Institutes 9.1). See further Buckland 1908, 1-2; Watson 1987, 7. 
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this by later jurists, we find no legal justification for the institution itself which was atypical 
of Roman jurists. Both slavery and capture in war were considered entirely within the 
provenance of the ius Gentium, rather than civil (i.e. Roman) law.
33
 
Fundamentally the justification of slavery came from the universally recognised ‘laws of war’ 
which essentially gave the victor the right to do as pleased with those they conquered. In the 
struggles between nations throughout human history this principle has always been held; so 
we see it advanced in the ancient world, for example, in the Athenian response to the 
Melians’ plea for clemency: “you know as well as we do that justice, as a matter of human 
reckoning, is in question only between equals in power, while those who are more powerful 
do what they can, the weak suffer what they must.”34 So too by the Romans’ answer to a 
Volscinian embassy: “it is for the conquered to accept terms, not to make them.”35 Both the 
Greeks and the Romans observed that it was the right of the victor to take from the enemy 
whatever was desired.
36
 
The inferiority of the conquered to the superiority of the conqueror is akin to the relationship 
of slave and master. Every slave owning society held the master as superior to the slave in 
some manner,
37
 typically in regards to a perceived superiority in intelligence,
38
 thus ‘naturally 
justifying’ the position of a master.39 Likewise the taking of captives through war was seen as 
a natural product of conflict between strong and weak.
40
 Aristotle explained this theory: “the 
                                                 
33
 Inst. Ius. 1.5.pr; Dig. 1.1.4; 1.5.4. See Buckland 1908, 1-2. 
34
 Loeb trans. Thuc. 5.89 τὰ δυνατὰ δ᾽ ἐξ ὧν ἑκάτεροι ἀληθῶς φρονοῦμεν διαπράσσεσθαι, ἐπισταμένους πρὸς 
εἰδότας ὅτι δίκαια μὲν ἐν τῷ ἀνθρωπείῳ λόγῳ ἀπὸ τῆς ἴσης ἀνάγκης κρίνεται, δυνατὰ δὲ οἱ προύχοντες 
πράσσουσι καὶ οἱ ἀσθενεῖς ξυγχωροῦσιν. Cf. the comments of Bosworth 1993, 39-40. At 5.105.2 Thucydides 
goes even further stating ‘by the law of nature, men rule wherever they can.’ 
35
 Liv. 4.10.2 victis conditions accipiendas esse, non ferendas respondit. 
36
 Liv. 9.1.5; 33.13.8; Xen. Cyr. 7.5.73. With regards to inanimate booty, this was commonly accepted as a 
standard rule in warfare by European jurists in the Enlightenment, e.g. Hugo Grotius, Christian Wolff, 
Emerich de Vattel, Henry Wheaton. For precise references to the right of possessing the enemy’s property by 
these see Burn 1903, 370-81. 
37
 See Davis 1984, 23f. 
38
 So the position of the European over the African was reaffirmed by the technological and perceived religious 
superiority, but in consideration of the African’s tolerance for working in the sun, black skin was thought 
superior for labouring, yet was believed to be a replication of the ‘curse of Ham’ (Gen. 9:20–27), see Vaughan 
& Vaughan 1997, 25-26. 
39
 This relates to every mode of acquisition, the debtor is financially inferior, the criminal morally so, the person 
who sells themselves or a parasite, and with regards to captives the physical superiority of masters is asserted 
by their being captured by them, see Arist. Pol. 1.1254b. Heath 2008, 251 refers to a perceived ‘impairment’ 
of ‘natural slaves.’ I also direct the reader to more modern examples of reinforced racial superiority (as in the 
note above) in justifying African slavery in the Americas, or religious superiority in justifying the 
enslavement of non-Muslim Africans and Europeans in the Arab slave trade. Cf. Patterson’s concept of ‘social 
death’ 1982, 38-45. 
40
 See Garnsey 1997, 113-4; Nyquist 2013, 25-6; Tuck 2001, 66. 
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art of war is a natural art of acquisition, for the art of acquisition includes hunting, an art 
which we ought to practice against wild beasts, and against men who, though intended by 
nature to be governed, will not submit; for war of such a kind is naturally just.”41 Capture in 
war serves logically as the starting point for interpreting the circumstance of slavery, as it is 
essentially the most rudimentary and fundamental means of enslavement. In the Digesta an 
etymological definition of slavery followed Florentinus’ statement that servi were so called 
because they were servare (preserved) by the commander, and likewise mancipia was 
derived from being captured by the enemy’s hand (manu capiuntur).42 As Alan Watson has 
suggested, the position of this text serves as a moral justification, slavery being a concession 
to someone whose life would have otherwise been ended.
43
 Capture in war was not the only 
means of enslavement,
44
 but as the victims were outsiders, it was clearly the easiest method 
to justify, morally, as well as legally, and so it is often used as a foundation for the 
explanation of slavery.
45
 
The legal position of captives (if any position at all) is difficult to ascertain, as their status 
was never defined or referred to by the jurists. In Roman law the distinction between the 
statuses of slave and free was clear, and subsequently any transition from freedom to 
servitude was considered immediate for legal purposes, despite the reality of a less immediate 
transition. The section in the Digesta concerning war captives is largely devoted to the legal 
problems in the absence of a captured Roman citizen, and it is asserted that at the moment of 
capture, the captive, for all legal intents and purposes, was considered to have perished.
46
 As 
a result, the captive, whose fate was not yet determined, was in a state of limbo; neither 
                                                 
41
 Arist. Pol.1256b20-5. This passage is often interpreted as a justification for slave raiding; note Albert the 
Great’s interpretation of this passage in his commentary on the Politica (Opera 4.2.29), see Tuck 2001, 66-7. 
We may compare here Arist. Pol. 1254a30-2, particularly his distinction of natural slavery between ruling and 
subject factors. Aristotle is even forced to admit that in war naturally free men were captured, see Garnsey 
1997, 126-127. Cf. Sen. Ira. 3.29, see Fitzgerald 2000, 89-90. 
42
 Dig. 1.5.4 (Florentinus institutes 9.2). Imperatores captives vendere ac per hoc servare nec occidere solent... 
mancipia ab hostibus manu capiantur. Likewise in Inst. Ius. 1.3.3. 
43
 Watson 1987, 8.  
44
 Other means of enslavement were through: Birth (Gaius Inst. 1.32; Inst. Ius. 1.3.4; Dig. 50.2.9.pr; Cod. Ius. 
3.32.12; 7.14.9). Child exposure (liberi expositi), although these were free in classical law should their origin 
be discovered (Suet. de Gramm. 7.21; Plin. Tra. 65.66), they were nonetheless reared as slaves, and in later 
law were considered slaves from the outset (Cod. Th. 5.9.1.2; Cod. Ius. 8.51.1). The change was likely made 
after Diocletian (Cod. Ius. 5.4.16; Buckland 1908, 402 n. 8). Debtors could also be sold into slavery (Gell. NA 
20.1.47). Self-sale into slavery (Inst. Ius. 1.3.2). A liber homo could not profit from his own sale, see 
Buckland 1908, 428 n. 1; Glancy 2002, 80-85. Lastly, people could be convicted and sentenced to slavery as 
an alternative to capitis deminutio maxima (various offences that amounted to capital punishment, but not all 
were punishable by slavery, see Buckland 1908, 403-5). 
45
 Patterson 1982, 106f. 
46
 Dig. 49.15.1. Though there were doubts with regards to Roman captives, for example Gaius Inst. 1.129, see 
Buckland 1908, 292, see further Chapter 4. 
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defined as free or slave.
47
 Although their legal position was indeterminate according to the 
rigidity of the law, the captive was no better off than a slave until their liberty was assured by 
ransom or release.
48
 Indeed, in Roman law a captive was assumed a slave by default,
49
 having 
no legal position, and having been acquired in the same manner as other booty (praeda). Like 
booty, a slave was essentially res (a thing), able to be destroyed, sold or given away either to 
others or to themselves (i.e. freed).
50
 That captives were considered booty is proven by 
Cicero’s charge against Verres for the abuse of the Sicilians: that he “considered every man's 
property as [his] own booty... [such that] no man's estate could be safe, no man's house 
closed, no man's life protected, nor woman's chastity fortified against [his] cupidity and 
audacity.”51 The abuse against the life and chastity of the individuals was considered by 
Cicero to be equateable with praeda, which Verres had tried to justify under the pretext of 
waging a war against the remnants of the slave rebellions in Sicily and during the crisis of the 
Spartacus revolt.
52
  
In Roman law the property of the defeated enemy became the property of the victor,
53
 and it 
was acknowledged that free men could be taken in the same way.
54
 Precisely at the moment 
                                                 
47
 Those destined to be slaves were considered as such (Ulp. 40.7.9.3). Buckland 1908, 291 argued (based on 
Dig. 49.15.5.1) that captives maintained their liberty until they passed permanently into the hands of the 
enemy or into their territory. However, this applied to Roman captives who were not considered to have lost 
their rights until they were removed to enemy soil i.e. outside of the imperium (albeit postliminium reserved 
their rights should they return). Captives taken by the Romans were considered within the general’s area of 
operation and so need not pass into Roman imperium proper, but simply pass into their hands.  
48
 Ins. Ius. 1.3.4. In any case, so long as the captive was intended to be sold as a slave, he or she was considered 
a servus (Ulp. 40.7.9.3). The actual act of enslavement sub corona or sub hasta or sale into slavery either 
cessio in iure or mancipatio only confirmed this fact. In the case of a Samnite woman who was purchased as a 
slave (probably during the Social War), she was freed upon Cluentius learning that she was in fact a free 
woman and thus abducted rather than captured (Cic. Clu. 59.162). Abducted persons and those taken by 
pirates or in civil wars were considered free (Cod. Iust. 7.14.4). Within the empire free persons were 
sometimes abducted and forced to work in ergastula, checks against this malpractice were carried out under 
Augustus (Suet. Aug. 32), see Capozza 1966, 145; Étienne 1974, 259-60. The workhouse were eventually 
abolished under Hadrian (SHA Hadr. 18.10), see Bauman 2000, 120; Fuhrmann 2012, 102 n. 45.  
49
 Ins. Ius. 1.3.4. 
50
 This creates a legal paradox; if a captive was an object then they could no more be released or given over to 
themselves as much as an apple. The same legal paradox applied to slaves in many different cases, see 
Buckland 1908, 2f. The slave was in many ways in a similar position to that of a son under a father. Roman 
law is full of contrasting rights concerning subservient individuals, see Watson 1987, 46-7. It is important to 
note that captives or slaves would not have been considered spolia, as this referred to captured enemy 
weapons, armour or clothing, either from the dead (Liv. 1.10.4; 7.26.6; Stat. Theb. 11.562) or defeated (Liv. 
23.12.14; Tac. Agr 15.3). 
51
 Cic. Verr. 2.5.39 ut omnium bona praedam tuam duceres, ut nullius res tuta, nullius domus clausa, nullius 
vita saepta, nullius pudicitia munita contra tuam cupiditatem et audaciam posset esse. 
52
 Cic. Verr. 2.5.39 in qua tu te ita gessisti ut, omnibus cum teneare rebus, ad bellum fugitivorum confugias. For 
the slave rebellions see Bradley 1989; Urbainczyk 2004; 2008. 
53
 Dig. 41.1.5; 41.2.1; Inst. Ius. 2.1.17; Gaius Inst. 4.16. So too in Xen. Cyr. 7.5.73. 
54
 Dig. 41.1.7; Inst. Ius. 2.1.17.  
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of capture, captives may have been regarded as res nullii (objects without an owner),
55
 the 
captive’s ownership over their own libertas being nullified by their capture, much in the way 
that the enemy’s property in Roman territory was considered res nullius. Thus captives could 
be seized, and hence possessed, through the process of occupatio.
56
 Since the acquisition of 
slaves through conflict was considered a legitimate practice by the universally accepted 
conventions of war, it is logical that their attainment was considered legally in a similar 
fashion to that of any other natural means of acquisition, like fruit from trees, or fish and 
game from the sea and forest.
57
 Captives were ‘ripe’ for the taking, and so they became the 
property of the possessor to deal with as desired.  
Captives had other practical purposes beyond their financial and political value as they could 
utilised for strategic purposes as well.
58
 Often the first captives likely to be taken by the 
Romans were opposing scouts or hapless locals. For example, during Trajan’s first campaign 
against the Dacians, the first captive depicted in the frieze progression of Trajan’s Column is 
shown being led by two auxiliary troops. At the point in the campaign in which the frieze 
depicts the captive, the Roman army had yet to engage the Dacians, except for skirmishes 
between the scouts.
59
 Prisoners, such as the Dacian captive, caught at the start of a campaign, 
were particularly useful as a means of initial intelligence and to act as scouts or interpreters. 
Early in the war against the Gauls, Caesar selected some of his Nervii captives to act as 
guides; through them, along with the information he gathered from the rest of the prisoners, 
he was able to locate the enemy camp hiding women and children in the forest.
60
 If no enemy 
turncoats were at hand, either of free will or in custody, then prisoners could be specifically 
sought after in order to provide these services. Such was the case when the emperor Julian 
                                                 
55
 Perhaps considered res nullius humani iuris (object without a legal owner) as described by Gai. Inst. 2.66.67. 
56
 Praeda became the property of the person who took it (Dig. 41.1.5.7; 41.2.1.1; 41.2.3.21; Gai. Inst. 2.69.1; 
Inst. Iust. 2.1.17). There is only one reference to occupatio pertaining to enemy property on Roman soil at the 
outset of hostilities passing into the hands of an individual (Dig. 41.1.51.1). All other references are not 
expressed in concrete terms, see Bona 1959: 364; Watson 1968: 64. Captives possessed strictly by seizure 
rather than by a new period of uninterrupted possession (usucapio), which generally required two years of 
uninterrupted possession for moveable property (Gai. Inst. 2.41.1). For occupatio as legal seizure see Cic. 
Dom. 5; Off. 1.121. For the modes of acquisition for slaves see Varro Rust. 2.10.4. 
57
 For the res nullius as pertaining to the fruits of nature see Percy 1925, 718-9. 
58
 Evidence of the use of captives for intelligence is scant prior to the campaign of Caesar in Gaul, but the nature 
of warfare did not differ in the second century BC to preclude the use of prisoners in this way. See Austin & 
Rankov 1995, 67-73 for a more thorough analysis. 
59
 Cichorius Pl. XVIII.11. Cf. Lepper and Frere 1988, plate 18; Rossi 1971, 138. From what little we can gather 
from the surrounding friezes and the reconstructed account of Trajan’s first campaign in Dacia by Cass. Dio 
68.6f. 
60
 Caes. B Gall. 2.16.1-4. Caesar used captives for intelligence prior to his invasion of Britain B Gall. 5.18.4; 
7.18.1; 72.1 and also from slaves of the enemy ps-Caes. B Hisp. 27.2. 
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ordered the capture of an Alamann to serve as a guide in his campaign against the Germans.
61
 
Captives, employed as guides, could be useful for the entire course of a campaign; however, 
there was always a risk of treachery.
62
  
 
Ownership of Captives 
With regards to the ownership of war captives, it has generally been considered that they 
became the property of the state,
63
 as suggested by repeated reference to their sale by the 
quaestors, who were in charge of state finances on campaign.
64
 The proceeds from their sale, 
along with the precious metals, usually gold and silver (coined or otherwise), were deposited 
in the treasury.
65
 Some captives were retained as slaves by the state and used for particular 
works or as servants to the state (i.e. servi populi publici Romani).
66
 For the most part, 
captives are mentioned as being taken from the enemy separately from the booty, because the 
capture of free persons was conspicuous amongst the booty taken from the enemy.
67
 Captured 
                                                 
61
 Amm. Marc. 17.10.5. Ammianus was aware of the value of prisoners as a source of intelligence (16.11.9; 
12.19). 
62
 Captured Samnites tricked the Romans into entering the Caudine Pass (Liv. 9.31.7,). Gallus, a prefect of 
Egypt, was misled by his captured guides into trekking through the Arabian Peninsula for six months (Strabo 
16.4.24). The captured Alamann mentioned by Amm. Marc. 17.10.5 agreed to cooperate on the preservation 
of his life. 
63
 According to the Lex Iulia (Dig. 48.13.15. Liv. 5.20.5) which seems to suggest this in the argument attributed 
to Appius Claudius against distributing booty to the people, so too after the fall of New Carthage (Liv. 
26.49f.; Polyb. 10.17.6). This has been generally accepted in earlier scholarship with no recent re-evaluation, 
Mommsen 1879 II, 443; Marquardt 1888, 358; Girard 1906, 281; Buckland 1908, 292.  
64
 Plaut. Capt. 1.2.110; Liv. 27.18.2,8; 34.21.5; Val. Max. 5.1.7; Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 7.63.2; 10.21.6 (refers to 
the quartermaster as ταμίας likewise at 5.34.4 cf. Plut. Publ. 12.3. In Greek ταμιας often referred to the 
paymaster in an army (Hdt. 2.121.1; Xen. Hel. 3.1.27). The office of quaestor, as it came to be known for the 
Republican period, dated very early to c. 447 BC (Tac. Ann. 11.22) the origin of the office dates even earlier 
to the Quaestores parricidii  of the monarchy, s.v. ‘quaestor’ OCD.  
65
 Typically deposited in the state treasury (aerarium) controlled by the Senate. Under the monarchy and early 
republic the spoils may have been deposited in the aerarium sanctis, which was later used to store the 
proceeds from manumissions after 357 BC, see Chapter 4. Under the empire the proceeds from war were 
deposited in the treasury controlled by the emperor, the fiscus. For instances of precious metals being sold by 
the quaestors see Cic. Verr. 2.3.18; Liv. 4.53.10; 26.47.8, and for the sale of enemy territory see Liv. 28.46.5. 
That it was both coined as well as crude gold and silver is evident in Liv. 45.43.8.  
66
 Buckland 1908, 292 n. 6; Halkin 1872, 17-18. The most obvious example being at New Carthage in 209 BC 
(Liv. 26.47.2-3; Polyb. 10. 17.9). Eutrop. 2.27 refers to prisoners being held publica custodia. and Cass. Dio 
34.109.5fr. states that Sulla had Italian captives gathered at the villa publica. That all captives acquired by the 
state were considered servi publici (δημόσιος) is unlikely, some may have been utilised as labourers on public 
works, as for example the captives taken during the First Punic War which were held in either prisons 
(carceri) or quarries (lautumiae), located northeast of Rome (Liv. 32.26.2). Jewish prisoners taken at 
Taricheae were sent to dig a canal near Corinth (Joseph. BJ 3. 540) and after the sack of Jerusalem young men 
were sent to work mines in Egypt (Joseph. BJ 6.418).  
67
 For example Flor. 1.18.21; Liv. 1.37.5; 8.39.13, 15; 10.17.4; 23.37.13; 27.19.2; 27.32.9; 30.9.10; 33.11.2; 
35.40.4; 38.27.77; 39.4.7; Sall. Iug. 81.2; Tac. Ann. 1.68.  
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free persons were not viewed as regular spoils, and so when their sale or disposal was similar 
to that of the regular booty it warranted comment,
68
 whereas there was no question that slaves 
were reckoned as normal items amongst the captured booty.
69
 We might also consider how 
the Romans regarded the captives in relation to other booty, from the manner in which 
captives were presented in a triumph. The captured leaders were always kept as a special 
spectacle apart from the rest, but it is unclear whether regular captives were marched along 
with captured slaves, and if either slaves or free captives were separated from the rest of the 
paraded booty.
70
  
Of all the booty taken from the city two categories can be observed; the first and lower 
category was the loot of generally lesser value which the soldiers personally took during the 
sack of a city, or (should the army be exceptionally disciplined) shared amongst each other 
following a siege.
71
 The booty of this category was the property of the soldier, from the 
moment it entered his hand or was distributed to him when the booty was pooled. The second 
and higher class of booty consisted of more valuable items such as slaves, livestock, enslaved 
captives, precious metals, coined money (gold or silver coins) and the money derived from 
the auction of booty.
72
 This second class of booty, if not captured coin and precious metals, 
usually constituted proceeds from the auctions and was typically deposited with the state.
73
 
That the state’s coffers were increased by such spoils suggests that all the booty taken in a 
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 Captivi disposed as praeda (Dig. 49.15.21.1; Diod. Sic. 16.53.3; 23.18.5; Flor. 2.30; Liv. 21.15.2;24.20.5; 
31.30.3. Caes. B Gall. 7.89.5) distributed captives one per soldier like booty: ex reliquis captivis toto exercitui 
capita singular praeda nomine distribuit. Liv. 7.27.8 explicitly states that those captured were not included 
within the spoils, but were instead reserved for the triumph. 
69
 For example, slaves taken after the revolt of Falerii in 241 BC (Zon. 8.18), the slaves of the Macedonian 
ambassadors are sold in 215 BC (Liv. 23.38.7), slaves taken at Syracuse – inherent in the statement that the 
free were spared (Diod. Sic. 26.20.1-2), the 30,000 slaves taken at Tarentum in 209 BC (Liv. 27.16.7),  slaves 
taken with the booty at Pelium in 199 BC (Liv. 31.27.4) slaves taken and sold at Asculum in 89 BC (Oros. 
5.18.26) and from Athens in 86 BC by Sulla (App. Mith. 38). 
70
 See Auliard 2001, 62. For general studies regarding Roman triumphs see Künzl, 1988; Versnel 1970; Beard, 
2007, for the fasti triumphales see Degrassi 1954. 
71
 Ziolkowski 1993, 74-6, 80 regards this as entirely an invention of Polybius to try to describe a Roman 
standard in taking cities and distributing the booty. This contrasts with Polybius’ general depiction of Roman 
soldiers as avaricious, see Erskine 1996, 2f. Equal distribution seems ultimately rare with regards to the 
general loot taken by the soldiers, more common was the command to allow the troops to plunder the city at 
the same time so as to give them an equal chance Ziolkowski 1993, 79-81 identifies several instances of this: 
at Anxur in 406 BC (Liv. 4.59.8); at Veii in 393 BC (Liv. 5.20.8-10); at Syracuse in 211 BC (Liv. 25.25.5) at 
Mount Olympus in 189 BC (Liv. 38.23.2-4).  
72
 Auctions specifically sold (vendere) sub corona Caes. B Gall. 3.16.4; Var. RR 2.10.4; Tac. Ann. 13.39, sub 
hasta Liv. 4.29.4. Typically the booty is just said to be sold Cic. Off. 2.27; Sall. Iug. 44.5; Liv. 4.53.10; 
10.20.16; 25.14.12; 26.40.13; 29.31.11; 38.23.10; 45.34.6; Plin. HN 35.24; Flor. 2.30. Also valuable artwork 
e.g. Liv. 38.9.13; Frontin Str. 4.3.15; Vitr. De arch. 5.5.8 and land e.g. Liv. 2.17.6, however the sale of land 
could not be immediate. 
73
 Veyne 1976, 434-436. For the distribution of the wealth derived from booty reserved for the state see Hopkins 
1978, 38f. 
Chapter 1 
21 
 
city of significant value was considered the property of the state. However, Roman generals 
exercised complete control over the dispensation of the booty, often rewarding their troops or 
reserving large portions of the spoils for celebrating their triumphs.
74
 Since captives were 
sold and the proceeds deposited in the treasury, as well as (on rare occasions) given directly 
to the troops
75
 as a reward, they may be classified as booty belonging to the state (manubiae), 
which raises the question of whether generals acted legally in distributing captives to their 
troops. 
The general’s authority over booty, and the significance of manubiae as pertaining to a 
classification of booty is not definitively clear. Even by the second century AD, manubiae 
had become synonymous with praeda, so that it required a lengthy explanation by the orator 
Philinus, drawing on two examples from Cicero, to demonstrate that they once had separate 
meanings.
76
 Philinus’ interpretation was that the manubiae referred to proceeds derived from 
the sale of booty, whereas praeda was the booty itself; accordingly, many historians have 
held this to be the case.
77
 But, the fact that manubiae also pertained to money (i.e. looted 
coins), renders this definition impossible.
78
 Instead, manubiae seems to be the booty, 
inclusive of proceeds, that belonged to the state over which the general held the authority to 
use as he saw fit, so long as he did not profit directly from it.
79
 The precise legal powers of 
the general are impossible to ascertain, and while generals were rarely if ever
80
 convicted of 
embezzling the state’s money (pecuniae residua) under a charge of crimen peculates, they 
were, at times, brought to trial for ‘misappropriation’.81 Often manubiae was reserved for the 
                                                 
74
 This led both Shatzman 1972, 188 and Bona 1960, 149 to suggest that manubiae was allotted to the general 
after the triumph, c.f. Churchill 1999, 86. Pressure from troops to share in the victory probably compelled the 
general to give captives directly to the troops or to give them the proceeds from their sale. Equal distribution 
was to be expected, Polyb. 3.76.13 see Auliard, 2001, 53. 
75
 At Fidenae in 426 BC (Liv. 4.34.4), after the sack of Alesia by Caesar in 52 BC (Caes. B Gall. 7.89.5). Dion. 
Hal. Ant. Rom. 4.24.2 states that the Romans during the monarchy came into the possession of slaves by either 
purchasing those taken in war at auction or receiving them as a reward for service from the general.  
76
 Gell. NA 13.25.3-4. Cic. Agr. 1.12; 2.59. See s.v. ‘manubiae’ TLL; Shatzman 1972 177f.  
77
 Mommsen 1887 I, 241; 1879 II, 443; Vogel 1948, 408. Both Shatzman 1972, 177 and Bona 1960, 124-5 
believed the manubiae to be the General’s personal share. 
78
 See Bona 1960, 149-50; Shatzman 1972, 179-80; Churchill 1999, 86.  
79
 See the argument of Churchill 1999, 93-101. A clear example that supports this, which surprisingly is omitted 
by Churchill, is a case in Liv. 38.23.10; after defeating the Galatians near Mt. Olympus in 189 BC Cn. 
Manlius Vulso burned the enemy weapons and then sold the booty of which Livy says it was his duty to bring 
back for public use and distribute the rest amongst his troops evenly. consul armis hostium [in] uno 
concrematis cumulo ceteram praedam conferre omnis iussit, et aut uendidit, quod eius in publicum 
redigendum erat, aut cum cura, ut quam aequissima esset, permilites diuisit. 
80
 Shatzman 1972, 177. In the case of L. Scipio, the charge was for misappropriation rather than embezzlement, 
Cass. Dio fr.63; Zon. 9.20. Cf. Shatzman 1972, 194. 
81
 Vogel 1948, 404 (cf.  s.v. ‘manubiae’ RE) argued that crimen peculatis could not be brought against a general 
for misusing the booty. Cato tried to bring a case against Glabrio and Scipio to return booty that they had 
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triumph and so captives that marched in the triumph, and subsequently sold were technically 
owned by the state, with the proceeds from their sale going into the state treasury.
82
  
 
Laws Governing the Taking of Captives 
Often ancient writers referred to the laws of war when the victor chose to exercise his rights 
as conqueror over the vanquished. This has been alluded to above, as essentially the exercise 
of power by the harshest of means. It is certainly true that the victor held the power of life or 
death over those they captured,
83
 but this must be measured against the harshness of the 
Romans in disciplining their own troops,
84
 over whom the general also held the power of life 
and death. The ‘laws of war’ were internationally recognised as they were matters of 
convention amongst all belligerents.
85
 In general, those that surrendered (deditio) were spared 
and often retained their liberty, whereas those that submitted (subducco) after blows had been 
struck could expect harsher punishment,
86
 through loss of possession, loss of liberty or even 
loss of life. It was customary to parley before coming to blows, and the Romans would 
typically offer the enemy an opportunity to submit to them.
87
 Caesar drew a clear line as to 
when the enemy moved from the former phase to the latter: “in accordance with his custom, 
rather than owing to their desert, should spare the state, if they should surrender themselves 
                                                                                                                                                        
personally kept. In general, Cato tried to reform the commander’s control over booty and limit their ability to 
profit indirectly from the booty (Priscianus Gramm. Lat. 2.367 =ORF 8 fr. 98; Polyb. 23.14.7; Val Max. 3.6.1; 
Gell. NA 4.18.7-8), see Watson 1968, 74 n. 1. It seems the lex Iulia later contained clauses that restricted the 
use of booty by generals (see the discussion on the charge of peculatis in Dig. 48.13.15). For other individual 
cases against generals see Shatzman 1972, 189-95. The legal texts are of little use in this since the legal 
dynamic completely changed with the Principate and the establishment of the fiscus.  
82
 Liv. 5.22.1; 7.27.8; 10.46.5; Plut. Fab. 22.4. See Nicolet 1976, 159-436; Auliard 2001, 53. Servilius 
specifically neglects to pay the funds derived from the sale of captives into the treasury and instead distributes 
the money amongst the troops, Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 6.29.4. 
83
 The right to execute captives stated by Caes. B Gall. 7.41. 
84
 The infamous decimation, for example. Rules of war also applied to the exercise of discipline amongst troops, 
Caes. B Afr. 54.2. 
85
 The Athenians accepted the depravation of their fields and the plundering of their goods and people by the 
Macedonians as the sufferings expected under the rules of war (Liv. 31.30.2; Polyb. 5.11.3). The pillaging of 
land was seen as another allowance under the rules of war (Joseph. BJ 3.62). The general acceptance of the 
enslavement of captives as simply pertaining to the rules of war can be seen in Greek Tragedy, see Andreau & 
Descat 2011, 55; Dué 2006, 163-4. Similarly in Roman comedy, especially Plautus, see Harsh 1955, 135-42. 
86
 Auliard 2001, 52-3, s.v. ‘War, Rules of’ OCD. Those that submitted deditio were still completely in the power 
of the conqueror, however, often deditio was also accompanied with fides and so the Roman general was 
obligated to protect them. Any violence or further reductions committed against those who submitted deditio 
was considered exceptionally harsh by ancient writers – see s.v. ‘deditio’ RE; Westington 1938, 69; Heuss 
1933, 62.  
87
 Cic. Off. 1.34.7; Liv. 24.33.1.  
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before the battering-ram should touch the wall.”88 A refusal of terms meant that the Romans 
could treat their captives with as much severity as imaginable,
89
 and often anything less than 
death was expressed as the victor choosing not to exercise, to the fullest extent, their rights as 
conqueror.
90
 Though the right of life and death over the vanquished extended to all those 
captured, it was generally reserved only for those resisting or capable of bearing arms (i.e. 
men of military age); women and children were most often spared execution, though they 
would often, in the absence of the men, be enslaved.
91
 
The authority and interaction of the Senate and the general in handling captured cities is best 
expressed in the accounts of the Syracusan and Capuan delegations to the Senate after their 
capture in 211 BC. In the case of Syracuse their petition was mainly against the confiscation 
of their property and their charge was levied personally against the consul Marcellus who had 
taken the city. According to Plutarch, in order for this charge to take place, Marcellus stepped 
down from his curule chair and allowed the Senate to hear the case against him as a private 
citizen.
92
 Though Livy omits this detail, it is clear from all the relevant sources that the 
Senate was willing to hear the Syracusans out, eventually reducing their deprivation by 
instructing the consul assigned to Sicily to restore what property he could to the Syracusans.
93
 
Whether or not the Senate heard the case of the Syracuesans against the consul as a 
magistrate, or as a private citizen, does not negate the fact that captives tried to find recourse 
in the Senate for their treatment at the hands of a commander. In the case of the Capuans, 
their appeal was a different matter, since they petitioned on the basis that they were Roman 
citizens.
94
 In response, Flaccus, who had taken the city, allowed a delegation to join the 
Roman magistrate Laevinus who was passing en route to Rome, in order for them to be heard 
by the Senate. Presumably, as Roman citizens, it was a legal right for their punishment, as 
handed to the entire civitas, to be ratified by the people; and this is confirmed by the advice 
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 Caes. B Gall.  2.32. 
89
 Resistance was always met with violence (Cic. Phil. 5.25), see Garlan 1975, 57f; Westington 1938, passim. 
August. De Civ. 1.5 mentions a number of illustrative examples. 
90
 Joseph. BJ. 6.354; Caes. B Civ. 1.85. 
91
 For the delineation of sparing and slaughtering see Liv. 5.27.6; 28.23.1. For examples of Roman temperance 
towards the defeated see Westington 1938, 68-9 n. 5. The execution of women and children was rare, often 
these were killed in the chaos immediately following the siege of a city, but not as a matter of course in 
dealing with them as captives, see Chapter 2. 
92
 Plut. Marc. 23.2. For the most part the senators stood behind Marcellus in the accusations made against him 
by the Syracusans and other Sicilians, Liv. 26.32.1, see Lazenby 1978, 169. 
93
 Liv. 26.32.6; Val. Max. 4.1.7; Plut. Marc. 23f.; Zon. 8.6. Plutarch emphasises the acquiescence of Marcellus 
that led to the lenience shown whilst Livy seems to suggest the Senate acted independently. For the insincerity 
of the appeal by the Syracusans in Plutarch and Livy see Pelling 1989, 204-5. 
94
 They had previously been granted civitas sine suffragio (Liv. 8.11.16; 14.10). 
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of M. Atilius Regulus, who cited a precedent in the example of the Satricans, for whom a 
tribune named Marcus Antistius introduced a bill that was passed by the people allowing the 
Senate to pronounce judgments upon the defeated Satricans.
95
 Accordingly, a similar bill was 
proposed by a tribune, and a resolution was passed, which granted the Senate the necessary 
judicial powers to pass judgment over the captured Capuans, as well as the Atellani, Calatini, 
Sabatini, and the right to seize their respective properties.
96
 In the end, the punishment of the 
Capuans was reaffirmed by the Senate and more draconian measures were meted out. The 
Capuan aristocracy were tried on a family by family basis, with some enslaved and others 
imprisoned. The common people were resettled in Etruria, but presumably some of the 
populace were allowed to stay in the city remained, since Capua continued to exist as a major 
city.
97
 Both of these examples show the Senate supporting the commanders by not finding 
them guilty of maltreatment or contravening the terms of a treaty. However, the Senate 
appears to have held the final say regarding captives, so that the vanquished could find 
recourse if they had been treated exceptionally poorly with regards to their ‘crime.’ Such was 
the case after the sale of Lusitanian captives in Gaul (c. 151 BC); a bill was raised in the 
Senate by a tribune and backed by the elder Cato to redeem them from their captivity, based 
on the heavy-handedness of Sulpicius Galba when he was praetor in Spain.
98
  
Under the Republic the Senate was the ultimate authority in governing Roman foreign 
policy.
99
 It has always been the orthodox view that the Senate was foremost and central in 
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 Liv. 26.33.10. Also a law enacted by Tib. Sempronius Gracchus Lex Sempronia, de capite civium Romanorum 
(mentioned by Vell.Pat. 2.7.4 Liv. Per. 61). It is questionable whether it was the Senate that tried the Satricans 
or the consul Papirus Cursor that carried out the sentence, as Liv. 9.16.9-11 fails to point this out at the time. 
See Welwei 2000, 98; von Ungern-Sternberg 1975, 111f. 
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 Liv. 26.33.12-14. 
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 There was a previous decision regarding the Capuans, Liv. 26.15.6-17.1. I agree here with Briscoe’s assertion 
that two separate decrees are given by the Senate regarding the Capuans rather than a doublet as others have 
interpreted, De Sanctis 1968, 330-1; Frederiksen 1984, 244-6. Levene 2010, 374-5 cites Livy’s choice to put 
the Capuan and Syracusan episodes together as a deliberate choice by the historian to illustrate how the 
Romans acted in a balance between mercy and harshness towards defeated enemies remarking that Livy made 
use of multiple versions of the same story to allow for more than one debate regarding the balance of Roman 
morality. 
98
 Liv. Per. 49. According to Livy the depositions of both Galba and Cato survived in his day. The commander 
Lucius Cornelius Cethegus admitted to the treacherous slaughter of Lusitanians during a truce and it is 
probable that the survivors of this clash were those enslaved in Gaul.  
99
 Under the monarchy the fetial priests were responsible for declaring war, and the Senate served as advisors in 
foreign policy to the king (Liv. 1.32f.; Festus, Lindsay 1913, 424-26), see Penella 1987, 223-37. By the 
Republic the fetiales carried out declarations in a strictly ceremonial capacity (Harris 1979, 171; Rich 1976, 
56f.; Walbank 1949, 17-19). They were replaced by Legati who issued declarations of war to the enemy, cf. 
Walbank 1941, 82-93 contra Bickerman 1945, 138-9. Though it is surprising that no formal procedure is 
mentioned in the outbreak of the First Punic War despite a plethora of sources, see Eckstein 1987, 85-6. 
Mommsen 1887 III, 1157-8 maintained that the authority of the Senate in the secular-political functions of 
foreign policy remained paramount throughout the Republic. 
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dictating foreign policy.
100
 Eckstein’s study, however, has shown that the commanders in the 
field often exercised a great deal of autonomy, their suggestions likely influencing senatorial 
decision rather than the other way around.
101
 As the empire expanded, and so too the distance 
between Senate and general, the Senate’s ability to micromanage campaigns was significantly 
reduced. According to Livy, in 314 BC the Lucerians betrayed the Roman garrison to the 
Samnites, but were then quickly retaken by a Roman army, after which the Senate debated 
whether to raze the city or not.
102
 By the end of the second century Laevinus, following the 
sack of Agrigentum in Sicily, had the leaders of the city beheaded and then handed out 
penalties and rewards with no indication that the Senate had any involvement.
103
 Despite the 
freedom exhibited by the generals in the field outside Italy, the major decisions of foreign 
policy such as wars and treaties ultimately required authorization by the Senate for proposals 
to then be submitted to the people’s assembly for ratification.104 Generals could present peace 
terms, but ultimately these would have to be submitted to the Senate, and then presented to 
the people as a senatus consultum to be ratified. Sometimes the Senate would send a 
delegation to work out the articles of a prospective treaty.
105
 During the campaign 
commanders would have kept in contact with the Senate;
106
 the Senate in turn would have 
been able to issue senatus consulta to the general, which would have directed him to act 
according to their wishes, as was the case with the Capuan captives.
107
 This communication 
maintained a shared doctrine between state and army, so that when a general proposed a 
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 Mommsen 1887 III, 1157-8; s.v. ‘Senatus’ OCD. 
101
 Eckstein 1987, xi- xiii, 323-4, passim. 
102
 Liv. 9.26.3. 
103
 Liv. 26.40.13-15. 
104
 The powers of the Senate in foreign policy are described as incorporative by Polyb. 6.13.5. The Senate’s 
approval was required in all declarations of war and peace, see Mommsen, 1887 III, 1167. For war votes see 
Rich 1976, 13-17, specifically a list of dates and references on p. 14. Ratification of treaties by the people e.g. 
treaty with Hiero (Polyb. 1.17.1), First Punic War (Polyb. 1.63.3), Second Punic War (App. Lib. 65; Liv. 
30.42.20) and the  Second Macedonian War (Liv. 33.25.6; Polyb. 18.42.3-4). 
105
 A commission of ten was sent out to assess the treaty presented by Lutatius to Hamilcar and only the 
indemnity was increased (Polyb. 1.62.3) The commission may have been a reconciliation to the people by the 
Senate who favoured continuing the war, see Walbank 1957 I, 127; Schleussner 1978, 9-23; Eckstein 1987, 
133 n. 128. A commission of ten was sent to Greece in 196 BC and in conjunction with Flamininus issued the 
Isthmian Declaration (Polyb. 18.45f.), see Eckstein 1987, 297. In the case of the agreement between the 
Samnites and the consuls following the Caudine disaster the treaty negotiated by the consuls was rejected 
specifically by the fetiales (Liv. 9.10f.), see Wiedemann 1986, 489-90.  
106
 Agrippa neglected to send reports back to the Senate during the Cantabrian War (Cass. Dio 54.11.6). 
Eckstein 1987, xix doubts the permanence of this stating that generals only dictated their acta to the Senate at 
the end of their office, and no record was kept. Eckstein’s further charge against the disorganisation of Roman 
record keeping prior to Caesar’s reform (Suet. Iul. 20.1) cannot discount that records were in fact kept. 
107
 Liv. 26.16.6-13 the Senate had issued an order to punish the Capuans, perhaps this was exceptional given the 
fact that the Capuans were technically Roman citizens, see Ungern-Sternberg 1975, 81-2. 
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treaty or dealt with captured cities and captives, he was essentially adhering to a collective 
strategy.
108
  
The role of the Senate ensured that the Roman generals acted in accordance with standard 
practice towards the defeated populaces; ‘rules of war’ which the Romans carried out in the 
harshest form against those that resisted, and with leniency towards those that submitted. On 
only rare occasions were commanders censured by the Senate for acting too harshly towards 
captured enemies. In 205 BC a commander named Fleminius left in charge of Locri was tried 
by the Senate and executed for his abuse of the Locrians.
109
 In Liguria the Statellati had 
remained loyal to Rome, but M. Popilius still sacked their city in 173 BC. When the Senate 
heard the news they immediately sent an order demanding that the consul seek out the 
Statellati and return their liberty and the money from the sale of the booty.
110
 Popilius refused 
the orders of the Senate, and a resolution was passed to send the praetors C. Licinius and Cn. 
Sicinius to force the resettlement of the Ligurians in the Po Valley. Popilius escaped 
punishment through the postponement of his trial beyond the current terms of office.
111
 In 
170 BC a Roman commander named Hortensius placed a large tax and grain levy upon the 
city of Abdera in Thrace. When the Abderans asked to send a delegation to the consul 
Hostlius to reduce or rescind the indemnity, the praetor no sooner let the delegation go, when 
he sacked the city, killed the leaders and sold the rest of the inhabitants.
112
 The Senate, upon 
hearing this, put a motion to the assembly and sent two commissioners to ensure that the 
Abderans were restored and Hortensius was ordered to locate and restore as many Abderans 
as possible. Livy remarks that the same proclamation had been made regarding the 
Coronaeians in the previous year.
113
 In these cases the sentiment of the Senate had gone 
against the consuls and praetors serving in Greece because their actions were regarded as 
exceedingly oppressive.
114
 Likewise, P. Licinius Crassus enslaved a number of Greek cities 
allied to Phillip; the Senate fined Crassus and passed a resolution for the captives to be 
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 For the Senate’s role in directing military campaigns see Eckstein 1987, passim. The senatus consulta were 
preserved at Rome, and we know that Cicero was able to draw upon archives from the early second century 
(Cic. Att. 13.33.3). 
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 Liv.28.19.4-6. 
110
 Liv. 42.8.7. 
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 Liv. 42.22.5-8. Cf. Westington 1938, 80. 
112
 Liv. 43.4.11-13. 
113
 Liv. 43.4.11-13. For Coroneia see SEG 19.374. The proclamation regarding Coroneia was etched on a stele 
now held in the Museum at Thebes. Sherk 1969, 33 suggested that the decree granted the return of possessions 
and the right to reoccupy the citadel as bestowed on the pro-Roman faction, which had been driven out by the 
pro-Macedonian faction prior to its capture. 
114
 Liv. 43.4.6-7; Zon. 9.22. 
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bought back from their owners.
115
 At times generals found it necessary to check the harshness 
of their men. Scipio Africanus could not prevent the indiscriminate slaughter of women and 
children by his troops at Lochra in 203 BC, and so punished the troops by not allowing the 
guilty companies to share in the plunder and put to death three officers responsible.
116
 
Senatorial involvement in the punishment of captives was limited to the early period of 
Roman expansion in Italy and was reserved largely for those that rebelled against Rome, in 
which political ties and sometimes citizenship made punishment by a general a legal problem 
that required approval from the comitia centuriata.
117
 Apart from the occasional interference 
of the Senate in the general’s affairs in Italy and in Greece up to the mid-second century, it 
was rare for the Senate to intervene on behalf of captured cities against their own generals. In 
part this must have been due to the difficulty of prosecuting politically well-connected 
figures; the obstinacy of Popilius, for example, was only possible because of his powerful 
allies within the Senate.
118
 Furthermore, the Senate lacked the authority to pass resolutions 
against generals without the support of the comitia centuriata. Such measures would have 
been difficult to pass through the popular assembly if the proceeds from captured cities and 
maltreated populaces paid for popular events and public building. Inevitably the Senate was 
reluctant to censure generals because brutality brought profit and reparation after the event 
was inevitably complicated.  
In deciding the fate of captives the Roman commanders also had to consider the long-term 
objectives of civil administration and future military action. All judgements, in this case, had 
to be weighed out by the commander, in order to achieve the overall aims of Rome; the 
decisions were of more than just immediate logistical and financial concern. The 
commander’s decision over the captives had wider ramifications, and the political concerns 
of Rome’s maius bonum had to be considered. As such, harsh punishment was meted out to 
deter further rebellion or to weaken the enemy’s resolve so that others were encouraged to 
submit. In other cases lenience was used as a political tool to undermine the enemy’s control 
over cities in resisting Rome.
119
 Despite the complexity of the dynamic between the Senate 
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 Liv. 43.6-7; Zon. 9.22. 
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 These were drawn by lot, App. Pun. 15. 
117
 As in the case of Capua, see Chapter 5. 
118
 Liv. 42.21-22. 
119
 Discussed in later chapters. The strategies of Brutus and Cassius serve as a prime example in how the 
strategies of lenience and austerity were used to produce the same result (support against Antony and 
Octavian), Cassius preferred severity and forced the city of Tarsus to contribute to his army so that they were 
forced to sell themselves into slavery (App. BC 4.63-4; Cass. Dio 47.31.1-4). Whereas Brutus, preferred 
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and general, on the whole it ran smoothly, as the two were rarely at odds over the decisions 
carried out regarding captives. This cooperation regarding the decisions over captives 
supports Eckstein’s belief that the Roman general, in practice, held pre-eminence when it 
came to foreign policy, rather than the Senate.
120
 The inhumane treatment and victimisation 
of captured people was not specifically Roman, as discussed above, it was a ubiquitous 
feature of the ancient world that the power of the strong justified their position over the weak. 
The reduction of captives to slavery (or their execution or ransom) was nothing more than a 
strict adherence to the conventions of war. 
 
The Commander’s Decision 
In most instances of capture the sources only give an outcome for captives en masse. The 
lack of specificity and acknowledgement of varying outcomes is misleading and there can be 
no doubt that the wholesale enslavement and slaughter of communities was at times 
exaggerated, particularly in cases where the communities continued to exist, suggesting that 
the entire population did not suffer the same fate. In the case of New Carthage Scipio 
Africanus held a court in which he passed various decrees regarding the captives all gathered 
in a single place.
121
 Polybius’ account of the aftermath at New Carthage, which is the most 
significant of our sources regarding the action at New Carthage, indicates that Scipio himself 
passed these judgements while the tribunes were occupied with the distribution of the 
booty.
122
 It is important to emphasise that the decision regarding the fate of captives was 
always made by the commander and never by his subordinates, although the gathering up and 
sorting of individuals for punishment was certainly conducted by these.
123
  
In cases of surrender commanders personally heard the deputations and negotiated the 
preliminary peace, as explained above. Cases of commanders passing judgement over 
                                                                                                                                                        
lenience and spared the Lycians (Plut. Brut. 30.4; Vell. Pat. 2.69.6), later he sold some citizens in front of 
Patara, but found that this did not sway the enemy and so he desisted from further sales (Cass. Dio 4.34.4). 
120
 Eckstein 1987, passim, even more so in campaigns outside of Italy. The Senate’s ultimate control over the 
commanders came in their ability to both grant and deny honours, for example the denial of a triumph for 
Marcellus on the basis that he entered into diplomatic talks with Hiero at Syracuse and avoided a siege (Zon 
8.9), cf. the comments of Eckstein 1987, 344. 
121
 Polyb. 10.17.6. These were then divided into groups of citizens and Spaniards and then the citizens were 
further divided into working men and strong youths. 
122
 Polyb. 10.17.6 also mentions that the booty was handed over to the quaestors, which Walbank 1967a II, 219 
remarks was inaccurate, as there was only one quaestor present (C. Flaminius, Liv. 26.47.8).  
123
 At least during the Republican period. Titus delegated the task of trying individual prisoners to one of his 
freedman and his Lieutenant Fronto following the sack of Jerusalem in AD 70 (Joseph. BJ 6.414-19). 
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captives were more common for the imperial period, but these indicate that the role of the 
military commander in hearing captives was similar to the same function in civil matters, so 
that these scenes often reflect iustitia in domestic courts. The visual evidence depicts a stark 
juxtaposition between the captor, who is portrayed with little emotion, and the captives, who 
are portrayed as pleading in a suppliant manner or as accepting of a decision, with downward 
glances in resignation or upturned with a hint of defiance.
124
 A general’s involvement in 
trying or hearing individual captives was probably limited to the cases of the wealthy and 
powerful, exceptional cases and those claiming to be Roman citizens - thus holding the right 
to be tried at Rome, as explained earlier. Captive leaders were commonly separated from the 
rest of the prisoners and often reserved for the general’s triumph, as key parts of the general’s 
spectacle - he may have wished to inspect them personally.
125
 
In most cases, the sorting criteria for the captives were immediately obvious, based on 
gender, age, physical build or other superficial disparities.
126
 However, in terms of wealth, 
political affiliation, culpability, or any other defining characteristics, the process of sorting 
was obviously a more difficult affair. Josephus informs us that in the case of the Jews, the 
criminals and robbers were impeached by one another,
127
 indicating that there was a diligent 
process and period of interrogation and hearings. On occasion members of other communities 
were sought out from amongst the captives, either for separate punishment or to be 
released.
128
 In these cases, we might infer that some investigation into the claims of 
someone’s origin was made in order to seek verification, particularly in instances where 
ethnicity or language was not readily apparent. In other cases it is likely that the Romans 
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 E.g. The lower left figures on the Gemma Augustea (Ferris 2000, Plate 8) and a representation of a bound 
captive in a triumph frieze (Ferris 2000, Plate 7, for the presentation of captives on floats or biers see Beard 
2007, 124-5). Scene of clementia on a sarcophagus in the Vatican Museums, Rome (Ferris 2000 Plate. 25, see 
further Kleiner 2007, 224-7); scenes on Trajan’s Column (Cichorius Pl. 61, 75, 118, 141), see also the North 
and South Attic Panels on the Arch of Constantine which were probably taken from an arch commemorating 
the victories of Marcus Aurelius as well as the four statues of Dacian captives which date to Trajan, all of 
these representatiosn of captives depict the expressions described above, see Carlson 2010, 163-176 and 
Varner 2004, 143-4. 
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 Beard 2007, 119-22. Many were executed (commonly by strangulation), but not all; Perseus, after the 
triumph of Aemilius, was spared for example (Diod Sic. 31.8.12; Cic. Tusc. 3.22).  
126
 Vespasian sent the strong young captive Jews to work the canal being dug at Corinth (Joseph. BJ 3.540). The 
tallest and most handsome Jews from Jerusalem were separated from the others to be sent to Rome for the 
triumph (Joseph. BJ 6.418). Likewise, the strong of the captives from New Carthage were sent to row the 
newly acquired ships (Polyb. 10.16.12). 
127
 Joseph. BJ 6.417.  
128
 319 BC Pro Samnites at Satricum (Liv. 9.16.9; Oros. 3.15.9-10), 308 BC Samnite Allies at Allifae (Liv. 
9.42.7-8), 209 BC Spaniards at New Carthage (Liv. 26.49f.; Polyb. 10.17.6), AD 67 Non Greeks from 
Taricheae (Joseph. BJ 3.338-9). Other likely cases include: The Volscian freedmen in 265 BC (Flor. 16.1; 
Plin. HN 31.31; Zon. 8.7), 212 BC Turdetani at Saguntum (Liv. 24.42.11; Zon. 9.3) and in 211 BC slaves at 
Syracuse (Diod. Sic. 26.20.1-2).  
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sought out individuals to meet military or civil purposes, as at New Carthage.
129
 Similarly, 
after the siege of Corinth, Mummius took a survey of all the freeborn children presumably to 
identify their levels of literacy.
130
 Plutarch does not say why, but it is obviously to assess the 
ability of children for work involving such skills. Indeed Plutarch recounts how one boy 
quoted a poignant line from the Odyssey, which moved Mummius to tears and so he freed the 
boy, indicating that the rest were kept as slaves.
131
 The retention of some captive boys for 
military service was likely during the Republic, as the presence of young foreign slaves 
acting as personal servants (calones) is commonly attested during the Empire.
132
 
For the vast majority of instances in which captives were said to have been taken, nothing 
more was said beyond the action of their capture, despite the fact that the procedure of 
reduction was typically not a straightforward matter. There were guidelines to enslaving and 
the process itself could be cumbersome at times. Furthermore, enslavement was not a 
foregone conclusion of capture as will be demonstrated in the proceeding chapters.  
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 For New Carthage see Chapter 6. The artisans of Haliartus captured in 171 BC were sent to Calchis (Liv. 
42.63.11). According to Josephus prisoners were sent to the mines in Egypt (BJ 6.414-419) and to build a 
canal (BJ 3.539, likely at Corinth (Suet. Nero 19). 
130
 Plut. Quest. conv. 9.1.  
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 Plut. Quest. conv. 9.1. 
132
 For example a second century AD gravestone (Speidel 1992 II, 353-122) associated with the the well 
documented equites singulares Augusti commemorates two boys serving as grooms to a cavalryman one of 
which was born on the northern shore of the Black Sea and there is no reason that captive boys could not fill 
such a role.  
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Chapter 2 
Release and Execution 
After a battle it was the commander’s choice in how to deal with captives. As explained in 
the previous chapter, the commander was only compelled by law and practice to dispense the 
booty so that gold and silver (either captured or derived from the auction of booty including 
captives) was paid into the public treasury or the booty (on occasion captives) was distributed 
to the troops. Ultimately, the political climate necessitated particular treatment for the 
captives and the results of capture in war could vary, as Dio explained what befell those 
captured by the Romans: 
“Prisoners captured in a just war which had been formally proclaimed by due ceremony 
were legitimately enslaved, if they hadn’t been massacred. The Romans had no doubts 
that any war they engaged in was just, and the captives their property: if they could not 
arrange to be ransomed, they had to face slavery.”1 
As Dio indicated, the result of capture could lead to massacre during the sack of a city or a 
rout, ransom, or enslavement, to which can be added the possibility of execution after capture 
or release without ransom. Ultimately Roman commanders were politicians, and defeated 
enemies became their de facto clients.
2
 A central component of Roman military doctrine was 
to conquer and move on, this meant that once a city was defeated it was to be treated so that it 
would not take up arms again. In many cases this meant systematic brutalisation, and 
sometimes resulted in the enslavement or execution of entire populaces, but this was done so 
that the majority would fear the example of one city and submit to Rome. In contrast, 
particular lenience and benevolence shown to a defeated enemy could gain similar results. 
We find in many cases that the Romans wished to lead with the open hand, only using the 
closed fist when the first option was rejected. Cities that took up arms a second time were 
treated as rebels, the initial lenience had meant Rome desired an allied city and so the 
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 Cass. Dio 23.18.3. 
2
 According to Eilers 2002, 34-5 clientship between a general and defeated city was a phenomenon of early 
Roman history, perhaps only ever used as a rhetorical emphasis upon the sparing of a populace. 
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populace were typically spared, but the ruling elites would be executed and replaced with 
men sympathetic to Rome. 
Hostages 
Although hostages (dediticii) were taken from the enemy, they were not captives in the same 
sense that prisoners of war were, and thus only a brief overview of hostages is necessary.
3
 
The detention of individuals as hostages served the primary function of securing a peace 
settlement and as collateral for the accepted obedience of foreign states to Rome.
4
 In most 
cases where hostages were taken, the enemy still possessed some means of continued military 
resistance and captives provided the guarantee that the enemy would not take up arms again.
5
 
Any hostility on the part of the surrendering party, after giving hostages, was viewed as a 
senseless obstruction to peace.
6
 As instruments of diplomacy, hostages were not viewed by 
the Romans as regular captives; their value was political rather than financial, and the taking 
of them and their maintenance perpetuated peace. Although hostages were not representative 
of military victory in the same sense as captives, they served as proof of a general’s more 
permanent subjugation of the enemy.
7
 
Legally hostages were similar to other captives, in that they were not cives of Rome; instead 
they were considered citizens of another state (peregrini) and therefore were, by default, 
considered the property of the state.
8
 Further evidence that they were the property of the state 
comes from the fact that any property they held in captivity was, in fact, owned by the state.
9
  
The captivity, particularly of young nobles, could be used as a means of manipulating the 
hearts and minds of the people of foreign states.
10
 Polybius for example was himself a 
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 For studies on hostages at Rome see Allen 2006; Walker 1980. 
4
 For example: Numidians (Sall. Iug. 54.6), Cantabrians (Flor. 2.33.52), Judeans (Joseph. BJ 6.356), various 
tribes of Britain (Strab. 4.5.3), Macedonians at Agassae (Liv. 44.7.5), Histrians (Liv. 41.11.9), Ligurians, who 
were forced to give hostages to the Massalians (Polyb. 33.10.13). 
5
 The failure to secure hostages could lead the enemy to betrayal (Liv. 43.10.2). 
6
 Notably at Same in 189 BC (Liv. 38.28.8), also the Gauls (Caes. B Gall. 3.10) and later the Sicambri (Strab. 
7.1.4). 
7
 Liv. 33.22.9 states that Q. Minucius Rufus’ failure to secure hostages was a basis for his denial of a triumph 
over the Ligurians as he did not have any enemy combatants to corroborate his victory claims. See Allen 
2006, 99. For criteria of attaining triumphs see Richardson 1975, 60-62; Gruen 1990, 129-33; 1995, 63; 
Versnel 1970, 168-9; Mommsen 1887 I, 126-36. For a summary of these arguments see Beard 2007, 206-9. 
8
 Gai. Inst. 1.25; Ulp. Dig. 20.14. 
9
 Dig. 49.14.31-2. Interestingly, the passage also cites an imperial rescript which stated that the heirs of captives 
that sufficiently ‘Romanised’ themselves should inherit their property after death in the same manner as 
normal circumstances would allow. 
10
 Albeit this required the eventual return of the hostage to their native land. This process is clearly evident in 
imperial and later sources (e.g. Tac. Agr. 20f; Plut. Sert. 14; Amm. Marc. 16.12.25), see Allen 2006, 149f.  
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hostage from 167 BC, and his acquaintance with well to do Romans certainly made his time 
as a hostage more comfortable. He became a close friend and client of Scipio Aemilianus and 
his Histories was undoubtedly partial where Scipio was concerned.
11
 Though hostages were 
valuable politically, and as a result fairly well treated, they were ultimately the cut-string 
should the submissive nation break from their obligations. Hostages were punished and 
sometimes executed as a result of their motherland’s transgressions.12 At least some hostages 
were considered prisoners whilst in the hands of Rome, their captivity representing a 
punishment rather than a guarantee.
13
 During the early Republic the carcer at Alba Fucens 
served as a notorious holding pen of political prisoners and from the second century BC 
prisoners were typically held in the carcer in Rome itself.
14
 The Romans were not 
particularly fond of long-term incarceration as a punishment, and the imprisonment of 
hostages was uncommon. What distinguished the hostages from captives was that, so long as 
the peace was maintained, they were not enslaved or executed. The Roman’s prided 
themselves on their fair treatment and respect for hostages, and the killing of hostages was 
considered treasonous.
15
 In cases where indemnities were concerned it is likely that hostages 
were discharged once the payments were complete.
16
 Hostages were also given when a state 
of war did not exist between Rome and the submitting nation, thus it is hard to imagine why, 
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 See Astin 1967, 3f; Walbank 1957 I, 1-26. 
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 Execution (Liv. 2.16.9; 25.7.11-14; Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 6.25.1-3; 6.30.1; Plut. Sert. 10.3). The execution 
was legal, contra Westington 1938, 31; Moscovich 1980, 126-7. For many examples of the breaking of 
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 Hostages of the Nergobriges were imprisoned for breaking the terms of peace (App. Hisp. 42), see Walker 
1980, 179. 
14
 Braund 1984, 167. Specifically held at Alba Fucens: Perseus and his sons Alexander and Philip (Liv. 45.42.4; 
Plut. Aem. 37; Diod. Sic. 31.9f.), Syphax ( Polyb. 16.23.6) and a chief of the Arverni Bituitus (Val. Max. 
9.6.3; Liv. Per. 61). The carcer in Rome (carcer Tullianus/Mamertinus) dates to the monarchy and served as 
a temporary holding pen for prisoners awaiting trial or execution (Liv. 1.33.8). An underground extension was 
soon added (Var. DLL. 5.151; Fest. Lindsay 1913, 356 cf. Cadoux 2008, 202-3) and it was still in use in the 
first century AD when it was repaired (CIL 6. 31674; s.v. ‘Tullianum’ OCD). Prisoners held in the carcer at 
Rome possibly included Aristobulus (Joseph. BJ 1.174; AJ. 14.97), Jugurtha (Plut. Mar. 12.4, Livy Per. 67, 
Eutrop. 4.27.6) and Vercingetorix (Caes. B Gall. 7.89.4; Plut. Caes. 27.10). Not all prisoners were detained in 
prison, in 61 BC Tigranes was kept in chains in the custody of a friend of Pompey’s named L. Flavius, 
presumably in his private home (Dio. Cass. 38.30.1-2). 
15
 Murder of hostages made a capital crime according to the lex Iulia, Dig. 48.4.1. The respectful treatment of 
captives was valued by the Romans (Liv. 34.52.9; 37.25.12; Polyb. 21.3.3; 21.11.10), and Liv. 34.22.11-12 
scorned the maltreatment of hostages by Nabis of Sparta, see Allen 2006, 91-119. 
16
 See Allen 2006, 41-2. Examples worth noting include the release of the son of Philip V of Macedon once his 
tribute was forgiven (Polyb. 21.3.3; 21.11.9; Diod. Sic. 28.15.1; App. Mac. 5). The Aetolian tribute in 189 
(Polyb. 21.32.10; Liv. 38.11.6-7). Possibly also Ocilis in 152 BC (App. Hisp. 48) and hostages given by 
Antiochus III, see Moscovich 1974, 420-1. 
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when the Romans prided themselves in the civility of their hostage system, that these would 
have been treated in the manner of prisoners.
17
 
 
Release 
Roman foreign policy in Italy was directed towards the incorporation of defeated enemies, in 
order to achieve this, their defeated neighbours had to be willing to join the folds of Rome’s 
political hegemony. As will be shown,
18
 this was achieved with varying levels of success. 
The determination of the Samnites against Roman expansion was particularly trying, but 
Rome, relatively early in the Republic, managed to establish supremacy over its Latin 
neighbours forging a path of continual outward expansion. Since Roman policy favoured the 
incorporation of the defeated through ties of alliance, they often chose to be lenient towards 
the vanquished, hoping to gain political advantage through benevolent, rather than castigatory 
foedera (treaties).
19
 Roman ambition in establishing a network of alliances, rather than 
building an empire based on direct political and territorial control can be seen in their choice 
to release captives after successful battles.
20
 This leniency was displayed for example after 
the sack of Tarentum, in which Epirote mercenaries were captured along with Tarentines. 
Rather than exact violent retribution, the Romans chose to allow the majority of the 
population to remain free, and according to Frontinus, the Roman general Papirius offered 
Milo the opportunity to return to Epirus with his soldiers free of ransom. Only the principle 
leaders of the Tarrentines defection were punished with execution.
21
 The choice to release 
these captives, when there was no risk of retribution for harsher treatment, exhibits the 
Roman desire to portray themselves as judicious and munificent.
22
 
                                                 
17
 Some of these hostages were gestures of a diplomatic nature rather than submissive, Germans from across the 
Rhine sent hostages as a sign of alliance to Caesar after his tour de force across the Rhine (Caes. B Gall. 
4.18). Much like the submission of hostages by the Parthians (Joseph. BJ 2.379), Tiridates I, king of Armenia 
and brother of the king of Parthia, paid homage to Nero in Ad 63 by sending his daughter to Rome as a 
hostage (Tac. Ann. 15.29). 
18
 See Chapter 4. 
19
 Pritchett 1991, 290 cites political advantage as the typical reason behind releasing captives in Greece. 
20
 Early examples include the Volscians spared at Ardea 443 BC (Liv. 4.10.4); Volscian senators spared in 431 
BC (Liv. 4.29.4); Samnites spared at Luceria in 320 BC (Liv. 9.15.6-9). 
21
 Frontin. Str. 3.3.1. Both Liv. Per. 15 and Zon. 8.6 state that the Tarrentines were forced to pay a tribute and 
demolish their walls, implying that they were allowed to remain. Oros. 4.3.4 suggests that the city was taken 
by the Romans, but does not mention the fate of the captives, praedam sibi omnem atque ipsum oppidum 
uindicauit. 
22
 For the continued Roman belief in themselves as conciliatory to defeated enemies, see Chapter 6. 
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There was a general sentiment amongst the Italians prior to Roman supremacy not to impose 
unnecessary bloodshed on other Italians.
23
 In Italy the Roman strategy was incorporation 
after defeat and so warfare served to display force and ensure submission. This submission 
required an act of humiliation, which in the early Republic meant they would be ‘sent under 
the yoke.’ The practice, as applied to defeated enemies, has no definite beginning other than 
the earliest instance mentioned by Livy, in which the Aequi were made to pass underneath a 
spear acting as a yoke by the Roman commander Cincinnatus in 457 BC.
24
 Festus explained 
that in the field spears were used to form a door and the captives stripped and disarmed and 
passed through it, and Trogus alludes to the practice being universally a custom of the 
Italians.
25
 There is no explanation as to why this practice was carried out or as to when it was 
implemented in the release of captives. In Roman legend the practice of passing beneath the 
yoke was first implemented by the elder Horatius in the wake of his son Horatius’ acquittal 
for an act of sororicide.
26
 According to Festus a beam was placed over top of two posts and 
Horatius was made to pass beneath it so as to absolve him of the crime to the satisfaction of 
the augurs.
27
 In this manner the yoke constituted a purification rite which allowed the guilty 
or tabooed to re-join the rest.
28
 There were similar parallels in Greek practices where 
murderers re-entering the polis were required to undergo rituals of purification.
29
 William 
Fowler identified a similar need for purification for Roman soldiers re-entering the city, these 
were made to pass beneath the porta triumphalis in the campus Martius, which Fowler 
believed to be a purification process.
30
 Both Fowler and the notable anthropologist James 
Frazer argued that this need for purification extended to the defeated enemies, who were 
guilty of taking up arms against the enemy and so by passing under the yoke they left one 
state of being belligerent to Rome and entered another as submissive to Rome.  
                                                 
23
 As exemplified by Pontius’ rejection of the idea to execute the Roman captives, Liv. 9.3f., see Fowler 1913, 
48; Phillipson 1911, 253f.  
24
 Liv. 3.28.10; 67.6. Cf. Flor. 1.5.13 Val. Max. 2.7.7. Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 10.24.7-8 also mentions the victory, 
but excludes the yoke scene. 
25
 Festus Lindsay 1913, 297; Trogus Historiae Philippicae 38.152f. 
26
 Having been the sole survivor of the battle between the triplets, Horatius arrived to see his sister weep for one 
of the fallen Curiatii, he killed her for this and was spared execution when his father came to his defence. The 
judges took pity upon the man who only had Horatius left amongst his children, see Liv. 1.24-26. 
27
 Festus Lindsay 1913, 297. This portal was known as the tigilium sorarium.  
28
 Thus Fowler 1913, 48-51; Frazer 1936 III, 157-165, 166-186; Halliday 1924, 93-95. 
29
 Plat. Laws  9 and many other equivalent rituals cited by Frazer 1936, 157-165. 
30
 Fowler 1913, 49. That the porta triumphalis was located in the campus Martius is based on a statement of 
Joseph. BJ 7.5.4.  
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By the time most of the references to passing under the yoke occurred, the ritual and 
purification aspect of the practice was entirely replaced by one of humiliation.
31
 But, 
purification and humiliation do not have to be completely divorced from one another; both 
acts allow for acceptance, in the case of purification by the unsullied, and in the case of 
humiliation by the victor. To allow the release of captives without any restriction would 
completely neglect the soldiers’ (and likely the Roman public’s) desire for adequate 
vengeance. So after the defeat of the Volsians at Ardea in 443 BC, the Roman commander 
responded to a Volscian envoy requesting terms: “the vanquished had to accept terms, not to 
dictate them; and as the Volscians came at their own discretion to attack the allies of the 
Roman people, they should not go off in the same way.”32 The yoke itself is highly symbolic 
in a number of ways, not the least of which is its representation of burden and subjugation - 
an English derivative of the same process (sub iugum).
33
 As a means of humiliation it was 
commonly used in Italy by the Romans,
34
 famously against the Romans by the Samnites at 
the Caudine Forks in 321 BC
35
 and by the Tusculans against the Aequi.
36
 The fact that the 
Romans never used the practice against non-Italian enemies and that people outside Italy 
used the yoke as a means of humiliation upon the Romans,
37
 suggests that it only held 
meaning to Italians. The humiliation of the Roman defeat at the Caudine Forks left an 
indelible mark upon Roman history and so the emotive action of passing under the yoke was 
often used to convey a sense of entering submission or experiencing humiliation, much as the 
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 Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 3.22.7 remarks that the ritual was last used by Horatius. The humiliation of the process 
is emphasised by Liv. 9.3.2. Following the Caudine disaster the peace with the Samnites was rejected on the 
basis that the surrender was particularly shameful (Liv. 9.8.3-9). 
32
 Liv. 4.10.2. ...victis condiciones accipiendas esse, non ferendas respondit, neque ut venerint ad oppugnandos 
socios populi Romani suo arbitrio, ita abituros Volscos esse. 
33
 Numerous examples and too many to list fully, for a range of the symbolic use by just one author see: Sen. 
Dial. 1.4.6; 2.14.3; 21.6; 3.16.1; De Clem. 1.16.5. Examples for the yoke symbolising slavery (literal or 
figurative) include:Cic. Orat. 1.6; Rep. 2.46; Liv. 3.15.9; Sen. Herc. Fur. 432; Troad. 747; Dial. 4.14.4; SHA 
Aurel. 41.8; Stat. Silv. 3.4.34; Tac. Agr. 31; Val. Max. 8.9.2. Similar examples in Greek: Hdt. 7.8; Aes. Th.75. 
See Fitzgerald 2000, 71f.  
34
 The Aequi outside Corbio in 457 BC (Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 10.20.7; 24.6-8; Liv. 3.28.10; 67.6; Flor. 1.5.13 
Val. Max. 2.7.7); at Ardea in 443 BC (Liv. 4.10.4; 10.7); The Samnites at Luceria in 320 BC (Ampel. 18.7; 
20.10; Liv. 9.15.6-9; 16.12; 22.14.12; 25.6.12; Oros. 3.15.9); after a victory at Allifae in 308 BC (Liv. 9.42.7-
8); Interamma in 294 BC (Liv. 10.36.14) and Duronia in 293 BC (Eutrop. 2.9. Liv.10.39.4). 
35
 App. Sam. 6; Aug. De Civ. 3.17; Aul. Gel. 17.21.36; Aur. Vict. 30.1; Cic. Off. 30.109; Cass. Dio 8.36.10; 
Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 16.1.4; Eutrop. 2.9.1; Flor. 1.11.11; Liv. 9.4.3; 6.1; 6.3; 15.4; 23.42.7; 25.6.12; Per. 9; 
Oros. 3.15.5; Val. Max. 7.2.17; Zon. 9.26. 
36
 Liv. 3.23.5.  
37
 By the Carthaginian commander Hannibal in the First Punic War (Frontin. Str. 4.1.19), Jugurtha forced the 
Roman troops under Aulus to pass under the yoke (Sall. Iug. 38.9; 49.2),  the Tigurini allowed the Romans to 
escape after passing under the yoke in 107 BC (Caes. B Gall. 1.7.4; 12.5.7; alluded to by Cic. Rhet Her. 1.25; 
Liv. Per. 65; Oros. 5.15.24) and in Armenia a legion was forced to surrender and pass under the yoke (Suet. 
Nero 39.1; Tac. Ann. 15.15.4). 
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yoke itself symbolised submission or humiliation.
38
 This expression of humility is only 
explained from the Roman point of view, but the fact the Romans forced their Italian enemies 
to undergo the ordeal implies that they were equally affected by it. 
Livy is particular in noting that the release of captives often resulted in the loss of all their 
goods and so upon their release they departed with only a single garment apiece.
39
 No other 
Latin author suggests that this stipulation occurred. This was not confined to Roman practice, 
but generally accompanied the practice of passing under the yoke.
40
 When the Carthaginians 
released captives they often made this stipulation as well, and later Philip proposed that the 
Rhodians and Attalus’ men could quit Abydus with a single garment each.41 By noting the 
departure of captives with a single garment apiece, Livy emphasises the point that their 
property was taken as booty. 
Humiliation was not always necessary, as mentioned above; political expedience sometimes 
dictated a release of captives. In Illyria the city of Pharos was razed to the ground, but if we 
are to believe the account of Appian, the captives were released without ransom at the behest 
of Pinnes, the boy king of Illyria, who had been deposed by Demetrius of Pharos. As Pinnes 
was to be reinstated, agreeing to his request ensured renewed friendship, though it would be 
short-lived as Pinnes suddenly died.
42
 In the war against Phillip, Roman policy was initially 
against excessive force. At Pelium in 199 BC, and at Carystus in the following year the 
citizens were spared; at Carystus the Macedonian garrison was even allowed to be ransomed 
and sent into Boeotia.
43
 Likewise, Hannibal had tried to win the Italians over to his side by 
releasing them without ransom. In 202 BC three Carthaginian spies were caught by the 
Romans and instead of punishing them, as was expected, Scipio showed them around the 
camps and released them. When they reported to Hannibal, he decided to meet with Scipio 
and so the celebrated parley of the two generals occurred before the battle of Zama. Although 
the sources vary as to why Hannibal wished to talk (he had to this point been reluctant to 
meet with Scipio) they all agree that the release of the spies was the impetus behind the 
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 There are a number of visual similarities in the humility experienced by the Romans following the Caudine 
Forks as described by Liv. 9.5.12-6.3 and the humility suffered by the sixteenth legion in Tac. Ann. 4.62. See 
Ash 1998, 31-33. 
39
 Liv. 4.10.4; 6.3.3; 9.4.3 (cf. 9.5.12); 9.15.6; 9.42.7; 21.12.5; 22.6.11; 22.52.3; 23.15.3; 31.17.4; 31.45.6. 
40
 Liv. 9.42.7; 9.15.6; 4.10.4. 
41
 Carthaginians (Liv. 22.6.11; 22.52.3; 23.15.3), Philip (Liv. 31.17.4). 
42
 App. Ill. 8. Polyb. 3.19.12 does not mention the taking of captives nor even Pinnes, but we know at least some 
captives were taken and brought back to Rome as implied by the fact that Aemelius celebrated a triumph.   
43
 Pelium (Liv. 31.40.5) Carystus (Liv. 32.17.2). 
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initiative.
44
 Internal politics also forced the general to release captives in favour of 
expedience. In 151 BC the consul Marcellus was anxious to wrap up his campaign in Spain 
before his rival Lucullus arrived to finish up the campaign, thus stealing the glory. This 
inclined Marcellus to be lenient towards the Celtiberians and he dismissed a number of 
hostages and, as he marched on Numantia, the city submitted and a few hostages were taken 
to guarantee their submission; as a result the Belli, Titthi and Arevaci submitted without a 
fight.
45
 
Of course political necessity was not the only reason behind sparing the defeated; the Romans 
on occasion chose to spare the defeated on ‘compassionate’ grounds. When the city of Locha 
was overrun by Roman troops, contrary to Scipio’s orders, the surviving Lochrians were 
allowed to go free without ransom.
46
 In taking Syracuse, Marcellus stipulated that free 
persons should not be harmed or enslaved. In Livy’s account of the fall of Syracuse, 
Marcellus is portrayed as acting sternly towards the Syracusans, their former alliance with 
Rome under Hiero II being the only thing that allowed the concession of granting them their 
lives and freedom.
47
 In contrast, Valerius depicts Marcellus as feeling remorse for the 
pillaging of the city,
48
 and Plutarch suggests that Marcellus was unable to prevent the 
plundering of the city because the long siege necessitated recompense for his soldiers through 
booty, but he made specific provisions for the protection of free people against enslavement 
and harm, and furthermore for the protection of the property of the Syracusans that had been 
loyal to Rome.
49
 Regardless of the account, the close alliance between Rome and Hiero II 
compelled the Romans to show leniency towards the people of the city even after their 
defection. 
                                                 
44
 Polyb. 15.5.4-7 suggests this had intrigued Hannibal. Liv. 30.29.1-3 remarks that the spies revealed Roman 
superiority and so Hannibal desired to negotiate rather than give battle, and Val. Max. 3.7.1 cites the show of 
Scipio’s confidence being a similar reason for doubt on Hannibal’s part, cf. Polyaen. 8.16.8; App. Pun. 39; 
Zon. 9.14. Eutrop. 3.22.2 also suggests that the spies were actually ambassadors, so too in the Suda s.v. 
‘Ἀννίβας’ 2425. 
45
 App. Iber. 50, cf. Liv. Per. 48. 
46
 App. Pun. 15. 
47
 Liv. 25.31.3-7. In his response to the Syracusans, Marcellus lays the blame of the city’s sacking on the 
Syracusans themselves who allowed the defection to the Carthaginians, citing the Syracusans who came to 
Rome for protection rather than remain in the city. 
48
 Val. Max. 5.1.4. The destruction of an opulent city is the focus of Sil. It. 14.623f. The removal of goods and 
wealth along with the death of Archimedes was the focus of Dio’s epitimists Tzetz. Chil. 2, 136‑49 and Zon. 
9.5. Polyb. 9.10f. reproaches Rome’s heavy handedness in stripping such a magnificent city. Diod. Sic. 
26.20.1-2 relates that this deprivation, though not reducing the citizens to slavery nonetheless forced them into 
slavery.  
49
 Marc. 19.2. cf. Cic. Ver. 2.2.4. 
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Overall Roman leniency towards captives lessened as wars extended beyond Italy, generally 
once captives were taken the Romans tried to extract profit form them whether through the 
sale of their bodies as slaves or as ransom. Often there is no indication what became of 
captives, and where there is no specific information relating to their sale or ransom it is 
possible that they may have been released; this was more likely to have occurred during 
Rome’s period of expansion in Italy.50 
 
Execution 
Wholesale execution of captives after a city was taken was rare and generally limited to cities 
which rebelled; when large numbers of civilians were killed it usually occurred during the 
sacking of a city. In cases where no distinction was made between the age and sex of the 
victims the killing was essentially an unrestrained slaughter. The bloodlust of soldiers often 
continued after the enemy forces had been routed or annihilated.
51
 When a city was sacked 
many of the defenders would have been killed in the process, the remainder, those that posed 
a physical threat (adult men in the Roman eye),
52
 were all that stood between soldiers and the 
booty, in such cases the slaughter was usually limited to the men, and often the general issued 
specific instructions for the soldiers to seek out and kill the men.
53
 Josephus, in his account of 
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 I argue specifically that the Romans refrained from enslavement during the Third Samnite War and that they 
also refrained from taking slaves from Veii, both events are generally cited as examples of mass enslavement, 
see Chapter 4. 
51
 For example: Velitrae in 494 BC (Liv. 2.30.15), Anxur in 405 BC (Liv 4.59.6-7), Veii in 396 BC (Liv. 
5.21.13), Saepinum in 293 BC (Liv. 10.45.11-14), New Carthage in 209 BC (Polyb. 10.15.4; Liv. 26 46 10), 
Locha in 203 BC (App. Pun. 15), see Westington 1938, 70-86. When the Gauls sacked Rome also they killed 
civilians without compunction (Liv. 5.41.9-10, Diod. Sic. 14.115.1). 
52
 In trophy representations female captives are often left unrestrained whereas the male captives are always 
bound. E.g. the arch at Glanum, see McGoweb 2010, 20-21. On the Augustan monument at La Turbie, see 
Ferris 2000, plate 9. A relief sculpture from the temple of Apollo Sosianus (Museo del Palazzo dei 
Conservatori, Rome), see Bradley 2004, plate 1; Ferris 2000, plate 7. Two victory monument statues depicting 
a male and female pair from the Sebasteion in Aphrodisias, for a plausible reconstruction of the trophies see 
Boube 1996, 24-25. The depiction of a trophy with captives is common on coins, as on the obverse of a brass 
sestertius (AD 85) BMC 143, see Kent 1978, 290, plate 69.243. Obverse of another brass sestertius (AD 105) 
BMC 294, see Kent 1978, 291, plate 72.249. Other examples of just male bound captives include a relief from 
the Arcus Novus (Boboli Gardens, Florence) depicted with a trophy and Victory, Ferris 2000, plate 31; two 
captives chained at the neck (Landesmuseum, Mainz), Bradley 2004, plate 5 and Ferris 2000, plate 38. Of 
female captives alone: obverse of an aureus minted by Vespasian (AD 70) BMC 32, see Kent 1978, 288, plate 
64.224; obverse of a brass sestertius minted under Titus (AD 81) BMC 164, see Kent 1978, 290, plate 69.238. 
Compare also two juxtaposing reliefs from Sabesteion in Aphrodisias, one depicting a single male captive and 
the other a female, Bradley 2004, 298-318, plates 14 and 16. For a brief overview of slave representation in 
art see George 2011, 399-403. 
53
 Cluviae 311 in BC (Liv. 9.31.3), Senones in 284 BC (App. Sam. 6. = Gall. 11), Antipatrea in 200 BC (Liv. 
31.27.4), Cauca in 151 BC (App. Hisp. 52), Corinth in 146 BC (Cass. Dio 21.72fr.) and Capsa in 107 BC 
(Sall. Iug. 91.6). 
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the Jewish war, gives numerous examples of the Romans slaying men once cities were 
taken.
54
  
The total slaughter of captives was not easy, large numbers of people suddenly faced with 
death could prove difficult to control and the executions were arduous to carry out with 
rudimentary weaponry.
55
 The disarmament and containment of captives was essential in 
carrying out the slaughter. Sometimes this deposer les armes required deceit on the part of 
the Romans as occurred at Henna in 213 BC. The Sicilian city wished to expel the Roman 
garrison and demanded the return of the city key. The Roman commander requested he be 
allowed to address the citizens in the central plaza the next day, and when all assembled his 
soldiers rushed in to kill the principle men of the city and then fanned out to massacre the rest 
of the population.
56
 Of all the theatres Rome’s military operated in treachery was particularly 
common in Spain. At Cauca
57
 in 151 BC a small Roman garrison was admitted who then in 
turn opened the gates for the entire army to slaughter the populace.
58
 In 144 BC the consul 
Sulpicius Galba tricked the Lusitanians into dividing themselves into three groups and 
occupying separate camps already laid out with deep ditches by the Romans. Once inside the 
camps, the soldiers went from one to the next killing everyone inside.
59
 Similarly at Colenda 
in 98 BC the general Didus offered to resettle the citizens and requested that the men enter 
the camp so that he might parcel out the land to them individually, the camp served as a trap 
and the soldiers slaughtered them, enslaving the remaining women and children.
60
 Roman 
treachery continued into the imperial period, in order to deal with the large number of non-
Greek captives at Terichaea, Vespasian ordered them to follow a single route lined by 
soldiers to Tiberias where roughly 42,000 of the prisoners were corralled into the stadium 
where they were divided up and executed, deported, or sold.
61
 In these examples it is evident 
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 Gadara in AD 67 (Joseph. BJ. 3.132), Japha in AD 67 (Joseph. BJ 3.304-6), Jotapata in AD 67 (Joseph. BJ 
3.338-339) and Hebron AD 67 (Joseph. BJ. 4.553). 
55
 Pritchett 1991, 208. 
56
 Frontin. Str. 4.7.22; Polyaen. 8.21; Liv. 24.39f. The booty was given over to the soldiers, as recorded in an 
inscription (CIL 1.608). 
57
 Cauca or Coca is near modern Segovia, specifically ‘north of the Tagus’ as App. Hisp. 52 mentions περάσας 
δὲ τὸν ποταμὸν τὸν καλούμενον Τάγον. 
58
 App. Hisp. 52. Men were the targets of the massacre, some of the Caucaei managed to escape by climbing 
over the walls to get out.  
59
 App. Hisp 60. A few managed to escape the slaughter including Viriathus, who would go on to be an 
important leader against the Romans in Lusitania. Galba is portrayed by Appian as a particularly avaricious 
fraudster and so this episode is in keeping with his immorality. 
60
 App. Hisp. 100. 
61
 Joseph. BJ. 3.532-542. Similarly during the Nika revolt in AD 532 at Byzantium 30,000 rioters were executed 
in the hippodrome by soldiers and guards thus quelling the revolt, Procop. Wars 1.24.54. 
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that the victims were tricked because their execution by conventional slaughter would have 
otherwise been costly to the Romans in terms of manpower and time. 
Executions and slaughter were also carried out as punitive measures. On two occasions the 
killing of civilians was in response to the death of Roman ambassadors.
62
 As a punishment, 
executions clearly gave teeth to the threat of Roman retribution. In 314 BC the Lucerians 
betrayed the Roman garrison to the Samnites, when the Romans re-conquered the city they 
did not give any quarter to the Lucerians or the Samnites inside. The Senate debated razing 
the city altogether, but eventually decided to allow it to stand with a Roman garrison. By the 
fact that the city required a garrison, it is likely some of the Lucerians who managed to evade 
the slaughter were allowed to remain in the city.
63
 In cases of rebellion executions were 
generally reserved for the community leaders and the principle fomenters of the revolt. After 
Pyrrhus departed Italy a group of Samnites turned to banditry; when their location was found 
the Romans took possession of the booty and executed all the rebel leaders.
64
 The style of 
execution was characteristic of anyone deemed enemies of the state: the prisoners were first 
beaten with rods or scourged and then beheaded.
65
 In Italy these executions were sometimes 
carried out in Rome,
66
 in other cases the execution was dealt with summarily on the spot. Of 
course Roman citizens who had not committed a clear act of treason could appeal for a trial, 
as at Capua,
67
 however, during the period of this study such appeals were exceptional and, as 
warfare extended beyond peninsular Italy, military encounters with communities awarded the 
citizenship no longer occurred. 
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 Senones had killed the Roman Ambassadors in 284 BC and the Consul marched into their territory killing the 
men and enslaving women and children (Polyb. 2.19.9; Liv. Per. 12; App. Sam. 6 = Gall. 11; Oros. 3.22.12-
13). In 229 BC a Roman senator was killed by the Illyrians and as a consequence the Romans executed a 
number of principal men (Flor. 1.21.1-3. Other accounts (Polyb. 2.8.4-12; App. Ill. 7) of this later episode 
vary, see Walbank 1957 I, 153; Petzold 1971, 199-223, Errington 85-87.1989. 
63
 Liv. 9.26.3-5. The city had previously been conquered and installed a garrison, Liv. 9.16.12. 
64
 Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 20.17.1-2; Zon. 8.7 gives a more thorough account of the event, but does not mention 
the execution of captives. 
65
 Pometia in 495 BC (Liv. 2.17.2; 2.25.5; Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 6.29.5), Antium in 459 BC (Dion. Hal. Ant. 
Rom. 10.21.6), Satricum in 319 BC (Liv. 9.16.9-11), Rhegium in 270 BC (App. Sam. 9.5; Polyb. 1.7.11-12; 
Liv. 28.28.3; Per. 15; Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 20.5.5; Frontin. Str. 4.1.38), the Illyrians (Flor. 1.21.4) and Hirpini 
(Liv. 23.37.13). This gruesome style of execution is depicted on the Column of Marcus Aurelius, Ferris 2000, 
plate 21 and Bradley 2004, plate 5. The beheading of enemy captives has been interpreted by Goldsworthy 
1996, 271-6 as a seemingly barbarian enterprise used by Roman auxiliaries. As indicated above, this practice 
was used to punish rebels and traitors during the Republic and there are a few notable instances where enemy 
captives not considered rebels were decapitated after death (ps-Caes. Hisp. 32; Liv. 24.15.3-5). See also 
Coulston 2003, 404-5 on the depiction of decapitation by Roman soldiers on Trajan’s Column. 
66
 Satricum in 319 BC (Liv. 9.16.9-11), Fregellae in 314 BC (Diod. Sic. 19.101.3), some Capuans and 
Carthaginians in 211 BC (Liv. 26.16.4-6; App. Hann. 43) and Rhegium (as above). 
67
 See Chapter 5. 
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Enemy combatants were not the only captives to be executed. Roman soldiers that defected to 
the enemy (transfugae) were considered enemies of the state (hostes publici) and could be 
killed on sight.
68
 Roman commanders typically executed turncoats,
69
 and often in the terms of 
surrender they demanded that Roman deserters be turned over.
70
 The mutinous legion at 
Rhegium seems to have provided the legal precedence for the execution of deserters, as they 
were sent back to Rome and convicted by a vote in the assembly.
71
 In future instances Roman 
deserters were sent to Rome to be executed, but trials were unnecessary or at least not worthy 
of mention by the sources; in most cases the defectors were probably executed on the spot.
72
 
In executing deserters the commander was operating under his martial authority in punishing 
subordinates rather than as a magistrate punishing captives.
73
 
The execution of captives was effective in removing the seditious elements of a community, 
but as a general deterrence of rebellious movements it was less successful. The execution of 
the Lusitanians in 144 BC by Galba only served to strengthen the anti-Roman resolve. 
Viriathus managed to escape from the slaughter and went on to lead a significant Lusitanian 
résistance.
74
 A number of Capuan youths angry at the maltreatment of their fathers started a 
fire in Rome.
75
 Five years after the execution of the pro-Samnite faction in Satricum, the 
citizens of Luceria betrayed their Roman garrison.
76
 The repeated executions in Spain did 
little to quell their recalcitrance and the executions during the Jewish rebellion did little to 
break the resolve of the rebels until they were essentially annihilated at Jerusalem, with the 
remaining defectors at Masada choosing to die by their own hands.
77
 
The brutal manner of execution and the possibility of torture or slavery struck fear into the 
hearts of the enemy, so that some preferred death to capture, on occasion destroying their 
                                                 
68
 Dig. 49.16.5.3; Quint. Decl. Min. 315, see Phang 2008, 121; Van Hoof 1990, 84. 
69
 After the Battle of Zama in 202 BC Val. Max. 2.7.12; Liv. 30.43.13. See other examples below. See Kyle 
1994, 49. 
70
 Caes. B Gall. 1.28, App. Pun. 130. 
71
 Polyb. 1.7.12; 1.10.4; Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 20.16.2; Liv. 28.28.3, see Harris 1979, 188. 
72
 Romans deserters caught in Italy were sent back to Rome and executed during the Second Punic War (Liv. 
24.20.6); allied deserters were sent to Rome to be killed by beasts (Val. Max. 2.7.13) and after the sack of 
Carthage in 146 BC deserters were trampled by elephants (Val. Max. 2.7.14), see Phang 2008, 120. 
73
 The discouragement of desertion was necessary for discipline, consequently strict discipline contributed to 
higher levels of desertion, see Campbell 1984, 303-14; Goldsworthy1996, 30; 251. Roman desertion was 
particularly problematic during the Jugurthine War (Sall. Iug. 44; 103), see Messer 1920, 170-1.  
74
 App. Hisp. 60. 
75
 Liv 26.26.10-27; Ov. Fast. 6.625-6. 
76
 Liv. 9.16.9; 9.26.3. cf. Oros. 3.15.9-10.   
77
 Repeated executions/massacres in Spain (Liv. 28.19.7; App. Hisp 52; 100) and during Jewish revolt (Joseph. 
BJ. 3.132; 304-6; 338-9; 4.553), particularly Jerusalem (Joseph. BJ. 6.414-419) and Masada (Joseph. BJ 
7.389-406). 
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valuables along with themselves to deny the Romans booty.
78
 During the siege of Jerusalem 
the people that tried to escape the city were crucified and, after this proved too time-
consuming, the Romans resorted to simply cutting off their hands.
79
 Men could expect 
physical and possibly sexual violence; for women rape was almost a certainty. Rome’s 
enemies were well aware of the consequences of capture to their wives and daughters.
80
 
Visual representation of captive women betrays the continued abuse at the hands of the 
Romans.
81
 Brutality is of course expected in war, and without an equivalent of the Geneva 
Convention, societies in the ancient world often treated their enemies with brutality; perhaps 
the most vivid description of the brutal treatment of war captives is that made by Dio in 
describing the torture of Roman women by the Iceni during the rebellion of Boudicca.
82
  
Overall the trend in the treatment or ‘disposal’ of captives shows a greater inclination towards 
release in earlier Roman history in Italy and more executions in later periods, as the Romans 
encountered more distant and often refractory enemies. This stark contrast between release 
and execution demonstrates the varying manners in with which captives were treated by 
Roman forces. As shown above, the political exigencies surrounding each case dictated the 
manner in which a defeated populace was treated by the Roman commander, and often 
enslavement was the middle ground. As portrayed in many of the examples above, and 
furthermore, in many examples discussed in regards to enslavement below, the outcome of 
capture varied; not only from case to case, but within groups of captives taken after single 
engagements. 
 
 
                                                 
78
 Cantabrians (Cass. Dio 54.5.2-3), Xanthians (App. BC 4.80), In 146 BC the wife of Hasdrubal killed herself 
in the fire of Carthage (reminiscent of Dido, Virg. Aen. 4.664f.) and the Roman deserters chose to die rather 
than be caught (App. Lib. 133; Polyb. 38.20.8-9; Liv. Per. 51; Flor. 1.31.15-16; Zon. 9.30). The people of 
Astapa burned their goods and committed mass suicide (App. Iber. 33; Livy 28.22.2-23.2). Callimachus set 
fire to Amisus (Plut. Luc.19). For numerous examples in Greece see Pritchett 1991, 219-23. See also the 
comments of Erskine 1996, 3 regarding the different portrayal of Greek and Carthaginian armies in similar 
circumstances, for references see Erskine 1996, 3 n. 9.  
79
 Joseph. BJ. 5.455-456. Likewise the Romans cut the hands off of the Thracian prisoners, a practice that the 
Thracians were known for using, Flor. 1.39.7. 
80
 Speach of Eleazar at Masada, Joseph. BJ. 7.323-325; A Jewish text recalled the reality faced by women 
caught by Roman soldiers, Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Gittin 58a.  
81
 Often appearing dishevelled and forlorn, for example: the lower left female captive figure on the Gemma 
Augustina, see Ferris 2000, plate 8; also common on trophy scenes on coins BMC 32; 143;164; 294. Women 
are also shown being dragged by their hair by soldiers: for example the lower right figure on the Gemma 
Augustea, see Ferris 2000, plate 8 and a frieze from the Column of Marcus Aurelius, see Ferris 2000, plate 22. 
82
 Cass. Dio 62.7.2.  
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Chapter 3 
Ransom 
 
Cases of wholesale ransom were relatively rare during the Republican period, or at least our 
sources are less inclined to mention cases in which entire populations of a fallen city or the 
entirety of an enemy force were allowed to be ransomed.
1
 Generally ransom was conducted 
privately rather than at state level, but the state did, at times, play a minor role in negotiating 
ransom prices or ransoming back soldiers in prisoner exchanges; ransom could also be 
conducted through the guise of a self-purchase.
2
 As a method for the disposal of captives, 
ransom was considered a lenient punishment and it achieved similar political aims with that 
of releasing the captives, whilst producing a financial gain. In some cases ransom was simply 
an alternative to slavery, the victor requesting a fee for release that, if not met, led to the 
captives being handed over to the traders following the army. Perhaps the most salient aspect 
of ransom in both Greece and Rome is that it could occur well into the period of an 
individual’s captivity as a slave. This chapter discusses the ransom process and shows that 
ransom and enslavement were sometimes synonymous in the eyes of the conqueror.  
An overview of the evidence for ransoming in the Greco-Roman world reveals far more 
examples of ransom occurring in pre-Roman Greece (i.e. pre 197 BC). In particular, 
ransoming was most often carried out between fellow Greek poleis, for which historical texts 
and inscriptions provide numerous examples.
3
 As a consequence works concerned with 
ransom, both ancient and modern, have overwhelmingly focussed on Greek practices. Even at 
Rome itself, the subject of ransom in popular culture was largely centred upon Greece. All of 
Plautus’ plays concerning captives (for example: the Asinaria, Captivi, Epidicus, Menaechmi, 
Mercator and Miles Gloriosus) were set in Greece, with the only exception being the 
Poenulus set in Carthage. The choice to set the plays outside of Rome was perhaps taken to 
maintain the setting of New Greek Comedy which they were most certainly based upon.
4
 At 
                                                 
1
 For ransom in Late Antiquity see Lenski 2011a,188-91, particularly the ransom practices of the early Christian 
church, Lenski 2011b, 257-8; Osiek 1981, 365-86. 
2
 Suet. De Gramm. 13.1, a grammarian named Staberius Eros was purchased with his own savings. 
3
 See Garlan 1987, 15-18. 
4
 See Gomme 1937, 287; Harsh 1955, 135 n.1; Stace 1968, 64f.  
 Chapter 3 
45 
 
the time of Plautus’ writing (late 2nd century BC) the Romans would have been familiar with 
the exchanges of prisoners and the ransom of soldiers, as the practice is clearly evident in 
both the First and Second Punic Wars.
5
 With regards to Rome modern historians have 
principally focused on the issues associated with captive Romans, such as their resumption of 
civic rights or capture through piracy.
6
 Yet despite the prevalence of Greek evidence, much 
can be said of the Roman process of ransom by garnering facts from Greek history that may 
similarly apply to the Roman system of captive disposal. 
The evidence for ransoming in the Greek world has been excellently collected by Pritchett.
7
 
Examples date to Homer; in the Iliad scenes of ransoming play an important role throughout 
the poem, with the ransom of Hectors’ body being the best example, exercising a profound 
and continued influence upon Greek art and drama.
8
 The Iliad, as an iconic war epic, has 
influenced accounts of conflict both fictional and non-fictional alike, and reflects the 
traditional Greek nature of ransom as an integral part of war, and thus a means of illustrating 
the level of animosity between combatants. Achilles’ response to Hector’s proposal to 
ransom his corpse after their duel is one of the most poignant scenes demonstrating the anger 
of the Greek hero.
9
 Roman tradition lacks such a strong heritage of ransom and so classical 
scenes of ransom are inevitably linked with the Iliad because of its unique omnipresence in 
ancient, as well as, modern historiography.  
 
Terms for Ransom 
The terms used for ransom in Greek and Latin hint at a variance in ransom practices between 
the Greeks and Romans. For example, in the Iliad, where ransoms were carried out on a 
                                                 
5
 See Chapter 5. 
6
 Recent publications concerning Greek captives and ransom include Bielman 1994; Fisher 1992; Gaca 2010. 
Ducrey 1969 (1999) and Panagopoulos 1978 still remain important and valid. More recently Lenski 2011a, 
2011b has investigated the subject of ransom in Late Antiquity. There still remains, as far as I am aware, a 
clear gap in our knowledge of ransom practices of the Roman Republic and early Imperial periods. 
7
 Pritchett 1991, 245-297. His data consists of evidence for ransoming from the Trojan War to the end of the 
Second Punic War. 
8
 Examples include Il. 1.4; 6.425; 11.106, 131; 16.559, 751; 18.540; 21.40, 102; 22.45; 23.21; 24;15. Not all 
attempts at ransom were successful, see Wilson, 2002 13-53; 109-133. Specifically, the ransom of Hector’s 
body (Il. 24.228ff), which became a common motif in classical art, particularly in vase-painting and tragedy, 
such as the tragedy attributed to Aeschylus entitled ‘Φρὑγες ἢ Εκτορος λὑτρα,’ see Radt 1985; TGF 3, 364-
370 and a play attributed to Dionysius of Syracuse entitled Εκτορος λὑτρα, see Radt, 1985 TGF 3, 794. Note 
the term λὑτρα in both titles. For vase paintings see Johansen, 1967, 127-138; De Roton 1950, 257-261; 
Graham 1958, 313-319; Brownlee 1989, 3ff; Tuna-Nörling 1999, 418-420. 
9
 Il. 22.351, see Pritchett 1991, 246 and Ducrey 1999, 238-246. 
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personal level, and those ransomed were individual captives rather than a group of captives, 
Homer uses the term and its verb form ἀποινάσθαι on several occasions.10 Eventually ἄποινα 
fell from use so that by the fifth century Herodotus was one of the last to use the term.
11
 In 
the three instances of ransom in Herodotus, ἄποινα is used twice and in both instances it 
refers specifically to the ransom of an individual.
12
 Since ἄποινα appeared frequently in the 
Iliad it continued to be used in its original Homeric context in later commentaries of the work 
and by lexiconographers, and it would have been well known to readers of Homer.
13
 During 
the Archaic period ἄποινα was also used in referring to compensation or even a reward.14 The 
multiple meanings of ἄποινα all indicate that it generally referred to a payment of some kind 
in which the receiver of the money had some sort of entitlement.
15
 Ἄποινα in reference to 
ransom was replaced by λύτρον with the verb form λύτρόω and this change in terminology 
seems to reflect a conscious disassociation with ἄποινα and its strong Homeric connotations.  
Λύτρον referred primarily to ransom rather than any secondary meaning. Herodotus makes a 
clear distinction between the ransom of individuals in using ἄποινα and the ransom of 
hundreds of Boeotians and Chalcidians in using λύτρων.16 However, apart from Herodotus 
there was no variation in terminology in relation to the number of people being ransomed. 
Other terms that may refer to ransom only do so within the specific context of captives being 
released for payment, such as the verbs διασᾠζω (to preserve) and άνασᾠζω (to restore). 
Λυτρον as conveyed by Greek sources generally refers to a payment that re-established an 
individual’s freedom. The use of λύτρον in referring to the money paid for manumission in a 
papyrus from Oxyrhynchus illustrates this concept, but stretches the definition in extending it 
to a case of manumission.
17
 In the Greek sources relevant to this study λύτρον and λύτρόω 
were primarily used in reference to ransom, rather than any other form of payment.  
                                                 
10
 Il. 1.13; 20; 23; 95; 111; 372; 377; 2.230; 6.46; 427; 9.120;11.131; 134; 19.138 (cf. Plut. Mor. 460e); 21.99; 
22.349; 24.137; 139; 276; 502; 555; 579; 594; 686. 
11
 See Pritchett 1991, 245-246 and Rüter 1092-1094 (s.v. ‘ἄποινα’ Lexikon des frühgrieschischen Epos). Also 
another appearance contemporary with Herodotus is in Eur. Rh. 164. There were, of course, some exceptions, 
see below. 
12
 Individual fugitives (Hdt. 6.79), a man and his son (Hdt. 9.120). 
13
 Ἄποινα appearing in Plato Rep. 393 is a Homeric passage as opposed to λυτρον at Rep. 393d, and Oppian 
Cynegetica 2.368 is specifically emulating Homeric style in the passage. 
14
 Compensation (Hom. Hymn Aphr. 140; 210; Aesch. Pers. 807; Ag. 1420; Pind. Isthm. 3.7; 8.4) Reward (Pind. 
Ol. 7.16; IG 14.1389i10; Pyth. 2.14; Nem. 7.16). 
15
 For example Joseph. AJ. 18.334 uses ἄποινα to refer to recompense for an injury sustained at the hands of an 
enemy (cf. Aesch. Cho. 48).  
16
 Hdt 5.77.3 καὶ τῶν λύτρων τὴν δεκάτην ἀνέθηκαν ποιησάμενοι τέθριππον χάλκεον. 
17
 P.Oxy. 48.6. 
 Chapter 3 
47 
 
In Latin the terms specifically concerning ransom are redemptio and redimo, while pretium 
referred to a payment that was not specifically a ransom. Redemptio indicated a form of 
contract, whereas redimo referred to a purchase, with redemptor referring to the redeemer 
and redemptus to the redeemed. Outside of the specific context of ransom in war, redemptio 
could apply to any contract and thus a redemptor referred more generally to anyone one who 
undertook a thing by way of contract.
18
 This later meaning was more often the one implied, 
particularly in inscriptions which identify the individual as a contractor rather than a 
redeemer.
19
 Likewise, redemptio could refer to a tie or bond as Caesar states in relation to his 
policy of borrowing from his officers to pay his soldiers: it ‘bound the officers to him by the 
obligation of interest and the soldier by a ‘tie’ of gratitude.’20 The meanings of redemptio 
seems to indicate that as an etymological root they all entail a form of agreement in which 
one party pays for services to be rendered ipso facto a contract. In most instances in which 
ransom is discussed by Roman sources the contractual nature of the ransom is often implied. 
Many of the instances of redemptio as referring to ransom occur in legal texts and so the 
contractual character of ransom is an obvious feature of the definition.  
Pretium, as noted above, denoted the payment, so that it could refer as much to a bribe as a 
ransom. However, more often in relation to a ransom ‘pretium’ was used as a term for the 
fees waivered in releasing the captives. There are eight cases in Livy alone which refer to the 
release of captives sine pretio (without a price).
21
 The qualification that prisoners were 
released without a price indicates that standard release practices may have included a 
payment of some kind. This philological inquiry into the Greek and Latin terms for ransom 
highlights a distinction that in Greek λύτρον and λύτρόω imply an act of ransom with a focus 
on the redemption of an individual or a group with an emphasis upon the captive, whereas 
redemptio implied a release for payment with the emphasis on the money there derived or the 
contract for the repayment of ransom.
22
 Furthermore, the discharge of captives sine pretio 
                                                 
18
 For example Cato De Agr. 144.3; 145; 3 refers to contractors as redemptori - and the section titles within the 
agricultural manual sometimes refer to contracts with the same vernacular Cato De Agr. 145; 146, although 
these may be later insertions. See also Cic. Att. 4.2.5; Inv. 2.96; Verr. 3.37; Liv. 34.9.12; Tac. Hist. 1.27; Vitr. 
7.5.8. 
19
 CIL 6.1265; 9034; 9852a; 9854; 14.3530 refer to contractors. 
20
 Loeb trans. Caes. B Civ. 1.39.3-4, …has exercitui distribuit. Quo facto duas res consecutus est, quod pignore 
animos centurionum devinxit, et largitione militum voluntates redemit. 
21
 Liv. 22.7.5; 22.58.2; 22.59.18; 27.19.2; 30.43.8; 31.40.4; 37.36.2; 38.51.2.b, cf. Joseph. Vit. 420-421. 
22
 As is often illustrated in Roman legal texts. For the Greek perception of Roman avarice in war, see Erskine 
1996, passim.  
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implies that captives had an obligation to pay for their release, but the typical price of release 
was waived and therefore noteworthy as such. 
The legal texts of the empire preserved in the law corpora of the Byzantine emperor Justinian 
provide us with an excellent, albeit chronologically removed, source of information regarding 
the practice of ransom; particularly a unique insight into the relationship between the 
redemptus and the redemptor. However, the legal texts are solely concerned with cases of 
Roman redempti rather than foreign captives, and so any interpretation of how redemption 
within the civil context was reflected in the redemption of foreign captives is a matter of 
supposition.
23
 Since our only source of information surrounding the process of ransom 
concerns the Greek and Roman point of view it is ultimately impossible to identify any 
unique barbarian perspectives on the topic and so we must try and piece together common 
threads of practice that passed between the Greeks and Romans indicating that the approach 
was universal, at least during the Greco-Roman periods.  
In both the Greek and Roman world the act of ransoming was seen as a virtuous deed and a 
matter of civic duty.
24
 Epigraphic evidence for this is extensive in Greece up to the period of 
Roman conquest. A prominent example is an Attic inscription which lauded the general 
Epichares in his negotiation for the ransom of his fellow Athenian citizens during the 
Chremonidean War.
25
 Many inscriptions extol the ransoming of prisoners by outside 
individuals who were then rewarded for their service, sometimes granted citizenship or 
προξενία by the captives’ polis. These actions were certainly deemed worthy of 
commemoration; Pritchett gathered no less than forty separate examples of ransoming of this 
kind in Greek inscriptions dating from the fifth to the early second century BC.
26
 Inscriptions 
for ransoming drop off by the mid second century BC in Greece and there are no Roman 
inscription examples which venerate the act of ransoming.  
 
                                                 
23
 Dig. 49.15 titled: De Captivus et de Postliminio et Redemptis ab Hostibus. Particularly relevant are Dig. 
49.15.12.8 ; 12.16 ; 15.pr ; 20.2, cf. 49.16.8.pr.  
24
 Cic. Off. 2.56 ; 63. Sen. Ben. 6.13.3-14.2. Cf. Plut. Mor. 1097c, discussed below. 
25
 SEG 24.154: 30.95 dated to 264/3 BC, see Austin 1981, n. 50. 
26
 Pritchett 1991, 272-282. A few notable examples include: a Salamite voted a crown for ransoming captives in 
Sicily c. 365/5 BC (IG 2.283), Eurylochos of Kydonia noted for ransoming Athenians in Crete in 320/19 BC 
(IG 2.399), an Athenian named Androtion awarded proxenia for ransoming Arcesian prisoners (IG 1.275), an 
unknown man granted Athenian citizenship for ransoming Athenian sailors in the Lamian War in 323 BC (IG 
2.398) and Lykiskos was praised for ransoming Athenian sailors in an inscription dated to the late 4th century 
BC (SEG 16.60),. See also Bielman 1994 passim. 
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Ransom in the Greek World and the Roman Attitude Towards Ransom  
There are a number of examples of ransom in written accounts concerning Greek warfare, 
and it was a conventional enough matter for Aristotle to remark that it was standard for a 
prisoner to be ransomed for a mina, just as a sacrifice consisted of a single goat.
27
 Ransom is 
mentioned frequently by Greek sources but not consistently throughout accounts of war. 
While instances of ransom occur regularly in Thucydides and Diodorus Siculus, there are 
only four instances of ransom mentioned by Xenophon.
28
 In both the accounts of Diodorus 
and Thucydides the ransom concerned Greek captives, likewise three of the four instances of 
ransom in Xenophon, with the fourth being notable for the size of ransom (said to be large 
enough to pay the troops wages for months). It is clear that the Greek authors and their 
audience, and their Roman counterparts, were concerned mainly with the plight of captives 
from their homelands; any further description of barbarian captives was superfluous unless it 
was extraordinary.  
Ransom as an expression of humanity is refuted by Pritchett, who only sees it as another form 
of financial opportunism.
29
 However, when compared with other possible outcomes of 
capture it must be viewed as calculated and extended by the victor to the vanquished as 
opposed to release, execution or sale into slavery, and that it was likely a decision made in 
consideration of humanitarian factors. This is not to say, however, that ransom was not 
primarily motivated by money. Indeed from the victor’s perspective there may have been 
little difference between ransom and sale into slavery, so long as a profit was realised. 
After the fall of Aegina to the Romans in 207 BC, Polybius states that the commander 
Publius Sulpicius
30
 had first denied a request by the captured Aeginetans to send for ransom 
from their kinsmen. However, the next day he had a change of heart and allowed them to do 
so, saying “it was for the sake of the rest of the Greeks that he would allow for ambassadors 
to be sent for ransom, as it was the custom of their country.”31 Sulpicius’ remark was 
certainly an invention of Polybius, but considering that one of the author’s arching themes in 
                                                 
27
 Arist. NE. 5.7.1.1134B. 
28
 Xen. Hel. 4.8.21; 6.2.36; 7.2.16. Xen. Anab. 7.8.23 possibly refers to ransom in the capture of Aidates and his 
family. In each instance Xenophon was in desperate need of funds and was able to acquire the shortfall 
through proceeds derived from ransom. 
29
 Pritchett 1991, 245. 
30
 Publius Sulpicius Galba Maximus listed as consul in 211 BC. 
31
 Polyb. 9.42.8 τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν Ἑλλήνων ἕνεκα συγχωρεῖν ἔφη πρεσβεύειν περὶ τῶν λύτρων, ἐπεὶ τοῦτο παρ᾽ 
αὐτοῖς ἔθος ἐστίν. See Garlan 1987, 13-15 regarding this ‘antidote’ to enslavement. 
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his work was to explain Roman military and diplomatic practices to a Greek audience, it is 
not without factual basis.
32
  
It is clear that the concession allowing the Aeginetans to send for their ransom was not a 
typical Roman practice. As Welwei has suggested, the decision of Sulpicius was probably 
one of financial and strategic opportunity,
33
 as it allowed him to increase his war chest 
quickly and continue to exert pressure upon the allies of Philip. However, the speech alludes 
to an ingrained Roman mentality in which ransoming was a foreign concept. This disdain was 
deeply rooted in Roman history. After the sack of Rome in 390/387 BC
34
 the Romans paid a 
ransom to the Gauls in order to redeem the city from them. The events of the actual Gallic 
sack and the ransom are unclear,
35
 and it is as much a mythical tradition as an historical fact. 
But the reconstruction of the events by later writers left its mark on the Roman attitude 
towards ransom. Earlier traditions
36
 put the return of Rome down to the intervention of the 
Etruscan city of Caere and the general Lucius Albinus,
37
 who accordingly saved the Vestal 
Virgins and returned the ransom to the Romans after defeating the Gauls.
38
 
The disgrace associated with the sack of Rome and subsequent ransom reverberated in 
Roman historiography.
39
 Regardless of whether the sack actually resulted in ransom, as 
related by our sources, it is undoubtedly a feature of the traditional Roman character (at least 
a rhetorical notion) to have an aversion towards ransom. Of course this aversion was wrapped 
up with military loss and was expressed only from the perspective of Romans ransoming 
themselves. There is no evidence that this distaste for ransom extended to foreign captives. A 
prime example of this disregard for the ransom of their own captives came in the wake of the 
battle of Cannae in 216 BC, as related by Livy.
40
 After the crushing defeat the remaining 
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 Cf. Ziolkowski 1993, 74; Walbank 1967b, 216. 
33
 Welwei 2000, 120. 
34
 The exact date varies between sources. 
35
 It is impossible identify the definitive account of the sack, we have the first century historians (Diod Sic. 
14.113-116; Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 13.6-9; Liv. 5.39-48, followed later by Gell. NA 5.17), see Beloch 1926, 
311f; Williams 2001, 140-84. 
36
 According to Plutarch Cam. 22.3, and as related by Arist. Fr. 568 (Rose); Theopompus FGrH 115.317 and 
Pliny HN.3.57. 
37
 The importance of the Roman-Caere relationship and the historical context of Gallic and Syracusan 
involvement in central Italy was argued by Sordi 1960, 62-72. 
38
 Strabo 5.2.3, see Venning & Drinkwater 2011, 58-9. 
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 Traditional viewpoint of derision towards captives is expressed in Seneca Controv. 5.7; Plut. Fab. Max. 7.4.5. 
40
 Liv. 22.50-61. An alternative narrative of the captive envoy is acknowledged by Liv 22.61.5. This seems to 
follow the narrative preserved in App. Hann. 28. The main difference is the envoys were numbered at three 
rather than ten. Appian’s narrative is less detailed and he is perhaps using Gaius Acilius for his Hannibalic 
War, who wrote during the mid second century in Greek, as a source (Cic. Off. 3.115), see Foster 1929, 411 
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Romans retreated to two separate camps. Rather than break through the Carthaginian lines in 
the night the smaller of the two camps surrendered to Hannibal the next morning in the hopes 
of being ransomed. Hannibal selected ten representatives from the captives to bring the 
proposal of ransom to the Senate. It is in the speech of the envoy and the scathing response 
by Titus Manlius Torquatus that we find all angles of sentiment associated with ransoming.
41
 
Both the captive’s envoy and Torquatus reaffirm that ransom was traditionally held in low 
regards by the Roman state. In the opening remark to the Senate, the envoy states, “None of 
us is unaware that no state ever held prisoners of war in less esteem than ours.”42 Likewise in 
addressing the Senate in the debate Torquatus remarks, “For what else need I have done than 
warn you to hold fast to the tradition of our fathers and teach a lesson necessary for military 
discipline?”43 The expression of the traditional value against ransom is expected of Torquatus 
by the audience since he was of a patrician gens with a distinguished history and he embodied 
the conservative element of the Senate.
44
 The traditional sentiment towards ransom is 
reaffirmed in Livy as acknowledged in the opening address of the envoy. Both capture and 
ransom are associated with cowardice, therefore the envoy endeavoured to argue against the 
charge of cowardice to persuade for ransom.
45
 To deny the charge of cowardice the envoy 
stated that the captured Romans did fight well, instead of escaping or running they had stood 
and fought the enemy. He further affirmed that, if ransomed, they would fight again, and 
should they be denied ransom it would not be on the basis of financial concern, but rather due 
to a charge of cowardice that would forever mark them with dishonour.
46
 To try and persuade 
the Senate the envoy also reminded them that a ransom had been paid by Rome before, when 
the city had been captured by the Gauls and when captives were redeemed after the battle of 
Heraclea.
47
 The purpose of this comparison was to emphasise that their actions were not 
cowardly when compared to earlier defeats that resulted in ransom. The speaker of the 
                                                                                                                                                        
n.3. Livy’s narrative is perhaps derived from Fabius Pictor, who was a contemporary of the events, but likely 
away from Rome at the time of the debate having been sent by the Senate to consult the oracle at Delphi, Liv. 
22.57.4. 
41
 Speech of envoy (Liv. 22.59f.). Response of Torquatus (Liv. 22.60.6-27). 
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 Liv. 22.59.1 Loeb trans. nostrum ignorat nulli unquam civitati viliores fuisse captivos quam nostrae. 
43
 Liv. 22.60.7 Loeb trans. Quid enim aliud quam admonendi essetis ut morem traditum a patribus neccessario 
ad rem militarem exemplo servaretis? 
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 Torquatus descended from the early 4
th
 century consul Marcus Manlius Capitolinus and Titus Manlius 
Torquatus who was thrice consul and thrice dictator in the mid fourth century. Torquatus was himself consul 
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 Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 19.13.1. 
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embassy related that in the comparative examples the Romans had taken to flight, whereas 
they had stayed put. Conversely, it is exactly this point that Torquatus argues against, 
believing that the Cannae captives acted as cowards; rather then attempt an escape they chose 
to be captured trusting in the safer option rather than what he deemed the only valiant 
option.
48
  
The Senate was divided over the issue of ransoming the Cannae captives. Livy listed the 
different positions held by the Senate which may be used to identify the range of possibilities 
in ransoming captives.
49
 Apart from the point of view of Torquatus, some wished to ransom 
the captives at state expense, others that they should be ransomed at private expense, and 
others still that the ransom should be conducted privately, but allowing the treasury to be 
used for loans provided there was collateral.
50
 The suggestion of such options shows that the 
Romans could, if the circumstances were severe enough, carry out large scale ransom at the 
state level. Despite the serious predicament the Romans found themselves in after the battle 
of Cannae, which depleted their military strength and brought Hannibal to their doorstep, 
they still refused to ransom the soldiers and so the refusal has continued to stand as a 
testament to traditional Roman honour and virtue. The rejection of the ransom proposal was 
made despite the fact that a similar number of slaves were armed at an equal expense to the 
ransom price.
51
 The Senate’s reply was based on the fact that they did not wish to diminish 
their treasury whilst simultaneously increasing Hannibal’s purse.52 Polybius explains the 
strategy behind Hannibal’s decision to offer the Roman captives for ransom as to diminish 
the Roman soldiers’ resolve for fighting through the hope of redemption after surrender.53 
Likewise, the Senate had previously denied a ransom to the 247 extra prisoners in the 
exchange of captives with the Carthaginians after the Battle of Trasimene in 217 BC on the 
grounds that they did not wish to expend money on soldiers they deemed unworthy.
54
 
According to the Digesta, in an excerpt attributed to the unknown author Macer, soldiers who 
‘went into slavery’ were to be capitally punished. This rule probably applied to soldiers who 
                                                 
48
 Liv. 22.60.9-27. 
49
 Liv. 22.60.3-4, cf. Polyb. 6.58; App. Hann. 28. 
50
 Liv. 22.60.3-4; see also App. Hann. 28. 
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 Polyb. 6.58.9. 
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sold themselves into slavery, but it is symptomatic of the Roman response towards soldiers 
falling into slavery.
55
  
Contrary to the prevailing sentiment against ransom, the Romans did allow for exchanges and 
even lauded, to some extent, private ransom. Livy states that Hannibal and Fabius followed 
the custom of the First Punic War in which prisoners were exchanged and if the numbers 
were unequal a ransom would be paid to cover the discrepancy.
56
 Earlier a prisoner exchange 
was voted upon in the Senate and an envoy was sent to bring about an exchange with Pyrrhus 
in 279 BC, and failing an exchange a ransom was to be offered.
57
 Unlike ransom, prisoner 
exchanges did not receive the same hostile response from the conservative elements of 
Roman politics. On several occasions an exchange was allowed for
58
 which hints at a more 
widespread practice of retaining captives for the purpose of arranging an exchange. The 
captives who had been exchanged seemed to have been spared the disdain that soldiers who 
surrendered normally suffered, as had happened after Cannae. Soldiers were, as a matter of 
course, expected to be victorious or die.
59
 
 
Ransom by Private Persons 
On a more personal level the act of ransoming, on the part of the redemptor, was seen as 
virtuous. Both Cicero and Seneca agreed that the act of ransoming should be considered a 
generous deed, regardless of whether the redemptor profited by the ransom or not.
60
 To 
ransom a fellow citizen (as implied by Seneca and Cicero) was a good deed, but to do so 
without expectation of repayment was an exceptional act of liberality.
61
 The Ransom of a 
member of one’s familia, on the other hand, was to be expected and it was done without the 
complications of indebtedness associated with the redemption of strangers. The responsibility 
of a pater familias for the welfare of his familia included ransoming them from the enemy, as 
a master replies positively in a play of Plautus to the question posed by his slave, “suppose I 
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fall into an ambuscade, would you redeem me, if enemies caught me?”62 Outside of the 
traditional family we find that ‘close’ relations were still the most common redempti as 
shown by courtesans and prostitutes being frequently ransomed.
63
 
In another play of Plautus, the Captivi, the plot develops from a scene in which a father is 
buying up newly acquired captives in the hopes of acquiring his son.
64
 The play, though 
fictitious and set in Greece, is telling in the manner of how the elderly man attempted to find 
his son. The captives were already slaves, purchased abroad and brought back to Aetolia. 
This implies that an agent was purchasing the slaves abroad in the hope that one of them 
would be his client’s son, but was unaware of the identity of the captives he bought. In Rome 
captives purchased as ‘slaves’ should they have been an ingenuus homo liber (free man with 
legal rights over himself) prior to capture could be redeemed by their redemptor through 
postliminium (the resumption of civic rights after a period of suspension) rather than 
manumission. Enslavement it seems was not always an end result; there was hope of 
redemption even after being sold as a slave. 
 
Ransom of non-Roman Captives 
Instances of non-Roman captives being ransomed are, on a whole, rarer than instances of 
Roman captives, and detailed examples of non-Roman ransom are even rarer still, but there 
are enough examples to indicate a similar trend in ransom to that of Roman domestic 
practices.
65
 Livy relates an episode in which Locrian artisans were captured by Roman 
soldiers and brought to Rhegium where they were recognised by fellow Locrians and 
ransomed by them. In this case the resident Locrians were able to convince Scipio to allow 
them to ransom their compatriots in order to hatch a plan of subterfuge against the 
Carthaginians in Locri.
66
 The Locrians, having seen fellow countrymen in captivity may have 
felt a sense of duty to ransom them; unfortunately any liberality is masked by the motive of 
regaining their city from the Carthaginians. When the Romans seized Panormus in 254 BC, a 
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ransom was set at two minas per person; this ransom must have been produced by friends or 
relatives of the Panormans since the Romans had taken possession of all their goods.
67
  
In the case of a Gallic woman named Chimora we find textual evidence that ransom on a 
personal level occurred, perhaps even being arranged individually between a specific captor 
and redemptor. Chimora was given to a Roman centurion as a reward for his bravery in the 
battle at Mt. Olympus in 189 BC. The centurion kept the woman for personal entertainment, 
but once confronted with the opportunity of financial gain from a ransom offered by her 
husband, he agreed to a deal. However, during the exchange the redeemers slew the centurion 
at the behest of the captive woman because he had violated her.
68
 Livy states that the 
centurion was of a disreputable character and agreed to the ransom for the sake of greed, 
suggesting that it was against his better judgement or perhaps contrary to the rules or 
regulations of individual prisoner exchange. Tacitus states that the heads of Galba’s consular 
colleague Vinius and his heir Piso were ransomed, from those who took them, by the 
relatives of the beheaded conspirators.
69
 That some form of permission by the commander 
was necessary in redeeming prisoners is expressed in Josephus. After the sack of Jerusalem in 
AD 70, Josephus was granted permission by Titus to go amongst the captives and select those 
he personally knew for release. Josephus states that he “took no ransom for their release and 
restored them to their former fortune.”70 In the same year Josephus encountered three men he 
knew who were crucified. He petitioned Titus to have them released, and though two died a 
third apparently survived. It is not clear if the man was freed or if Josephus requested a 
ransom from him for his release.
71
 In the two examples of Josephus permission needed to be 
granted before a release could be secured; of course Josephus was not a Roman soldier, and 
was himself a prisoner. Yet it seems most likely that a prisoner’s ransom required either the 
approval of a commander or specific ownership as in the case of captives granted specifically 
to troops as booty.
72
  
 Those enslaved could be ransomed en masse after a conflict, either being recovered by their 
own forces or by friendly nations. Following the sack of Dyme in 199 BC the Romans sold 
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the captives as slaves. However Philip V was later able to recover many of the captives by 
ordering that they be ransomed from their owners and restored to their homes.
73
 Antiochus 
III, after gaining control of Lysimacheia, noticed that it was nearly deserted because most of 
its inhabitants had been captured and sold as slaves by the Thracians. He thus set about 
rebuilding the city and ransoming the Lysimacheans who had been sold as slaves in the 
area.
74
 Likewise, Sulla restored the citizens of Rhodes and a number of Anatolian cities after 
recovering them from Mithridates VI.
75
 The Romans on several occasions made explicit 
attempts to recover captive soldiers,
76
 and their outward expansion and victories in all major 
conflicts allowed them to do so. From the examples above it is evident that large scale 
recovery of captives was mostly limited to the benevolence of third parties or lulls in conflict 
whilst the opponent of Rome could still draw upon resources to attempt a large recovery, 
either financially or militarily.  
The statement by ancient authors that a ransom was not requested in releasing captives hints 
at a widespread practice by the Romans of gaining a ransom in releasing prisoners or whole 
communities from captivity. Livy states that after the sack of New Carthage Scipio sent away 
the Spanish natives that were captured there without ransom.
77
 Likewise, the free citizens of 
Pelium were similarly dismissed by the Romans,
78
 and Brutus freed the captives of many 
Lycian strongholds without ransom.
79
 In these instances, though the Roman commander 
pursued an alternative course of action, he was within his right to demand a ransom. In some 
instances the lack of ransom may have been a conscious political device. In the 
aforementioned cases of Scipio, Caesar and Brutus gaining the support of those shown 
leniency was certainly behind their decisions. Likewise, Hannibal tried to win over Rome’s 
Italian allies by showing them clemency when captured.
80
  
The opportunity to be ransomed was, at times, presented by the captors to the captives, as 
seen by the Romans after the sack of Perusia, Panormus, Casilinum, Aigina and Carystus, and 
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by the Carthaginians after Trebia, Trasimene and Cannae.
81
 In these cases the captives were 
either able to send envoys to neighbouring cities or their respective governments in order to 
secure the city’s entire release, and in some cases a neighbouring city came to their aid.82 
More common was an agreement for remuneration following release; in these cases the 
capture of a town was not necessary. During the civil war that followed Caesar’s 
assassination, we find two examples which contrasted each other in Brutus’ actions in Lycia 
and Cassius’ actions in Rhodes. Brutus invested the cities of Patara and Xanthus, and 
following their capture he was able to gain the surrender of the Lycians for the sum of 150 
talents, whereas Cassius simply strong armed the Rhodians into giving up all of their gold 
and silver without sacking any cities.
83
 Wholesale ransom was little different than an 
indemnity in that both were a remittance for what the victor could otherwise take. This can be 
seen in the example of Cercina (also known as Menix - modern Djerba) in which the 
inhabitants paid a ransom of ten talents to prevent the Romans from further ravaging their 
island.
84
 Both ransoms and indemnities served to enrich the victor whilst preserving the 
liberty of the vanquished. Ransom was a negotiation in which the victorious held the upper 
hand and the defeated always had the threat of slavery should the victor choose not to accede 
to a ransom. 
In other cases the ransom of captives seems to have been arranged on a personal basis, as 
with the Gallic woman Chimora. The manner of effecting a ransom reflected the practice of 
pirates, who made a point of informing the captive’s possible redemptor.85 It was of course 
necessary for a redemptor to be informed of someone’s captivity as well as the terms of the 
ransom, especially the price. It seems that individuals could arrange their own ransom, 
possibly even after being sold. An analogy for the perspective of one being ransomed is 
depicted in a play of Terence, in which advice is given to a love-struck young man, “Ransom 
yourself from captivity as cheaply as you can; if you are unable to do it for a small price, then 
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strike the best deal you can and stop worrying yourself.”86 The analogy highlights the 
predicament a captive was in regarding their own ransom, which was ultimately determined 
by the captor; there may have been at least some leeway. After all a ransom that was 
impossible to reach was not going to be successful. There must have been some valuation, 
over which the captive themselves could exert a limited influence. In the case of Julius 
Caesar he increased his own ransom amount, but Caesar was not alone in captivity, several of 
his attendants captured with him were sent off to raise the exorbitant ransom.
87
  
The value of individuals could identify them as better targets of ransom rather than 
enslavement. Likewise, high value captives were held in the hopes of regaining important 
captives from the enemy. During the First Punic War, the Roman commander Atilius Regulus 
was captured by the Carthaginians. Dio states that the Carthaginians sent him as an envoy 
with the hopes of establishing a peace, and if not to at least ransom many Carthaginian troops 
with him since he was of consular rank.
88
 But the Romans famously refused the terms and so 
Regulus was returned to the Carthaginians to be executed.
89
  
A universally recognised standard of ransom is evident in the process of prisoner exchanges. 
The highly valued Carthaginian captive Hanno was swapped for Massinissa’s mother.90 In 
general a fighting man of one nation was worth that of another, the exception being cavalry 
for which an equal exchange was probably sought.
91
 The value of prisoners was best 
expressed by the price of their ransom, of course being weighed against the possibility of 
their meeting the demand, and accordingly, in both Greece and Rome, a standard ransom 
price seems to have emerged for captives.  
 
Ransom Prices 
There are a number of specific examples of ransom prices for common soldiers in Greece, 
again collected by Pritchett.
92
 At the end of the sixth century the Athenians captured a 
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number of Chalcidian and Boeotian soldiers who were then ransomed at 2 minae apiece, 
roughly 200 Athenian drachmae at the exchange of 100 drachmae per mina.
93
 This price 
corresponded with a later statement by Herodotus that two minae was the standard price of 
ransom amongst the Peloponnesians at the time.
94
 A century later, the Spartans organised a 
prisoner exchange with the Athenians, with the excess individuals ransomed for a single mina 
apiece.
95
 In 390 BC 1,000 Thurians escaped from a battle lost to the Lucanians by swimming 
to Syracusan ships. The Syracusan commander Leptines negotiated a ransom of one mina 
(100 drachmae) per Thurian and even offered himself as surety.
96
 Four years later Leptines’ 
brother Dionysius I allowed for a ransom of a mina (100 drachmae) per Rhegian captive, 
those unable to meet the ransom were sold into slavery.
97
 In the middle of the fourth century 
Athenian captives who were captured at Olynthus by Philip II were out on bail (ἐγγύη) at 
Pella and wished to borrow their ransom money which ranged from 3-5 minae (300-500 
drachmae).
98
 Another century on, in 264/3 BC, the Athenian general Epichares arranged a 
ransom of prisoners set at 120 drachmae, and he was able to further stipulate that those 
unable to pay the ransom were not to be sold abroad and their slaves were not to be killed.
99
  
Due to the relative stability of the Atttic drachma from the end of the sixth to the third 
century a reasonable average can be formed from the examples in which specific figures for 
ransom are given.
100
 The average (mean) thus derived during the Peloponnesian War was 164 
drachmae, which sits nicely between Aristotle’s reference to the average price of a mina (100 
drachmae) and Herodotus’ statement that 2 minae secured ransom during the Peloponnesian 
War.
101
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*Outlier not considered in calculating the average. 
High ransom prices were of course remarkable and so we find a number of examples of 
payments that seem incredibly high. At the end of the fourth century the Rhodians captured a 
number of ships off their shore belonging to Antigonus I, the crews were brought into the city 
and those who could pay a ransom were held rather than enslaved, since an arrangement with 
Antigonus’ son Demetrius had been made in which free captives would be ransomed for 
1,000 drachmae each and slaves for half as much.
103
 In most cases high ransom prices for 
large numbers of captives corresponded with a need to secure a diplomatic deal. Thus Nikias 
suggested that a single Athenian captive should be given as hostage for each talent to be paid 
to the Syracusans. Earlier in 427 BC the Corinthians had allowed 250 Corcyrans to be 
released on bail upon the payment of 800 talents, which equates to roughly three talents per 
captive.
104
 Similarly the ransom of notable individuals fetched a far higher price, and it is for 
these reasons that exceptionally high ransoms should be ignored in relation to typical ransom 
prices for ordinary captives. When Nikostratos, for example, was seized and sold as a slave 
his ransom was arranged at over four talents by his brother.
105
 Likewise, after Diopeithes had 
                                                 
102
 Hostages suggested to be given at a rate of 1 man per talent. An Athenian talent was worth 60 minae and a 
minae was worth 100 drachmae. 
103
 Diod. Sic. 20.84.6. See also Paus. 1.6.6. 
104
 Thuc. 3.70.1. 
105
 Dem. 53 Against Nikostratos 6-10. See Pritchett 1991, 248-9. 
Reference Date Detail Price (pp 
drachmae) 
Hdt. 5.77 505 BC Ransom 200 
Thuc 7.83.2 413 BC As collateral 6,000
102
 
FGrH 324 408/7 BC Ransom 100 
Demosthenes 19  
Embassy 169 
 Bail 300-500
 
Aischines 2  
Embassy 100 
 Ransom 6,000* 
Diod. Sic. 14.102.2 390 BC Ransom 100 
Diod. Sic. 14.111.4 386 BC Ransom 100 
SEG 24.154; 30.95 264/3 BC Ransom 120 
I. Greek Ransom Prices 
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seized several towns in Thrace and took a number of captives, an ambassador named 
Amphilochus was sent to negotiate their release, but Diopeithes seized the ambassador and 
was able to settle a ransom of nine talents for his release.
106
 Ransoms of important individuals 
could easily exceed a talent, as Aeschines relates, regarding the amount carried by 
Demosthenes to ransom any unfortunates, “a single talent could ransom many captives but it 
was only sufficient to ransom a single known man and not one of any note.”107 
In Rome an average price for ransom during any period is more difficult to determine, as 
there are no statements hinting at a relative standard like that of Herodotus or Aristotle. The 
examples of ransom in which a specific sum for ransom is known are few in number. When 
coupled with the price of ransom set by the Carthaginians in the First and Second Punic Wars 
there is, at least, an indication that ransom prices were close enough that an acceptable and 
pertinent average can be made. 
The earliest price for the ransom of common soldiers occurs during the Third Samnite War, 
following a battle near Clusium, where 1,740 prisoners were ransomed for 310 asses per 
person.
108
 The figure is surprisingly low, only equating to 31 denarii of the second century 
BC standard.
109
 In 254 BC the citizens of Panormus were ransomed at 2 minae apiece, with 
only half the population capable of meeting the demands.
110
 It seems that there was no effort 
to pool the community’s resources and so the un-ransomed were sold to traders. The 
difference between the two prices is remarkable given the relatively short passage of time 
between them; the citizens of Panormus were ransomed at almost seven times the price of the 
captured Samnites. It is difficult to draw any conclusions from only two episodes, but it may 
be that financial gain was not the primary motive behind the Samnite ransom. Perhaps 
humiliation, as seen in the process of passing under the yoke, was intended.
111
  
                                                 
106
 Dem. 12 Philip 3. 
107
 Loeb trans. Aeschin. 2.100 πολλῶν δ᾽ ἠτυχηκότων τάλαντον φέρων, ἑνὸς ἀνδρός, οὐδὲ τούτου λίαν εὐπόρου, 
ἱκανὰ λύτρα. 
108
 Liv. 10.31.3 Clusium was a city of the Etruscan Perusini. 
109
 The as was the standard coin of the Republic probably until the Second Punic War, see Woytek 2012, 315-
316. Although mint production of silver coins occurred early on, beginning in the early third century, the 
precise date of the introduction of the denarius as a standard is debatable; the earliest date for the transition to 
the silver standard is in the 260’s BC made by Ronchi 1998 46; 51-52. Pliny HN. 33.44 sets the reform at 269 
BC. The latest date for the reform was 189 BC favoured by Mattingly & Robinson 1932, 211-66. However, 
most scholars favour a date in the midst of the Second Punic war with little agreement on the exact year, see 
Crawford 1974, 28-35; 1998, 121; Hollstein 2008, 42-44; Loomis 1996, 347; Woytek 2012, 316. 
110
 Diod. Sic. 23.18.5. Cf. Flor. 1.18.12; Polyb. 1.38.9-10. 
111
 See Chapter 2. 
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During the Second Punic War Livy informs us that in keeping with the custom of the First 
Punic war Carthage and Rome agreed to an equal exchange of prisoners with the excess 
being ransomed at a price of 2.5 lbs of silver (210 denarii).
112
 In cases where a previous 
arrangement did not apply, or there was perhaps the opportunity for leverage, the price of 
ransom could rise significantly. After Cannae, Hannibal offered the Romans the opportunity 
to ransom back their soldiers at a rate of 500 chariot pieces (quadrigati, roughly 750 denarii) 
for cavalrymen, 300 (450 denarii) for foot soldiers and, 200 (300 denarii) for allied 
soldiers.
113
 The price was almost double that of the going rate which was agreed during the 
exchange. Likewise the garrison at Casilinum were ransomed at 7/12 lb of gold per man 
(approximately 580 denarii each).
114
 It seems these two examples represent the high end, 
since only the year before Fabius was able to arrange for Roman captives captured at Trebia 
to be exchanged at a rate of 250 drachmae each.
115
 During the Second Macedonian War the 
Romans allowed for the Macedonian garrison at Carystus to be ransomed at a rate of 300 
nummi per head.
116
 With such a variance in denominations and the scope of figures it is hard 
to establish an average, which in any case would be of little use. But it may be noted that the 
high price of the ransom after Cannae, as indicated by the Senate’s deliberation over the 
money, suggests lower figures of around 200 and 300 denarii were closer to any perceived 
standard or average. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
112
 84 denarii per lb of silver up to at least 50 BC, Suet. Iul. 54. The denarius was nominally set at 96 denarii per 
lb of silver during the empire (first century AD onwards), Plin. HN. 33.46; Celsus 5.17.1. 
113
 Liv. 22.58.4. Silver was not standardised until the denarius was introduced in 211 BC (for the 3rd century BC 
Frank 1933 I, 101 gives an estimate of 1.5 denarius per quadrigatus. Cf. Polyb. 6.58.5 who says the Roman 
captives were offered at an exchange of 3 minae each (450 denarii). 
114
 Liv. 23.19.15-16. A pound of gold was worth 1,000 denarii based on the principle that an aureus was 
equivalent to 25 denarii and weighed approximately 1/40 of a pound when it was standardised by Julius 
Caesar, see Buttrey 1961, 40 n. 5.  
115
 Plut. Fab. Max. 7.4; Liv 22.23.6, Cf. Del Mar 2000, 31. 
116
 Liv. 32.17.2.  
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When prices for ransom are compared with rough estimates of average contemporary slave 
prices we find that ransom prices were lower. Though slave prices varied considerably, for 
unskilled workers a range, and thus, an average can be identified. A.H.M Jones suggested an 
average price for a slave miner at Athens in the early fourth century BC based on a passage in 
Xenophon, in which he recommended for the state to get into the business of buying and 
                                                 
117
 295 BC is earlier than the earliest estimate of when the denarius was introduced and so it is hard to 
approximate its valuation. Until the coinage reform of 133 the as was set at 1/10 of a denarius and after the 
reform to 1/16. I chose the earlier, since the 1/16 rate would only further emphasise the low figure of ransom. 
118
 The drachma and denarius were based on silver and so a talent which was equivalent to 100 lbs of silver 
equated to 6,000 drachmae and 8,400 denarii (up to 50 BC) respectively. I’ve adjusted the denarius to 
drachma exchange to 1.5, see Meadows & Williams 2001, 37f. 
119
 Three minae per soldier. 
120
 A nummus before 190 BC refers to the silver didrachma of southern Italy and post 190 BC to the Roman 
denarius. Here I take it as referring to the denarius of Livy’s day so that the nummus was just an 
interchangeable denomination in his text. Nummus may also refer to money as in the denomination value of a 
coin, for example denarius nummus Pliny HN 33.3, see Milne 1933, 215-17. 
 
 
Reference Date  Detail Price (pp denarii)  
 
 
 
Liv. 10.31.3 295 BC  Ransom 31
117
 
Diod. Sic. 23.18.5 254 BC  Ransom 240
118
 
Liv. 22.23.6 217 BC  Ransom 210 
Plut. Fab. Max. 
7.4;  
Liv 22.23.6 
217 BC  Ransom 300 
Liv. 22.58.4 
 
 
 
Polyb. 6.58.5 
216 BC            Ransom  
 – Cavalryman 
 – Foot Soldier 
 – Allied Soldier 
Roman Soldiers 
 
750 
450
 
300 
450
119
 
Liv. 23.19.16 216 BC  Ransom 583 
Liv. 32.17.2 198 BC  Ransom 300
120
 
Liv. 34.50.6 194 BC  Buy Back 500 
II. Roman Ransom Prices 
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leasing slaves to work the silver mines.
121
 He calculated that with an initial corps of 1,200 
slaves the profits from their labour (increasing annually with additional slaves), if put solely 
into the purchase of new slaves, would allow for the state to accumulate 6,000 slaves in five 
or six years (not allowing for amortisation). Jones calculated, based on the profit realised, that 
these slaves were estimated to cost in the region of 125-150 drachmae. Jones estimated that 
skilled labourers could fetch far higher prices - between 300 and 500 drachmae based on the 
average price found form the Delphic manumission records, where 72% list a sale between 3 
– 5 minae (58% 3-4 minae). We have several references which suggest that a similar average 
price was recognised. This figure agrees with other estimates, Demosthenes states that in the 
fourth century BC a slave could sell for between 2 and 2.5 minae
122
 (200-250 drachmae). The 
difference in price between those mentioned by Xenophon and Demosthenes is that 
Xenophon referred to miners and Demosthenes probably to agricultural workers; Jones has 
suggested that miners would have fetched a lower price than farmers. A good example of 
how the ransom was below that of the market slave price is the case of the Roman captives 
bought back from their Greek captors in 194 BC at the orders of Flamininus for a price of 500 
denarii each, presumably to compensate the owners of the Roman captives.
123
 In the case of 
the Cannae captives, the envoy had argued that it would have been less costly to ransom the 
captives than purchasing and arming slaves to replace them.
124
  
While market prices for slaves may have been higher than ransom prices, the wholesale price 
of captives enslaved and sold to the traders following the army must have been lower. For 
example in 414/13 BC 16 slaves were confiscated and auctioned at an average of 160 
drachmas each,
125
 a price much lower than that suggested for skilled labourers in the Delphic 
inscriptions. Indeed Jones remarked “slave merchants could hardly have made a profit unless 
they acquired their wares for nothing or next to nothing and sold them very rapidly.”126 
Josephus remarks on the overabundance of slaves and the low prices caused by mass 
enslavements in the Jewish war.
127
 Likewise, the surfeit of Sardinian captives may have led to 
the phrase Sardi venales (Sardinians for sale) in reference to anything that was overabundant 
                                                 
121
 Jones 1956, 188-9, based on Xen. Vect. 4.23 See also the comments of Jones regarding average slave prices 
in Rome, 1960, 9-10. Cf. Hopkins 1978, 110 n. 23. 
122
 Dem. 41.8; 53.1. 
123
 Liv. 34.50.6. 
124
 Liv. 22.57.12; stated by the envoy 22.59.12. See also Sen. Controv. 5.7; Cic. Off. 3.114; Macrob. Sat. 
1.11.31; Isid. De vir. ill. 9.3.  
125
 Todd 1948, 79. 
126
 Jones 1960, 7. 
127
 Joseph. BJ 6.386. 
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in the market and low in price, a trader might entice a buyer with the phrase ‘cheap as a 
Sardinian.’128 Either outcome, ransom or sale into slavery, meant the Romans could acquire a 
large amount of money through the capture of cities. Frank estimated that the proceeds from 
wars occurring between 264-220 BC equated to approximately 8,000 talents of silver (40 
million denarii) 5.8% of this came from the ransom of Panormus alone and we can assume 
that less than that came from the 13,000 sold into slavery from Palermo so that between 6 and 
10% of the silver gained in fifty years came from a single siege.
129
 Such a large figure, 
though heavily rounded, indicates that the ransom of captives made significant contribution 
to the Roman purse.  
Despite the overwhelming examples of Roman conquest few clear instances of ransom can be 
found. Though this indicates a lack of interest on the part of the Roman military in initiating 
ransom it does not exclude the fact that ransom could be carried out on a more personal level, 
most likely between the slavers and advocates for the captives. As seen in the case of pirates, 
slavery and ransom can go hand in hand. The low prices created by mass enslavement 
allowed slavers to purchase their wares at little cost and so ransoms may have been sought 
later when the dust of conquest had settled. Inevitably a trader could see a gain from his 
purchase, for if a ransom demand fell through, sale into slavery was always an option. 
 
The Process of Ransom 
As with the majority of sources concerning ransom, the focus is entirely upon Romans made 
captive, which makes the construction of the legal circumstances and status regarding foreign 
captives conditional upon the Romans regarding foreign captives in the same manner as they 
regarded their own, at least in law. So far, much has been said about the Roman opinion of 
ransom and the practice behind it according to Roman law, with the intention of forming a 
basic picture of how it applied to foreign captives. But there is an obvious point to be made 
here: that it was possible for Roman citizens to be captured in war and returned within the 
confines of the empire, not as free men through postliminium, but rather as slaves or as 
redempti, and so it seems practical to treat both instances within a single section. 
It is not clear whether Romans could be enslaved during civil wars during the Republic, but it 
is evident from later jurists that, by at least the second century AD, Romans could not be 
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 Aur. Vict. De vir. ill. 65, cf. Festus Lindsay 1913, 322. See Chapter 6. 
129
 Frank 1933 I, 74-75. Diod. Sic. 23.18f. 
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enslaved as a result of Roman military action; reduction in civil war was considered an act of 
piracy or brigandage.
130
 An instance recorded in Tacitus is problematic in this regard because 
it is clear that Roman citizens were taken with the intention of being sold. After the second 
battle of Bedriacum in AD 69, in which Vespasian’s lieutenant Antonius defeated Vitellian 
troops, Antonius’ troops sacked the neighbouring city of Cremona. There a number of the 
citizens were taken prisoner and a proclamation was soon made by Antonius banning the 
detention (detineo) of the prisoners. The proclamation was in agreement with Italian doctrine 
as Tacitus goes on to say, because Italy “despised the buying of such purchases.”131 The 
soldiers, frustrated by the inability to sell their captives, began to slaughter the enemy, which 
resulted in the friends and relatives of the captives secretly ransoming them.
132
 Tacitus 
suggests that the action of the soldiers to sell Roman citizens as slaves or to ransom them was 
not sanctioned by Roman law; however the realities of war, particularly with mortal threats, 
could bend the rules in the victor’s favour.133 The enslavement of Roman citizens upon 
Roman soil had always been a contentious issue. In some cases of punishment a freedman 
could be reduced to a slave (servus poenae),
134
 or a free man could sell himself into 
slavery.
135
 Slavery for debt brought about complex legal issues and the status of an individual 
in debt bondage was not quite that of a slave. During the fifth and fourth centuries BC a form 
of quasi servitude known as nexum arose in which the debtor entered a contract in which they 
pledged their labour to the creditor, but this was later abolished because of the abuses 
suffered by the nexi.
136
 Likewise, captives who were ransomed became indebted to their 
redemptor, but were not necessarily considered slaves, as these had to be ‘purchased.’137 The 
legal controversies surrounding the enslavement of fellow Romans can be traced to the 
Twelve Tables in which Romans enslaved for debts were to be sold outside Rome (trans 
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 Cf. Buckland 1908, 292. Cod. Iust. 7.14.4; Dig. 49.15.19.2; 21.1; 24.  
131
 Tac. Hist. 3.34 emptionem talium mancipiorum aspernantis. 
132
 Tac. Hist. 3.34. 
133
 It should be noted that sometimes in civil war the regional background of the troops, in this case Danube 
based legions, could influence the fighting and thus the treatment of prisoners was more akin to a war fought 
with foreign enemies. This is not to say that civil wars were any less violent, as some of the bitterest fighting 
in history has been in episodes of civil war, but rather the treatment of the enemy in such conflicts was more 
inclined towards re-enfranchisement rather than outright subjection. 
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 Dig. 28.3.6.7-8; 48.19.2. Punishment was essentially capitis deminutio maxima. Cf. Buckland 1908, 403-7.  
135
 See Buckland 1908, 427-33. The majority of discussion by jurists on self-sale concerns fraudulent attempts 
to evade debts. Dig. 40.12.40; 40.13.3; Ulp. 40.13.1. 
136
 Nexum appears as early as 495 BC (Liv. 2.27.1). It was abolished by the lex Poetelia according to Liv. 8.28f. 
in 326 BC or in 313 according to Varro Ling. 7.105 (See also Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 16.5). Brunt 1958, 168 
suggests that the lex Poetelia put an end to nexum as a form of labour contract, but ultimately debt bondage 
continued. Cf. the argument of Behrends 1974, 137-184.  
137
 See below. 
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tiberum).
138
 In all these cases the enslavement and indenture of Roman citizens was in 
accordance with civil law rather than ius gentium and so required a trial or contract.  
In wars fought with foreign enemies Roman soldiers could be captured and enslaved. This 
became increasingly common as Roman territorial expansion halted and the chance of 
recovering captives, other than through diplomacy, was effectively eliminated.
139
 Since Rome 
was such a large consumer in every respect, particularly in slaves, Romans could very well 
find themselves brought back within the confines of the empire as slaves or sold to a Roman 
citizen who purchased them from outside the imperium. What is most telling of the Roman 
attitude towards the preservation of the institution of slavery is that legally the recognition of 
the captive as a servus was paramount to the liberation of a civis Romanus. That Roman 
citizens who left the empire as free men and returned as slaves were not immediately freed 
upon entry via the process of postliminium rested upon a single legal principle: that 
enslavement in war was a universally recognised means of acquiring slaves (ius gentium) 
and, therefore, Roman law needed to be in accordance with this principle.
140
 Avoiding any 
discussion of the justification of slavery (moral, philosophical, legal or practical), the law is 
clear that those taken by the enemy (ab hostibus manu capiuntur) became the property of 
their captor.
141
 This law is reflected in earlier sources where the right of the victor over the 
vanquished was always advocated.
142
 A captive captured in war and enslaved, though a free 
man prior to capture with the right of postliminium, should he return, remained a slave upon 
entry to the empire as he was no longer considered a civis. As a slave he was considered res, 
like any other spolia, subject to uscapio and without rights over his person. Buckland states, 
“so far as doings of the captivus during his captivity are concerned there is nothing to be said: 
he remained a slave and the ordinary rules of slavery applied to him: the possibility of 
postliminium does not affect the matter, any more than the possibility of manumission does in 
other cases.”143 
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 Table 3.9. Echoed in the language of Gai. Inst. 3.189 and Dig. 49.16.4.10.  
139
 For example Roman captives sold across the Danube during the reign of Marcus Aurelius (Cass. Dio 
71.13.2). Approximately 150,000 Roman captives were returned by the Quadi and the Iazyges indicating that 
large numbers of Romans were made captives during the Marcomannic Wars (Cass. Dio 71.13.4; 71.16.2). 
140
 The contradiction between slavery and nature and the inadequate legal justification of enslavement has 
already been discussed, see Chapter 1, see also Bradley 1994, 23-4. 
141
 Inst. Iust. 1.2.2; 3.4. 
142
 Flor. 2.33.52; Joseph. BJ. 3.62; 6.354; Liv. 4.10.2; 21.23.1; 31.30.2; Polyb. 2.58.9-10. See also the emphatic 
language used by Greek historians (Thuc. 5.89; Xen. Cyr. 3.3.45; 4.2.26; 7.5.73). 
143
 Buckland 1908, 292. 
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Postliminium applied from the moment captivity ceased, as it applied to those who re-entered 
the imperium Romanum. For Romans who surrendered to the enemy, postliminium did not 
apply,
144
 echoing the general sentiment felt by the Romans towards those who failed in war. 
The only difference with a captivus reduced to a servus was that his captivity was considered 
to have ended upon manumission, at which point he regained his former status and rights as a 
civis Romanus without any of the legal restrictions of a freedman. This is evident in the 
complex legislation pertaining to the ownership of a captive’s property whilst he was in the 
service of another, and thus holding no legal right over his property; a slave could neither 
own property nor form a will which would allow another to attain uscapio over his 
property.
145
 Neither did the property of the captive pass into the hands of his owner when 
purchased; instead the property remained in a state of abeyance (i.e. it was kept from the 
slave owner as much as it was kept from the slave).
146
 The property could theoretically 
remain in abeyance until the captive died, after which it passed into the hands of his heir 
(heres suus) or it passed back into the hands of the captive once he was manumitted by right 
of postliminium.
147
 That the rights of postliminium outweighed the right of an owner over his 
former slave is again interesting and in contrast with the initial law enforcing the servitude.
148
 
The resumption of former civil rights after manumission shows the variance in the law 
regarding Romans made captive and enslaved foreigners. It seems that the preservation of 
liberty was of higher importance than the right of a patron over his freedman. However, as 
suggested above, the preservation of liberty was less important than the preservation of the 
right to acquire slaves, particularly the right to acquire them through war.  
Intriguingly a foetus was considered to have been conceived when the mother was free and 
subsequently born within the confines of the empire to a mother returning as a slave was 
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 Dig. 49.15.4. The extent to which this was applied in civil cases cannot be known. It certainly would have 
been a critical point in assessing the legality of a manumitted slave recovering his former status as an 
ingenuus rather than libertus.  
145
 Dig. 3.5.18.5; 9.2.43. With the exception of wives, who were the property of their husbands, a woman whose 
husband was taken captive could remarry in classical law (under Justinian if he was positively dead or after a 
period of five years) and in that case were unrecoverable by their former husbands who returned by 
postliminium (Dig. 49.15.8), see Buckland 1908, 67. 
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 Dig. 41.2.23.1, a captive’s property may have been protected under the lex Hostilia which allowed for legal 
actions to be made on behalf of an absent person. The existence of the law is questionable and the date 
unknown, see Buckland 1908, 293. Cicero Orat. 1.57 listed a few cases which may have concerned the lex 
Hostilia. 
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 There were, of course, a number of loopholes in which the property could be usufruct, such as appointing an 
executor (curatio), the captive allowing his property to be considered peculiaris thus becoming an allowance 
to the slave under the direction of the owner, see Buckland 1908, 294-296. 
148
 Chiefly the rights of a patron over his freedmen were obsequium operae and the right of succession by the 
patron in his freedman’s will, cf. Watson 1987, 35-45. 
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considered to be have been born free.
149
 In contrast, a child conceived and born outside the 
limits of the empire to captive parents was considered to be a slave should the mother return 
to the empire as a slave, in following the standard law that a child born to a slave mother 
gains her legal status.
150
 Children were, of course, recoverable under postliminium so long as 
they were un-owned or manumitted.
151
 
From a legal standpoint the only person whose property raised a question of ownership and 
uscapio was a pater familias; in the case of women, children and young men with fathers, 
their property could be usufruct by a pater familias who was not in captivity as he held all 
power over his family and their possessions.
152
 Any captive regardless of status
153
 regained 
their former position and rights (if any) through postliminium when their captivity ended, 
either being freely returned to the empire or manumitted within.  
In the case of Romans ransomed from the enemy from the third century AD onwards it is 
clear that they entered a form of servitude under which they were kept until they could 
discharge the lien imposed by their redeemer.  During the time period covered in this study, it 
is difficult to ascertain the actual status of the redemptus or the relationship between the 
redemptus and the redemptor. The captivus redemptus was bound by ius pignoris
154
 (security 
for debt) to the redemptor. Although the application of this is hard to understand as pignoris 
applied to property secured for debt including chattels,
155
 it was never explained by the jurists 
as to how it might apply to the debtor himself. As a legis actio, ius pignoris typically applied 
to debts incurred from religious or government (the two need not be exclusive) related 
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 Dig. 1.5.7; 26. The practical responsibilities of upbringing is ignored by Paul and it is unlikely that the true 
status of the child would be recognised or accepted, nor could it be proven since the slave mother could not 
bring a case against her owner. 
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 Inst. Iust. 1.3.4. This was to prevent the problem of succession that would have followed if a dominus 
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children of a legal marriage were protected from claims by other natural siblings, not to mention the difficulty 
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 Dig. 49.15.25, if the father died in captivity according to a rescript of Severus the child was considered a 
bastard.  
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 Dig. 50.60.195.2, see Frier et al. 2004, 19. 
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 I.e. free, slave, freedman. The former status always applied following postliminium to the point that a slave 
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manumitted from the servitude that interrupted the previous condition returned to the former status of servus 
poenae. This was the case of a woman condemned to the salt works, who was taken captive and then 
recovered by a centurion, although her capture was the result of brigandage rather than capture by an enemy 
force (Dig. 49.15.6).  
154
 Mentxaka 1985, 273f. 
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 Gai. Inst. 4.26. 
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expenditure and many were based on issues of mores rather than law.
156
 Thus, if the legal 
texts related to ius pignoris are anything to go by, the debt from ransom and the system of 
repayment were a matter of custom rather than law, and for this reason they have no clear 
footprint in Roman law like that of postliminium. The origin of ius redemptus is early; it is 
mentioned in the Twelve Tables in connection with security against a debt for an animal 
purchased for sacrifice.
157
 The obligation of an individual to ransom members of his familia, 
client or patron from the enemy had been established early as well and this was based upon 
the moral obligation imposed by religious custom (ius sacrum).
158
 This continued to be 
viewed as a moral practice in the obligation of a redemptus towards their captor, as Seneca 
observed in the first century AD. 
159
  
Until the Second Punic War ransom was essentially a private affair, the state’s involvement 
extended only to arranging periods for conducting ransom negotiations
160
 or in granting 
permission to ransom captives.
161
 After the battle of Cannae, Livy relates a debate in the 
Senate in which there was a suggestion to allow for private ransoms,
162
 whereas the account 
of Appian ignored this option, suggesting that the only courses open to the Senate were to 
ransom the soldiers from the state coffers or to let them linger in captivity.
163
 The latter is 
supported by the sentiment towards ransom expressed by the Roman general Publius 
Sulpicius after the battle of Aegina, as interpreted by Polybius.
164
 In the year preceding 
Cannae Fabius Maximus arranged with Hannibal to ransom the Roman captives taken at the 
Battle of Lake Trasimene. But the Senate dallied over approving state money to be sent for 
the ransom of the Roman captives in excess of the exchange. In the end Fabius sold his farm 
to pay for the soldiers’ ransom.165 It seems that up to the first century AD ransom was 
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 See Buckland 1908, 623-624. 
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 Examples include a patron to be ransomed by his client (Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 2.10.1), a son (Plaut. Capt. 
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 A prisoner exchange in the First Punic War (Liv. 22.23.6) Permission to ransom captives at Tarentum (Liv. 
22.59.7). Cf. Mommsen 1887 III, 1121 who maintained that this was always the case. 
162
 Liv. 22.60.3-4. The opinion expressed even went so far as to suggest that interest free loans be made 
available to those without the money. Levy 1943, 161 states that the redempti would have served surety for 
the loan. 
163
 App. Hann. 28. 
164
 Polyb. 9.42.4-8. 
165
 App. Fab. 7.4.5; Liv. 22.23.6-8. 
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allowed for by the Senate, and captives could be ransomed privately or by the state. However, 
the state had to approve ransoms, or at least those made in bulk or in matters of state (i.e. 
treaties). The main determinant of whether or not a Roman soldier could be ransomed was a 
charge of cowardice. It was clear that soldiers who surrendered could not receive 
postliminium and it was upon this basis that the Cannae captives were refused ransom. 
Likewise, for soldiers captured in the wake of the Varian disaster in AD 9 their relatives were 
permitted to ransom them back, with the exception that they could not return to Italy.
166
 This 
act, and the peculiarity of the restriction, implies that their capture was at least, in part, 
considered cowardice. The families seem to have acted without senatorial approval and so the 
act was intended as a stop gap measure to avoid a trial that would have brought more grief 
and worry to the Roman heartland still reeling from the clades Variana. 
In raising money for a ransom Wyse suggested that in Athens friends of a captive would 
come together to put up the ransom.
167
 Within the Roman military there was the means to 
provide a ransom for fellow soldiers. Since ransom was largely frowned upon by the state, 
the obligatory savings of each soldier, untouchable until retirement, would normally be 
unavailable to ransom the soldier or anyone acting on his behalf.
168
 However, the army took a 
relaxed approach to a collegia tenuiorum amongst the legions which acted as a burial club. 
For the most part soldiers were prohibited from forming clubs,
169
 and of those formed only 
officers could participate, but the burial club was open to all soldiers as it posed little political 
threat because no meetings were held. The burial club acted as a collective charitable society 
supported by donations from its members.
170
 Strictly speaking, the burial club operated only 
to provide appropriate burial for its members, but in practice it assisted its members and their 
heirs in many other ways by paying out anularium (payments upon discontinuation of 
membership) and viaticum (assistance). The only examples of the burial club come from 
inscriptions at Lambaesis where the III Augusta was stationed during the Severan period.
171
 
                                                 
166
 Cass. Dio 56.22.1-4. 
167
 Wyse 1904, 556. states that such a group was similar to an ἔρᾰνος, where everyone paid a share (Antipho 
2.2.9; Thphr.Char. 22.9). 
168
 Half of all bonuses and donations made to a soldier during his career were deposited with his century’s 
savings, the century’s signifier was in charge of keeping the accounts. A soldier could only draw upon his 
savings when he was discharged from the army. There is no legal evidence that a soldier’s savings could be 
drawn upon in the event of capture, and it seems the regular rules of postliminium applied in this case. A 
soldier’s savings were inheritable (Dig. 48.17.2; 20), see Ginsburg 1940, 151. 
169
 By AD 136 the restrictions on the formation of clubs was relaxed, CIL 9.2112. 
170
 The precursors to later Christian charitable organisations of which some, notably in Christian Spain during 
the 10
th
-14
th
 centuries, were devoted to the redemption of war captives, see Brodman 1986.  
171
 CIL 8.2551-7, see Ginsburg 1940, 154-5. 
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No policy concerning payments for ransom is present, but the structure was at hand as the 
death or absence of the member soldier resulted in payment to his heir, who was then 
responsible for the payment of the soldiers’ burial. Though it is impossible to state that burial 
club payments were, in fact, used to pay a ransom, given the private administration of the 
club, it was possible for them to do so. 
In regards to the status of the redemptus, Mommsen and his adherents maintained that the 
Roman captives ransomed from the enemy became the property of their redemptor 
throughout Roman history.
172
 However, Levy has argued that in all the early cases of ransom 
(at least pre Nero)
173
 there is no evidence that the captive became the property of his 
redeemer.
174
 For example Fabius turned down an offer by the soldiers to repay him for the 
ransom prices, and there was no indication in the debate in the Senate over the Cannae 
captives that they would be slaves.
175
 Furthermore, Levy suggests that the ransom by the mid 
first century could be recovered by the redemptor via actio certae creditae pecuniae or 
negotiorum gestorum, but the captive remained under no obligation of servitude.
176
 Levy is 
correct in doubting the ownership of the redemptus by the redemptor, as it is not until the 
third century AD that we can be sure that the redemptus became the property of the 
redemptor as seen in the examples of Diocletian’s rescripts.177 It seems that according to the 
legal texts the change occurred to reflect a difference in custom or practice wherein 
redemption was no longer considered or controlled at state level, save for rare examples. 
Throughout the Roman period, ransom was carried out by family members or benevolent 
members of society neither of whom would have expected the redemptus to repay them, 
                                                 
172
 Mommsen 1907, 8f; Voigt 1899 (1963) II, 465; Girard 1911, 129; and Krüger 1931, 204 (s.v. ‘Captivus 
redemptus’). Cf. Levy 1949, 159-60. 
173
 As evident by the concept of ransom depicted by Sen. Ben 6.13.3-14.2; 21.1-2, see Levy 1943, 161. 
174
 Levy 1943, 161. I reject here the association of nexum with ransoming as put forward by Mitchell 1995, 210. 
In the case cited by Mitchell, a boy is reduced to nexum as a result of a debt incurred in burying his father, 
who had been impoverished, but not indebted after paying his own ransom (Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 16.5; Liv. 
8.28; Val. Max. 6.1.9). The nexum in this case was a result of a debt independent of ransom. 
175
 Liv. 22.23.6-8; App. Fab. Max. 7.4. 
176
 Levy 1943, 162. Dig. 3.5.18.5; Ulp. Dig. 3.5.19. The actio certae creditae pecuniae permitted a creditor to 
seek repayment of a loan that was granted muutum (transfer of ownership of money). A negotiorum gestorum 
was an act committed by an agent (gestor) in the absence of the individual the act was being carried out for. In 
this case, if an agent (here a redemptor) acted on the benefit of an individual in his absence, the agent could 
seek reimbursement. This is evident in the examples laid out in Dig. 3.5.10; 11.7. 
177
 Outlined in the Corpus Iuris Civile Iustiniani (Cod. Iust. 8.50). Levy 1943, 164-167 identified this with 
constitution, stating that it must concern all redempti rather than just servi redempti, contra Krüger 1931, 215 
and Buckland 1908, 315f. Since Tryphoninus refered to a free man in considering a redemptus that had 
previously been deported – a punishment only inflicted upon free individuals. Furthermore, he posits a date of 
the change in the constitution to between AD 161 and 198, in which any redemptus exchanged their captor for 
their redemptor as their dominus. 
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during the Republican period the repayment of a ransom was only considered in accordance 
with mores and thus never required a legal regulation.
178
 By the first century AD some form 
of remuneration was guaranteed in the same manner as other debts might be repaid. However, 
by the third century, perhaps as a consequence of more Romans being captured and 
subsequently fewer having the means to repay, a change in system occurred that encouraged 
redemption, but protected the expense laid out by the redeemer. 
Overall the contribution of Roman captives to the slave supply was limited. The legal 
question regarding the enslavement of Roman citizens is what caused extensive inquiry by 
jurists and thus the complex laws surrounding cases in which postliminium may have applied. 
This inquiry into the process of Roman ransom shows that even in a society like Rome, 
where ransom was traditionally scorned, there were still means of carrying it out. As the 
institution of postliminium and the plots of Plautine Comedy suggest, ransom could be carried 
out after a captive entered a period of servitude. It is possible that many captives sold into 
slavery were still recovered by their friends or families, if any were left, and barring their 
existence, it was possible that they could be recovered by their community through a system 
of redemption like that of Rome. 
 
 
                                                 
178
 Cf. Millar 1984, 10 and Katsari 2005, 29 who both suggest that captives may have been purchased by their 
family or friends. 
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Chapter 4 
Enslavements before the Punic Wars 
 
Terms for Enslavement 
At the end of the sixth century BC the first instance of ‘sale under the crown’ by the Romans 
appears.
1
 According to Livy, after the capitulation of Pometia the Romans marched against 
Auruncus, the principle city of the Aurunci, whose citizens promptly surrendered, hoping for 
similar lenience to be shown to them, as had been shown to Pometia. Instead, the Romans 
beheaded the foremost men and “sent the other farmers under the crown.”2 The significance 
of the crown is difficult to ascertain. Aulus Gellius provides two possible etymological 
explanations.
3
 Firstly, that garlands were placed on the heads of captives to be sold as slaves, 
in a similar fashion to the caps placed on slaves, whose origins were unknown, and thus could 
not be guaranteed by the seller, the cap signified caveat emptor.
4
 Secondly, that the captives 
were surrounded by a ring of soldiers, with the ring referred to as a corona. Gellius was of the 
opinion that the former explanation was true, and supports this with a statement made by the 
Elder Cato, in which he proclaims that the victorious were crowned so that they could 
perform sacrifices and the defeated were crowned to mark them for sale;
5
 this explanation is 
also offered by Festus.
6
 The symbolic significance of the crown is not certain, and by the first 
century BC, when our earliest use of the term in reference to sale occurs,
7
 its actual meaning 
seems to have been forgotten, or at least considered irrelevant.
8
  
After a battle near Fidenae in 426 BC centurions and cavalrymen were each given a captive 
as a slave, and those who displayed gallantry were honoured with a second; the remaining 
                                                 
1
 This is not the earliest reference to the phrase in regards to the date of the written word, see below. 
2
 Liv. 2.17.6 sub corona venierunt coloni alii. 
3
 Gell. NA 6.4.1-4. 
4
 Gellius cites the jurist Caelius Sabinus, who wrote a work on the aedile edict Ad Edictum Aedilium Curulium 
(Gell. NA 2.5.4). The original work of Sabinus only survives in fragments, but was largely preserved as a 
basis by the jurists Ulpian, Pomponius and Paul, and is quoted in the Dig. 21.1. Cf. Huschke 1908, 2. The cap 
was known as a pilleus (Phrygian cap) and the seller must declare a slave’s nationality; some nationalities 
were thought preferable to others as slaves (Dig. 21.1.31.21). The pilleus was also a symbol of manumission 
(Liv. 24.16.18; 33.23.6; Val. Max. 5.2.6; Petron. Sat. 40.3). 
5
 The full text of Cato’s de re Militari (On Military Science) does not survive, cf. Jordan 1860, 80 Fr. 2. 
6
 Festus Lindsay 1913, 306.38. 
7
 Caes. B Gall. 3.16.4. 
8
 Welwei 2000, 12-14; Scheidel 2011, 294.  
 Chapter 4  
75 
 
captives were put up for sale under the crown.
9
 Livy seems to suggest that the crown marked 
the captives as public property, rather than the property of individual soldiers.
10
 That sale sub 
corona profited the exchequer, rather than the individual soldier, is reaffirmed in the next 
instance in Livy, when the sale sub corona of free men from Veii in 393 BC, was the only 
money paid into the treasury from that engagement.
11
 Throughout his work, Livy used sub 
corona to denote both captives and booty sold at auction, with the proceeds going to the 
public treasury.
12
 The phrase sub corona, in regards to the sale of captives is first used by 
Caesar, who sold (vendere) captives into slavery as a punishment for the maltreatment of 
ambassadors.
13
 Varro, a contemporary of Caesar, also used sub corona within the context of 
goods bought at public auction.
14
 Though the etymological significance of sub corona seems 
to have disappeared by the first century, it eventually became synonymous with sale at public 
auction, as shown by later uses of the phrase.
15
 In all instances of sub corona involving 
captives, they are said to have either been ‘sold’ or to have ‘come’ (venire)16 under the 
crown. The use of venire emphasises the movement of the captives independent of their 
captors, and the loss of liberty would hence be associated with the vanquished, as the 
obligation of the defeated, rather than a form of subjection by the conqueror. Sub corona 
denoted the sale of property, whilst in the case of captives it also indicated their reduction to 
servitude.  
                                                 
9
 Liv. 4.34.4 aliis sub corona venumdatis.  
10
 Further, compare the significance of military rings to crowns (Diod. Sic. 25.19.1). We might also compare the 
rings (δακτύλιοι) worn by Greek soldiers (Xen. Anab. 4.7.27). 
11
 Liv. 5.22.1 Postero die libera corpora dictator sub corona uendidit, ea sola pecunia in publicum redigitur. 
Cf. Diod. Sic. 14.93.2, Diodorus uses the terms έξανδραποδίζω ‘to reduce to slavery’ and λαφυροπωλέω ‘sale 
of war booty’ in describing the fate of the Veii captives.  
12
 Sale of captives sub corona at Suessa Aurunca in 502 BC (Liv. 2.17.6), Fidenae in 426 BC (Liv. 4.34.3); Veii 
393 in BC (Liv. 5.22.1), Pollian tribe voted in favour of enslaving the Tusculan women and children in 323 
BC (Liv. 8.37.11), Allifae in 308 BC (Liv. 9.42.8), Malta in 218 BC (Liv. 21.51.2), Turditanians at Saguntum 
in 212 BC (Liv. 24.42.11), Bergistani in 193 BC (Liv. 34.16.10), Same in 189 BC (Liv. 38.29.11), Istrians in 
177 BC (Liv. 41.11.8), Haliartus in 171 BC (Liv. 42.63.11), Abdera in 170 BC (Liv. 43.4.11) and Allies of 
Philip in 170 BC (Liv. Per. 43.5). Livy also refers to Aetolian refugees being sold by the Achaeans as slaves 
using the phrase sent under the crown. The property of the citizens of Haliartus was sold at public auction in 
170 BC (Liv. 42.63.12). 
13
 Caes. B Gall. 3.16.4. 
14
 Varro RR 2.14.4. Varro composed his agricultural manual in his eightieth year (Varro RR 1.1.1) and so his 
manual was a quarter century after Caesar’s commentaries of his Gallic campaigns.  
15
 Liv. 7.89.5; Tac. Hist. 1.68; Ann. 113.39; Val. Max. 9.10.1; Curt.9.8.15; Licinianus Ann. 35.24.  
16
 Vendere (Aul. Gel. NA 6.4.4; Caes. B Gall. 3.16.4; Flor. 2.33; Fronto Parthico 7.7; Liv. 4.34.4; 5.22.1; 
24.42.11; 42.63.12; SHA 7.2). Venire (Aul. Gel. NA 6.4.1-4; Curt. Ruf. 9.8.15; Festus 306.38; Licinianus Ann. 
35.69 ; Liv. 2.17.6 ; 8.37.11 ; 9.42.8 ; 21.51.2 ; 34.16.10 ; 35.36.10 ; 38.29.11 ; 41.11.8 ; 42.63.11 ; 43.4.11 ; 
Per. 43 ; Val. Max. 9.10.1 ; Varro Rust. 2.10.4). 
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Another means of reducing captives to slaves was their sale sub hasta (under the spear). Save 
for a few instances,
17
 the captives were always referred to as having been ‘sold’ under the 
spear.
18
 Though the majority of these occurrences refer to sale, the inclusion of sub hasta 
placed an emphasis upon the military subjugation of the vanquished, which resulted in the 
sale of captives or booty. The spear as a weapon was evocative of force, and was an 
important symbol of power beyond that of forcible acquisition;
19
 indeed Festus remarked that 
the spear symbolised Roman imperium.
20
 This echoes similar terms in Greek, 
δοριάλωτος/δορυάλωτος or αἰχμάλωτος, where the spear was also integral to the expression 
of someone taken by force.
21
  
Sale sub hasta was similar to an early legal form of ownership, known as iure quiritium (law 
of the Quirites or law of the Roman people),
22
 which required the purchaser to strike the 
object with a piece of bronze.
23
 In cases of disputed ownership, the plaintiff was required to 
touch the object with a festuca, perhaps also made of bronze.
24
 In explaining the iure 
quiritium, Gaius used an example of a dispute over the ownership of a slave in which both 
parties touch the disputed ‘property’ with a festuca.25 Juvenal remarked that those who 
intended to make a living in Rome had to be willing to perform uncivilised work, or even 
“offer their own head for sale sub hasta.”26 The expression of ‘sub hasta’ in the context of 
free men at Rome indicates that such a sale was not exclusive to post battle auctions; but in 
the case of captives, it was certainly an auction, rather than any other form of sale, as 
indicated by the presence of quaestors by Livy.
27
 Captives were not the only items to be sold 
sub hasta; in two instances booty, not including captives, was also ‘sold’ or ‘sent’ sub 
hasta.
28
  
                                                 
17
 Liv. 5.16.7; 23.37.13; Flor. 2.9.1 the verb venire under the spear. 
18
 Liv. 4.29.4; 4.53.10; 6.4.2; 23.32.15; 23.38.7; Juv. 3.33; Val. Max. 6.5.1. 
19
 As a symbol of office, such as primus pilus or praetor hastarius (Quint. Inst. 5.2.1; Plin. Ep. 5.9.1-2), as a 
symbol of political power, such as the hastae iudicium (Val. Max. 7.8.1; 4) or as military signa. See 
Domaszewski 1885, 50 and Alföldi 1959, 12-13, Töpfer 2011, 18-34. 
20
 Festus Lindsay 1913, 55. 
21
 See Chapter 1. 
22
 For example as expressed in Cic. Verr. 2.2.31; pro Cael. 96; Mur. 26; Sen. Q Nat. 3.pr.16. As an expression 
of full Roman civic rights, see Gai. Inst. 1.17.  
23
 Gai. Inst. 1.54. Cf. Gai. Inst. 1.119 in the case of manumission or the purchase of liberty. 
24
 Gai. Inst. 4.16. The rod may have been of straw or of wood see Alföldi 1959, 8 n. 78; Nisbet 1918, 1. 
25
 Gai. Inst. 4.16. Cf. Hopkins 1978, 82; Joshel 2010, 85. The festuca was also a symbol of manumission Plaut. 
Mil. 4.1.15; Pers. 5.175, see Nisbet 1918, 1-14.  
26
 Juv. 3.33. 
27
 Liv. 4.53.10. 
28
 Liv. 4.29.4; 5.16.7. On both occasions the booty was unclaimed property recovered by the Roman forces. 
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Contrary to sub corona and sub hasta, the term sub iugum does not reflect a process of 
enslavement, but rather a form of humiliation, in which the captives were sent (missio) with 
verb accompanying the phrase typically mitto (to send).
29
 As a practice in Italy, chiefly 
amongst the Romans and Samnites, the ritual of sending enemies under a yoke did not 
accompany enslavement.
30
  
The enslavement of captives is typically expressed by their sale. In Latin vendere, in most 
cases the type of sale, either sub corona or sub hasta, is specified, but in some instances the 
captives are simply said to have been sold.
31
 In Greek the reduction of captives could also be 
inferred by the terms for sale, simply πωλέω 32 or more precisely moved from a site to be sold 
(i.e. exported ἐπρ θησαν or πιπράσκω).33 In many instances the passage from freedom to 
slavery is expressed as entering slavery ‘in servitutem,’ with the action indicating a forced 
transition in which a second party is responsible for the change,
34
 which include: to carry off 
(abduco),
35
 tear or drag away (abripio/abstrao),
36
  lead/lead away (duco/deduco)
37
 or reduce 
(redigo), the last of which was commonly used in the Digesta as a general term for someone 
of free status who became a slave in reference to their regression in status.
38
 The selling of 
free people did not require the specification ‘in servitutem,’ there was no doubt that sale 
implied slavery, but enslavement did not always require a transaction; slaves were simply 
made (facio) from free people or given to someone as a slave.
39
 In contrast, those entering 
slavery were also expressed as doing so on their own: to surrender or deliver (trado), fall 
                                                 
29
 The exceptions being: abeo (‘to go,’ Liv. 3.28.10), do (‘give,’ 4.26.10) and subigo (‘to bring under,’ Fronto 
4.2.30). This is not to say that the reduction to slavery was not emphasised through slavery in other ways, see 
Bradley 1994, 23-4. 
30
 See Chapter 2. 
31
 Dig. 1.5.4.2; 50.16.239.1; Hyg. Fab. 15.5 ; Liv. 39.42.1; 43.20.3; Quint. Dec. Mai. 3.16; Sen. Controv. 
10.5.pr; Val. Max. 5.1.7; Vell. Pat. 2.42.3. 
32
 Diod. Sic. 23.9.5; P. Oxy.1477.3. 
33
 Il. 21.102; 21.40; Od. 14.297; Zon. 8.10. 
34
 Note, the verb assero is often associated with in servitutem, but refers to the action of claiming either as a 
slave or most often as a freedman in the process of manumission. 
35
Caes. B Gall. 1.11.3; Cic. Pis. 84; Frontin. Str. 1.11.6; Vitr. 1.1.5. Also rapio ‘carry off rapidly’ (Cic. Rhet. 
Her. 4.51). 
36
 Abripio (Caes. B Afr. 26.5; Liv. 43.5.2), abstrabo (Caes. B Gall. 7.14.10; 7.42.4).  
37
 Duco (Liv. 6.14.4; Hyg. Fab. 111.1), deduco (Dig. 41.1.7.pr.). 
38
 Caes. B Gall. 2.14.2; Dig. 4.1.6.pr; 4.2.21.1; 23.5.2; 26.1.14.1; 26.4.3.5; 28.6.43.3; 38.2.32.pr; 38.17.2.3; 
40.5.24.3; 49.16.4.10; Plaut. Aul. 169. 
39
 Made Slaves  (Liv. 35.16.12; 45.22.6). Varro Ling. 7.105 remarks that free persons owing money were 
‘bound’ (debeo) in servitutem. Given as slaves (Cic. Ep. ad Oct. 10; Hyg. Fab. 34.4; 79.4; Liv. 3.56.4; 3.57.5; 
41.6.11; Quint. Dec. Min. 339.13. Ter. 653). 
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(cado/elabor), or sink (subeo).
40
 Similar to the process of sub corona, free persons were 
sometimes said to go into slavery, implying the action rested upon their shoulders rather than 
that of the captors or slavers, although the decision to do so was obviously made under 
duress.
41
 While many of the above examples include instances outside of capture, such as the 
selling of one’s self or illegal seizure, the actions used in expressing someone’s entrance into 
slavery can be illuminating. The fact that people are said to enter slavery by their own action, 
as well as being forced, is indicative of a society that accepted slavery as a result of natural 
order; placing the victor and the strong above the vanquished and the weak. Slavery was an 
alternative to death, a choice that, prior to capture, was in the hands of the soon to be 
vanquished; it is because of this that the captor’s choice to spare the defeated was viewed as 
an act of clemency.
42
 
In Greek, the verb ἀνδραποδίζω43 has been interpreted as referring to a process of enslaving. 
Etymologically ἀνδραποδίζω comprises two parts, a man and hoof, so that an ἀνδράποδον 
referred to someone essentially rendered a human pack animal.
44
 The traditional definition 
given by the LSJ is “to enslave, or sell the free men of a city into slavery.” However, Kathy 
Gaca has argued that the mercantile aspect of ἀνδραποδίζω is incorrect, and is based on a 
fallacious etymology stemming from ἀποδíδοσθαι (to sell), as explained in the scholia on 
Aristophanes’ play Plutus.45 For many Greek writers, ἀνδράποδον was a term for both a 
captive and a slave.
46
 The definition in the LSJ has been interpreted as being too male centric 
by Gaca, who argues the act of ἀνδραποδίζω was typically only carried out upon the women 
and children of a defeated city, the men, at least those of fighting age, were normally 
eliminated during battle.
47
 A poignant remark by a captured Spartan soldier emphasised the 
                                                 
40
 Trado (Caes. B Gall. 1.51.3; Cic. Prov. cons. 10; Liv. 37.54.8; Gell. NA. 20.1.7), Cado (Sen. Ep. 95.71; 
Phoen. 598), Elabor (Liv. 3.37.3) and Subeo (Sen. Dial. 529.1). 
41
 Dig. 4.4.9.4; 48.19.14.pr.; Aul. Gel. NA 2.18.9; Sen. Q Nat. 6.1.14; Liv. 42.21.5; 43.8.7.  
42
 For the etymology of servus in relation to their preservation and the clemency of captors see Chapter 1. 
43
 Within this semantic field we may add the verbs ἐξανδραποδιζεσθαι and άνδραποδιζεσθαι and the verbal 
nouns ἐξανδραπóδισις and άνδραποδισμóς.  
44
Cf. Gaca 2010, 121; Chantraine 1999, 295. 
45
 Gaca 2010, 126, based on Schol. Ar. Plut. 521d (ed. Chantry). 
46
 Thucydides uses the term άνδράποδον for both captives enslaved and ransomed 6.62.3-4. Diodorus repeatedly 
uses ἁνδράποδον in referring to slaves rather than captives, ex. sale of Plato 15.7.1. There is a single 
exception where Diodorus refers to those taken from a fortress as ανδράποδοι, 23.9.4. Plutarch also uses 
ἁνδράποδον for slave in Mor. 100C and 174E before giving an example (Mor. 234C) of how it may also be 
interpreted as a war captive, though the use is questioned by the subject. 
47
 Killing and άνδραποδίζω are expressed as two different actions first expressed by Hdt. 3.140.5; 3.147.1, see 
Gaca 2010, 121. Numerous examples of men being killed and the others ‘andrapodised’ (App. Celt. 11.3; 
Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 3.49.3; 10.26.3; Joseph. BJ 3.62-3; Procop. Goth. 7.11.15; 8.18.25). The biggest 
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distinction between an ἀνδράποδον and a war captive (αἰχμάλωτον). When the auctioneer 
stated that he had an ἀνδράποδον for sale, the Spartan was quick to state that he was actually 
an αἰχμάλωτον.48 From the Spartan’s response, it seems that those taken by the spear were 
more honourably reduced to slavery than those taken ἀνδραποδίζω. Gaca also states that 
ἀνδραποδίζω implied a brutality beyond simply ‘enslaving,’ and any complete definition 
should incorporate an element of abuse that was experienced by non-combatants at the hands 
of enemy soldiers.
49
 An ἀνδράποδον was distinguishable from an αἰχμάλωτον; whereas a 
soldier was taken in the fighting and thus ‘by spear,’ the captive (ἀνδράποδον) was seized 
after the fighting, and herded like an animal. 
 
Enslavements in Early Rome up to the Sack of Veii 
In the ancient world success in war brought economic gains for the victor.
50
 The wealth 
acquired from military victories was foremost generated from booty acquired from the 
defeated. Sometimes this included the sale of captives. The right of the victor to take from his 
defeated enemies anything, including the enemy themselves as slaves, is well attested in 
Greek and Roman history.
51
 Roman politico-economic growth and military expansion went 
hand in hand from the very beginning. The absorption of geographically close neighbours 
within the Roman community and the acquisition of spoils were the predominant source of 
economic and population growth in early Rome. However, I argue that the sale of captives as 
slaves did not occur with any regularity until the end of the third century BC. 
The earliest clear case of mass enslavement comes during the reign of Tarquinius Priscus in 
the sixth century.
52
 Tarquinius had to deal with a Latin uprising, which came as a result of 
their rejection of a treaty made with Rome under his predecessor. He used a combination of 
force and leniency to re-establish peace and to reassert Roman hegemony over the Latins, 
beginning with the destruction of Apiolanum and the enslavement of the surviving men, 
                                                                                                                                                        
argument against this interpretation is the άνδραποδίζω of the Epirotes in 167 BC, including men, women and 
children, see Chapter 7. 
48
 Plut. Mor. 234C. 
49
 Gaca 2010, 122f. 
50
 See Garlan, 1972, 200; Harris 1979; 56f. 
51
 See Chapter 1. 
52
 Lucius Tarquinius Priscus, fifth Roman king 616-579 BC. 
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women and children.
53
 Afterward, the cities of Crustumerium, Nomentam, Ficula, and 
Cameria were spared without penalty when they surrendered to Tarquinius,
54
 but the citizens 
of Collatia met the Romans in battle and were defeated; they too were spared enslavement, 
but forced to accept Tarquinius’ nephew as a ruler and to pay a hefty indemnity.55 Finally, a 
combined force of Latins, Tyrrhenians and Sabines were defeated in a field engagement and 
the survivors sold as slaves, with the booty going directly to the soldiers and the proceeds 
from the sale of prisoners to Tarquinius.
56
 This set an example of the typical division of 
booty, in which the state took control of the prisoners and profited from their sale, and the 
soldiers were allowed the other booty. It has been suggested by Siber that Tarquinius’ 
treatment of conquered cities was a discernible shift in more forceful foreign policy by the 
Etruscan kings.
57
 However, this was rejected by Volkmann, who sees the change as nothing 
more than the use of several topoi by Dionysius of Halicarnassus in describing the reign of 
Tarquinius and his successors.
58
 
The son of Tarquinius, Tarquinius Superbus, was noted for his reorganisation of the Latin 
League into a permanent military alliance.
59
 This reorganisation was remarkably similar to 
that of his father; indeed, the actions of both kings mirror one another to such a degree that it 
is difficult to attribute certain episodes to the reign of one in particular.
60
 For instance, 
Tarquinis Superbus’ sack of Pometia strikingly echoes his father’s sack of Apiolanum.61 In 
502 BC the two consuls made forays against the cities of Cures and Cameria.
62
 The fate of 
the 4,000 captives at Cures is unknown, but the sources agree, that after the city had been 
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 Apiolanum according to Strab. 5.231 was in the territory of the Volscini. The exact site is unknown, see 
Ogilvie 1965, 149. For the enslavement see Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 3.49.3, remaining soldiers were ‘sold’ 
(πιπράσκω) the women and children were ἀνδραποδίζω. Cities taken by storm were to be ἀνδραποδίζω, 
whereas those that capitulated were only obliged to submit obedience to the Romans (‘deditio in fidem,’ Dion. 
Hal. Ant. Rom. 3.51.1. Cf. Liv. 1.35.7) does not mention enslavement, but states that the booty allowed for 
exquisite games to be held and for the perimeter of the Circus Maximus to be first laid out. Liv. 8.20.1 states 
that the first permanent structure of the Circus was dated to 329 BC. 
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 Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 3.49.4-51.2. 
55
 Liv. 1.38.1-3. 
56
 Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 3.53.5. 
57
 Siber in s.v. ‘Tarquinius Superbus’ RE. 
58
 Volkmann 1990, 36. Cf. Gaida 1934, 26. 
59
 Lucius Tarquinius Superbus, ‘Tarquin the Proud,’ seventh King of Rome (535-509 BC). The son of 
Tarquinius by tradition, s.v. ‘Tarquinius Superbus’ RE. 
60
 Both Tarquins are noted as being victorious over Latin cities and are credited with beginning the work on the 
circus and the Capitoline temple. Cf. Ogilvie 1965, 145. Indeed, the whole succession of the Roman kings is 
specious, but this should not preclude that events of early, at times mythic, Rome are not reflective of wider 
social and political shifts; in particular the inter-state relations of Rome and central Italian city-states.  
61
 Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 4.50.4. 
62
 Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 5.49.1. 
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pillaged by the troops, the leaders were beheaded and the remaining Camerians were 
enslaved.
63
 However, Valerius adds that these were later restored by citizens, who sought out 
the Camerians and redeemed them, eventually settling them on the Aventine.
64
 During the 
fledgling Republic Tarquinius Superbus, with the aid of allies amongst the Latin League, 
tried to reclaim the throne, but he was defeated in 498 BC.
65
 Livy does not mention the 
capture of any captives in his account of the battle, but later relates that the Latins revealed a 
plot of the Voscinians and Hernici to go to war with Rome, and were rewarded for their 
loyalty with the release of 6,000 captives held by the Romans.
66
 These were likely hostages, 
but a significant enough number that they may have been kept from amongst the captives 
taken.
67
 In 495 BC
68
 the Romans sacked the city of Pometia who had sided against Rome in 
their war with the Volscians. There the ringleaders were killed, and the remaining survivors 
were sold into slavery.
69
 This marks the first enslavement of captives under the Republic and 
it is notable as an act of punishment, a stern response to Pometia switching allegiance.
70
 
All the accounts of capture during the first few years of the Republic share a common theme 
of a Roman victory over rebellious neighbours. In all instances, the sacked cities were caught 
up in an uprising against Rome (particularly the Latin cities), either reneging on treaties or 
testing Rome’s position as the leader amongst ‘equals.’ As such, Rome’s response is 
expressed as harsh. At Pometia, for example, despite the defender’s surrender to the Romans, 
the city was sacked and the inhabitants enslaved as though they had been taken by storm.
71
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 Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 5.49.5 ἀιχμαλόιτοι; Val. Max. 6.5.1c Sub hasta vendere; Zon. 7.13. For problems 
associated with this episode see Brennan 2001, 929 n. 498. We must of course be sceptical of numbers, 
particularly rounded figures. Whilst 4,000 is a relatively small figure by later comparisons, it should 
nonetheless be treated with caution; the addition of 10,000 slaves after the capture of Veii a century later has 
raised significant doubt by historians over the ability of the Roman economy to absorb such a number, see 
below. 
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 Val. Max. 6.5.1c. 
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 For problems with this date see Cornell 1995, 216.  
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 Liv. 2.19.1f. 
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 Liv. 2.22.5. According to Foster (loeb n.) Livy was following a different authority than in his account of Lake 
Regilus, perhaps even following Valerius of Antium, who he later criticises for exaggerating numbers (Liv. 
33.10.8).  
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 I choose this date, which contrasts with Livy’s first claim that the sack occurred under the consulship of 
Opiter Verginius and Spurius Cassius in 502 BC, as it fits more clearly within the wider narrative in Livy and 
corresponds with Dionysius’ account, see below. 
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 Liv. 2.17.6; 2.25.5. Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. There is much confusion regarding this episode. Livy duplicates the 
story first in 2.22.17 and next in 2.25.5. Ogilvie 1965, 276 notes that in Livy’s first episode of the Aurunci is 
wrongly brought into the history since they could not have interfered at this time, their inclusion is likely an 
attempt to link Pometia with Suessa (Sezza) as a duplicate names for the same city (ex. Liv. 2.25.5; Dion. Hal. 
6.29.4). Cf. s.v. ‘Aurunci’ RE.  
70
 Liv. 2.16.25. See s.v. ‘Aurunci’ RE.  
71
 Liv. 2.17.6. Quam si capta foret. 
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Similarly, the Volscian city of Antium was captured in 467 BC, its leaders were beheaded 
and its citizens sold.
72
 As in previous engagements, the booty was given to the soldiers, but 
the captives along with the precious metals were reserved for the public treasury.
73
 
Conversely, a different tactic was used following the seizure of a Volscian camp in which all 
the captured soldiers were sold except the senators.
74
 In 459 BC the Aequians decided to 
seize the opportunity afforded them by Rome’s military engagements with the Volscians and 
occupied the Roman allied city of Tusculum. In response, the Romans sent the famed 
Cincinnatus, who defeated the Aequians, compelling them to undergo the humiliation of 
passing under the yoke in surrendering, and furthermore to submit to the Romans the city of 
Corbio to be sacked as they had done to Tusculum. A provision was made in which the free 
inhabitants of Tusculum were exchanged for the free inhabitants of Corbio.
75
  
The beheading of leaders and enslavement of the populace, along with the execution of 
hostages were all brutal actions,
76
 but it proved effective in convincing other cities that were 
either rebelling or contemplating taking up arms against Rome into making peace or staying 
loyal.
77
 Roman treatment of disaffected neighbours resembled that of quashed rebellions, the 
leaders were sought and punishment was meted ad exemplum, with the ultimate goal of 
returning the majority of the rebellious into the status quo of the Roman fold. Ultimately, 
enslavements during this time were rare, certainly by later comparison. The capture and 
retention of captives as slaves or hostages was not even listed in the grievances that 
Coriolanus suggested the Volscians ask the Romans to recompense.
78
 It seems more likely 
that enslavements were limited, and used only as a trope of later conflicts to describe the 
violence of nearly fraternal strife amongst the cities of central Italy at this time.
79
 It is hard to 
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 Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 10.21.7. The city seems to be sacked twice according to Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 9.56.5; 
10.21.6 and Liv 2.65.6; 3.1.1. If the two sacks are actually one and the same, then according to Dionysius’ 
history, the captives of Antium were not publicly sold until eight years later, as Volkmann 1990, 36 seems to 
suggest. Plut. Cor. 9.1 mentions the capture of some captives in an initial engagemen,t and later at Antium 
many captives were taken along with a great deal of booty (Plut. Cor.13.4).  
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 Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 9.56.9. Here however, Coriolanus was rewarded for conspicuous valour and presented 
with ten captives, he declined accepting only a single captive who was a friend of his along with a horse 
(Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 6.94.2). 
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 431 BC. Strictly venum rather than sub corona (Liv. 4.29.4). 
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 Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 10.24.7-8. 
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 As at Pometia (Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 6.30.1). 
77
 After Lake Regillus (Liv. 2.25.6) at Pometia (Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 6.29.5). 
78
 Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 8.8.3, only the return of cities indicates a return of humans taken, not specifically 
captives. Πέμπετε οὖν πρέσβεις ὡς αὐτοὺς ἀπαιτοῦντες ἃς κατέχουσιν ὑμῶν πόλεις. 
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 The Romans were not alone in taking cities and subjecting the inhabitants to violence and slavery. Cf. the 
actions of Coriolanus against cities allied to Rome, specifically Tolerium, Lavicum, Pedum, and later Bola, 
(Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 8.17.6-18; Plut. Cor. 28.3). The sack of Tusculum and Ortona by the Aequians in 459 
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imagine that the enslaved captives, still remaining in Latium from their capture by the 
Volscians under Coriolanus, were not eventually restored.  
Rome had profited from the wars with their neighbours at the end of the monarchy as the 
booty from conflict was used in constructing the first temple to Jupiter and the Circus 
Maximus.
80
 During the fifth century Rome entered a period of decline as evinced by the 
reduction and lack of growth in census figures.
81
 There is little explanation for this lack of 
growth, but Roman expansion seems to have slowed significantly, perhaps as a result of 
internal class struggle between the plebeian and patrician orders,
82
 or external competition 
with Veii, which resulted in a series of engagements and culminated in the destruction of that 
city, and the supposed enslavement of many of its inhabitants in 396 BC.
83
  
The sack of Veii has been interpreted as the watershed moment in Roman enslavement 
practices by many historians. In Harris’ view the Roman economy of the early fourth century 
was not developed enough to accommodate the introduction of over 10,000 slaves, and 
considerable enslavements were not a feature until later in the century because of Rome’s 
military weakness following the Gallic sack of the city.
84
 Eder comments that the 
procurement of a considerable amount of land precipitated a need to feed the Veians who 
were enslaved, and so the acquisition of land went hand in hand with the acquisition of 
workers to till it.
85
 Eder seems to be following the conclusions of Ogilvie, in which he 
believes that early Rome was not able to support large slave numbers,
86
 but after the sack of 
Veii the sale of several thousand captives was possible because the large addition to the ager 
Romanus facilitated their use as labourers.
87
 However, Cornell believes only a few Veians 
                                                                                                                                                        
BC (Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 10.20.3; 26.3). The Tusculans were exchanged, but no such release was negotiated 
for the citizens of Ortona, see Volkmann 1990, 38-9. Also the Samnites seized the city of Cumae in 421 and 
sold the survivors according to Diod. Sic. 12.76.5 (cf. Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 15.6; Liv. 4.44.12; Strab. 5.243). 
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 Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 3.69.1; Liv.1.38.7; 55.1. It is interesting that the temple of Jupiter would later be 
associated with the slave market and manumitted slaves in several inscriptions (CIL 6.396; 397a; 397b; 398; 
399). 
81
 150,000 in 498 BC, according to Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 5.75.3 and would not return to 150,000 again until 393 
BC when Plin. HN 23.16 states that the 152,573 were recorded in the census, there is little evidence to suggest 
that Rome suffered any major military losses that would result in a reduction of territory or manpower, see 
Thomsen 1980, 118-21; Cornell 1995, 207-8. Brunt 1971, 23f was highly sceptical of any census figure prior 
to 225 BC. 
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 Liv. 3.9-57; Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 10.1-60. 
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 Diod. Sic. 14.93.2 ἐξανδρᾰπόδισμένοι; Liv. 5.22.1 sub corona vendere. 
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 Harris 1984, 23-24; 1971, 41; 1979, 59. 
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 Eder 1990, 546f. 
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 Ogilvie 1965, 677 suggests that the references in Livy to slaves in early Rome are anachronistic colourings 
that reflect how Romans of the first century viewed their early history and the composition of its population.  
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 Ogilvie 1965, 678. 
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were actually enslaved and that in fact most of the inhabitants of the city were given Roman 
citizenship, thereby eliminating their threat through enfranchisement.
88
 Livy suggests that at 
least some of the Veians were granted citizenship,
89
 but what is clear, is soon after the 
acquisition of the ager Veientanus, four full tribes were added at Rome.
90
 The addition of 
these four tribes must have represented a considerable addition to the citizen rolls, perhaps 
making the sharp increase in the census record for 393 BC more likely.
91
 A similar addition 
was made to the citizen rolls following the defeat of the Hernici in 358 BC with the district 
situated on Hernician soil.
92
 The addition of citizens after the fall of Veii and the general 
hesitation in enslaving enemies prior and well after the siege seems to suggest that Cornell’s 
view is the more probable. 
To add weight to the argument, Welwei has highlighted a number of potential problems with 
the theory that the Romans enslaved all the Veians. In his view it was unlikely that slave 
traders would have been willing to purchase over ten thousand slaves, especially when most 
Romans were not in the position to buy slaves at all, and in the absence of buyers little profit 
could have been realised in selling the captives. Furthermore, Welwei believes the farms 
would have to have been fitted for the use of slave labour, and the labourers themselves 
would require substantial rehabilitation after the malnourishment stemming from the 
starvation always accompanying a siege.
93
 Welwei, agreeing with Harris, suggests that the 
acquisition of land was the real factor in changing Rome’s ability to acquire slaves, but 
acknowledges that the slaves of the Veians could also have been taken, and that they may 
have represented a considerable number.
94
 This is improbable, as it is highly doubtful that the 
Romans were incapable of maintaining large numbers of slaves whilst their Veian neighbours 
could, and in any case, the hypothetical acquisition of twice as many slaves would have little 
impact on the city’s demographics as slaves represented only a small minority of the 
population at this time. 
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 Cornell 1995, 320. 
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 Liv. 6.4.4. As these were granted citizenship for a reward of loyalty to Rome it is possible they were made 
citizens immediately after the fall of Veii and therefore rewarded with land in the same manner as other 
Roman citizens. 
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Liv. 6.5.8. The Arniensis, Stellatina, Sabatina and Tromentina c. 387 BC, see Taylor 1960, 48-9. Oakley 1997 
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of the Veians under Augustus, see further Taylor 1960, 46f.  
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 From 117,319 in 459 BC (Liv. 3.24.10 ; Eutrop. 1.16) to 152,573 (Plin. HN 33.16), see Brunt 1971, 13.  
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 Liv. 7.15.9. 
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 Such a change in the villa structure did not occur until much later in the Republican period, see Carandini 
1985; Rathbone 1983, 162. 
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 Welwei 2000, 34-35; Harris 1990, 499. 
 Chapter 4  
85 
 
Rome’s sudden acquisition of the ager Veientanus, nearly doubling the ager Romanus, was 
an impressive victory, but it was shortly eclipsed by the sack of the city by the Gauls.
95
 The 
later writers, Livy, Dionysius, Plutarch and Dio Cassius, all give an account of a rapid 
recovery by Rome in which Camillus won a series of stunning victories over the Gauls.
96
 
Such a recovery as portrayed by these writers is questionable, in particular Livy, whose 
narrative offers the fullest account.
97
 The validity of the different narratives need not be 
discussed here as it has little bearing on capture by the Romans, since few human captures 
are mentioned at all. It seems that the reassertion of Rome’s supremacy over the Latin allies 
was not through enslavement, but through a tour de force. Camillus’ military triumph may 
have resulted in the enslavement of a few captives reserved for the celebration, but this could 
hardly have been the case for all the enemy captives, who at one time or another, came into 
Camillus’ possession.98 In general, narrative histories and biographies concerning Rome 
during the fourth century concentrate on the internal conflicts, centred largely on the class 
struggle within Rome. The sudden acquisition of large tracts of land, the monopoly on free 
land use by the rich and the subsequent debt crisis which led to the formation of the system of 
nexum dominate the social history of the century.  
 
Nexum 
Internally, problems arose over land distribution and debt exemplified by the system of 
nexum. The problems of the late fifth and fourth centuries seem to provide a precursor to the 
economic model put forward by Hopkins regarding the rise of the slave economy at Rome in 
the second century.
99
 Hopkins’ model still represents the most concise formulation of the 
socio-economic theory that can be considered orthodox; with the notion of slaves, stemming 
from an influx of captives thereby replacing the free work force. This has remained the 
cornerstone of most interpretations of societal and economic models of the time. Imperial 
expansion benefited the rich, while neglecting to adequately enrich the poor in light of their 
service, leaving the latter open for exploitation by the former. In the case of the second 
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 See Chapter 3. 
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 Liv. 5.1f Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 1.74.4-75.3; Plut. Cam. 31f ; Cass. Dio 7.28f. 
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 On the validity of accounts of Livy et al. here and a general summary of Rome’s military expansion post 390 
BC see Cornell 1989, 309-323 and Homo 1929, 554-5. Cornell’s chapter in CAH2 is exceptionally useful for 
this under-published period of Roman history. 
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 Prisoners sold after triumph, Liv. 6.4.2; Plut. Cam. 35.1-36.1. 
99
 Hopkins 1978, 8f, particularly the diagram on p. 12. 
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century, according to Hopkins’ model, this resulted in the replacement of the small land 
owner with large slave estates, forcing the poor into urban and largely dependant forms of 
work.
100
 Exploitation, in this manner, was the direct utilisation of the poor for dependant 
labour predominantly in agriculture as indentured workers. The victims of such exploitation 
shared a common characteristic of humble loss to opulent oppressors,
101
 in the case of nexum 
it was the soldier, whose absence from his home led to his demise, losing his land to enemy 
raids and falling victim to cruel usury at the hands of his creditors.
102
 In Hopkins’ model the 
soldier who is kept on a long, often distant, campaign sees his farm fall into neglect,
103
 to be 
purchased by ruthless robber barons in an ancient equivalent of a today’s cash for gold 
schemes.
104
 The returning soldier was landless and dependant on benefactors for casual work 
or continued military service. At different times many of these landless citizens were given 
land outside of Italy in colonies, where they were taxed, rather than directly exploited for 
their labour.  
Nexum as an institution was not slavery, since the nexi crucially retained their civic rights.
105
 
The treatment of nexi had the trappings of slavery, notably their chaining by the lender.
106
 
Presumably nexum was much like serfdom, as it is hard to imagine that once their labour was 
fully taken the nexus could ever earn enough to pay the debt. Most historians have focused on 
the exploitation of the nexus by the lender. The impoverished veteran cuts a sorry scene, but 
it is hard to imagine that nexum was ever proportionate to slavery. The debts were paid to the 
various parties owed on behalf of the debtor, and the lender gained the labour (sua opera) of 
                                                 
100
 The emergence of villas which fit Varro’s (Rust. 1.194) concept of villa perfecta do not appear until the first 
century BC, with the famous villa at Setteffinestre only becoming so after a second phase of building in the 
first century AD, see Carandini and Filippi 1985. That Roman farms were beginning to employ slave labour 
(at least in southern Italy) from the second century BC as testified by Plut. Ti. Gracch. 8 (cf. App. B. Civ. 
1.1.7-9). For the great estate latifundia of the Imperial period see Kuziŝĉin 1984, see also Rathbone 1983, 
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 The impoverished soldier is a popular theme, as it contrasts the humble farmer soldier of honour, with the 
decadence of the later Roman elite. For this reason, figures who shunned opulence, such as Cincinnatus and 
Cato the Elder  were held in high regard.  
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 This story is repeated by Cic. Rep. 2.58; Liv. 2.23; Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 6.26, see  Cornell 1995, 265-6. 
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 Citizens were required to serve for up to sixteen years, with cavalrymen afforded a reduction in required 
service to ten years. Soldiers were kept from home for long periods of time during the Second Punic War, Liv. 
40.36.10 remarked that it took 6 years before a soldier was considered overdue for a return home (cf. App. 
Hisp. 78), see also Brunt 1962, 80. The length of service increased in the first century BC with the 
professionalism introduced by Marius, see Smith 1958, 22f. 
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 Hopkins 1978, 35-36. Hopkins assumes that recruitment generally occurred in the countryside, following the 
observation made by Brunt 1962 69f.  
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 Liv. 2.24.6; 2.28.4; Val. Max. 6.1.9. 
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 According to Ogilvie 1965, the presence of nexi liberatio (Festus Lindsay 1913, 165) suggests the slave was 
actually chained, whereas solutio per aes et libram Gai. Inst. 3.174, suggests that the chaining was symbolic 
as it is hard to imagine why, someone, who could perform a transaction to free themselves, would have been 
treated in the same manner as a common slave.  
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their newfound bondsman, and nothing more. As the harsh rules of debt permitted actual 
enslavement, it is unreasonable to assume that nexum was de facto slavery, by the nature of it 
being an alternative to servitude.
107
 Similarly nexum was unlikely to have affected the 
property of the nexus, as he would have surely allowed the goods standing as surety to have 
been seized or sold in order to pay his debts; nexum was again an alternative to this. In all 
likelihood the majority of nexi maintained their small landholdings, passing their profits to 
their creditors. The story in Livy of a centurion made to work in an ergastulum seems to 
portray an anachronistic impression of how nexum worked.
108
 It is hard to believe a free man 
would submit to a condition that was no different to enslavement, unless there were some 
advantages, and likewise difficult to understand why a creditor would need to detain a free 
man who willingly submitted his labour in the same fashion as an unmanageable slave.
109
 
Livy seems to be applying a feature of the first century BC to this early period, where there is 
no evidence that even slaves on estates were housed in such a way.  
It is held that the abuses suffered by the debtors at the hands of the lenders eventually led to 
the system being abolished. The story of the abuse of a handsome youth at the hands of his 
father’s creditor because he was a nexus is contrary to the principle that nexum expunged the 
bondsman’s debts.110 Of course removing the bondsman’s ability to profit from his own 
labour probably plunged his family into perpetual reliance upon the creditor for their basic 
needs, forcing them into a form of serfdom in which they were legally free, but also legally 
forced into perpetual bondsmanship. It is the likeness to slavery that forced the strict reform 
of nexum through the resolution of the Senate under the Lex Poetelia,
111
 Livy remarked, with 
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 Stipulatio was another means of contracting debt against one’s self, if a suit was brought against the borrower 
in absence of repayment, he could be found immediately liable for the debt manus iniectio, which gave him 60 
days in which the creditor had to maintain the debtor at his own expense (Gai. Inst. 4.17a). If unable to pay 
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20.1.47).  
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 Liv. 2.23.6. The ergastulum could be either a workhouse/factory (Isid. Orig. 15.6.1) or an underground 
prison (Apul. Apol. 47; Columella Rust.. 1.6.3; 1.8.16; Liv. 2.23.6), or a combination of the two. Cf. Étienne 
1974, 250 – 221; Marzanno 2004, 323-325. 
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 Columella Rust. 1.8.16 seems to suggest the ergastulum was a place of punishment, and Apul. Apol. 47 
emphasised it being a place of confinement and torture.  
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 Liv. 8.28.7-9. Cf. Varr. LL. 7.105; Cic. Rep. 2.59; Dion. Hal. 16.5.1-3; Val. Max. 6.1.9. See further for the 
legal procedure of nexum in Jolowicz & Nicholas 1972, 164-6; Watson 1975, 111-24.  
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 Lex Poetelia was dated to 326 BC by Liv. 8.28.7-9 under the consulship of G.Poetelius Libo Visolus, Varro 
Ling 7.105, attributes it to the dictatorship of the same Poetelius in 313 BC. The lex Poetelia de ambitu of 358 
BC (Liv. 7.15.12) was probably introduced by Poetelius when he was a tribune. Neither date has any more or 
less an impact upon this study. Nexum was an obscure and obsolete debt solution to Livy (cf. Dion. Hal. Ant. 
Rom. 16.5), see also Jolowicz 1972, 164; Ogilvie 1965, 296-299, Oakley 1998, 689-94. It is unlikely that the 
Lex Poetelia put an end to debt bondage, defaulters were still subject to quasi-servitude or even outright 
slavery under the old debt laws, see Brunt 1971, 168; Oakley 1998, 690-1. 
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regards to debt, that “as for money lent, the debtor's goods, not his person, should be 
distrainable.”112 
Since nexum did not produce a form of dependant labour akin to slavery, and was reformed 
once it began to be utilised like slavery, its removal could not have left a demand for chattel 
slavery, as it was not a like for like replacement. The Rome that emerged in the second half 
of the fourth century was a politically stronger, more cohesive Rome, capable of fielding a 
large army levied from an increased citizen body and strongly bound allies. Both the ending 
of nexum by the lex Poetelia at the end of the fourth century and the rapid expansion of Rome 
beyond Latium in Italy from the end of the fourth century, have made it easy to place the rise 
of the slave economy in Rome to this point in history and, in particular, to the Third Samnite 
War.
113
  
 
The Fourth Century  
Externally, Rome’s military expansion during the fourth century was a quest to gain ever 
increasing political dominance over her Italic neighbours. There was a clear trend in Italy 
from at least the sixth century for cities to form into regional confederacies and leagues. The 
Romans were only peculiar in their rapid ascendancy and success in expanding the league 
system beyond Latium. During the fourth century, the Roman-Latin relationship went from 
one based on a partnership between equals to one of Roman suzerainty.
114
 Though the 
process of Roman domination within the League had apparent roots in the fifth century, it 
was effectively and symbolically sealed following the Latin War and the subsequent treaty in 
338 BC, in which Rome was essentially affirmed as the driver of foreign affairs in the 
League. Rome slowly subjected the people of Italy into a web of alliances based on varying 
and often complex connections, which often included the award of Roman citizenship (civitas 
or civitas sine suffragio) and formal allied status, socii and amici.
115
 It is hard to identify the 
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 Liv. 8.28.9 Loeb trans. pecuniae creditae bona debitoris, non corpus obnoxium esset. ita nexi soluti, 
cautumque in posterum ne necterentur.  
113
 Argued by Cornell 1989, 388-389; Harris 1979, 59; Oakley 1993, 24-25. See below for Samnite War. 
114
 The Latin League was created during the seventh century and the Romans became the head of the league 
under Tarquinius Superbus. The Republic was allied with the league through the Cassian treaty (foedus 
Cassianum) which was probably equivalent to a foedus aequum (a treaty amongst equals), see Sherwin-White 
1973, 23-25.  
115
 Exemplified by the admission of the new voting tribes: the Publiia and Pomptina in 358 BC, the Scaptia and 
Maecia in 332 BC, Oufentina and Falernia in 318 BC and the Aniensis and Terentina in 299 BC. The grant of 
citizenship without the vote began from the mid fourth century, with the admission of the Caerites in 353 BC 
(Gell. NA 16.13.7), see Taylor 1960, 79. It has been suggested by Sordi 1960, 78 that the Veliterni were also 
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motives of Roman expansion in any strict terms, but it is clear that as a result Rome gained 
considerable amounts of land, which came directly under the ownership and control of the 
state. Eventually these acquisitions would have a considerable impact on Roman politics in 
the second and first centuries, but it could hardly be seen as a primary motive for expansion 
at this time. The exertion of any direct control over newly acquired lands by the Romans was 
relatively limited as predominantly Latin colonies were established in the new acquisitions.
116
 
The total land taken from the defeated cities and devoted to the colonies was relatively 
small.
117
 Apart from this initial contribution of land, Rome’s only demand of the newly 
submitted allies was an annual contribution towards military levies. 
Roman treatment of captives during this early period reflected the foreign policy geared 
towards the acquisition of favourable alliances, rather than territorial acquisition. From the 
fall of Veii until the Second Samnite War at the end of the century, there are only two noted 
instances of enslavement. After the capture of Sutrium in 388 BC, the remaining enemy 
soldiers were paraded in Camillus’ triumph and then sold.118 Then in 356 BC, following a 
victory over the Volscians, the remaining soldiers were paraded in the triumph and then 
sold.
119
 During the Second Samnite War (326 – 304 BC) there is only one clear instance of 
captives being enslaved by the Romans. After the defeat of the Samnites and their allies near 
Allifae in 308 BC the Samnite soldiers were stripped and sent under the yoke as per an 
agreement (deditio) they made in surrendering.
120
 The Samnite allies, however, were not 
                                                                                                                                                        
admitted sine suffragio around the same time. This may in fact have been a practice of limited incorporation 
employed by the Etruscans. 
116
 Prior to the Third Samnite War, to the South of Rome, the Latin colonies of Circeii (393 BC), Setia (383 
BC), Cales (334 BC), Fregellae (328 BC), Saticula (313 BC), Suessa Aurunca (313 BC) and Sora (303 BC); 
to the North, Sutrium (383 BC), Nepete (383 BC) and specifically in the ager Veiianus Alba Fucens (303 
BC), Narnia (299 BC) and Carseoli (298 BC). Far to the East beyond the Apennines and the Samnite 
controlled lands the Latin colony of Luceria was established in 314 BC. The Roman colonies of the fourth 
century were concentrated on the coast of Latium and northern Campania at Antium (338 BC), Terracina (239 
BC), Minturnae (295 BC), and Sinuessa (295 BC), see Cornell 1989, 391 fig. 48. 
117
 Colonies in the fourth century were typically formed of 2,000 male citizens and according to Livy between 
two and seven iugera was allotted for each citizen (Liv. 5.24.4; 5.30.8; 6.15.12; 8.11.14 8.21.11. Ignoring the 
pitiful two-thirds suggested for the Privernate district). Diod. Sic. 14.102.4 suggested the colony at Veii 
received between 4 and 28 plethra per head (3-21 iugera). For the odd measurement of plethora see Carter 
2006, 95-6; Pelgrom 2008, 128; Quilici 1994, 128. Varro Rust. 1.10.2 had a notion that two iugera was 
allotted per citizen. The survey of Gabba 1978, 250-8 suggests that the individual allotments of colonists were 
closer to Livy’s figure of seven iugera. Based on iugera for a typical colony of 2,000, the land allotment 
would be approximately 38 km
2
. For colony populations in general see Brunt 1971, 56f; Salmon 1969, 
passim. For the land size of these colonies and usage by the colonists see Pelgrom 2008, 338.  
118
 Mostly Etruscans soldiers who were garrisoning the city Liv. 6.4.2; Plut. Cam. 35.1-36.1. 
119
 Liv. 7.27.8. Livy gives a figure of 4,000 captives, but it is unlikely that all of these were marched in the 
triumph. It is possible that the captives of an Etruscan camp in the same year were treated the same way (Liv. 
2.17.9).  
120
 Liv. 9.42.7. 
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protected by the same agreement and Livy states that 7,000 of these were sold as slaves.
121
 Of 
the allies, the Hernici soldiers were sought out for it to be determined if they had been 
forcibly conscripted or had willingly joined the Samnites.
122
 The matter was referred to the 
Senate to to judge them. This angered several of the Hernician cities and they declared war 
on the Romans. The rebellion was ill conceived, and the dedication of a full consular army 
towards a war with the Hernici was enough to scare them into surrendering.
123
 In the instance 
of Allifae, it is possible to infer that the captives of Talium and Silvium, as they are expressed 
by Diodorus, were taken as αἰχμάλωτος.124 
Rome won several engagements with the Samnites and Etruscans during the Second Samnite 
War. On three occasions the defeated were spared execution or enslavement,
125
 notably in 
320 BC when the Roman commander Papirius was able to avenge the Roman defeat by the 
Samnites in the Caudine Pass, where the Romans had been trapped and forced to pass under 
the Yoke.
126
 In response, Papirius ordered the 7,000 Samnites he captured to be sent under 
the yoke in the same fashion that the Romans had been humiliated.
127
 In the case of the cities 
of Canusium and Teanum, Livy states that hostages were received by the Romans to ensure 
their future compliance.
128
 Following the war with the Samnites, the Romans successfully 
defeated the Aequi, who were ‘subjugated’ according to Livy, and admitted as cives Romani 
according to Cicero.
129
 Other cities fared far worse during the Second Samnite War. At 
Satricum the faction within the city that had chosen to support the Samnites were executed.
130
 
Likewise the chief magistrates of Nola were killed.
131
 The city of Luceria had withdrawn 
their support and it was retaken by the Romans, after which the Lucerians and the Samnnite 
garrison were executed.
132
 At Cluviae, in response to the torture and murder of their Roman 
garrison, all the males of the city were massacred and it is not difficult to imagine that, in 
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 Liv. 9.42 sub corona veniere. 
122
 They were allies (foedus cassianum) of the Romans since at least 389 BC (Liv. 6.2.2). They were subjugated 
under a Roman controlled treaty in 359 BC 7.15.9, see s.v. ‘Hernici’ RE. 
123
 Liv. 9.42.8-43.7. 
124
 Talium Diod. (Sic 20.26.3) Silvium (Diod. Sic. 20.80.2). 
125
 Luceria 320 BC (Cass. Dio 32.22; Eutrop. 2.9.1; FGrH 255.10; Flor. 1.11.1; Liv. 9.15.6-9; 22.14.12; 25.6.12; 
Oros. 3.15.9), Canusium 318 BC (Diod. Sic. 19.10.2; Liv. 9.20.4) and Teanum 318 BC (Liv. 9.20.4). 
126
 Liv. 9.31.7.  
127
 Cass. Dio 32.22; Eutrop. 2.9.1; FGrH 255.10; Flor. 1.11.1; Liv. 9.15.6-9; 22.14.12; 25.6.12; Oros. 3.15.9. 
128
 Canusium (Diod. Sic. 19.10.2; Liv. 9.20.4) Teanum (Liv. 9.20.4). 
129
 Liv. 10.1.9 Aequos subegit; Cic. Off. 1.32, cf. Strab. 3.4. 
130
 Liv. 9.16.9; 26.33.10; Oros. 3.15.9-10. 
131
 Diod. Sic. 19.101.3, cf. Liv. 9.28.6. 
132
 Liv. 9.26.3. 
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such an instance, many of the women and children would have been enslaved, although Livy 
is silent on the matter.
133
  
 
The Third Samnite War and the Misinterpretation of Livy 
Competition is an integral aspect of a republican government, as competition for offices is the 
cornerstone to candidacy and the fundamental means of election. In Roman society this 
competition was grounded upon military participation; political office required a minimum 
service, and military success was often the basis on which many candidates were elected. 
Furthermore, only the highest political offices could command full armies, and victory in war 
frequently defined the measure of one’s success once elected. Indeed, such competition, and 
the value placed upon military success were the driving points of Roman imperialism; 
underpinning the theory of Hopkins, as a necessary prerequisite to the aggressive expansion 
theory of Harris, and by extension, anyone trying to understand the exceptional bellicosity of 
Rome.
134
 Political competition and martial tradition were omnipresent in Roman society, and 
as overarching factors in the expansion of the Republic they can never be discounted. 
However, the reasons for individual conflicts were often manifold, and it is in determining 
the factors which led to individual conflicts that a tremendous amount of argument should be 
concerned. Enslavement as a mechanism of imperialism through subjugation, suppression 
and exploitation, is often an important aspect of imperialist theory, and thus it is against these 
theories that the importance of particular instances of enslavement becomes apparent, and 
overall, the acquisition of slaves constitutes a substantially important contribution to the 
economic motivation behind war. 
Harris argued that the Senate continually carried out a conscious policy of aggressive warfare 
for the enrichment of the state from at least the time of the Third Samnite War.
135
 Warfare 
could be profitable, at least for those directly involved in successful ones. Harris believed that 
the Romans must have associated military success with material gain, and the evidence is 
clear in the construction of buildings, growth in individual wealth and that of the Roman 
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 Liv. 9.31.3. 
134
 Harris 1979, 9-15; Hopkins 1978, 1-98. Cf. the review of North 1981, 1-9.  
135
 Harris 1979, 54-58. The Senate has traditionally been viewed as the primary director in Roman policy, see 
Mommsen 1887 III, 1158; Momigliano (s.v. ‘Senatus’ OCD); Kunkel 1966, 19. More recently Eckstein 1987, 
passim has shown that as Roman wars were fought with increasing distance from Rome, the Roman general 
had more power in effecting foreign policy directly rather than under the supervision of the senatus 
consultum.  
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treasury; all enriched from the proceeds of war. Any theory concerning the Romans acting 
otherwise is simply dismissed as pertaining to the false tradition that early Rome was free of 
any form of avaritia.
136
 According to Harris’ theory, the acquisition of slaves through conflict 
was a part of the clear economic benefit of military action, and so mass enslavement became 
ipso facto a motive for war.  
There were, however, motivations which support the ‘defensive’ or ‘accidental’ imperialism 
theory which contrasts with the ideas of Harris.
137
 It is true that many of Rome’s wars were 
profitable. But, they also fought numerous unprofitable conflicts, as well as wars in which 
they did not fully exploit their economic advantage.
138
 Roman policy in dealing with their 
Italian neighbours suggests that they were concerned with preserving the Roman state 
through an extended region of buffer states, allied and subjected to Rome in increasingly 
secure and permanent alliances, resulting in the enfranchisement and amalgamation of the 
Italian states.
139
 Under this theory of the motivation of Roman imperialism it is more difficult 
to accept the enslavement of captives from states that were quickly offered alliances and 
varying degrees of citizenship.  
For the Third Samnite War we have the first consistent account of a Roman campaign in 
which battle figures are regularly given, along with enemy captured and killed, as well as the 
amount of gold, silver and bronze paid into the treasury from spoils. Given the importance of 
enslavement as a means of generating wealth from war, it is not a matter of coincidence that 
the presence of these figures has been interpreted as the beginning of Roman mass 
enslavements by many historians.
140
  
In his tenth book, Livy breaks from the pace of his first nine, which cover the first four 
hundred years of Roman history, to describe the events of roughly ten years within a single 
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 Eckstein 1987, xiv. 
137
 Cf. Sherwin-White’s criticism of Harris 1980, 177. For a more balanced view of the merits of both Harris’ 
aggressive theory and the defensive theory, see North 1981, 1-9. See also Luttwak 1980, 606. It must be said 
Harris’ focus is largely on the mid-late Republic, although he cites the Third Samnite War as an exemplum 
that the mechanisms for economic gains and motives in warfare were present in early Roman history. 
138
 Cf. Sherwin-White 1980, 179. On the limitations of profit from war see Veyne 1975, passim.  
139
 Liska 1978 11-12 gives this as an explanation for many state’s political objectives in controlling neighbours. 
Cf. the motives of Roman politics, see Eckstein 1987, xiv. 
140
 Harris 1979, 59; Oakley 2005a IV, 193-194; Cornell 1989, 388-389; Scheidel 2011, 294. Finley 1980 
suggests this occurred much later probably during the Second Punic War. Hopkins 1978, 8-15 does not 
specifically name captives as the source of slaves for the early period, Welwei 2000, passim is non-committal 
on a period and Salmon 1967 neglects to mention the captures in any significant way. Also the enslavement of 
captives during the Samnite Wars factored significantly into the estimates of the state revenue for the 290’s in 
Frank 1933 I, 43 n3.  
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book, providing a consistent annual narrative for the final campaign against the Samnites and 
on-going fighting with Etruscans, Sabines, Umbrians and Gauls to the north. The series of 
captures recorded by Livy occur entirely in the second half of the book, which may indicate 
that Livy is working from a source directly involved with the events or records made during 
the 290’s BC.141 Whilst there are earlier examples of enemy casualties and captives, even in 
Livy, there are no earlier examples within Roman history in which consistent figures for 
enemy captured are given for an entire campaign. Since books 11 – 20 of Livy are lost it is 
impossible to conclude if the figures for the captures are an isolated instance in which the 
historian had the benefit of working with a first hand account or primary record. It is clear, 
however, that after Livy’s narrative resumes with book 21 specific casualty numbers and 
battle figures are a more regular occurrence.  
In the account of the Third Samnite War, Livy is highly methodical in recording the 
aftermath of battle, particularly in giving the details of the enemy figures killed or captured. 
In contrast, Roman casualties are rarely mentioned.
142
 The preciseness of many figures, 
sometimes rounded to the nearest ten, suggests that Livy was working with documents that 
recorded the aftermath of battles. Typically the number of casualties was inflated by ancient 
historians, but in the case of the Third Samnite War Livy’s figures seem to correspond with 
the losses that would be expected from the size of the armies involved. Despite the 
plausibility of the numbers, particularly the relatively conservative casualty numbers used by 
Livy, it is clear they are still presented with some degree of artifice, as the numbers are just as 
often rounded as they are specific.
143
 During the Third Samnite War the Romans often fielded 
more than one army,
144
 and as engagements were fought by multiple commanders over 
greater distances the need for communication between each army, including specific casualty 
figures, became necessary to fulfil a co-ordinated strategy. This information was also 
important in granting triumphs or ovations, since honours were awarded on the basis of the 
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 Oakley 2005a IV, 194. Oakley states that there were only three other instances of specific figures for enemy 
captives in early Roman history (Liv. 9.42.8; 9.44.7 and Diod. Sic. 20.80.2). However, there are numerous 
early examples, though most could be little more than traditional figures or fictitious numbers for the purpose 
of elaboration e.g. 4,000 in 502 BC (Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 5.49.1); 6,000 ransomed after Lake Regullus in 498 
BC (Liv. 2.22.5); 8,000 in 356 BC (Liv 2.17.9); 7,000 Samnites sent under the yoke in 320 BC (Liv. 9.15.6, 
Oros. 3.15.9); and certainly the exaggerated figure of 60,000 at Perusia in 310 BC (Diod. Sic. 20.35.4; Liv. 
9.37.11; 40.19). 
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 At the battle of Sentinum 8,700 Romans and allies (socii) were said to have fallen (Liv. 10.29.17). 
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 Welwei 2000, 42-43. 
144
 For example in 295 BC there were two new consuls for that year, Fabius and Decius (Liv. 10.26.14), 
Volumnius operating as a proconsul (Liv. 10.27.1) and two pro-praetors Gnaes Fulvius and Lucius Postumius 
Magellus (Liv. 10.26.15) each with their respective armies. 
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number of enemy killed or captured.
145
 In all likelihood such communications between the 
commanders, or between the commanders and the Senate, were preserved and drawn upon by 
either Livy himself or his source. 
Livy’s neglect to consistently convey Roman battle casualties and his fickle reporting of the 
number of enemy killed or captured illustrates the lack of importance he attributed to casualty 
figures rather than their absence within the communications of commanders. Once Livy’s 
books resume, it is clear that, he was generally unconcerned with the detailed outcome of 
battle. The focus of his history tends to skirt around the impact of losses upon the enemy, and 
often he omits the fate of captives all together. During the Third Samnite War in 295 BC, at a 
pivotal battle near Sentinum, the Romans defeated a combined Samnite and Gallic force with 
the loss of their consul Publius Decius Mus. Throughout the course of this battle the fighting 
is described in symbolically heroic detail.
146
 The battle hangs in the balance with only a last 
minute reverse giving the Romans victory. Retrospectively this engagement was seen as a 
turning point in the war, and important and large enough for word to have spread to the Greek 
world.
147
 Despite the significance of the battle, which is recounted in a large passage within 
the tenth book, very little of the narrative is devoted to the actual outcome in terms of human 
cost. Livy sums up the battle in a couple of lines, “twenty five thousand of the enemy were 
killed, eight thousand captured; nor was it a bloodless victory, for of the army of Publius 
Decius, seven thousand were slain and seventeen hundred of the army of Fabius.”148 Livy 
states that a search for Decius’ body was made and its retrieval from underneath countless 
enemy dead was testament to his bravery. The rest of 295 BC is quickly summed up and the 
events of the year are concluded with a triumph celebrated by Fabius Rullianus and the son of 
Publius Decius.
149
 In the narrative surrounding the Roman victory at Sentinum Livy only 
remarks in two lines the human cost for both sides. It serves only as a quick corroboration of 
the scale of the victory, 25,000 enemy killed (probably an exaggeration) coupled with the 
impressive 8,000 captured represents one of the most significant losses of a Roman enemy to 
date, and furthermore the loss of 8,700 Roman soldiers and allies was also remarkable on 
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 See Beard 2007, 206-9; Richardson 1975, 60-62. 
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 Liv. 10.27.-29. Prior to battle an omen of Roman victory was perceived by a wolf chasing a deer between the 
two armies (Liv. 10.27.8-9). 
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 Duris of Samos (early third century) commented upon the size of the battle in Diod. Sic. 21.6 (FGrH 76.56). 
148
 Liv. 10.29.17-18, Caesa eo die hostium viginti quinque milia, octo capta. nec incruenta victoria fuit; nam ex 
P. Deci exercitu caesa septem milia, ex Fabi mille septingenti. 
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 Liv. 10.30.8; cf. Degrassi 1954, 97.  
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their part.
150
 Apart from illustrating the scale of victory these numbers hold little significance 
to Livy, other than illustrating that the battle was less decisive than it could have been.
151
 
With so few words devoted to the human cost in such a significant battle it is apparent that 
Livy is generally unconcerned with the fate of captives and this is clearly evident in his 
sparse phrasing of rarely anything more than caeda or capta. 
Despite Livy’s general disinterest in captives, there is enough detail in the narrative to 
analyse the effects of war and capture on both the Romans and the vanquished Samnites. The 
instances of actual capture are well known from the partial collection of Livian references by 
Frank and Volkmann, as well as the full list of Livy’s references to enslavement by the 
Romans in Harris, and the gathering of these into a concise table by Cornell.
152
 Apart from 
Volkmann, in which the references comprise a portion of a wider survey, the purpose of these 
was simply to highlight a wider phenomenon of a growing slave system in Rome and 
economic gain from war. To these brief surveys must be added the study of Welwei, who has 
been the only historian to analyse the Third Samnite War with regards to the practice of 
capture by the Romans in any depth.
153
 As I wish to analyse the degree to which the Romans 
actually enslaved the captives of this war, it is necessary to provide a summary. 
The Third Samnite War was fought primarily in Campania and Samnium, but there was also 
a dangerous second front to the north against a number of independent Etruscan cities and 
their mercenary Gauls. The strong cohesion of the Samnite league made the war upon them 
the primary focus of the Romans. In the years preceding the war, the Etruscans, under the 
pretence of protecting themselves from the Gauls, began amassing a large force that 
threatened Rome; this was exacerbated by the talks held between the Etruscans and the 
invading Gauls which led to the latter being bought off. The Romans reacted by sending the 
newly appointed Consul M. Valerius into Etruria in 299 BC.
154
 Valerius, by Livy’s account, 
pillaged the land about Southern Etruria, scorching farms and villages. Despite such 
provocation, the Etruscans did not put up any significant resistance, and the consul returned 
home. At the same time, to the south of Rome the Samnites began raiding their neighbours 
the Lucanians. As a result, the Lucanians entreated the Romans to pledge protection over 
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 Perhaps a loss of nearly a quarter of the force of roughly 40,000, if in fact there were four full legions of the 
day and an equal number of allies. On the size of legions at this time see Keppie 1984, 17-22. 
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 Levene 1993, 234. 
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 Frank 1933 I, 43 n3; Volkmann 1990, 40; Harris 1971, 59 n.4; Cornell 1989, 389. 
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 Welwei 2000, 42f. 
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them in exchange for an alliance. When a Roman envoy was sent to the Samnites to urge 
them to desist from their aggression upon the Lucanians he was threatened, and so the 
Romans entered a war on a second front with the Samnites.
155
  
An interregnum caused a rushed election for consuls in 298 BC, in which the Romans elected 
L. Cornelius Scipio Barbatus and Gn. Fulvius. In 298 BC, according to Livy, Scipio was sent 
to Etruria. There, his scorched earth policy, unlike that of Valerius, enticed the Etruscans into 
a single engagement in which the Romans at last prevailed, earning a considerable amount of 
booty.
156
 The other consul was sent into Samnium, capturing Bovianum and Aufidena,
157
 and 
earning a triumph against the Samnites.
158
 A second century epitaph for Scipio Barbatus 
commemorates his victories as consul in Samnium and is in direct contrast with Livy’s 
account and the fasti triumphalis.
159
 This variance illustrates the confusion of early Roman 
history in our sources and the evident variation in tradition.
160
 After the campaigns of 298 BC 
both the Samnites and Etruscans realised the necessity of gathering larger and stronger forces 
to oppose the Romans. In response, in 297 BC the Roman centuries elected the reluctant 
Quintus Fabius Maximus Rullianus as consul. He had been a hero during previous conflicts 
and held the office of consul three times; as his colleague they elected the proven Publius 
Decius to his third consulship. Due to the respected stature of these two appointments the 
Etruscans held councils to consider peace with Rome, leaving the Samnites open to the full 
brunt of the Roman military. In a field engagement the army of Fabius defeated a Samnite 
force near the city of Tifernum, resulting in the death of 3,400 Samnites and the capture of 
830 prisoners and 23 standards.
161
 Meanwhile, the other consul Decius killed 2,000 Apulians 
allied to the Samnites at Beneventum.
162
 Throughout 297 BC the two consuls pillaged the 
Liris Valley in hopes of disrupting Samnite agriculture for the following year. At some point 
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 According to Salmon 1967, 261 the capture of Bovianum is likely a fictitious event, based on Livy’s 
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in the year the only other notable engagement with enemy forces resulted in Fabius taking a 
place named Cimetra,
163
 acquiring there 2,900 fighting men as captives, having slain 930.
164
 
In 296 BC two new consuls were elected, Lucius Volumnius and Appius Claudius. However, 
Publius Decius Mus was tasked with continuing his scorched earth strategy throughout the 
elections and had his command prorogued. Likewise, Fabius’ command was extended so that 
there were essentially four commanders in the field in a single year.
165
 Decius then 
disengaged from the policy of laying waste to the land and led his army to Murgantia, there 
surrounding and capturing 2,100 Samnite soldiers, along with a large quantity of booty.
166
 
Welwei suggests that the numbers are plausible, but the large amount of booty seems to be an 
invention of Livy to lend credibility to Decius’ abandoning his strategy of pillaging the 
countryside in favour of taking cities.
167
 After Murgantia, Decius called upon the soldiers to 
alleviate themselves of their booty by selling it and in so doing to lure the traders on.
168
 Over 
criticism of Livy’s invention here needs to be avoided; if in fact Decius’ strategy had been to 
ravage the countryside he was probably moving lightly with a limited baggage train, and 
therefore the idea that he had to encourage his troops to sell the booty in order to move 
quickly is a reasonable assertion. Decius immediately moved his army against the city of 
Romulea, where in a single day the siege was carried, with 2,100 enemies killed and 6,000 
captured (a lot to off-load quickly), along with a very large quantity of booty which the 
soldiers were again obliged to sell.
169
 From there Decius moved on to Ferentum, where the 
army encountered stiffer resistance, but gained yet more spoils.
170
 Welwei’s scepticism 
regarding Livy’s account of Decius’ actions is acceptable in regards to the numbers, which 
seem to be arbitrarily recorded with varying degrees of accuracy, and there is no clear method 
present in Livy’s choice in reporting specific or rounded figures. However, it is difficult to 
disregard the episode with the troops selling their booty as it seems highly probable given the 
sudden change in Decius’ strategy. That the actual shift in strategy occurred is in itself 
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 Cimetra is unknown, the name implies a Volscian city, but could also be Etruscan, see Salmon 1967, 262 n3. 
164
 Liv. 10.15.6. Fabius etiam urbem Cimetram cepit, ibi capta armatorum duo milia nongenti. 
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 Cornell 1989, 377-8 suggests that the unorthodox extension of command and the number of commanders in a 
single year during much of the Third Samnite War was reflective of a transitional system of military office 
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multiple fronts and multiple army groups. It must be said that there was particularly strained relations within 
the patrician elements of the Senate (Liv. 10.15.12).  
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 Liv. 10.17.4 duo milia Samnitium et centum pugnantes circumventi captique, et alia praeda ingens capta est. 
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 Welwei 2000, 43. 
168
 Liv. 10.17.5-6. 
169
 Liv. 10.17.8 ad duo milia et trecenti occisi et sex milia hominum capta, et miles ingenti praeda potitusquam 
vendere, sicut priorem, coactus. 
170
 No mention of captives, Liv. 10.17.10. 
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questionable, but seems possible given the fact that a series of large victories that profited the 
soldiers would ensure success in the consular elections of the following year, elections in 
which Decius won office.
171
  
Elsewhere in Samnium in 296 BC the newly elected consul Volumnius, with a particularly 
strong army,
172
 took three fortresses in which 3,000 enemies were killed and half as many 
apparently taken prisoner.
173
 From there he marched northwest to meet up with the army of 
Appius Claudius, and together they fought a battle in which the Samnites were driven into 
their camp, which was then taken. In the later engagement 7,800 of the enemy were killed 
and 2,120 captured, along with a vast amount of booty.
174
 During this time the Samnites had 
made a foray into Campania in which they captured a number of prisoners, but on their return 
they were intercepted by the Romans under Volumnius. A battle was fought between the two 
armies in which the Campanian prisoners, seeing the opportunity afforded them by the fray, 
broke from their captors and seized the Samnite commander (Statius Minatius), conveying 
him to the Romans. The Samnites were easily defeated without their general and their losses 
amounted to 6,000 killed and 2,500 captured.
175
 The recovery of the Campanians, along with 
their booty from the Samnite train, resulted in less loot for the Roman soldiers who, like those 
under Decius, were compelled to sell off the booty so as not to be overburdened during the 
campaign.
176
 In this episode there is no mention of the sale of the captives by Livy, which is 
surprising given the perfect context provided in the reversal of fortunes of the Samnites. It is 
likely that the Samnites were either turned over to the Campanians or stripped of their arms 
and released, as it is doubtful that 2,500 Samnites even divided amongst traders could be 
guarded so close to their home territory. Any notion that these Samnites were carried to 
Rome is precluded by the fact the Romans wished to be unencumbered by loot, let alone by 
enemy soldiers who themselves had recently been the victims of a prisoner breakout.  
The defeats suffered by the Samnites and the Etruscans in 296 BC induced them to enter into 
a pact with the hopes of overpowering the Romans with a joint force, also including 
                                                 
171
 295 BC (Liv. 10.22.9). 
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 Comprising of two legions, legio II and III, and 15,000 allies, roughly 50% more than typical of a consular 
army at the time (Liv. 10.18.3). 
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 Liv. 10.18.8 in Samnio tria castellan ceperat, in quibus ad tria milia hostium errant, dimidium fere eius 
captum. 
174
 Liv. 10.19.22 Castra capta dereptaque; praeda ingens parta et militia concessa est. Septem milia octingenti 
hostium occisi, duo milia et centum viginti capti. 
175
 Liv. 10.20.11-15. Figures of 6-8,000 are common and seem to represent a typical army size of the Samnites.  
176
 Liv. 10.20.16. 
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Umbrians and mercenary Gauls. The Samnite commander Gellius Egnatius was able to break 
through the Roman lines and join his forces with that of the Etruscans in Etruria.
177
 Winter 
fell before the Roman and Etrusco-Samnite coalition could meet in battle, and so the 
elections of 295 BC were held against the backdrop of a looming decisive conflict. The 
experienced commanders P. Decius Mus and Q. Fabius Maximus Rullianus were again 
elected consuls, with Volumnius’ command prorogued as a pro-consul, along with three other 
previous consuls who were granted pro-praetorships. The number of forces committed to the 
war on each side was high,
178
 and two full consular armies under Fabius Maximus Rullianus 
and Decius Mus were sent to meet the Etrusco-Samnite coalition. The ensuing battle fought 
near Sentinum resulted in the death of Decius and the Samnite commander Egnatius. The 
Romans suffered 8,800 casualties, but according to Livy 25,000 Samnites were killed, with 
8,000 captured.
179
 The can be viewed as a watershed in Roman history, the signifying 
moment in which Roman dominance over central Italy, and by extension, their eventual 
dominance of the entire peninsula and the greater Mediterranean, was ensured. Welwei notes 
that such an outcome was inevitable given that the tradition around the martyrdom of Decius 
required a “battle for the supremacy of Italy.”180 Regardless of the poetic hype associated 
with it, the battle proved a pivotal point in paving the way for the Roman conquest of Italy.
181
 
However, Sentinum, though effectively reducing the Samnites to the point that they could 
never overcome the Romans, failed to be the coup de maître intended; continuous fighting 
would continue for another four years.  
From Sentinum Fabius marched his troops into Etruria, where he took Perusia; there 4,500 
were killed and 1,740 prisoners were taken prisoner, to be ransomed at 310 asses each. 
Elsewhere the pro-consul Volumnius was said to have been involved in a battle, though Livy 
reports a number of different versions in which the opponents of the legions vary, as does the 
identity of the victors, either Volumnius or his enemy. One account held that Volumnius and 
his entire legion were destroyed by Gauls, another version that only some foragers had been 
killed by Umbrians. A third held Volumnius coming to the rescue of a young lieutenant and 
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 Liv. 10.22.5; Cass. Dio fr.36.28 Zon. 8.1. Cf. Salmon 1967, 263-4.  
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 Salmon 1967, 265 estimates at 100,000 corresponding with the number of Samnites killed in the campaign 
attributed to Duris (Diod. Sic. 21.6 = FGrH 76.56) cf. Cic Att. 6.1.18. Liv. 10.30.5 remarks on some of the 
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 Liv. 10.30.10. The numbers are more credible than the inflated figure of 100,000 enemy killed as often 
interpreted from Duris (Diod. Sic. 21.6 = FGrH 76.56.). 
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 Welwei 2000, 44 “kampf um die vorherrschaft in Italien.”  
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 Duris (Diod. Sic. 21.6 = FGrH 76.56.) Cic. Att. 6.1.18; Flor. 1.12.5-7; 4.5.15; Oros. 3.21.6; Polyb. 2.19.6; 
Zon 8.1 cf. Frontin. 2.1.8; Juv. 8.254-8.  
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actually capturing a number of Umbrians with their booty.
182
 According to Livy, Volumnius 
was not killed, as he is credited with joining his forces with Appius Claudius, who had 
assumed control of Decius’ army; the two combined to defeat the Samnites in a battle where 
16,300 Samnites fell and 2,700 were captured at the cost of 2,700 fallen Romans. The 
numbers are an obvious construction, as the Roman dead match the numbers of Samnites 
captured,
183
 and the Samnite casualties adding up to a convenient four traditional legions.
184
 
This last battle of 295 BC was remarkably similar to the one fought at Sentinum, and is yet 
another example of how the events of the Samnite wars are saturated with repetition and 
muddled tradition.
185
 Salmon questioned whether many of the battles attributed to the Second 
and Third Samnite War were actually other engagements placed in the wrong conflict, and 
further questioned if they should be accepted as real events at all, particularly given the 
repetitiveness.
186
 Indeed, it is impossible to accept Livy’s account of each battle when he 
himself expresses concern over the variation in his sources.
187
 
In 294 BC Fabius and the deceased Decius were succeeded as consuls by Lucius Postumius 
Magellus and Marcus Atilius Rufus. Due to illness Magellus remained at Rome, whilst 
Atilius set off immediately into Samnium.
188
 Rumours of Samnite movements, however, 
compelled Magellus to leave Rome with his army, proceeding into Samnium to take the city 
of Milonia. There 3,200 were slain and 7,400 Samnites were captured.
189
 Here Livy makes an 
interesting statement in regards to the captives and booty, stating capti quattuor milia 
septingenti praeter praedam aliam.
190
 At first glance it appears that the qualification “besides 
other booty” is implying that the captives were in fact considered praeda (booty). However, 
as soldiers are generally reckoned separate to booty, particularly in regards to their 
distribution as such, it seems more likely that praeda has been inserted as a synonym for 
spolia. In other words, the captives too were taken along with booty; both of the accusatives 
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 Liv. 10.26.12 Umbros redintegrato proelio victos esse captivosque eis ac praedam ademptam. Livy suggests 
the Gauls were more likely the enemies involved. Liv. 10.26.5f lists the variant accounts. 
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 A tit for tat cf. Welwei 2000, 44-45.  
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 Livy draws little distinction in the composition of the Samnite army from that of the Roman army, Liv. 
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 See Oakley 2005a, 199-200. Kraus 1998 264-83 defined epetitions within Livy as either ‘good’ in which the 
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 Salmon 1967, 267-8. 
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 Notably at 10.26.9-12; 10.30.5. 
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 Liv. 10.32.2-5. 
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 Liv. 10.34.3. 
190
 Liv. 10.34.3. 
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sharing a similar action of capture, as in the result of victory, rather than a shared 
classification of booty subject to sale.  
From Milonia Magellus marched to the city of Feritrum which he found entirely abandoned 
except for a few Samnites unable to flee.
191
 Along with these few captives, the Romans also 
took with them the heavy (presumably valuable and worthwhile) objects left behind, which is 
in contrast to the years prior in which the speed of the baggage train was held more important 
than the possession of booty. From the sick and old left behind Postumius learned that the 
people in the city had fled at first light and it was agreed that a number of other communities 
would do the same, so Magellus was able to move unmolested to take a number of other 
abandoned cities. He then moved his army into Etruria where his pillaging forced the 
Etruscans to meet him in a pitched battle. 2,800 Etruscans were killed, but the remainder 
escaped into the nearby Volsinian city. Rather than laying siege, Magellus moved on the city 
of Rusellae, and there captured over 2,000 Etruscans, having killed somewhat fewer.
192
 
Magellus’ victories and the crippling affect of the war with Rome to this point convinced 
three Etruscan cities to sue for peace; specifically the major centres of the Volsinii, Perusia 
and Arretium.
193
 It was the large fortune amassed from the ransom of these cities that spurred 
Magellus to request a triumph, which, after much consideration by the Senate, he was 
awarded.  
The other Roman consul Atilius suffered a setback when he met the Samnites near the 
Lucerine frontier. The Romans were driven back into their camp and, when morning broke, 
the consul found his army dispirited. He was eventually able to rally his troops by explaining 
that their only chance lay in a sally from the fort, whereas to remain within the walls they 
would surely be overwhelmed and face “certain death or slavery.”194 This was (of course) a 
piece of rhetorical drama, the threat of enslavement, though plausible, seems unlikely given 
the Roman handling of the captives after they won the battle. Livy wished to convey an 
overriding sense of low morale; the soldiers were exhausted and physically could not 
transport or oversee the Samnite captives who would have amounted to nearly the same size 
force of the Romans. Equally problematic was slaughtering the Samnites, and so Atilius here 
is portrayed as a shrewd decision maker. The Romans only wanted to beat a hasty retreat out 
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 Liv. 10.34.12. Those burdened by years and the sick (graves aetate aut invalidos). 
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 Liv 10.37.3. capta amplius duo milia hominum, minus duo milia circa muros caesa. 
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mortem aut servitutem patiendam. 
 Chapter 4  
102 
 
of Samnite territory, but the low morale and the bad blood between the two nations dictated 
that the Samnites pass under the yoke. In this way Roman retribution was sated, the 
humiliation of the Samnites ensured and the retreat from Samnium was made possible.
195
 The 
whole episode is rather inconsistent with the surrounding narrative, Livy states that Atilius 
was initially sent to prevent the Samnites from raiding the Liris valley so that his surprise in 
meeting the Samnites is unbelievable.
196
 Of course Livy’s choice in displaying the clemency 
shown by Atilius is highly impressionistic, the act serves as a basis for denying him a triumph 
in the Senate, not because he let the Samnites off without enslaving them, but because he did 
not adequately avenge Rome’s losses by “sending the Samnites under the yoke without 
terms.”197 
In the following year the Samnites, realising the perilous state they were in, recruited all the 
able bodied men into an army with the most experienced being equipped to form an elite 
legio linteata (linen legion), and the whole force of approximately 40,000 was assembled at 
Aquilonia.
198
 A showdown on par with Sentinum was imminent and the two consular armies 
moved towards Aquilonia. On the way Spurius Carvilius, with the veteran legions of Atilius, 
seized the city of Amiternum and there slew 2,800 of the enemy and captured 4,270.
199
 The 
other consul, Papirius, after levying a new army, took the city of Duronia by storm and there 
“made fewer prisoners than his colleague but killed many more.”200 From both places Livy 
states a large amount of booty was acquired.  
With Duronia and Amiternum taken, the Roman forces were able to swoop in for a decisive 
engagement with the Samnites, whose reinforcements were cut off by the army of Papirius. 
The engagement that ensued is described in the dramatic fashion required of a battle of such 
importance, and in the end, the Samnites were cut to pieces with the loss of 20,340 killed and 
3,870 captured.
201
 At Cominium, where Papirius was engaged with the other half of the 
Samnite force, 11,400 of the enemy threw down their arms and “cast themselves upon the 
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 Liv. 10.36.14. 
196
 Welwei 2000, 46. 
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 Liv. 10.36.18 quod captivos sine pactione sub iugum misisset. 
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 Liv. 10.38.3f; Flor. 1.11.7. The Samnites performed a gruesome sacrifice inside a tent and demanded a 
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102; Sil. 4.223), see Salmon 1967, 182-3; 270.  
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 Liv. 10.39.4 minus quam collega cepit hominum, plus aliquanto occidit. 
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 Liv. 10.42.5 caesa illo die ad Aquiloniam Samnitium milia viginti trecenti quadraginta, capta tria milia 
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mercy of the commander.”202 Welwei has rejected any notion that these captives were 
enslaved as they were not considered spoils.
203
 It seems unlikely that these were enslaved 
given the statement that they had submitted (admittedly not formally deditio) to the 
commander. Had they been enslaved it would have required elaboration on the part of Livy as 
it would have contradicted the heroic image of Papirius; he was cast in the same light as 
Fabius Rullianus, who himself had shown clemency to the Samnites in avenging the Caudine 
Forks.
204
 Furthermore the detail of the arms being “thrown down” is shared by Dionysius of 
Halicarnasus, although he attributes it to the fall of Venusia, later the site of a major Latin 
colony.
205
 Salmon describes the battle of Aquilonia as the ‘Gettysburg’ of the Third Samnite 
War.
206
 Indeed, the battle was the last throw of the dice by the Samnites and its loss broke the 
back of their resistance. The next two years of campaigning were essentially extended mop 
up operations where the Romans set out to extinguish the last of the Samnite strongholds.
207
 
The consuls having fought what they thought to be the last pitched battle, set about the task of 
sacking cities, which they noted would bring more booty to their soldiers and further crush 
their enemy.
208
 Carvilus sacked the cities of Velia, Palumbinum, and Herculaneum, and from 
these the Samnites suffered 10,000 casualties, with the captured slightly outnumbering the 
slain.
209
 The other consul Papirus faced difficult foes, who on many occasions launched 
sorties dogging the Romans, but eventually Saepinum fell.
210
 Livy qualifies the higher degree 
of deaths sustained by the Samnites at the hands of the Romans here, stating “with great rage 
they cut down those who came forward and captured the city.”211 There 7,400 of the 
Samnites were killed, with less than 3,000 captured.
212
 A considerable amount of booty was 
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 Liv. 10.43.8 Loeb trans. abiectis armis ad undecim milia hominum et quadringenti in fidem consulis 
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 Welwei 2000, 47 n78. Cf Prachner 1966, 97. 
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 In 320 BC, Cass. Dio 32.22; Eutrop. 2.9.1; FGrH 255.10; Flor. 1.11.1; Liv. 9.15.6-9; 22.14.12; 25.6.12; 
Oros. 3.15.9. Similarly at Allifae in 308 BC (Liv. 9.42.7-8). 
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 Salmon 1967, 274. 
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 Cf. Salmon 1967, 273-6; Welwei 2000, 48. 
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 Liv. 10.44.8. 
209
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 See Oakley 2005a, 385. On the possible location of Saepinum see Oakley 1995, 131. 
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 Liv. 10.45.14, Itaque ab ira plus caedis editum capta urbe. 
212
 Liv. 10.45.14 septem milia quadringenti caesi, capta minus tria milia hominum. 
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also taken and handed over to the soldiers. With the campaigning season not yet over the 
consuls felt they had dealt enough of a blow and returned to Rome, where they both 
celebrated triumphs whilst still in office.
213
  
It is with the close of the year 293 BC that Livy’s tenth book ends and with it our main 
narrative. However, the Samnite war continued for another couple of years. During the 
remainder of the war, the Samnites were unable to field a large army. The Romans were able 
to split their forces and in 292 BC the consul Junius Brutus was sent into Etruria to prevent 
them from reneging on the peace. Whilst a plague raged in Rome the other consul, Q. Fabius 
Gurges, suffered a number of military setbacks and required the intervention of his father, 
Rullianus.
214
 Eventually, Gurges, with the aid of his father, was able to crush the Caudini 
Samnites; according to Orosius, 20,000 Samnites were killed and 4,000 captured in this 
battle, a clear exaggeration.
215
 Amongst those captured was the famous Samnite general 
Gaius Pontius, who was then marched in Gurges’ triumph and beheaded.216 The following 
year (291 BC) the situation in Etruria was stable enough to allow both consular armies to 
march on the last of the Samites, the Pentri and Harpini. Gurges is recorded as having 
celebrated a triumph over the Pentri by capturing their stronghold Cominium, with no 
mention of captives.
217
 In the following year both consuls ravaged Samnium to the point of 
submission, and the war was finally brought to an end.
218
 
The interpretation of capta as resulting in enslavement within Livy’s narrative of the Third 
Samnite War is presumptuous and contrary to Livy’s antecedent phraseology. Prior to the 
events of the Third Samnite War in Livy’s narrative his description of capture by Roman 
forces was typically ambiguous, particularly in accounting for the fate of those taken. For 
example, during the Second Samnite War the captives taken from Perusia,
219
 Ocriculum
220
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 Liv 10.46.1-2. 
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 Salmon 1967, 274-5 suggests that the setbacks faced by Gurges were exaggerated by Livy so as to require the 
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220
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and Bovianum
221
 are only stated as having been captured (capio) with no further detail, apart 
from the fact that during the same battle some of the enemy may also have been killed. Livy 
is not alone in displaying ambiguity in the fate of captives for this period, as Diodorus is 
similarly non-committal in the outcome of battle.
222
 This lack of clarity is in contrast to a few 
particular instances in which Livy is specific in stating that the captives were in fact sold as 
slaves.
223
 Livy’s choice to elaborate on the sale of captives in these instances is not for the 
purpose of highlighting an action that was out of character, and so was not an exceptional 
instance that required a comment or further explanation. With the exception of Veii, as 
rejected above as a credible incident, in each case the Roman choice to enslave the captives 
was for a greater, typically strategic or political, purpose. Once Livy’s narrative resumes with 
the surviving books from 21-45 we find that he is still specific in stating when captives are 
sold as slaves.
224
 In a few instances the ‘sale’ of the captives is not expressed, but we are told 
that they are sent back to Rome, implying that they were to be reserved for a triumph or 
sold.
225
 Although Livy was still ambiguous at times, employing the caeda – capta formula for 
many post battle descriptions,
226
 he no longer does so with the same consistency concerning a 
single conflict. It is by the virtue of a consistent ambiguity regarding captives that the Third 
Samnite War in Livy stands out. 
Orosius, writing in the late fourth/early fifth century, follows Livy’s ambiguity regarding 
captives in the Third Samnite War.
227
 Orosius as an epitomist of Livy in all probability had 
access to the entirety of the Ab Urbe Condita.
228
 If this is indeed the case, then it is clear 
Orosius is more confident in interpreting enslavements following capture from the later half 
of the third century onwards, likely a reflection of the books of Livy that do not survive.
229
 
Neither Livy nor Orosius explicitly state that Samnites were ‘sold’ during the Third Samnite 
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war, sale being the primary indication that a captive was enslaved.
230
 Livy is also distinct in 
regarding the captives as generally separate from the rest of the booty.
231
 In only two 
instances does Livy refer to the captives as booty or spoils in war, with the distinction that 
there was ‘other booty’ after listing the number of captives taken.232 In both of these cases the 
captives were specifically mentioned as being captured, and booty is inserted to make the 
reader aware that the fruits of victory also included inanimate spoils. 
There is generally a lack of a civilian presence in Livy’s account of the Third Samnite War. It 
is hard to imagine that the women and children of the communities that Rome sacked were all 
able to escape when their male compatriots were either killed or captured. Livy suggests, at 
least from the later half of the war, that many of the towns the Romans encountered were 
empty, the non-warrior inhabitants choosing to flee before their approach.
233
 Most Samnite 
hill-forts, built upon prominent heights overlooking long valleys, were situated so that they 
could easily signal to their neighbours, thus allowing an early warning of Roman 
approaches.
234
 The presence of walled cities and other fortifications makes it less likely that 
the Samnites were willing to flee at the sight of the Romans.
235
 The wealth of booty 
recovered by the Romans from the Samnite cities suggests that the non-combatants remained 
in the citadels. In the case of the abandoned cities in 294 BC the villagers who fled the towns 
took everything that could be carried.
236
 Presumably they had to run somewhere, and 
eventually the cities into which the majority of Samnites fled were sacked by the Romans. 
 Despite the obvious presence of civilians in the cities laid siege to by the Romans, there is 
not a single reference to the capture of women or children anywhere in Livy’s tenth book. In 
some cases this can be explained by the fact that the armies met in the field and fought 
pitched battles, but the conspicuous absence of women and children can only be explained if 
they were evacuated ahead of time, if they were not wanted by the Romans as captives, or if 
                                                 
230
 See above. 
231
 Liv. 10.17.4; 17.8; 17.11; 19.22; 20.15; 26.12; 39.3-4; 45.14. 
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 Oakley 1995, 139. 
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 Samnite towns, though generally small in size, were often coupled with the formidable natural barriers. 
Consequently they could be very difficult to besiege. Polygonal walls first appear in Campania and seem to 
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Roman style of building walls- their style of fighting had certainly influenced that of the Roman’s (Prop. 
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possessed see Oakley 1995, 131-4, 139-40. 
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they were simply glossed over by Livy. As mentioned above, in some cases the civilians were 
indeed evacuated, but in the case of bigger cities it is improbable given the large amounts of 
booty, as it is unlikely the women and children would flee without any means of supporting 
themselves. Indeed, where could they retreat to apart from other allied Samnite cities?
237
 
During a siege the women and children could provide vital support to the men, in all 
capacities not necessarily limited to non-combative support. Since sieges rarely lasted very 
long (none could have lasted more than a couple of months, as each consul or prorogued 
commander moved his armies in the spring) the extra mouths would have been more helpful 
in their capacity as support to the soldiers than a hindrance in their consumption of supplies. 
It seems all the more likely that women and children were present in the cities captured by 
the Romans. 
The fact that Livy excluded women and children from his narrative is a typical omission of 
history, and particularly so within this context, given the predominantly military subject. But 
the omission of civilians within the account is highly suspect, even by the standards of 
historical misogyny. It is unlikely that non-warrior captives were included in casualty reports 
since this would be superfluous information regarding the strength of a city or in determining 
the scale of victory. From many later examples it is clear that women and children were in 
fact present during sieges, although their presence was marginalised by the military nature of 
the topic.
238
 Women and children following a siege were often treated differently to the men, 
requiring a specific comment on their fate.
239
  
It seems peculiar that the Romans would choose not to take the women and children as 
captives when their capture is regularly noted later on. If we are to believe that all of the 
captives taken during the Third Samnite War were sold as slaves than we must also accept the 
same numbers, if not more of women and children. The number of captives transferred into 
bondage becomes staggering, at perhaps 100,000 to 150,000 individuals who would 
constitute roughly half of the men registered as citizens in Rome following the war.
240
 Such 
numbers at this time are hard to imagine, and so due to the practical improbability other 
alternative avenues for the captives would be more likely. As Finley noted “war... produced 
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captives, not slaves; captives are transformed into slaves by the consumers, who obtain them 
through the agency of slave traders. In sum, war and conquest were no doubt important 
contributing factors to the establishment and preservation of a slave society; they were not a 
necessary condition (at least in a direct way) and certainly not a sufficient condition.”241  
Following the Third Samnite War the Romans seem to have kept to their standard practice of 
enfranchisement of former enemies; as evinced by the growth in the census figures.
242
 This 
increase was in spite of the losses that must have been suffered in the 290’s. The Third 
Samnite War, notwithstanding repeated success on the part of Rome, must have cost a large 
number of Roman lives, all of whom were citizens, i.e. men of military age. We know of at 
least 18,200 casualties suffered by the Romans as mentioned by Livy.
243
 Of course these 
represent the high end of casualties sustained in a single engagement, but as figures they may 
be more accurate than those of the Samnites given Livy and many Roman writers’ propensity 
for exaggerating Roman victories and minimising losses. It is impossible to estimate, with 
any certainty, the number of Roman casualties during the whole Third Samnite War, but it 
would not be unreasonable to conclude that Roman casualties for the ten years of war could 
be double the few figures given by Livy. The loss of as many as 40,000 men was also 
exacerbated by the plague (probably malaria) that began in 295 BC.
244
 Again, the number of 
deaths is impossible to estimate. It is safe to say that the increase in the number of citizens 
was almost entirely from the extension of citizenship to Samnite cities and a large number of 
Sabines, who were probably enfranchised cives sine suffragio in 289 BC, although the 
evidence for Dentatus’ campaign against the Sabines is scant to say the least.245 Again the 
contrast between enfranchisement and enslavement could not be further apart. On the whole 
Roman treatment of the defeated Samnites seems to be particularly lenient. Livy states that 
following the defeat of the Samnites, “the Samnites sought peace and renewed the treaty for a 
fourth time.”246 It is difficult to imagine a treaty offering the same terms as before the war 
given the Roman military victory, particularly with regards to territory. Yet the Samnites had 
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proved a recalcitrant foe three times up to this point, and would later turn their coats for both 
Pyrrhus and Hannibal. This perhaps indicates that a completely lopsided treaty would never 
have been accepted by them, nor could the Romans have hoped to keep such terms.
247
 
Towards the end of the Third Samnite War the Romans established a Latin colony at the site 
of Venusia on the southern border of Samnium, presumably to prevent Samnite collusion 
with the Apulians.
248
 The land assigned to the colonists was particularly large, perhaps as 
much as 800 km
2
, with 20,000 colonists.
249
 Apart from the colony we know of no other 
mulcting of Samnite land. The circumvallation of Samnium by the establishment of colonies 
at aforementioned Venusia, coastal Campania and in the Volturnus valley, seem to have 
contented the Romans enough to readmit the Samnites into Rome’s network of alliances. The 
Samnites were diminished by the war, and their league was fractured and weakened by the 
admission of Atina, Casininum and Venafrum as praefecturae.
250
 Perhaps this reduction of 
Samnite power made it possible for the Romans to accept their offer of peace rather than push 
their already insurmountable advantage. The insertion of 6,000 Latin families into their 
territory was overall a rather insignificant burden upon the Samnites, as it was already 
thoroughly devastated and depopulated by the war.
251
 
From the defeat of the Samnites Rome also gained a considerable amount of booty, 
particularly in the form of precious metal. In the triumph of Papirius in 293 BC Livy states 
that 2,533,000 lbs of bronze was placed in the aerarium.
252
 He elaborates that the bronze was 
derived redactum ex captivis dicebatur.
253
 The fact that Livy used redigo rather than the 
obvious vendere indicates that the transference of captives to bronze paid into the treasury 
was not via sale ipso facto enslavement, but more likely through ransom. The fact that the 
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bronze was gravis is anachronistic, but the uniformity in regards to the type of metal from the 
proceeds indicates that the bronze was in fact from ransom. In 294 BC Fabius had captured 
1,740 Perusians and ransomed each for 310 asses, equating to over 500,000 asses.
254
 During 
the campaign season of 293 BC around 30,000 captives are recorded, no less than a third of 
which were captured by Papirius.
255
At the rate of ransom received by Fabius this would yield 
to Papirius roughly 3.5 million asses. However, according to the amount paid into the 
treasury the price per captive of ransom or otherwise would amount to roughly 250 asses.
256
 
A further 380,000 lbs of bronze was also added to the treasury in 293 by the other consul 
Carvilius.
257
 The acquisition of such considerable amounts of bronze made the large issue of 
the aes grave possible, and there is considerable evidence in coin finds to suggest that the 
new bronze coinage was also adopted by or issued to most of central Italy.
258
 
 
Enslavements up to the First Punic War 
At the end of the fourth and the beginning of the third century BC transalpine incursions by 
Northern Gauls into the Po valley forced the Boii and Senones to advance southward, and the 
latter set upon the city of Arretium. The Arretines sent to Rome for help and a relief force 
under the praetor L. Caecilius was sent. The Romans met the Gauls and were soundly 
defeated. According to Polybius the Romans sent ambassadors to the Gauls to treat for the 
prisoners, but they were coldly executed.
259
 Appian, however, suggests that the ambassadors 
were sent to request that the Senones cease providing soldiers as mercenaries to the 
Etruscans.
260
 Regardless of the motive of the ambassadors, Appian and Polybius agree that a 
severe breach of diplomacy was carried out by the Senones and a swift Roman reprisal 
resulted in the devastation of much of southern Cisalpine Gaul. Appian states that a punitive 
expedition was carried out, with the men massacred and the women sold into slavery.
261
 The 
son of a Senone chieftain was also specifically reserved for torture and execution in 
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Dolabella’s triumph.262 The other Cisalpine Gauls (Boii, Insubri and the warrior Gaesatae) 
with the remaining Senones and the Etruscans met the Romans again and were soundly 
defeated near Lake Vadimon in 283 BC, with the result that the Senones and the Gaesatae 
ceased to exist.
263
 The depopulation conveyed by the sources could not have been strictly 
through enslavement, they were instead reduced to refugees, perhaps joining with the Boii, 
who remained steadfast in northern Italy. Volkmann suggests that the captives may have been 
transported to the newly established colony at Sena to be sold;
264
 but there is no evidence to 
suggest that the Romans acted any differently than before, and most likely the captives were 
purchased by merchants and sold in more affluent areas rather than a newly settled colony - 
comprising the poorer individuals of Roman society.
265
 
With the Samnites and the Etruscans subdued and the Cisalpine Gauls held in check, Rome 
was clearly the dominant and controlling power in the Italian peninsula. Rome’s ambitions 
and commercial interests at this time clearly extended beyond central Italy with almost a 
manifest entitlement of suzerainty to the entire peninsula.
266
 Roman foreign policy at this 
time, which would became increasingly common, favoured the rule of an oligarchy which 
could be easily incorporated into the Roman political framework as clientele of the elite.
267
 
Of course Rome was not the only power who wished to establish hegemony over their 
neighbouring states: Carthage and Syracuse in Sicily, Tarentum in Southern Italy, and 
Rhodes over the maritime trade routes of the southern Adriatic, were also extending their 
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political control beyond their individual borders.
268
 The political trend in the western 
Mediterranean at this time was one of rapid imperial expansion, where slowly the lesser and 
peripheral city-states were united under the predominant power of Carthage and the rapidly 
emerging power of Rome.
269
 Rome’s treaties with foreign powers well beyond their borders 
tended to establish a limitation upon territorial expansion and military operations within each 
other’s perceived region of control. As Rome exerted itself further and further from its 
traditional domain of the greater Latium, and in a broader context central Italy, its military 
operations came to surpass previously established borders. Conflict was inevitable.
270
 During 
these power struggles between larger nations it was the lesser city-states that suffered the 
brunt of conflict. In Italy this resulted less often in enslavement, but as military expansions 
operated further from the Italian homeland, mass enslavements increased.  
In 282 BC Rome sent ten warships to Tarentum, in violation of a previously established 
treaty.
271
 Despite the supposed peaceful intention of the Romans the Tarrentines attacked the 
Roman ships and then marched northward to Thurii, where they ousted the pro-Roman 
aristocracy along with the Roman garrison.
272
 After a failed embassy the Romans sent a 
consular army to invade Tarrentine territory.
273
 In desperation the Tarrentines implored 
Pyrrhus for help, who intervened on their behalf with an ambition to expand his empire over 
Italy and Sicily.
274
 However, Pyrrhus would be unable to match the manpower of the 
Romans, despite repeated success on the battlefield. He was eventually forced to abandon his 
expedition due to the repeated depletion of his manpower and resources. During this conflict 
few if any enslavements were made, or at least none are mentioned by the sources. From 
Pyrrhus’ point of view it is likely that the expeditionary nature of the conflict and its ultimate 
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abandonment prevented the taking of many prisoners, whilst on the Roman side repeated 
reversals and the defensive nature of the fighting resulted in few captures as well. Rome was 
defeated repeatedly by Pyrrhus,
275
 but was more fortunate against the Samnites, Lucanians 
and Brutii that had joined him.
276
 
Following the first major defeat of the Romans by Pyrrhus at Heracleia in 280 BC a number 
of Roman prisoners were taken. Pyrrhus, wishing to win popular support, released the 
prisoners without ransom,
277
 and in the following year there is no mention of captives taken 
after the battle of Asculum.
278
 Throughout the accounts of the 270’s Pyrrhus’ actions take 
centre stage in the accounts - the war fought between his Southern Italian allies and Rome 
was decidedly one sided given Rome’s repeated successes. Despite such victories, there is no 
mention of any enslavements, but we are made aware of the presence of prisoners on both 
sides. In 277 BC a Roman army was defeated by the Samnites in the Cranita hills and many 
were taken prisoner.
279
 In the same year the Romans were able to capture the city of Croton 
through the treachery of a prisoner, whom they induced with a large bribe to convince the 
Crotoniates that the Romans were departing, and so to send away their allies.
280
 Presumably 
the only large intake of prisoners by the Romans followed the defeat of Pyrrhus at 
Beneventum, after which captives of more exotic origin than the Italian prisoners up to this 
point were marched in the triumph.
281
 Of course the presence of the first elephants in Rome 
warranted far more treatment by the sources and so there is no elaboration on the fate of the 
prisoners.
282
 The Battle of Beneventum forced Pyrrhus to leave Italy and so he left his 
lieutenant Milo in charge of the city of Tarentum. In 272 BC the Romans laid siege to the city 
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and, with the death of Pyrrhus in Argos, Milo was able to come to an agreement independent 
of the radical Tarentines, allowing him to leave the city with his army and return to Epirus.
283
 
The allies of Pyrrhus were treated leniently by the Romans. Tarentum was made to pay an 
indemnity, but allowed to remain independent from Rome, and admitted among the socii 
navales.
284
 Prior to the departure of Milo, the city of Heraclea had been granted a favourable 
treaty with Rome that allowed them to maintain their autonomy until the Social War.
285
 
Whilst formal states in Italy were treated with surprising leniency, the actions of what Rome 
considered brigands were dealt with swiftly and harshly. The obvious example being the 
punishment of its own rogue unit at Rhegium. In 278 BC the Rhegians requested a Roman 
garrison, which was duly dispatched. However, the Mamertine mercenaries sent to Rhegium 
chose to take the city for themselves, killing or expelling the men of the city and seizing their 
wives.
286
 After the threat of Pyrrhus was removed the Romans marched on Rhegium and, 
after some difficulty, managed to capture it. They then returned the city to the survivors and 
marched the Mamertine criminals to Rome, where they were all beheaded.
287
 In the following 
year a last Samnite stronghold, which had been forced into desperate brigandage following 
the defeat of Pyrrhus, was sacked. According to Dionysius of Halicarnassus the authors of the 
revolt, including the Samnite leader Lollius, were tortured and killed, with the survivors sold 
as booty.
288
 The slaves in a Volscian city overthrew their masters and Roman intervention 
was requested by the ousted citizens, the rebellion was quashed with difficulty and all the 
slaves were eventually tortured to death and the city destroyed. The free Volscians were then 
settled at a new site.
289
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 Frontin. Str. 3.3.1; Liv. Per. 15; Zon. 8.6. 
284
 Liv. 35.16.3; Frontin. Str. 3.3.1; Zon 8.6, cf. Schmidt 1969, 128 (SdA.III 475). 
285
 Cic. Balbo 21, see Nicolet 1978, 42. 
286
 Cass. Dio 40.10-11; Diod Sic. 22.1.2; Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 20.4.6-7; Liv. 31.31.6; Per. 12; Polyb. 1.7.8. 
287
 Either the 300 survivors or more likely the principle leaders of the rebellion, App. Sam. 21; Dion. Hal. Ant. 
Rom. 20.16; Liv. Per. 12; Polyb. 1.7.12; Val. Max. 2.7.15.  
288
 Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 20.17.2 τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς ἐλαφυροπώλησαν. Zon. 8.7 mentions the defeat of the 
Samnites and the seizure of a second city, but does not recount the capture of any captives. That this was a 
recovery of rebellious territory is attested to the fact that neither consul received a triumph, cf. Salmon 1967, 
288 n.3. 
289
 Flor. 16.1; Liv. Per. 16; Plin. HN 31.31; Zon. 8.7. 
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Chapter 5 
Enslavements during the Punic Wars 
  
First Punic War 
The First Punic War was the first conflict in which the Romans fought large battles upon the 
waves and also the first war that took place outside peninsular Italy, with the battlegrounds in 
Sicily and North Africa. Warfare outside of Italy and upon the seas meant that captives taken 
could not be brought directly over land to Rome.
1
 Furthermore, the capture of enemy vessels 
raised the dilemma of whether to remove and replace the hundreds of rowers upon which 
each prize ship relied or to retain them on board in Roman service.
2
 In this way the sea posed 
the greatest limiting factor in removing captives to Rome. While the Roman navy was 
manned by the proletariat of Rome and her allies, the Carthaginians were forced to rely upon 
mercenaries for their navy and army in Sicily.
3
 The presence of mercenaries rather than 
Carthaginian sailors suggests that the Romans would not have had the same difficulty in 
utilizing the rowing crews as they may have had with more patriotic rowers.  
Overall, enslavements are rarer in the First Punic War than in the Second. Only at 
Agrigentum, outside Agris and at Panormus do we hear of civilian populations being 
enslaved.
4
 The large numbers of captives derived from sea battles were undoubtedly mostly 
military men, and it is questionable (as will be shown) whether these were actually enslaved, 
beyond temporary impressments. Furthermore, we are made aware of the taking of captives 
                                                 
1
 Until this point, Rome had fought on the fringes of already conquered territory, and lines between Rome and 
the fronts passed through continuous territory; with only the temporary interruption of such a line in the war 
with Pyrrhus when the Samnites, siding with Pyrrhus, blocked the Apennine route north. 
2
 See below. 
3
 The presence of mercenaries in the Carthaginian army of the Second Punic War and navy is well known. 
Polyb. 6.52.3-10 compares the Carthaginian and Roman armies lauding the citizen soldier of the Italians over 
the mercenary of the Phoenicians (echoed by Machiavelli, art of War book I). The last overseas battle in 
which Carthaginian citizen soldiers were known to have served was the battle of Crimissus in Sicily in 340 
BC. Following the heavy indemnity of the First Punic War, many of the Carthaginian mercenaries were left 
unpaid. This led to a major uprising, resulting in the loss of Sardinia, which the Romans later annexed, and a 
number of hard fought battles in North Africa (Polyb. 1.65-88), see Scullard 1989, 566-569. During the 
Second Punic War Carthaginian citizens only served as officers overseas. The use of mercenaries was not 
necessarily the cause of Carthage’s defeat (see Bagnall 1990, 10-11; Lazenby 1996a, 12-14), but the use of 
mercenaries was a significant factor in their treatment once captured, see below. 
4
 Agrigentum in 261 BC (Diod Sic. 23.9.1; Oros. 4.7.6; Polyb. 1.19.15; Zon. 8.10), Agris in 255 BC (Eutrop. 
2.22.1; Oros. 9.4.7; Zon. 8.14) and Panormus in 254 BC (Diod. Sic. 23.18.5; Flor. 1.18.12; Polyb. 1.38.9-10).  
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on both sides for the purpose of future exchanges. Carthage held its Roman captives in 
Africa, perhaps intending to use them as leverage in a settlement of the war.
5
 The Romans, on 
the other hand, waged the war with different motives. There could only be one conclusion for 
them, and that was the imposition of terms from the Senate rather than a settlement.
6
 In the 
eventual peace treaty it seems one of the only concessions awarded to the Carthaginians was 
that they be allowed to redeem their prisoners from the Romans.
7
  
The first instance of capture by the Romans in the First Punic War occurred after their siege 
of Agrigentum.
8
 The Carthaginians were encamped outside the city, where, after a two month 
siege, the Romans were finally able to bring them to battle and defeat them. The defeated 
army retreated to its camp and was able to abscond unseen during the night.
9
 At dawn the 
Romans occupied the unguarded city, after which some 25,000 people were carried off, 
though it is not clear whether these constituted the citizens taken ‘as slaves’ or the slaves of 
the city. Walbank suggested that the citizens were enslaved;
10
 however there is considerable 
evidence to suggest that it was the city’s slaves that were taken rather than the enslavement of 
the free inhabitants.
11
 Agrigentum had been an affluent city prior to the war, with a sizeable 
population, therefore it is likely a large number of slaves were within.
12
 Polybius, our primary 
account of the sack, states that the Romans “plundered the city and many of the slaves, and 
the Romans possessed themselves of many slaves and further came into possession of a great 
assortment of things.”13 Polybius used the word σῶμα which may refer to ‘body’ or ‘slave’ to 
denote those being plundered (διαρπάζω). In a later passage Polybius uses σῶμα to indicate 
what could only be a personal slave, and so by the argument of consistency the insertion of 
                                                 
5
 As shown by the negotiation for the exchange of captives by the Carthaginians in Africa, see below. 
6
 Notably Regulus’ failed peace (App. Pun. 4; Aug. De. Civ. 3.15; Flor. 1.18.24; Polyb. 1.35.1-4; Zon. 8.13), see 
Eckstein 1987, 132. On the feigned negotiation of Lutatius’ peace see Lazenby 1996a, 168. 
7
 Zon. 8.17; Eutrop. 2.27.4-5, see below. 
8
 The city is also referred to as Acragas by Polyb. 1.17f.; Zon. 8.14; Diod. Sic. 23.7f., and is possibly identified 
as ‘grgnt’ in a Punic inscription from Carthage from the late fifth century CISem 1.5510; the association of 
‘grgnt’ with Agrigentum/Arkagas was first argued by Krahmalkov 1974, 171-177; and has been more recently 
defended by Schmitz 1994, 1-13. 
9
 In Zonaras’ account 8.10 the Carthaginians under Hannibal launch a nigh time attack on the Roman camp, but 
are repulsed, whereas the Carthaginians under Hanno steal away in the night. 
10
 Walbank 1957 I, 72. 
11
 See also Ducrey 1999, 28; Volkmann 1990, 95. Welwei 2000, 65 n. 6 is sceptical of the figure of 25,000, 
particularly given Diod. Sic. 23.9.1 exaggeration of the Romans sustaining a loss of 30,000 foot soldiers from 
a consular (4 legion) army with the addition of the alae sociorum. 
12
 Diod. Sic. 13.84.1-5 surely exaggerated the size of the city, at not less than 200,000 adult males. The citizen 
body is a more believable number, which he puts at more than 20,000. The wealth of this city is noted as 
being considerable, thus the presence of a proportionally large number of slaves is a reasonable assertion.   
13
 Polyb. 1.19.15 διήρπασαν τὴν πόλιν καὶ πολλῶν μὲν σωμάτων, πολλῆς δὲ καὶ παντοδαπῆς ἐγένοντο 
κατασκευῆς ἐγκρατεῖς. 
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slaves into the passage seems appropriate.
14
 The distinction of slaves rather than ‘bodies’ 
agrees with Diodorus, who specifically states that the Romans took slaves (δούλοι).15 The 
interpretation that the citizens were enslaved comes from the later historians. In Zonaras’ 
account the people of Agrigentum turned on the remaining Carthaginian garrison just before 
the city was captured, but were not rewarded for their volte-face and instead “all their 
property was plundered and everyone was sold abroad.”16 Whereas Orosius simply states “all 
of the Agrigentines were under the crown.”17 We should of course be hesitant to accept the 
accounts of Orosius and Zonaras over those of Polybius and Diodorus in this case. Zonaras’ 
narration, which follows Dio’s second century AD account, emphasised the fruitless attempt 
of the Agrigentines to ingratiate themselves with the attacking Romans, and so the result of 
their sale into captivity abroad (ἐπράθησαν) was all the more convincing. However, the city 
would once again become prosperous during the Second Punic War, and so it is hard to 
imagine that a city, whose entire population was enslaved, could quickly recover.
18
 
The next engagement which resulted in enemies being captured came in the wake of Rome’s 
first major success at sea. In 261 BC the Romans, with a newly built fleet equipped with 
corvi, managed to defeat a Carthaginian fleet near Mylae. In the initial engagement with the 
forward squadrons the Romans were able to capture 30 ships along with their crews. By the 
end of the battle the Carthaginians had lost a total of 50 ships, roughly half their fleet, 
including their flagship.
19
 According to Orosius this amounted to 7,000 captured 
Carthaginian sailors.
20
 This figure is puzzling as it is difficult to understand what his basis or 
source for the number of captives is; perhaps from the lost portion of Livy, and so either 
directly or indirectly from Fabius Pictor or Philinus.
21
 The figure 7,000 would yield roughly 
225 men per captured ship and this corresponds with the possible crew size of typical Punic 
                                                 
14
 Polyb. 12.16.5. He also refers to the slaves captured outside Aspis in 256 BC in the same way (1.29.7). Σῶμα 
clearly refers to a slave in an inscription, contemporary with Polybius, at Delphi GDI 2154.6. For earlier 
Greek writers σῶματα sometimes indicated people made into slaves (Dem. 20.77; Xen. Hell. 2.1.19). 
15
 23.9.1. Contra Walbank 1957 I, 72. 
16
 Zon. 8.10 ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ χρήματα σφῶν διηρπάσθησαν καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐπράθησαν ἅπαντες. 
17
 Zon. Oros. 4.7.6 Agrigentini sub corona omnes venditi sunt. 
18
 Frank 1933 I, 67; Volkmann 1990, 55. Walbank 1957 I, 72 rejects the mitigation stating “it was common 
practice for the Romans to enslave entire populations,” he follows the same line of argument given by Beloch 
1929, 653, n1.  
19
 Polyb. 1.23.7 ἀ ναῦς αὐτάνδρους απεβαλον Eutrop. 2.20.2 puts the figure at 31 ships ‘capta,’ Oros. 4.7.10 at 
31 as well. Zon. 8.11 simply mentions that many ships were captured. An inscription upon the columna rostra 
CIL 6.25 gives a figure, but apart from the ‘X’ in the number the remaining digits are illegible. Cf. Walbank 
1967 I, 79; Tarn 1907, 52. 
20
 Oros. 4.7.10. 
21
 Cf. Welwei 2000, 65; Meister 1990, 143f. 
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vessels of the age, accepting some losses through casualties.
22
 The majority of these captives 
were likely the rowing crews, who would have been necessary in allowing the Romans to 
capitalise on the prize ships taken in the battle. The training of new crews took a considerable 
amount of time and the manpower required to row the newly taken ships would have been 
difficult to acquire quickly enough to use them in battle. Ad hoc manning from amongst the 
current crews was possible, as occurred amongst the navies of the 16
th
 - 19
th
 centuries in 
taking prize ships. But unlike sailing ships, rowing ships could not manoeuvre sufficiently 
under skeleton crews. Many of those on the deck would have been killed during the boarding 
and seizure of the ship. Of the captives taken it is likely that, after good service in the navy, 
they would have been made free men, as occurred during the Second Punic War.
23
 Contrary 
to popular belief, the Romans, like the Athenians, were loath to use slaves as rowers in their 
navies; and given the proclivity towards mercenaries, it is likely that the Carthaginians used 
hired rather than forced labour for rowers, along with their own citizens.
24
 
In 259 BC the Romans sent the Consul L. Cornelius Scipio to subdue the islands of Corsica 
and Sardinia. The principle cities of Olbia in Sardinia and Aleria in Corsica were captured.
25
 
                                                 
22
 The ‘five’ or quinquereme (πεντήρης) was a favoured vessel of the Romans, which was based upon the 
Carthaginian model (cf. Polyb. 20.10f.).  ‘Five’ likely refers to the number of rowers per oar or a combination 
between rowers and oar ports, see Morrison, Coates and Rankov 2000, 9-10. The heavier Roman version of 
the vessel-type probably required a slightly larger rowing crew, which Casson 1971, 101 n.41 puts at around 
270 rowers. Meijer, 1984, 152 estimates that at least 300 rowers were needed. Lancel 1995, 126 estimates the 
same, but includes the onboard marines in the number. According to Polybius 1.26.7 the Roman fleet bound 
for Africa had 300 rowers per ship, with a complement of 120 marines, but this was an invasion force, thus 
containing more fighting men and requiring more rowers for the added weight. The Carthaginians also 
favoured a ‘five’ system during the Punic Wars, see Casson 1959, 162-165; Morrison and Coates 1996, 293; 
Morrison 1995, 68-9. Larger ships were becoming the general practice amongst Mediterranean navies from 
the late fourth century, cf. Casson 1969, 185-194. 
23
 See below. After the fall of New Carthage, Scipio pressed the strong captives as rowers in the navy, 
promising them their freedom, should they prove zealous and loyal (Polyb. 10.17.15). Welwei 2000, 74 is less 
accepting of this for the case of captives taken at Ecnomus, but allows for the replacement of some Roman 
losses from amongst the Carthaginian crews. 
24
 For Athens see Sargent 1927, 201-212; Amit 1962, 157-78; Casson 1971, 322-23. For Rome see Meijer 1986, 
147f.; Höckmann 1985, 96f. On the general argument against slaves as rowers in antiquity see Westermann 
1955, 15-16; Casson 1971, 322-328; 1994, 69-71. For a contrasting view see Thiel 1946, 196-198. Clear 
examples of this preference include: Athens freeing the slaves that were pressed into service in an emergency 
after the battle of Arginusae in 406 BC (Xen. Hell. 1.6.24). During the Hellenistic period Greek navies often 
relied upon mercenary rowers (Dem. 50.7-13; 7.18; 51.6), cf. Glover 1917, 328-3; Casson 1971, 323-324. 
Augustus freed slaves before enrolling them in his navy to fight Sextus (Suet. Aug. 16). Likewise, Sextus 
Pompey used the service of freed slaves, but this was an exceptional circumstance (App, Bel. Civ. 2.103; 
Cass. Dio 49.1.5). The imperial fleet used free provincial rowers, see Starr 1960: 71-77. Only during the 
Second Punic War did the Romans use slaves, but these were then granted their freedom after decommission 
(Liv. 22. 57.11; 24. 14. 1-8; 18. 12; Zon. 9.2.3), cf. Libourel 1973, 116-119. 
25
 Flor. 1.18.5; Eutrop. 2.20 and Oros. 4.7.11 mention Scipio’s operations in both islands, whereas Sil. 6.671-
672 and Val. Max. 5.1.2 only mention Sardinia. An inscription commemorates Scipio’s capture of Aleria and 
a victory in Corsica (CIL 6.1287=37039c). 
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Eutropius states that several thousand captives were brought back for the triumph,
26
 and 
Frontinus hints at a canny tactic which left the cities unguarded. Accordingly, Scipio invested 
the cities with half his force whilst keeping the other half hidden, he then feigned a retreat 
and, in giving pursuit, the enemy left the cities open for the other half of his force to enter 
unmolested.
27
 If this is to be believed, it is likely the majority of captives taken from Olbia 
and Aleria were civilians.  
Roman success in Sicily was initially limited. The Roman forces captured the fortress of 
Mazarin in 260 BC, and according to Diodorus the inhabitants therein were enslaved, though 
there could not have been many.
28
 In 258 BC the Romans, on their third and final attempt, 
managed to capture the city of Mytistratus.
29
 According to Diodorus, after the slaughter the 
remaining ‘bodies’ were sold as booty.30 Here Diodorus’ use of σῶμα, which contrasts with 
its use in Polybius (above), emphasises the corporeal with regards to the body count of the 
survivors. Zonaras describes the capture of Mytistratus in far greater detail; according to him 
the Carthaginian garrison fled in the night, leaving the people of Mytistratus to fend for 
themselves.
31
 As the men of the city took to the walls, the women persuaded them to 
surrender the city and so the gates were opened to the Romans. However, the Roman soldiers, 
probably exasperated by the staunch defence of the city that had cost them dearly up to this 
point, burst into the city and began ruthlessly slaughtering everyone. The consul Atilius 
Regulus, was only able to check his soldier’s bloodlust by promising to award all the captives 
taken to those that took them, and so the troops ceased their slaughter. The Roman intent at 
vengeance is clear in the decision to burn the city to the ground. The inhabitants were likely 
sold or ransomed on the spot, as the troops soon marched on the city of Camarina and took it 
by storm. Diodorus states that the inhabitants were all sold (πωλέω),32 but doubts have been 
raised regarding their wholesale enslavement due to an inscription found on Cos, dated only 
16 years later, which thanks the ‘citizens’ of Camara.33 Regardless, the rough handling of 
                                                 
26
 Eutrop. 2.22 multa milia inde captivorum adduxit triumphum egit. For the Triumph see Degrassi 1954, 100. 
27
 Frontin. 3.9.4; 3.10.2. 
28
 Though Diod. Sic. 23.9.4 specifies that the captives were ‘enslaved’  specifically εζηνδραποδισμένον. The 
description of Mazarin (Mazara) as a ‘φρούριον’ suggests that there were not many captives to be taken, as it 
was only a citadel or hill fort in the ‘classical sense’ (eg. Thuc. 2.18.2; 3.18.4; Xen. Cyr. 1.4.16). For the 
baffling assertion by some modern historians that it was the Carthaginians who seizeded Mazarin see Lazenby 
1996, 73 n. 22. 
29
 Diod. Sic. 23.9.4; Zon. 8.11. Polyb. 1.24.10 only mentions the capture of the city. 
30
 Diod. Sic. 23.9.4 καἰ τα ὑπολειφέντα σὡματα λαφυροπονωλήσαντες, see Lazenby 1996, 75. 
31
 Zon. 8.11. 
32
 Diod. Sic. 23.9.5 τὴν πόλιν εἷλε καὶ τὰ σώματα τὰ πλείονα Καμαριναίων ἐπώλησεν. 
33
 SEG. 12.379, cf. Ducrey 1999, 110; Welwei 2000, 67.  
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these cities convinced many Sicilian communities to capitulate to the Romans.
34
 
In 257 BC the Romans won another sea battle off Cape Tyndaris. According to Polybius 10 
ships along with their crews were captured, however Zonaras states that the battle took place 
close to shore and that the Carthaginians abandoned the ships before the Romans seized 
them.
35
 If Polybius’ account is true, then the Romans would have captured approximately 
1,400 sailors, if we accept the average derived from a later naval battle, or, without any 
casualties and full rowing crews for all the quinquiremes, as many as 3,000.
36
 The minor sea 
battle off the Aegates Islands was a prelude to the significant naval victory in the following 
year. In 256 BC the Romans amassed a large fleet that would take an invasion force to 
Africa.
37
 On their way they met the Carthaginians off the coast of Sicily near Encomus and 
won a major victory which resulted in the capture of 64 enemy ships.
38
 Since the fleet was 
carrying an invasion force there was no shortage of guards to ensure the newly acquired 
rowing crews of the captured ships would submit to Roman orders. The shift of captives from 
the rowing benches to the transports is highly unlikely given the large invasion force.
39
  
The battle of Encomus crushed the Carthaginian navy and left Africa open for the invasion 
force, which established a beachhead and laid siege to the city of Aspis (also known as 
Clupea).
40
 In Zonaras’ account the city was empty – the inhabitants having fled at the 
approach of the ships.
41
 Whether captured by force or not, Aspis was subsequently used as a 
                                                 
34
 Zon. 8.12. Polyb. 1.24.12 gives an account of the capture of Enna, but neglects to mention prisoners, cf. 
Lazenby 1996, 75-6. 
35
 Polyb. 1.25.4; Zon. 8.12. Other sources mention the battle without the details of ships or enemies captured 
(Aur. Vict. 39.2; Diod. Sic. 23.10.2; Polyaen 8.20.1). 
36
 After the sea Battle of the Aegates Islands in 241 BC Polybius 1.61.6 gives a figure of 70 captured ships 
amounting to 10,000 captives (a rough estimate to be sure), yielding an average of 142 per boat. We might 
just as well use the average of 225 as derived from Oros. 4.7.10, see above. 300 is the typical number in 
Polyb. 1.26.7. Larger figures cannot be excluded either, as survivors from sunken ships could also be taken 
(Diod. Sic. 24.11.3), cf. Lazenby 1996a, 153. For the Tyndaris engagement Welwei 2000, 70 estimates a high 
figure of between 4,000-5,000. Cf. Walbank 1957 I, 82. 
37
 For estimations of the fleet size see Walbank 1957 I, 83; Thiel 1954, 84; Tipps 1985, 432; Lazenby 1996a, 
81f. For scepticism of the numbers see Welwei 2000, 71 n.27. 
38
 Polyb. 1.25.7. Aur. Vict. 40.1 puts the figure at 63 captured. Oros. 4.8.6 and Eutrop. 2.21.1 refer to the loss of 
64 ships rather than capture and most sources focus on the victory ignoring the casualties (Diod. Sic. 23.11.1; 
St. Jerome (Hieronymus) 1757; Liv. Per. 17; Zon. 8.12).  
39
 Welwei suggests the Roman foot soldiers were distributed amongst the quinquiremes with only the cavalry 
carried on the transports. It stands to reason that Roman shipbuilding was stretched enough to make use of as 
many warships as possible for the purpose of transports. For a discussion of the number of Carthaginian ships 
refitted for use by the Romans see Welwei 2000, 72-3; Walbank 1957 I, 83f. These estimations hinge on the 
overall size of the fleet in 255 BC (350 according to Polyb. 1.36.10). For the limitations of space aboard 
warships see Rankov 1996, 51. 
40
 Eutrop. 2.21; Polyb. 1.29.5; Vell. Pat. 2.32.2. App. Pun. 3 and Flor. 1.18.19 mention the capture of Clipea 
along with the capture of 200 or 300 towns/fortresses respectively, see Lazenby 1996, 96. 
41
 Zon. 8.12. 
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base of operations for the Roman Army. Polybius states that the Romans moved outward and 
“plundered the countryside,” capturing 20,000 slaves (again σῶματα).42 The raiding and 
capture of people from the area around Aspis is also alluded to by Livy,
43
 and the seizure of 
many other towns and fortresses in the area seems to support Florus’ statement that Regulus 
held a large number of enemy troops as prisoners.
44
 According to Eutropius 27,000 captives 
had been amassed and brought back to Rome by L. Manlius Vulso, Regulus’ consular 
colleague.
45 
Orosius puts the figure at 20,000 but does not state that they were brought back 
to Rome.
46
 Of these, it is hard to imagine they were all enemy combatants, the Carthaginians 
having systematically withdrawn their troops before the Roman advance to block a path to 
Carthage. Furthermore, Polybius referred to those captured as slaves, for the most part field 
hands, having been taken along with cattle. Interestingly Zonaras notes the recovery also of 
Roman prisoners suggesting that the Carthaginians had removed their Roman captives to 
Africa, though at this point there could not have been very many.
47
 Once the area about Aspis 
had been thoroughly devastated the Senate requested the fleet be returned to Rome; the 
aforementioned L. Manlius, according to Polybius, loaded the captives (now under Roman 
control referred to as αἰχμάλωτοι) and a large quantity of booty into the ships and sailed for 
home.
48
 
The transport of between 20,000 and 27,000 captives back to Rome is possible given the 
number of troops and cavalry left behind.
49
 Volkmann misinterpreted the number of captives 
to be 270,000 and seemed to believe that these were all brought back to Rome; an 
impossibility given that the number of captives would have drastically exceeded the transport 
                                                 
42
 Polyb. 1.29.7. 
43
 Liv. 29.28.5. 
44
 Flor. 1.18.21. In Africa Regulus was said to have captured 300 castella (Flor 1.18.19; Oros. 4.8.7) or 200 
πóλεις (App. Lib. 3). 
45
 Eutrop. 2.21. 
46
 Oros. 4.8.9. 
47
 The Roman losses to this point were high. As many as 30,000 died in taking Agrigentum alone (Diod. 23.9.1). 
But overall, Roman success ensured only a few fell in to the hands of the Carthaginians up to this point. That 
the Carthaginians maintained captives is evident in their wish to later exchange prisoners, using the captured 
general Regulus as the agent for negotiation (App. Pun. 4; Aug. De. Civ. 3.15; Flor. 1.18.24; Polyb. 1.35.1-4; 
Zon. 8.13). 
48
 Polyb. 1.29.10. Since there was no supplies of food available around Aspis, they were forced to sail back to 
Italy late in the season, cf. Caven 1980 35-36. 
49
 Lazenby 1996, 98 noted that the forces left behind in Afica were indeed meagre implying there was plenty of 
room aboard the returning ships, but the initial cavalry force was particularly small and thus it was unlikely 
many ships were needed for horse transport. 
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capabilities of the Roman fleet.
50
 It is difficult to understand the Roman’s motives for 
acquiring such large numbers of captives in the first place if they intended to transport them 
all the way to Rome. Large numbers of slaves had been incited to revolt by the Samnites, 
angry at their forced service in the navy, only two years earlier.
51
 In the wake of the rebellion, 
the addition of 20,000 slaves with the prospect of increasing the navy and supplementing the 
legions out of the pool of citizens seems ludicrous. If the captives (slave or free) from 
Agrigentum were sold abroad, which being situated in Sicily would imply the use of ships for 
their transport, it was unlikely their conveyance to the markets was carried out by the Roman 
navy, who simply could not commit the necessary vessels at the time. If the Romans in fact 
had captives to be sold it is likely that they would have been offloaded in Agrigentum, where 
the Romans had established themselves and which had already been the site of a major 
auction.
52
 The fleet returning from Rome therefore probably carried only a few captives, 
either as hostages to ensure the loyalty of many of the communities that went over to the 
Romans when they invaded Africa or as objects for the triumph celebrated by L. Manlius 
Vulso in the following year.
53
 
Eventually the Carthaginians, under the leadership of the Spartan Xanthipus, defeated 
Regulus’ army in a battle on flat open ground, taking many captives, including the consul.54 
A few lucky Romans made it back to the original beachhead of Aspis and there remained 
hard pressed by the Carthaginians. The Roman fleet that set out in the spring of 255 BC had 
originally been intended as a blockading armada, but now was tasked with the recovery of the 
survivors of Regulus’ army. En route this fleet encountered a Carthaginian force off the 
Hermaeum promontory on the Southern coast of Sicily. The Carthaginians were thoroughly 
defeated and either 114, 30 or 24 ships were captured depending on the account, the lower 
figures seeming more probable.
55
 The number of Carthaginians captured here could have 
                                                 
50
 Volkmann 1990, 57. Even if the fleet had carried two consular armies with supplies the number of captives 
that could be crammed on board the vessels with no guards or supplies could not exceed 60,000 only less than 
a quarter of the number suggested by Volkmann. Horsmann (Volkmann 1990, 149) suggests this was only a 
clerical error, but Volkmann tried to justify the high number in relation to 200,000 taken from 200 cities in 
Aur. Vict. De vir ill. 40.2. 
51
 Oros. 4.7.12; Zon. 8.11. 
52
 See above. 
53
 Cities submitted to Rome when they landed in Africa (Zon. 8.12). For the triumph see Degrassi 1954, 100. 
54
 The Carthaginians were able to make effective use of their elephants and cavalry, Frontin. 2.2.11; 3.10. 
Regulus and many troops captured, Ampel. 14.9; App. Pun. 3; Oros. 4.9.3-10.1; Polyb. 1.34.12; Liv. Per. 18; 
Sil. 2.340-343; Zon. 8.13. 
55
 Polyb. 1.36.11 gives 114 ships captured. Eutrop. 2.22.1 and Oros. 4.9.5 put the figure at 30 and Diod. Sic. 
23.18.1 at only 24. Welwei 2000, 77 favours Orosius’ figure (c. 5,000 captives); De Sanctis 1969 I, 157 n. 25 
favours Diodorus’ figure; Walbank 1957 I, 95 favours Polybius’ figure on the basis that a triumph was 
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totalled as many as 34,200 or as few as 3,400; given the vagaries of the sources it is, as so 
often, impossible to be certain.
56
 Once the Romans reached their beleaguered colleagues in 
Aspis they were able to again strike out against the Carthaginians. In a land battle, only 
mentioned by the annalists, as many as 15,000 Carthaginians were captured.
57
 According to 
Zonaras the Carthaginians prisoners were spared their lives because Regulus and many 
Roman captives were still in Carthaginian custody.
58
 The Romans, having loaded their ships 
with captives and their recovered troops, set sail for Sicily, but were soon caught in a terrible 
storm that resulted in the near obliteration of their navy. Of several hundred ships, only a 
fraction survived and were recovered by Hiero at Syracuse.
59
 
In 254 BC the Roman legions in Sicily laid siege to the city of Panormus, which was 
essentially formed from two cities, one older than the other. The Romans broke through the 
new city, but before breaching the old city the Panormitans surrendered.
60
 The city’s citizens 
were set a ransom price of 2 minae each and those that could pay it were allowed to go free; 
“those remaining, to the sum of 13,000, were sold along with the plunder as booty.”61 
Subsequently the Roman ships likely carrying the ransom monies and captives to Rome after 
the sack of Panormus were intercepted and most captured by a Carthaginian fleet, with only a 
few managing to escape.
62
  
In 252 BC the Romans defeated the Carthaginians near Himera and were able to capture a 
large number of elephants, along with many enemy prisoners.
63
 The incident is not mentioned 
                                                                                                                                                        
awarded. However naval triumphs had been award for the capture of 64 ships after Encomus and for the 
capture of 30 ships after Mylae. The addition of 30 ships off of Aspis, if Orosius’ and Eutropius’ accounts are 
accurate, also makes the higher figure unnecessary.  
56
 Again the number of captives per ship is impossible to know it could exceed or fall below these numbers. For 
the sake of argument I give the low average at 142 as previously and the high at 300, neglecting any onboard 
fighters who would mostly have been killed in boarding. This yields a range of 3,408 – 7,200 for 24 captured 
ships, 4,260 – 9,000 for 30 ships and 16,188 – 34,200 for 114 ships. 
57
 Eutrop. 2.22.1; Oros. 9.4.7. Zon. 8.14 does not give an exact figure, but states that ‘many’ were captured. 
Polybius does not mention this land battle, and so the accuracy, or legitimacy, of this event should be treated 
with caution.  
58
 Zon. 8.14. 
59
 For the debate on possible fleet figures see Walbank 1957 I, 95. As few as 80 ships survived, Cf. Diod. Sic. 
23.18.1; Eutrop. 2.22.2; Oros. 9.4.8; Polyb. 1.37.2; Zon 8.14. 
60
Diod. Sic. 23.18.5. Polyb. 1.38.9-10 does not mention captives. Florus 1.18.12 eludes to the expulsion of a 
garrison and Aur. Vict. 39.2 simply states that the city was captured. Zon. 8.14 puts the surrender of the old 
city down to starvation.  
61
 Diod. Sic. 23.18.5 τοὺς δὲ λοιπούς, μυρίους τρισχιλίους ὄντας, καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἀποσκευὴν ἐλαφυροπώλησαν. 
Volkmann 1990, 56; Welwei 2000, 77. For the significance of the ransom see Chapter 3, cf. the note of 
Horsmann (Volkmann 1990, 112-3). 
62
 Cass. Dio 43.29fr.; Zon. 8.14. 
63
 Zon. 8.14 says 120 elephants were captured; Diod. Sic. 23.21.1 gives 60. Enemy prisoners are mentioned by 
Zonaras as αιχμαλοιτοι.  
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by Polybius, but Zonaras goes to great length to describe the ordeal of getting the elephants 
across the straits of Messina in which the animals panicked but were eventually calmed by 
their mahouts. The pachyderms were the centrepiece of C. Aurelius Cotta’s triumph along 
with 13 enemy leaders.
64
 
Rome’s initial success in the First Punic War soon dried up with repeated disasters at sea and 
renewed vigour on the part of the Carthaginians in Sicily. From 252 BC to the very end of the 
war more than a decade later, there are no notable examples of enslavements by the Romans. 
In fact the Romans on several occasions are the victims of capture, with their defeat at Eryx 
perhaps the greatest loss. According to Diodorus (probably following Philinus), as many as 
35,000 Romans were taken prisoner in the sea battle.
65
 The Carthaginians were perhaps 
amassing these prisoners in the hopes of bringing the Romans to the table, either for peace or 
for a prisoner exchange. That prisoner exchanges were at least considered by both parties is 
indicated by the settlement following the war.
66
 By 242 BC the Romans had retaken Eryx and 
Hamilcar requested a truce to collect the dead from the consul Fundanius. The consul’s 
response was that Hamilcar should request a truce to recover the living rather than the dead. 
In a twist of fate, when Fundanius was defeated by Hamilcar, he found himself begging the 
exact same request; Hamilcar consented and smartly replied that he had already come to 
terms with the dead.
67
  
Overall, Rome’s allies were loyal partners in the conflict. On only two occasions do we hear 
of any resistance to Roman demands; the previously mentioned incident with the Samnites, 
whose dissent probably rested with military service in the navy, and the Faliscans just after 
the conclusion of the war. The latter rebelled but were quickly quashed by the consul Manlius 
Torquatus. As punishment the Faliscans were forced to give up their arms, horses and 
property, including their slaves, whilst half of their territory was taken as ager Romanus.
68
 
Considering the typical treatment of rebels, the Faliscans were handled with leniency, and it 
is probable that the Romans were bearing in mind the opinion of their other allies. 
Eventually the Romans plucked up enough courage to venture again on the sea and, having 
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 The mahouts were rewarded with freedom (Zon. 8.14. Cf. Liv. Per. 19), see Degrassi 1954, 100. 
65
 Diod. Sic. 24.1.11, this does not correspond with Polybius or any other account, and is hard to place within a 
collective narrative or indeed accept as a stand alone event. 
66
 Polyb. 1.62.9; 3.27.5; App. Sic. 2.5; Diod. Sic. 24.13.1; Eutrop. 2.27.4-5; Zon. 8.17. 
67
 Diod. Sic. 24.9.1-3. 
68
 Zon. 8.18; Polyb. 1.65.2; Eutrop. 2.28.1; Oros. 4.11.10. Val. Max. 6.5.1 alludes to the slaves taken as pueri 
vinctum. The colony of Spoletum was established within the on the ager Romanus, Liv. Per. 20. Cf. 
Volkmann 1990, 41; Welwei 2000, 80-1. 
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scraped the barrel of the recruitment pool, they sailed under the consul Q. Lutatius Cerco to 
the Aegates Islands in 241 BC. There they met the Carthaginians in the final clash of the war, 
winning a great victory and capturing large numbers of enemy ships with their crews. 
According to Polybius 70 ships were taken, yielding nearly 10,000 prisoners.
69
 Diodorus, as 
earlier, gives a far more conservative figure of 20 ships taken.
70
 No two sources agree on the 
exact figures, but the estimates tend to favour Polybius’ number as it is highly unlikely all the 
captured ships were ‘fives’ and that they were captured with the full compliment of their 
rowers, crew and marines.
71
 Following the battle Lutatius made port at the formerly 
Carthaginian held city of Lilybaeum. There Polybius told us he “occupied himself with the 
disposal of the captured ships and men,” a business, he tells us, of considerable magnitude 
given the large number of captives.
72
 Polybius here indicates that 10,000 men was a 
considerable number, and likely the ships captured were not to be included within the Roman 
fleet, or at least they were not yet fit for regular duty - ramming was a destructive means of 
incapacitating a ship and the corvus was a damaging instrument as well. 
This final sea battle meant Rome now ruled the waves and so Carthage was effectively sealed 
off from Sicily. Hamilcar, now denied any possibility of reinforcement, was forced to come 
to terms. Lutatius as consul was empowered by the Senate to negotiate with the Carthaginian 
commander, and it is evident that the Carthaginian Senate had also granted Hamilcar similar 
autonomy in negotiating terms. Lutatius opted for moderate terms, given the circumstances 
and Hamilcar’s likely willingness to prolong the war in Sicily73. Polybius several times refers 
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 Polyb. 1.61.6. 
70
 Diod. Sic. 24.11.2 states that Philinus gave a figure of 6,000 Carthaginians captured, but others only 4,040. 
De Sanctis 1969 I, 235 believed this to be corruption of later copying, and as a result, Philinus’ figure  should 
be read as: 6,000 Carthaginians and 4,040 ‘others’ captured, equalling a total of 10,040. This conveniently 
corresponds with Polybius’ number of men captured. Welwei 2000, 79 rejects this as mere convenience. 
When averaged against the number of ships captured the number of crew aboard each ship is far too high, but 
Diodorus states that many captives were also plucked from the sea, presumably from the sunk ships, and this 
could bust the acceptable total. Cf. Lazenby 1996a, 153-4; Walbank 1957 I, 127. The total number of captives 
and the composition with regards to their roles as sailors and marines was attempted by Prachner, this is 
summarised in Welwei 2000, 79 n. 54. 
71
 Oros. 4.10.7 lists 63 ships sunk and Eutrop. 2.27.2 gives 73. Both put the number of captives taken at 32,000. 
For problems with these figures see Tarn 1907, 56-57. Tusa and Royal 2012, 42 noted that if all 70 ships, as 
mentioned by Polybius, taken were quinquiremes then the number of captives (ignoring casualties) would 
have been closer to 30,000 as suggested by Orosius and Eutropius. However, it is likely that the fleet 
consisted of a combination of vessel types and many of the ships would have been smaller biremes and 
triremes, thus the lower figure given by Polybius appears more accurate. 
72
 Polyb. 1.61.8. 
73
 As evident in his famous hatred of the Romans that he passed on to his sons (Nepos 22.4.3; 23.3.1; Val. Max. 
9.3.2; Zon. 8.21). 
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to the treaty, and its terms are well known as they appear in several different sources.
74
 
Importantly there is a provision in the treaty that the Roman prisoners and traitors were to be 
returned without ransom.
75
 Hamilcar agreed to the terms; given the position he was in it was 
difficult for him to negotiate, Sicily being firmly in Roman hands, but he was able to win the 
concession that he would not be made personally to pass under the yoke.
76
 Of the remaining 
Carthaginian forces in Sicily that surrendered they were allowed to go without ransom, the 
release of Hamilcar without further humiliation probably symbolic of his entire force. 20,000 
of these soldiers were returned to Africa and there began the Mercenary War. Had they been 
ransomed it would have certainly amounted to a large enough sum to provoke comment. The 
initial terms agreed by the two generals were not approved by the comitia centuriata, of 
which every foedus required a vote of approval. In response, the Senate sent a commission of 
ten to oversee further negotiations.
77
 In the end the indemnity was increased by a thousand 
talents, with the repayment period cut in half. Furthermore, the Carthaginians were also 
forced to vacate the islands lying between Sicily and Africa. 
It is also evident that there were other negotiations on smaller points taking place, as the 
Carthaginians also requested that their prisoners be returned. The prisoners whose release 
was requested were probably Carthaginians and perhaps those of their close allies of 
Phoenician decent, such as Utica and Hippo Regius, rather than all their forces inclusive of 
mercenaries.
78
 Zonaras states that it was eventually decided that the Carthaginians should be 
granted this concession, but that they should be required to pay a ransom.
79
 Eutropius is far 
more detailed on this matter;
80
 it was decided by the Senate that the Carthaginian prisoners 
held as state prisoners, perhaps even as servi publici populi Romani,
81
 were to be returned 
                                                 
74
 Polyb. 1.62.4-9; 3.21.2-5; 27.1-6; 29.2-10; App. Sic. 2.4-6; Cat. Orig. 4.9; Diod. Sic. 24.13.1; Eutrop. 2.27.4-
5; Liv. 21.18; Per. 19; Nepos 22.1.4; Oros. 4.11.1-4; Zon. 8.17. 
75
 Specifically Polyb. 1.62.9; 3.27.5; App. Sic. 2.5; Diod. Sic. 24.13.1; Eutrop. 2.27.4-5; Zon. 8.17. 
76
 Zon. 8.17. This is likely an invention of Zonaras as only Italians were made to pass under the yoke, see 
Chapter 2. 
77
 Similar to the case of a commission of ten (decemviri) being sent from Rome to Flamininus in order to advise 
in the Isthmian peace in 196 BC (App. Mac. 9.3; Polyb. 18.44.1-45.12; Liv. 33.30.1f.; Plut. Flam. 10.1-3, 
Zon. 9.16).  
78
 These two cities had remained loyal at the outset of the Mercenary War due to their historical ties, and it is 
hard to imagine that they would have sided with Carthage against the Libyans, had their interests not also 
been protected in the Carthaginian treaty with Rome. The cities were eventually captured by the rebels, but 
were quickly retaken by Hamilcar and Hanno in 238 or 237 BC. 
79
 Zon. 8.17. 
80
 Eutrop. 2.27.4-5. 
81
 As property of the state (Dig. 48.13.5). Buckland 1908, 292 notes that these do not always become 
distinguished servi populi publici Romani. If a captive owned by the state was to be sold at auction to private 
buyers it was unlikely that these would be given the distinction of servi publici. On the other hand slaves 
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without ransom; however, those held by private citizens were to be ransomed, and it was 
stipulated that these should be redeemed from the Carthaginian state treasury and explicitly 
not by individuals. Many captive Carthaginian nobles were housed with Roman citizens; 
despite their care being entrusted to individual citizens, they were property of the state since 
the state alone had the right to release them. The evidence of this arrangement is found in the 
case of two captives tortured by the wife of Regulus, who according to Zonaras and Aulus 
Gellius were turned over to the sons of the consul by the Senate, implying that they were 
under the ownership of the state. Diodorus states that the Senate intervened when they found 
out the prisoners were being maltreated; that they could do so indicates the captives were not 
property of Regulus’ wife. It is clear that the preservation of the Carthaginian captives were 
maintained for the occasion of peace.
82
 
On the whole, there cannot have been many Carthaginians captured, since most of their army 
comprised of mercenaries.
83
 The ransom of all the Carthaginian prisoners at state expense 
implied that they were all to be removed back to Africa and these would have been 
predominantly captured officers. Of all the captives taken, it is likely that only a fraction of 
them were in fact enslaved, since most captures took place at sea and the rowing crews may 
well have been freed upon the completion of the war. There were, of course, still the citizens 
of many of the cities taken who may have fallen into captivity, but there had been a system in 
place in Sicily in which captives were either redeemed or sold, presumably to both foreign 
and domestic markets, and there is no reason to believe that it would be any different during 
the Punic War.
84
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
could also be bought at auction by the state or acquired in lieu of default to the state, c.f. Halkin, 1872, 17f.; 
Mommsen 1887 I, 241; 1891, 275, Eder 1980, 9f. The more recent publications concerning servi publici (Eder 
1980 and Weiss 2004) have not expanded upon this aspect of acquisition. For a treatment of servi publici in 
the late Empire see Lenski 2006. 
82
 Cass. Dio 11.26fr.; Diod. Sic. 24.9.1-3. 
83
 With the exception of 256-255 BC and the final battle of the Aegates in which perhaps 6,000 were captured, 
cf. Lazenby 1996a, 164. 
84
 In 483 BC Gelon the Tyrant of Gela and Syracuse had captured Megara and sold the common folk abroad 
(Hdt. 7.156). Dionysius I enslaved the inhabitants of Motya in 397 BC and sold the inhabitants into slavery 
(Diod. Sic. 14.53.2-4). Leptines, the brother of Dionysius I, ransomed Greek sailors form Italy (Diod. Sic. 
14.102.2) and Dionysius I also freed slaves to man ships (Diod. Sic. 14.58.1), Cf. Boese 1973, 26-27. There is 
little evidence for markets in Sicily, and overall references to slave markets seem to date only from the first 
century BC, see Trümper 2009, 20f.; Bodel, 2005, 184-185. Cf. Chapter 7. 
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Between the First and Second Punic Wars 
In the interlude between the First and Second Punic War Rome fought intermittently with the 
Cisalpine Gauls. In 238 BC the Consul Valerius marched against the Gauls; he was at first 
defeated in a skirmish, but on giving battle a second time the Gauls were defeated with 
14,000 killed and 2,000 captured. The figures, given only by Orosius, are realistic.
85
 In 225 
BC the Insubres, Boii and Gaesatae united to march upon Roman territory. The force was 
large enough to spur the Romans into taking account of their military strength, which they 
assessed at around 800,000 Romans and allies capable of bearing arms.
86
 Both consuls set out 
from Rome and met the Gauls near Arretium. Similar to the previous fight with the Gauls, the 
Romans were initially defeated and their enemies took several Romans as prisoners, the 
survivors taking refuge upon a hill.
87
 The camp of the Gauls was filled with booty including 
captured slaves;
88
 but these were soon recovered by the Romans and probably returned to 
their owners, since they were taken from the Rome’s allies.89 Subsequently, the Gauls were 
defeated in a battle in which the consul Atilius was killed, and so L. Aemilius Papus 
triumphed alone. Polybius puts the number of Gauls captured at over 10,000, whereas 
Diodorus grossly overestimates the number of Gauls present, inflating the number to 
200,000, with 40,000 killed. Both figures seem inflated given the number of captives taken 
two years later in a battle that was not fought against an invading force.
90
 Zonaras gives a 
detailed account of Papus’ triumph, during which the Gauls were made to wear full military 
dress , mocking what the Romans considered their foolishness in going into battle naked.
91
 In 
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 Oros. 4.12.1 duo milia capta sunt. Valerius was denied a triumph because of the initial defeat he suffered. 
86
 This is a well-known census remarked upon by most sources, perhaps because it provides the best indicator of 
Roman strength prior to the Second Punic War (Polyb. 2.23.4- 24.17; Diod. Sic. 2.5.7; Liv. Per. 20; Plin. HN 
3.138. Plut. Marc. 3.3-5; App. Ill. 8; Eutrop. 3.5.1; Oros. 4.13.5-7). Cf. Brunt 1971, 44-47. 
87
 Polyb. 2.25.11. The prisoners were interrogated and revealed that the Roman relief force was approaching 
from the rear of the Gauls position (Polyb. 2.27.7).  
88
 Polyb. 2.26.5 describes the booty ἦν γάρ, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ τὸ τῶν σωμάτων καὶ θρεμμάτων πλῆθος, ἔτι δὲ τῆς 
ἀποσκευῆς ἧς εἶχον, ἀμύθητον. 
89
 Polyb. 2.31.3. 
90
 Polyb. 2.31.1-6; Diod. Sic. 24.13.1.  
91
 Zon. 8.20. cf. Degrassi 1954, 101. Eutropius 3.5.1 notes that Fabius Pictor was present, and his account  of the 
battle was presumably used by Livy (Lvy’s book concerning this is lost). The figure of 40,000 killed agrees 
with Diodorus 24.13.1, but the number of captives is not mentioned by Eutropius. Later depictions of Gauls 
and Germans by the Romans were generally without armour and this may have been a trope harkening to this 
early triumph of the disciplined and heavily armoured Roman infantryman over the barbarous and 
unarmoured Gaul.  
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224 BC, with the Boii thoroughly defeated, the Romans crossed the Po and attacked the 
Insubres. Orosius states that the battle resulted in 5,000 Gauls captured.
92
 
The Romans also made incursions outside of Italy in the interim between the First and 
Second Punic Wars. In Sardinia in 238 BC the Romans intervened with the mercenary 
rebellion. When Carthage protested, Rome threatened a war, which the Carthaginians were 
indisposed to wage. Carthage submitted without a fight to the Roman’s demand, and were 
forced to relinquish the island and pay a further 1,200 talents as recompense.
93
 In 
consolidating their newly acquired province the Romans seized half the land as ager 
Romanus. They then proceeded to strip the Sardinians of their weapons and valuables, and 
carried off the slaves, of which there cannot have been many given the poverty of the 
island.
94
 The Romans also seized Corsica, and though the two islands proved difficult to 
bring under control they were eventually administered as a province under a Praetor.
95
 In 
Corsica the last of the rebels held out in caves and the Romans used dogs to hunt the soldiers 
out.
96
 In the late 230’s BC the Illyrians began to make extensive raids upon their southern 
Greek neighbours. The newly formed federal Epirote republic was particularly victimised by 
these raids, and when one of their chief cities was sacked by the Illyrians a number of Italian 
merchants were captured, leading to Roman intervention in Illyria.
97
 The War was quickly 
dealt with by the two consuls in 228 BC and a peace concluded.
98
 Of war captives nothing is 
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 Oros. 4.13.11 quorum interfecta sunt viginti tria milia, quinque milia capta sunt. Cf. Zon. 8.20, Polyb. 2.32.1-
3. Orosius places the battle in 224 BC giving the consuls as Manlius Torquatus and Fuluius Flaccus, Polybius, 
however, puts it a year later under the consuls Publius Furius and Gaius Flaminius. Polybius’ account is more 
likely as it matches up with the fasti triumphales which gives a triumph in the following year 222 BC for 
Furius and Flaminius [Philus], Degrassi 1954, 101.  
93
 App. Hisp. 4; Pun. 5; Polyb. 1.88.8-12; Eutrop. 3.2.1. 
94
 Zon. 8.18 states specifically slaves (δουλεῦον) ‘taken away’ ἀφαιρέω. The capture of Sardinia, as mentioned 
by others but not the taking of slaves (Liv 23.34.15; Sil. Ital. 12.342; Eutrop 3.3.1; Oros 4.12.2). Vel. Pat. 
2.38.2 states that the island was subjected to the imperial yoke by the consul. consulis certum recepit imperi 
iugum. 
95
 Liv. Per. 20; Zon. 8.18. Scullard, 1961, 166-167. 
96
 Strab. 5.224. Volkmann 1990, 54. 
97
 The First Illyrian War (Cass. Dio 12fr.; Polyb. 11.2-12; App. Ill. 7-8; Flor. 1.21; Oros. 4.13.1-4; Zon. 8.19) 
The accounts of Polybius and Appian are the most extant of thes sources, however neither agree on the 
causation of the war. Whilst Polybius’ account is the more detailed, there is merit to the argument that Appian 
was the more informed historian on this matter, cf. Petzold 1971, 199-223; Derow 1973, 118-134; Walbank 
1957 I, 153-167.  
98
 Polyb. 2.12.3-7l; App. Ill. 8; Liv. Per. 20. The Illyrians again took up piratical raiding and were quickly 
defeated by the Romans in the conflict regarded as the Second Illyrian War (App. Ill. 8; Cass. Dio 12fr.; 
Polyb. 3.16.18-19; Zon. 8.20). After the capture of the chief cities of Dimallum (also known as Dimale, Polyb. 
3.18.1-7; Zon. 8.20) and Pharus (also spelled Pharos, Polyb. 3.18.8-19.12; Liv. 22.33.3; App. Ill. 8; Zon. 8.20) 
the war was concluded in 219 BC with no mention of captives. In the following year some remaining pirates 
were subdued at Issa (Eutrop. 3.7.1). 
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mentioned, save the beheading of a number of the Illyrian chiefs.
99
 According to Polybius 
and Zonaras, the Romans were able to capture 20 ships laden with booty plundered from the 
Greeks, and it is possible the crews of these were taken captive, whilst a number of towns had 
been seized.
100
 Orosius suggests that the towns were destroyed.
101
 Overall Rome was most 
successful in mounting marine operations on coastal cities, and the proconsul Cn. Fulvius 
Centumalus, serving as admiral, celebrated a triumph in for the year 228 BC.
102
 The consuls, 
however, were not awarded a triumph, and so it is unlikely any large-scale enslavements 
resulted from the First Illyrian War. Nor is it likely that any occurred in the Second Illyrian 
War, save for the sack of Pharus, which may have produced captives, and thus slaves.
103
  
 
Second Punic War 
Much of the Second Punic War was fought on Italian soil and Hannibal’s lengthy stay there 
resulted in a great deal of fighting against fellow Italians for the Romans. The treatment of 
such communities was similar to previous rebellions, where we find a reluctance on the part 
of the Romans to enslave fellow Italians. In Sicily the treatment of Agrigentum was severe, 
but it served to scare many other cities into capitulating.
104
 Volkamnn noted that the Romans 
refrained from mass destruction in Sicily, preferring to preserve the cities and, for the most 
part, the populations too; this pattern continued into the first century with the treatment of the 
Sicilian communities in the fight against Sextus Pompey.
105
 Similarly, in Spain the 
magnanimity of Scipio Africanus was lauded, and proved an effective strategy at winning 
over the Iberians instead of hardening them as Carthaginian allies against Rome.
106
 With 
regards to Carthaginian prisoners, the Romans were inclined to preserve them,
107
 and on 
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 Flor. 1.21.4. 
100
 Polyb. 2.11.13. Ships Polyb. 2.11.14; Zon. 8.19. 
101
 Oros. 4.13.2 Deleo. These could not have been any towns of major significance. 
102
 Degrassi 1954, 101.  
103
 The consul L. Aemilius Paullus celebrated a triumph after the Second Illyrian War, ps-Aur. Vict. De vir. ill. 
50.1; Polyb. 3.19.12, but this was probably awarded for the sack of Dimallum and Pharus (Pharos) rather than 
for large scale enslavements. Polybius notes that Pharus was levelled by Aemilius. Αἰμίλιος τὴν μὲν Φάρον 
εὐθέως ἐξ ἐφόδου παραλαβὼν κατέσκαψε if the city was utterly destroyed then enslavements were likely to 
have taken place. 
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 Discussed below. For a thorough account of captures during the Second Punic War see Welwei 2000, 88-
132, who consistently argues that the figures presented in the sources should be significantly reduced. 
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 Volkmann 1990, 56. Eg. Octavian intervened when Lepidus began to burn Messana, Cass. Dio 49.11.2.  
106
 Knapp 1977, 54. 
107
 E.g. spared at Arpi in 213 BC (Liv. 24.47.10; cf. Frontin. Str. 3.9.2) contra App. Hann. 31, who says the 
Carthaginians were executed. Possibly enslaved, but not executed at Baecula in 208 BC (Eutrop. 3.15; 
Polyb.10.40.1; Oros. 4.18.7), likewise at Grumentum and Metaurus in the following year (Liv. 27.42.7; 
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occasion they were also allowed to be ransomed.
108
 On the whole Roman enslavement was 
reactionary, and punishment ad exemplum, with no indication of a motive for acquiring 
slaves.  
Specific figures concerning casualties and enslavements for the Second Punic War need to be 
treated with a great deal of caution, particularly in Livy. His primary source for the war is the 
first century BC historian Valerius Antias, whose tendency to exaggerate was even 
commented on by the Augustan historian.
109
 Roland Laroche suggested that Valerius’ figures 
probably derived from family histories which tended to reflect ‘mystical’ numbers (basic 
multiples of the same number).
110
 Several of the figures given by Livy appear to be arbitrarily 
given; the figure of 10,000 is a particularly common one, which seems to indicate that a 
significant battle had occurred, and the rounded figures, also observed above, suggest the 
numbers are largely estimations.
111
 This has led Welwei to largely criticise the figures as pure 
invention, and as constructs of the author to convey a particular message – the Romans did 
well, the Romans did poorly.
112
 However, the figures are tempered, at least to some degree. 
Livy and Polybius both display caution in presenting numbers above 10,000.
113
 Therefore, we 
cannot immediately discredit the figures given, but as Welwei has thoroughly done, they may 
be tempered to more realistic numbers.
114
 
The first instance of capture by the Romans in the Second Punic War occurred in 218 BC 
when Rome’s navy met a Carthaginian fleet off the coast of Sicily near Lilybaeum (Marsala). 
With the superior presence of marines, the Romans quickly routed the Carthaginians and 
managed to capture seven ships with a total of 1,700 captives, including three noblemen.
115
 In 
the same year the Roman forces operating in Spain managed to defeat Hanno near the city of 
                                                                                                                                                        
27.49.6; Oros. 4.18.14; Polyb. 11.3.1-3). Following the capture of Orongis in 207 BC Hanno and other 
Carthaginian prisoners were brought back to Rome, but not executed (Liv. 28.4.4; Zon. 9.8). Carthaginian 
ship excused as carrying envoys by Scipio Africanus in 204 BC (Cass. Dio 17.57.70). Spies released by him 
in 202 BC (App. Pun. 39; Eutrop. 3.33; Polyaen. 8.16.8; Polyb. 15.5.1-7; Zon. 9.14).  
108
 After Casilinum in 216 BC (Liv. 23.19.5) and eventually 200 were released without ransom after the war 
(Liv. 34.43.8). 
109
 Liv. 26.49.1; 33.10.1; 36.19.12; 39.41.6. 
110
 Laroche 1977, 359-60. 
111
 The number 10,000 appears 51 times in Livy’s Ab Urbe Condita. Similarly 2,000, 7,000 and 20,000 occur 
with significant frequency. 
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 Welwei 2000, 88f. 
113
 Both Polybius and Livy are sceptical of their sources particularly in relating the large figures given by them 
(Polyb. 2.56.f. Liv. 26.49.3; 33.10.8). 
114
 Welwei 2000, passim. 
115
 Liv. 21.50.5f. 1,700 captives from 7 ships yields an average of 242 per ship, this corresponds with the Roman 
equivalent minus a marine contingent.  
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Cissa and took his camp, resulting in the capture of 2,000 Carthaginians.
116
 Cissa was also 
taken by assault and the booty of the town, including slaves of little value, was given over to 
the soldiers,
117
 the Carthaginian camp, however, yielded a huge amount of booty since 
Hannibal’s army was en route to Italy and had left all the unnecessary baggage behind. Both 
Hanno and Andobales, the general of his Iberian allies, were taken prisoner,
118
 but neither 
were brought back to Rome as the fleet was attacked, forcing the consuls to return to Spain 
and winter at Tarraco.
119
 Elsewhere in 218 BC the Carthaginian garrison, along with their 
commander Hamilcar (son of Gisgo), were compelled to surrender (trado) on Melita to the 
Romans, probably because any relief by sea was denied when a nearby Carthaginian fleet 
was defeated with the capture of 10 ships.
120
 
The Roman defeat at Cannae in 216 BC led to a large number of defections in Italy; in 
particular, the Samnites and Bruttians, as well as some cities in Campania and Apulia – the 
chief of these being Capua and Tarentum respectively.
121
 In Sicily too the faithful ally Hiero 
died and his grandson switched  his banners to Carthage. With so many defections the war in 
Italy was waged as much in the manner of suppressing a revolt as it was in meeting an 
invading army. Conversely the acquisition of new allies required Hannibal to defend them, so 
that the invading Carthaginian force was often fighting to defend cities and break sieges.
122
 
The Roman punishment of these Italian communities reflected their previous method of 
treating them moderately rather than ruthlessly.
123
 The Carthaginian soldiers seem to have 
been treated in a similar manner to the first Punic War; they were incarcerated, perhaps 
because so many Romans had been taken, and exchanges were being considered.  
Signs of discontent and opportunity had occurred prior to Cannae. In 217 BC a collection of 
Campanians decided to try their luck in attacking Cumae during an annual ritual that took 
place nearby in Hamae. The plan was to move large numbers of troops close to the city under 
the guise of guards for the festival. The Cumaeans caught wind of the treachery and informed 
the Roman commander Tiberius Sempronius Longus, who marched by night and seized the 
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 Liv. 21.60.7. 
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 Liv. 21.60.8 supellex barbarica ac vilium mancipiorum.  
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 Polyb. 3.76.6 ζωγρία – taking alive. 
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 Polyb. 3.76.10-12. 
120
 Melita – modern Malta. (Liv. 21.51.2). Ships captured (Liv.21.51.7). 
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Campanian camp, killing 2,000 soldiers, including the commander Marius Alfius, and 
capturing a large number.
124
 In 215 BC the Hirpini had likewise taken the opportunity 
afforded by Hannibal’s presence to break from their obligations to Rome, but the retreat of 
Hanno into Bruttium gave the Romans an opportunity to retake the towns of Vercellium, 
Vescellium and Sicilinum.
125
 The leaders were beheaded and more than 5,000 captives were 
sent under the spear. Since Livy states these were ‘sent’ under the spear it may suggest they 
were released in the fashion of passing under the yoke.
126
  
In 215 BC the Romans crossed the Ebro and defeated a large Carthaginian force under 
Hasdrubal, the enemy camp near Ibera was taken and plundered and as many as 10,000 
soldiers were made prisoner.
127
 Welwei regards this number as ‘phantaseizahlen,’ as the 
number seems grossly out of proportion.
128
 From Ibera the Roman army marched to 
Saguntum where they took the town and destroyed it selling all those within. The city was 
then restored to its original inhabitants, which is puzzling given Zonaras and Livy’s 
assertions that it had been destroyed.
129
 In Sardinia the Romans defeated the Carthaginian 
forces and took between 1,500 and 3,700 captives.
130
 Following the battle, the praetor Titus 
Manlius sacked the nearby city of Cornus, in which many of the Carthaginians and Sardinian 
rebels had taken refuge, compelling most of the disloyal cities to submit to the Romans. All 
parties surrendered to Manlius, and both the Carthaginians and Sardinians provided hostages. 
Once affairs were settled in Sardinia, Livy states “he [Manlius] turned over the tribute to the 
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 Liv. 23.35.19, the exact number is unknown due to a lacuna, but it probably is in the thousands given (contra 
Loeb notes Roberts 1912, 127 n. 6) the initial figure of 16,000 Campanians. Thirty four standards taken, on 
the Roman model of 60 per century, would put the number captured at 2,040, but the number is pointless as 
the capture of a standard could not have required the complete capture or death of the unit, cf. Welwei 2000, 
91 n. 14. 
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 Liv. 23.37.11 The Romans had defeated Hanno in Luceria and captured 280 soldiers and 41 standards. 
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 Liv. 23.37.13 supra quinque milia captivorum sub hasta venierunt. It could be that these were stripped of 
their possessions rather than punished. 5,000 captives is not a large number from three towns, but Livy refers 
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principle participants of the rebellion that were punished. The location of these sites is unknown. The Hirpini 
inhabited the foothills on the border of Samnium and Campania. Vescellium is also mentioned by Pliny HN. 
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Campania given the name. 
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 Eutrop. 3.11.2 Perdit in pugna XXXV milia hominum; ex his capiuntur X milia, occiduntur XXV milia. Oros. 
4.16.13 puts the total at 35,000 either killed or captured and Liv. 23.29.15 only mentions the plundering of the 
camp. 
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 Welwei 200, 108, certainly the number 10,000, which is often repeated, should make us wary to accept it as 
an accurate figure. 
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 Liv. 24.42.11 sub corona vendiderunt urbemque delerunt; Zon. 9.3 πόλισμα κατέσκαψαν καὶ τοὺς 
ἀνθρώπους ἐπώλησαν. Cf. Volkmann 1990, 47. 
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 Liv. 23.40.12 estimates 3,700. Eutrop. 3.13.2 gives 1,500.  
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quaestors, the grain to the aediles, the captives to Quintus Fulvius, the praetor.”131 It is most 
likely that these captives were in fact the hostages, mentioned earlier rather than those taken 
in the engagement with Hasdrubal. The Romans later succeeded in defeating the 
Carthaginians in a battle near Ilurgeia, capturing less than 3,000.
132
 
The city of Cumae was soon besieged by the Carthaginians, and during the siege the 
defenders were able to kidnap a total of 59 sentries, coupled with the killing of 1,300 soldiers. 
The Cumaeans proved staunch defenders. A Roman relief force eventually arrived and 
compelled the Carthaginians to break off the siege; we do not know what became of the 
prisoners there.
133
 At the same time, Tiberius Sempronius Longus captured 280 
Carthaginians, along with a disproportionately high 41 standards, in a battle near 
Grumentum.
134
 Whilst remaining at the city, a suspicious ship passed near Cumae and was 
intercepted by a couple of Roman vessels despatched from the coast. Macedonian and 
Carthaginian ambassadors were discovered on board, and a further search revealed a treaty 
outlining an alliance between Hannibal and Philip; this discovery sparked the first 
Macedonian War.
135
 The ambassadors and the incriminating evidence were quickly sent to 
Rome, where the consul ordered that the ambassadors be imprisoned and their attendants 
‘sold’ sub hasta.136 
In 214 BC, an army, largely made up of slave volunteers, under the commander Longus 
marched into Campania, where they met the Carthaginians in battle.
137
 As a motivation 
Longus offered freedom to all those who brought back an enemy head. During the battle the 
Carthaginians shouted abuse towards the Romans, calling them nothing more than ex-
prisoners and slaves cleared from the ergastula. The Romans beat the Carthaginians back into 
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 Liv. 23.41.7. Titus Manlius was acting as praetor in place of Quintus Mucius who was delayed in taking 
Sardinia as his province due to illness. Manlius was selected as his substitute because of prior success against 
the Sardinians over whom he triumphed, see Degrassi 1954, 101.  
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 Liv. 23.49.10. Perhaps a duplication of another instance ‘Iliturgi’ (Liv. 24.41.10), see Welwei 2000, 109. 
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 Liv. 23.37.6-10. 
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 215 BC Liv. 23.37.11. 
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 For a list of citations regarding the treaty see Schmitt 1969, 245-50 (SdA. III 528). For modern discussions 
see Austin & Rankov 1995, 35; Dorey & Dudley 1971, 120-1; Eckstein 2010, 231; Errington 1990 192-6.; 
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 Liv. 23.38.7 comitibisque eorum sub hasta venditis. The treaty is quoted by Polyb. 7.9f. According to Liv. 
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rejected as an invention of Livy by most historians, see Bogurth 1892, 5; Walbank 1967b, 42.  
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 These were largely recruited in the wake of Cannae, Liv. 22.57. Slaves were often given their freedom just 
before they enetered service or as a reward after their service (Val. Max. 5.6.8 C. Th. 7.13.6). Cf. Buckland 
1908, 73; Halkin 1872, 45; Welwei 1988, 5f.; 2000, 88. 
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their camp, and there the prisoners of the Carthaginians broke out and attacked their gaolers 
from behind. The battle was conspicuously bloody, and less than 2,000 Carthaginians, mainly 
cavalry, escaped – the remainder were either killed or captured.138 Following the battle the 
booty, except for the captives, was given to the soldiers. Cattle were exempted as well and 
the owners given 30 days to claim them back. Some of the slave-soldiers had held back 
during the fighting and took refuge upon a hill in fear of reprisals. Longus, however, still 
granted their freedom, but stipulated that for the remainder of their service they take their 
meals standing, and so in the ensuing feast many soldiers wearing the pilleus or lana alba 
(hats worn as symbols of freedmen) could be seen eating whilst seated and others whilst 
standing.
139
  
The city of Casilinum was retaken in 214 BC; it had been captured the year before despite a 
valiant effort by the Roman garrison. As the Romans burst into the city they slaughtered a 
great number of the Campanian populace who had taken refuge within the walls. Many of the 
Campanians had thought of throwing themselves upon the mercy of the consul, and so were 
exiting the gate at the time of the city’s fall. In the end only fifty made it to the consul and 
these were permitted to go to Capua. Livy remarked that the Campanians, along with 
Hannibal’s soldiers, were sent to Rome to be imprisoned. The remaining populace was 
distributed amongst neighbouring communities to be guarded.
140
 The incarceration of the 
captives suggests that the Carthaginians were held for a ransom, as the case with many others 
detained in Rome.
141
 The rebel Campanians likely faced trials, as would be the case with their 
compatriots at Capua.
142
 In the following year the city of Arpi turned out its Carthaginian 
garrison and re-joined the Roman side. The Arpini leader Dasius Altinius had switched his 
allegiance to Hannibal after Cannae and now, believing the Romans the more probable 
victors in the conflict, sought to re-join the winning side.
143
 Appian and Livy differ in their 
accounts of how the city was turned over to the Romans, but both agree on the vacillated 
nature of Dasius. Appian suggests that once the city was turned over to the Romans the 
Carthaginians were sought out and executed.
144
 Livy however, who gives a more detailed 
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 Liv. 24.15.7-24.16.5. Zon. 9.4 gives only a passing reference to the battle. 
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 Liv. 24.16.18.  
140
 Liv. 24.19.11 captivique Campanorum quive Hannibalis militum erant Romam missi atque ibi in carcere 
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account, says that the Spanish mercenaries in the city offered to bring over their standards on 
the condition that the Carthaginians be allowed to leave. This was accepted and the 
Carthaginians re-joined Hannibal in Apulia.
145
 
In 212 BC a number of major cities were captured by the Romans. The Romans first laid 
siege to Capua, and because of the presence of both Roman and Carthaginian armies the 
Campanians had very pitiful food stores. While the Romans were dug in at Capua, Hannibal 
was called away to Lucania. The Campanians meanwhile had sent a convoy containing many 
women and children to Lucania to bring back food.
146
 The Romans besieging Capua took the 
opportunity in Hannibal’s absence, to seize both the camp he left behind and the convoy. 
Livy does not detail the composition of the captives, but states that above 7,000 of the enemy 
were killed, and that of the convoy more the 6,000 were captured, but their fate was not 
specified.
147
 In Spain, Saguntum was retaken in 212 BC and restored to the remaining 
Saguntines whilst the Turdetani, who had been installed at Saguntum by Hannibal, and were 
supposedly responsible for the conflict that would spark the war, were sold as slaves and their 
city utterly destroyed.
148
 
In Sicily the Romans finally captured Syracuse.
149
 The city had been a steadfast ally under 
Hiero II until his death in 215 BC, but his grandson successor Hieronymus broke his alliance 
with Rome following the disaster of Cannae. The Roman response was to lay siege to the city 
immediately, but because of its remarkable breastworks and the brilliance of Archimedes the 
city held out for three years.
150
 At one point a pro-Roman faction emerged within Syracuse 
and murdered the mercenary commanders, and a peace was proposed which would have 
preserved the city and its inhabitants along with their property. But the mercenaries and the 
Roman deserters feared reprisals should Syracuse be surrendered and executed the leaders of 
the pro-Roman faction within the city. From this point the sacking of the city was inevitable, 
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 Liv. 24.47.4-10. Frontin. Str. 3.9.2 seems to agree with Livy’s account of the capture of the city, but does not 
mention the captives. 
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 Diod. Sic. 26.12.14; App. Hann. 36. 
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 I place it in 212 BC, but it is possible that it was sacked in early spring of 211 BC. 
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 Syracuse protected by three rings of walls and could be supplied from the harbour. Archimedes had a number 
of famous defences, including a crane which could lift Roman ships and his famous mirrors that directed 
sunlight to light ships on fire (Lucian Hippias 2; Zon. 9.5; Tzetz. Chil. 2.109-123). 
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and the Romans were able to take the city quarter by quarter.
151
 The sack was a violent affair 
noted for the killing of Archimedes.
152
 The freeborn of the city were explicitly not enslaved, 
and this specificity suggests that the city’s slaves were.153 However, Diodorus continues that 
the deprivation of the siege and the plundering of all the property by the Romans forced the 
Syracusans to sell themselves into slavery in order to eat.
154
 The plundering of the city was 
particularly noteworthy for both the harshness of it upon the populace, who had been allies 
for so long (this was also the reason why they were spared a harsher treatment following the 
capture of the city),
155
 and for the richness of the haul.
156
 Not all Syracusans were treated this 
way, and the pro-Roman inhabitants of Syracuse were spared from the plunder as Marcellus 
posted guards to ensure that their property was not pillaged, and their country estates were 
left intact.
157
 The other Syracusan elite’s property was seized, as made clear by their later 
petition against Marcellus.
158
 
In 211 BC the city of Antikyra was captured by the Romans and the Aetolians, and in 
accordance with a treaty concerning the division of spoils
159
 the city and territory went to the 
Aetolians and the booty (including captives) to the Romans. Polybius tells us that the captives 
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 The City was also weakened by an outbreak of plague App. Sic. 4; Liv. 25.26.1-15; Sil. 14.580-526.  
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157
 Liv. 26.21.11. 
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For all the related passages in Livy and Polybius see Schmitt 1969, 258-66 (SdA. III 536), 
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were enslaved,
160
 noting “the Romans are carrying off the women and children to suffer, of 
course, what those must suffer who fall into the hands of aliens.”161 The suffering here of 
course is being sold outside of Greece, contrary to Greek custom, hence Polybius’ reaction 
towards Greeks being made captives of barbarians.
162
  
Like many other Italian cities, Capua sided with Hannibal after the disaster at Cannae.
163
 
Prior to their shift in allegiance, Capua had tried to extort from the Romans, in their state of 
weakness, a consulship to be continuously held by a Capuan; but this was emphatically 
rejected.
164
 As Hannibal’s army quartered in Capua they indulged themselves in the famously 
luxuriant city, which most ancient sources cite as a major contributor to the downfall of 
Hannibal’s venture in Italy.165 In 212 BC, with the Campanians defeated in a series of 
previous engagements and Hannibal occupied to the south of Campania, the opportunity was 
ripe for Rome to exact its revenge upon the rebellious city. The siege lasted for a full year 
and in that time Hannibal tried unsuccessfully to dislodge the Romans, at one point marching 
towards Rome before famously turning from a siege.
166
 As Capua starved under the siege its 
people sent a last ditch appeal to Hannibal for aid, but the envoys were caught by the Romans 
and their hands cut off;
167
 with the failure of the envoy all hope was lost, some senators killed 
themselves and the city was surrendered along with the Carthaginian garrison to the Romans. 
The Carthaginian garrison was placed under guard and perhaps redeemed by Hannibal. 
Appian’s account is ambiguous on this matter, and Livy gives little help, stating only that the 
Carthaginians were “bound together and put under guard” and the commanders Hanno and 
Bostar were sent to Rome.
168
  
The Capuans, being rebels were treated accordingly, but the importance of the city prevented 
its destruction, and its size and proximity to Rome precluded the enslavement of the entire 
populace. Many of the Capuan senators were executed, having been ultimately responsible 
for the city’s defection to Hannibal.169 Livy gives an interesting account of how this was 
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carried out: once the gates were open the city was put under guard by a legion, who posted 
sentries about the walls and gates. The Capuan senators were put under arrest and their 
wealth seized. Twenty-five of the senators were sent to Cales and twenty-six to Taeanum. 
The two consuls had not agreed on the course of punishment, with Fulvius in favour of severe 
punishment and Claudius in favour of lenience.
170
 Fulvius decided to take matters into his 
own hands, and so in the middle of the night he sped to Teanum where he had the Capuans 
scourged to death and beheaded. He then made for Cales where he was met by a messenger 
bearing a directive from the Senate. He ignored the message, knowing it contained 
instructions to preserve the Capuan senators, and executed the Capuans at Cales. Only once 
the executions were carried out did he open the directive.
171
  
The Capuan masses were largely spared,
172
 and the city itself preserved, as mentioned above, 
perhaps because of its opulence, but as Cicero and Livy suggest, and considering the blow it 
struck to the supplies of Hannibal, also because of its importance as a grain producer.
173
 The 
city was then stripped of its government and put under a Roman magistrate.
174
 The loss of 
political autonomy and the execution of many of the principle men lead to some Campanian 
youths starting a large fire in Rome.
175
  
In 210 BC the Romans took the city of Agrigentum, which was being used as the 
Carthaginian headquarters in Sicily. The Carthaginian commander Hanno had recently 
dismissed his cavalry lieutenant Muttines out of jealousy, and this proved a fatal move, as the 
latter betrayed the city to the Romans.
176
 In the assault Hanno was captured.
177
 According to 
Livy the principle men responsible for the city’s defection to the Carthaginians were 
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 Zon. 9.6 puts Claudius’ death before the fall of the city, Livy is specific post captam. 
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 Liv. 26.14.7-14. Livy gives the total cost of the Capuan rebellion at 70 senators executed (19 more than at 
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 The arsonists were found and put to death (Liv. 26.16.5-10; Ov. Fast. 6.625-626). Liv. 27.3.4-8 offers an 
almost duplicate story of an attempt to burn the Roman camp outside of Capua. Fulvius was reproached over 
this by Taurea Vibellius, a Capuan senator, who was not executed (Liv. 26.15.11-15). 
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 Zon. 9.7; Liv. 26.40.6. 
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 Eutrop. 3.14.4; Oros. 4.18.2; Zon. 9.7. 
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scourged and beheaded, as occurred at Capua. This was quickly becoming the Roman custom 
of dealing with revolts and uprisings. Others, who were implicated but not deemed necessary 
to punish with execution, were sold with the booty, and the money was sent to Rome.
178
 Not 
all of the Argigentines could have been sold as slaves, since it continued to be a principle city 
in Sicily.
179
 The reaction of the remainder of Sicily is also commensurate with a typical 
punishment of the elite and preservation of the populace – no less than 40 cities switched 
allegiance to Rome, and 20 more either expelled or killed their Carthaginian garrisons. Only 
6 cities of little note remained loyal to Carthage, and these were all captured by the proconsul 
Laevinus.
180
 
In 209 BC Scipio Africanus captured the city of New Carthage. It had been the base of 
Carthaginian operations in Spain and was a reasonably large city containing a significant 
amount of supplies and plunder, as well as Carthage’s Spanish hostages.181 The fall of New 
Carthage is used by Polybius as an example of how the Romans sacked cities, distributed the 
booty and dealt with captives; he breaks with the narrative of events to describe in detail how 
the Romans carried out these particulars.
182
 The leniency shown to the captives here, and 
even their sheer survival, is in stark contrast with his description of the sack, which was 
particularly brutal.
183
 Polybius reports that on the day following the siege 10,000 captives 
were assembled so that they may be divided and addressed by Scipio, though Livy later notes 
that accounts varied and the number could have been as high as 25,000.
184
 The captives were 
then separated so that two distinct groups were formed, one comprising of citizens or 
statesmen (πολιτικοὐς ἄνδρας) and their families and the other the artisans (χειροέχνας). The 
citizens and their families were allowed to return to their homes by Scipio and so were spared 
any further punishment than that which had been visited upon them during the siege. This 
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 Liv. 26.40.14 ceteros praedamque vendidit The fact that the money was sent to Rome suggests that the 
money came from the sale of prisoners.  
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 The Agrigentines were eventually given Roman citizenship after the death of Caesar in 44 BC when Antony 
issued a decree found amongst Caesar’s papers granting citizenship to Sicily. Later indicated by the 
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 Liv. 26.40.13-14. Laevinius also spared 4,000 brigands who along with the Rhegians were transported to 
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 App. Hisp. 23; Liv. 26.49.2; Polyb. 10.15.5; 17.6. 
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 Polyb. 10.15.1-10.18.2 The sack of cities and the distribution is discussed in Chapter 2. 
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 Polyb. 10.15.5 dogs cut in half, captives put to the sword etc. Volkmann 1990, 199 notes that Scipio’s 
lenience was an exceptional case compared to the wider practice of mass enslavement and execution thus far 
exhibited by the Romans in the Second Punic War. 
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 Polyb. 10.17.6; Liv. 26.49.2. Liv. 26.49.3 illustrates the variance of his sources giving an example of the 
number of artillery scorpions taken with a low number of 60 according to Silenus and a ridiculously high 
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was of course a decision of purely political design, the clementia shown to the Spanish 
winning Scipio valuable allies and undermining Carthaginian support, particularly after the 
loss of their principle centre of operations in Spain.
185
 The artisans were told by Scipio that 
they were now considered property of the Roman people (servi populi publici Romani).
186
 
However, he promised that should they perform their duties, which were mostly in 
manufacture and support of the army, then they would be granted their freedom once the 
Carthaginians were defeated. Scipio placed Roman overseers, one for every thirty, over the 
artisans, who numbered as many as 2,000.
187
 These were eventually freed, as an inscription 
indicates that the Punic community continued to inhabit New Carthage.
188
 
From the remainder, which supposes that the citizens did not number much more than the 
artisans, were selected the strongest, and these were assigned to the ships.
189
 In the harbour 
the Romans had seized 18 vessels,
190
 and Scipio used the captives both to man these and to 
supplement his own ships as well. Polybius states that the crews were all nearly doubled, and 
this would have required a large number of men to have made up the difference. This large 
number almost certainly indicates that the 10,000 gathered only constituted men, as Polybius’ 
later figures cannot have been inclusive of women and children. When combined with the 
number required to man the ships, as explained by Polybius, the number of captives must 
have exceeded 10,000. Therefore Polybius must have confused or exaggerated the manning 
of the ships.
191
 It is hard to see how a ship with already cramped conditions could 
accommodate a double sized crew. The rowing benches could not be improved by more 
hands, although they could benefit from shifts, but even this would slow down the ships 
performance with the increased weight from additional bodies. Alternatively the addition of 
rowers could have freed the Roman oarsmen to serve in other capacities, but this again seems 
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 Eckstein 1987, 211. Volkmann 1990, 47 notes that this was clearly a surprise to the Spanish who on a later 
occasion at Astapa killed themselves in anticipation of falling into the hands of the Romans (cf. App. Hisp. 
33). 
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 They were bidden to enrol themselves with the quaestor (ταμἰαν), who was responsible for receiving and 
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 Polyb. 10.17.6-10. 
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 CIL 2.3048, see Eckstein 1987, 211. 
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 Lazenby 1978, 139 remarked that many of the captives taken may have been the city’s slaves. 
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 Or 33 warships according to App. Hisp. 23. 
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However, the manning of the ships, as Polybius suggests, would require at least 200 for the captured ships and 
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counterintuitive, as the replacement of skilled oarsmen by novices would not have been 
beneficial. Overall the fact that these recruits were ‘selected’ indicates that the total number 
of those captured was in fact more. Of the eventual freedom of these captives we cannot be 
sure,
192
 but their hope of freedom and the promise of Scipio would have warranted comment 
by our sources if they were not granted their freedom. 
In the same year, 209 BC, Q. Fabius Maximus Cuncator led his legion into Apulia and took 
the city of Manduria by storm, capturing 3,000 people along with some booty.
193
 He then 
moved his camp to outside Tarentum. Tarentum had been persuaded by Hannibal to rebel 
against Rome, though the Roman garrison under the command of M. Livius Macatus was 
able to hold the citadel throughout the Carthaginian occupation of the city.
194
 Fabius was able 
to lure Hannibal out of Tarentum through the treachery of an inside man,
195
 he then quickly 
seized the city by storm, from both land and sea, before Hannibal could turn back. Fabius is 
famed for preserving the temple riches in the city despite their being exceptionally rich in 
paintings and tapestries.
196
 In the city Livy states that 30,000 slaves were captured, the 
distinction of slaves and the huge number were likely a construction of Livy to illustrate the 
richness of Tarentum, which he compares to that of Syracuse.
197
 Plutarch simply refers to the 
captives as ‘Tarentines,’ who Welwei has suggested were comprised of all classes, since the 
sack of the city was particularly unorganised and frantic, and distinction between slave and 
free was unlikely. Historians have typically favoured the account of Plutarch regarding this, 
citing Livy’s distinction of slaves as deliberately playing down Roman maltreatment of free 
Greeks.
198
 However, this ignores the fact that Livy was portraying the city as exceedingly 
rich to further enhance the effect of Fabius’ frugality.  
In Spain Scipio’s forces were able to capture 12,000 Carthaginian soldiers at Baecula in 208 
BC, following which Polybius states that Scipio “occupied himself with their transition.”199 
                                                 
192
 Walbank 1967a II, 216. 
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 Cf. Cic. Brut. 72; de Or. 2.72; Sen. 11; Plut. Fab. Max. 23.3. 
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Scipio was perhaps sorting between the Carthaginian and Spanish troops as he had at New 
Carthage. Orosius noted that it was in principle Scipio’s strategy to release without ransom 
the Spanish and to sell the Carthaginians as slaves.
200
 In the following year the Romans 
defeated the Carthaginians near Grumentum, where 8,000 Carthaginians were slain and over 
700 captured along with two elephants.
201
 In the retreat to Orongis, the Carthaginian 
commander Hanno was captured along with his retainers.
202
 The Romans then moved to the 
city of Orongis, took it by storm and returned to New Carthage, where they wintered. Lucius 
Scipio was sent back to Rome bringing Hanno and other distinguished prisoners to await his 
brother’s triumph.203 Off the coast of Sicily a Roman fleet under the proconsul Marcus 
Valerius Laevinus ran into a Carthaginian fleet and out of 70 enemy ships sunk four and 
captured 17.
204
 In Greece the Romans laid siege to the city of Oreus and its citizens were 
prevented from any escape. Consequently when the city fell they were either killed or 
captured. Of the Macedonian garrison we know only that they made an indecisive stand near 
the citadel.
205
  
Also in 207 BC Hannibal’s brother Hasdrubal managed to cross the Alps with his forces and 
acquired a number of Gallic allies. Hasdrubal intended to join his forces with Hannibal in 
order to bring the Carthaginian army up to the strength necessary to turn the tide against the 
Romans in Italy. A messenger was despatched by Hasdrubal to Hannibal, but the messenger 
was captured and the Romans were able to intercept Hasdrubal near Metarus. In the pitched 
battle the Romans defeated the Carthaginians and their allies. In the mêlée Hasdrubal fell 
along with 56,000 of his men
206
 and as many as 5,400 were captured.
207
 After the battle the 
enemy camp was taken with a large amount of booty, as well as 4,000 Roman prisoners that 
had been captured en route from Spain.
208
 Polybius suggests that the Carthaginian prisoners 
were sold, yielding an impressive 300 talents, which equates to approximately 330 drachmae 
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per person.
209
 This sum would be high in comparison to what we might expect from 
wholesale slave prices, but not from ransom prices. Polybius also noted that some 
Carthaginian nobles were taken, and so the high price per person could perhaps have been 
offset by their ransom. At least some captives were brought to Italy for the triumph of Scipio 
in the following year.
210
 
In 205 BC Scipio raised an army in Sicily in order to bring the war again to Africa, but first 
he made a detour to the Italian mainland and attacked the city of Locri, which had admitted a 
Carthaginian garrison. The garrison was wiped out and the city put under the command of 
Pleminius. Pleminius, however, maltreated the populace and desecrated a temple, for which 
he and his followers were condemned to death by the Senate.
211
 The Locrians were also 
compensated by the Roman Senate and their temples restored at Roman expense. Thus it 
stands to reason that they had originally not been enslaved. 
In 204 BC Scipio’s army in Africa captured a town north of Utica. According to Orosius 
5,000 Carthaginians were captured.
212
 Livy is more specific and states that “where, besides 
other things which were immediately put on board the transports and sent into Sicily, eight 
thousand free persons and slaves were captured.”213 These were put on ships and it is possible 
that they were sold as slaves, since Sicily had previously been used for the disposal of slaves 
from Africa.
214
 But, they could also have been reserved for ransom or exchange, since the 
Romans were pushing to end the war at this point. Welwei suggested that the transport of 
captives from North Africa to Sicily would have been easily facilitated as there was a well-
established network from the Tunisian beachheads to bases in Sicily.
215
 
With the Romans operating in Africa Hannibal was forced to leave Italy, and so the Romans 
were able to exact their punishment on the rebellious cities that could no longer rely upon 
Carthaginian help. Overall the Romans treated the Italian communities who had defected to 
                                                 
209
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Hannibal leniently;
216
 a few communities such as Capua were made an example, but by and 
large they were not stripped of their governments or enslaved. The Bruttians above everyone 
else had been the most steadfast in their support for Hannibal, and so the Romans treated 
them particularly harshly, but they were not removed from their territory. Thus ‘slavery’ in 
the strict sense was not what they endured; though Appian states that “they were no longer 
considered free.”217 Their lack of ‘freedom’ referred to the loss of their political autonomy 
and the degradation they suffered, they were not allowed to bear arms and did not have a say 
in government, and were “made to attend the praetors and consuls when they were in 
Bruttium.”218 
The armies of Scipio and Hannibal met on the plains of Zama in 202 BC and Roman victory 
here effectively ended the Second Punic War. Following the battle Hannibal managed to 
escape with a few men. According to Appian 8,500 Carthaginians were captured.
219
 Livy and 
Polybius both put the figure higher at approximately 20,000.
220
 Only Appian specifies that 
some of the distinguished captives were sent to Rome along with the gold, silver and ivory 
which were taken from Hannibal’s camp, and Scipio’s army was enriched by large stores of 
precious metals derived from Hannibal’s campaign in Italy.221 
After Zama, the Carthaginians were sorely pressed, and so they acceded to the peace set out 
by Scipio and later ratified by the people. The treaty had a provision that all the Roman war 
captives be returned, however no such provision is mentioned for the Carthaginian prisoners. 
Furthermore, the Carthaginians were made to pay large reparations and give 100 hostages to 
ensure that they adhered to the treaty.
222
 According to Nepos, the Carthaginians sent 
ambassadors to Rome whilst the treaty was being ratified by the assembly.
 223
 They requested 
that the hostages be kept at Fregellae and for the Carthaginian prisoners to be restored. The 
Romans granted the former request, but rejected the latter on the grounds that Hannibal was 
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still under the protection of Carthage. Livy states that the ambassadors accomplished their 
aims and that 200 of the state prisoners held at Rome were released without ransom and sent 
back to Carthage with Scipio.
224
 Of the many Carthaginian captives spread throughout Italy it 
is impossible to conclude how many were redeemed by Carthage, but there was no mention 
as in the previous treaty that ransom by private individuals be excluded.
225
 
Towards the end of the third century the number of freedmen at Rome had increased 
significantly. This growth was substantial enough that in 220 BC the freedmen of Rome were 
registered into four different voting districts.
226
 The presence of slaves had already been 
noteworthy enough for a manumission tax to have been levied in the mid fourth century.
227
 In 
209 BC this tax, which had been kept in special reserve in the aerarium Sanctius, was taken 
out and used to fund the Roman state. This was the first instance of the fund being used that 
we know of, and so could be the entire tax levied from 357 BC to 209 BC.
228
 If so, the 
number of manumitted persons for the 152 year period may have been between 160,000 and 
500,000.
229
 The amount of inflation and the difference in the rate of manumission are 
impossible to pinpoint with any accuracy and so a clear estimate of the slave population 
based on these figures is not possible. Suffice it to say that the amount of gold generated from 
manumission from the 152 years prior to 209 BC was roughly equivalent to that for the 32 
years prior to 49 BC, indicating a large presence of slaves in Rome in the third century BC. 
Brunt estimated that just prior to the Second Punic War the number of slaves in Italy was as 
many as 500,000, although this figure is a high estimate and could easily be reduced to 
200,000 on the conservative end of the scale.
230
 With such a large presence of slaves in Italy 
it would have been impossible to have maintained these through a supply from war captives. 
                                                 
224
 Liv. 30.43.8 They were to be given over as soon as confirmation of Carthage’s acceptance of the peace terms 
was received. These were held as state prisoners capti in publica custodia (Liv. 30.43.5). 
225
 As stipulated in the treaty following the First Punic War according to Eutrop. 2.27.4-5. See above. 
226
 Liv. Per. 20. the Esquilina, Palatina, Subura and Collina. 
227
 Discussed in Chapter 4. 
228
 The tax was kept in gold bars and in 209 BC totalled 4,000 lbs of gold. Many have doubted that this was the 
total amount for the 152 year period, cf. Frank 1933 I, 101-2; Brunt 1971, 549-50; Mouritsen 2011, 121. 
229
 160,000 estimated by Beloch 1886, 414 from a particularly high manumission price of 2,000 denarii (which 
does not equate, cf. Brunt 1971, 549). 500,000 is based on Frank’s 1933 I, 360-3 figure for the number of 
manumissions required to amount to 4,135 lbs of gold in the treasury in 49 BC, as recorded by Oros. 6.15.5 
(=15,000 lateres Plin. HN 33.55 roughly 12 million denarii by Frank’s estimate). From when Sulla emptied 
the treasury in 82 BC to the figures for 49 BC, Frank estimated an annual manumission rate of 16,000, 
totalling 512,000 based on the typical manumission price of 400 denarii. Brunt 1971, 549 has cast serious 
doubt on these figures suggesting the number of manumissions was a mere 8,000 by Beloch’s calculations. 
Cf. Mouritsen 2011, 121. 
230
 Brunt, 1971, 67, cf. Scheidel 1999, 109 who uses Brunt’s estimate as the high watermark for his estimates. 
 Chapter 5  
147 
 
Accepting the highest figures given by the sources and assuming everyone taken was 
subsequently enslaved the number of slaves could only have amounted to approximately 
200,000 for the 70 years previous.
231
 If we factor in the deaths and manumissions of these 
captive slaves, the number of new slaves from reproduction or other means of supply (apart 
from captives) becomes the vast majority required to maintain the population. A rough figure 
for my (admittedly conservative) overview of enslavements resulting in servitude within Italy 
for this period would suppose a figure of no more than 50,000. This significant reduction in 
previously estimated figures for this period is based on the following observations:
232
 that 
Carthaginians were ransomed at the end of the First Punic War, ancient historians had a 
tendency to exaggerate and Italy was not the only destination for enslaved captives. This 
would mean that even the low estimate of 200,000 slaves in Italy could not have been 
comprised of a majority of captives. Even doubling the figure for captives to 100,000 could 
only have supplied a fraction of the total population of 200,000 for 70 years. Identifying an 
exact figure would require extensive calculation based on conjectural figures and thus 
arriving at such a figure could only be speculative. Suffice it to say that 200,000 slaves would 
need to be replaced by at least as many again in 70 years, assuming that virtually all slaves of 
the initial corps would die by their 70
th
 birthday. Since life-expectancy was far below 70 in 
ancient Rome and we can assume many, being slaves, would have died earlier than their 35th 
birthday or would have been manumitted, it would be far from excessive to say that 400,000 
slaves would be needed for 70 years to maintain a population of 200,000.
233
 Therefore 
100,000 war captives could only have provided a quarter of the total need for slaves at the 
time. Whilst instances for the enslavement of war captives increased during the Second Punic 
War it was still not the principle source of slaves considering the infrequent pattern of 
enslavements and the overall low figure for slaves realistically acquired in war and brought to 
Rome. 
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Chapter 6 
Enslavements after the Punic Wars 
 
By the second century BC Rome emerged as the dominant power in the Western 
Mediterranean, having defeated its only contender the Carthaginians. In the East, the 
Macedonians would soon prove no match for Rome’s ambition to expand her control into 
Greece. Roman policy in controlling conquered territory was significantly altered by this 
overseas expansion.
1
 In Spain, the distance from Rome and the recalcitrance of the locals 
required a permanent garrison, essentially establishing a province through continuous Roman 
administration. This provincial system directed through the Senate and through the office of 
praetor governors was pioneered in Sicily in the previous century; but by the end of the 
Republic it would become common practice. Any analysis of the manner in which the 
Romans treated the conquered populaces from the second century BC must be accounted for 
within the context and framework of their burgeoning overseas empire. Diodorus explained 
that Rome’s treatment of captured people changed significantly with their established 
dominance, citing the examples of Carthage, Numantia and Corinth, all of which were razed; 
he remarked upon the stark contradiction of their previous benevolent and enfranchising 
policy towards defeated foes.
2
  
A clear caveat to any long-term analysis of enslavements in the second century must be the 
exiguous textual evidence. Polybius’ Histories from Book 22 (c. 188 BC) becomes 
increasingly patchy, and his work concludes with the destruction of Corinth in 146 BC. 
Livy’s narrative, which has proved the most consistent in relating captures in war, is lost 
from his 46
th
 book, forcing reliance upon the Periochae of his work after 166 BC. For the 
purpose of continuity, this chapter concludes with the sack of Corinth in the East, effectively 
ending where Polybius, too, saw a natural conclusion.
3
 In the West, although fighting 
continues intermittently in Spain, this chapter concludes with the destruction of Carthage in 
order to coincide with the East. 
                                                 
1
 For this concept (originally espoused by Arnold 1879) see Stevenson, 1939 and Brennan, 2000. 
2
 Diod. Sic. 32.4.4. This lack of a significant rival was perceived as the cause of moral decline in the late 
Republic by later historians (Sall. Iug. 41.1-10; Hist. 1.10; Plin. HN 33.150; Plut. Mor. 88a). 
3
 Polyb. 1. 1.3.9; 39.8.6. 
 Chapter 6  
149 
 
 
The Macedonian Wars 
Captures in war resulting in enslavement tapered off significantly in Greece during the third 
century BC.
4
 The impropriety of enslaving Greeks over barbarians, held by Aristotle and 
Plato,
5
 in part a response to the cases of Greek enslavements during the fourth century,
6
 
limited such a practice during the third. However, external powers continued to prey upon the 
Greeks, so that it was not devoid of the unpleasant practice. The Illyrians, in the late 230’s 
BC, conducted a series of raids that resulted in the enslavement of a number of Aetolian 
captives.
7
 Likewise, enslavements carried out by Greeks and Macedonians continued outside 
Greece in this period. Philip II raided Scythia and was there said to have captured 20,000 
women and children in 339 BC.
8
 Boese has suggested that the restraint of the Greeks in 
enslaving their countrymen changed irreparably after the sack of Mantinea in 223 BC.
9
 But 
the fate of the Mantineans was not exactly a straightforward affair. Polybius used the episode 
as an example to launch a diatribe against the earlier historian Phylarchus, who gave a 
graphic account of the city’s fall.10 This episode has often been cited as an example of 
Polybius’ view being coloured by his political convictions or his attack on literary-styles 
different to his own.
11
 But to simply accuse Polybius of parti pris is to ignore his reasoned 
critique of Phylarcus, as John Marincola has shown, Polybius felt Phylarchus’ history 
favoured the emotive at the expense of the factual ultimately preventing the historian from 
identifying the cause of events.
12
 Whereas Phylarchus tried to rouse the sympathy of his 
                                                 
4
 Boese 1973, 71. 
5
 Pl. Rep. 469-471; Arist. NE 1149a9-12. Cf. Philostr. VA 8.7, see Chapter 1. 
6
 See Arist. Pol. 1333b38-1334a2 argument against warfare for the sake of acquiring slaves. Instances of 
enslavement amongst the Greeks were relatively common during Aristotle’s time, for specific examples see 
Pritchett 1991, 229-31. Cf. Garnsey, 1996, 113 n. 8; Lloyd 1993, 145-7.  
7
 Medion in 231 BC (Polyb. 2.3.7), Phoinice and Helikranon in 230 BC (Polyb. 2.5.8; 6.6).  
8
 Justin. 9.1-2; Oros. 3.13.1-4. Finley 1962, 58 states that this probably stemmed from Theopompus. 
9
 Boese 1973, 71-2. Volkmann 1990, 74-5 argued that the lenience shown to Greek cities was adopted by the 
Romans. 
10
 Phylarchus’ work is now lost, Polybius is likely referring to his Histories, mentioned in the Suda s.v. 
‘Phylarchus.’ 
11
 Most notably the accusation by Walbank 1962, 12 that Polybius’ criticism of Phylarcus here was actually a 
defence of Aratus and Achaea.  
12
 Marincola 2013, 73-90. Polyb. 2.56f. Similarly Polybius criticised Theopompus whom he charged with 
misrepresenting Philip as a philandering brute that enslaved cities (Polyb. 8.9f. specifically the enslaving of 
cities 8.9.3). According to Marincola 2013, 76 Polybius identified Phylarcus’ style as tragic history by 
identifying four key aspects of tragedy: a reversal of fortune, emotive narration, detailed suffering and vivid 
description. However, the purpose and ‘value’ of tragic history according to Polybius was not the accurate 
depiction of events, but rather to benefit a reader enabling him to better cope with personal tragedy. Polybius 
therefore rejects Phylarcus’ style rather than his politics (what Walbank termed Polybius’ bête noir, see also 
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Greek readers for the Mantineans in what Polybius described as “debased and effeminate;”13 
Polybius gave an account of the entirety of the incident, in which he saw the fall of the 
Mantineans as a fitting punishment for their betrayal of the Achaean garrison.
14
 Presumably, 
Phylarchus also believed all of the Mantineans to be enslaved as his treatise (according to 
Polybius) described men, women and children being carried off into slavery. Polybius took 
issue with this, stating that it could not have been, as it was not a fitting punishment as it 
punished the innocent along with the guilty.
15
 He then contradicts this statement by 
remarking that the Mantineans’ property was plundered and the free enslaved,16 the clarity 
being lost in the discrediting of the Phylarchus. With the addition of Plutarch’s account, the 
enslavement of the entire population is less likely, since he states that Mantinea was given by 
Antigonus to the Achaeans, and renamed Antigoneia after the man who “destroyed and took 
up [the city’s] citizens.”17  
Of course Mantinea was an exceptional case in breaking with the regular code of conduct, 
and the enslavement was a matter of punishment.
18
 Clemency towards captured enemies in 
Greece continued to be the normal practice amongst the Greek leagues, in stark contrast with 
the Peloponnesian War;
19
 with only Philip, Rome and Antiochus displaying the ruthlessness 
of imperialist enslavement.
20
 Although Pritchett has interpreted all the examples where 
captives are mentioned as examples of enslavement,
21
 it is clear that Polybius was himself, 
not so committal in relating the fate of captives. Where he was elsewhere explicit in stating 
                                                                                                                                                        
Eckstein 2013, 327) For the purpose of writing a history which sought to identify causation see explicitly 
Polyb. 6.2.8. 
13
 Polyb. 2.56.9 ἀγεννὲς καὶ γυναικῶδες.  
14
 Polyb. 2.58.4. Polybius here following the Memoirs of Aratus of Sicyon, this choice would have surprised 
readers familiar with the histories pertaining to Mantinea as Phylarcus was considered a reliable source, 
Marincola 2013, 74. 
15
 Polyb. 2.58.10 ἀλλὰ τοῦτό γε καὶ τοῖς μηθὲν ἀσεβὲς ἐπιτελεσαμένοις κατὰ τοὺς τοῦ πολέμου νόμους 
ὑπόκειται παθεῖν. 
16
 Polyb. 2.58.12 Walbank 1957 I, 265 reads τοὺς ἐλευθέρους as ‘the free citizens,’ whereas Paton Loeb 
translates as ‘male citizens.’ Polyb. 2.62.12 later states that Phylarcus believed all the booty and slaves taken 
from Mantinea equated to only 300 talents. Polybius rubbishes this figure as far too little. 
17
 Plut. Arat. 45.6 ἀπολεσάντων καὶ ἀνελόντων τοὺς πολίτας. Nothing is said concerning the Mantineans in his 
other accounts (Cleom. 5.1. Paus. 2.8.6) of the episode. 
18
 For a number of similar references to the concept of a recognised code of conduct between Greek states see 
Walbank 1957 I, 264. 
19
 Pritchett 1991, 218 lists no less than 16 examples of the massacre of captives, and 17 examples of mass 
enslavements during the Peloponnesian War.  
20
 The Rhodians pleaded with Philip to spare the people of Abydus (Polyb. 15.23.1-4). Attalus restored 
Gaurelum after it was turned over to him by the Romans (Liv. 31.45f), similarly Kios was restored by Prusias 
(Strab. 12.4).  
21
 Pritchett 1991, 225. 
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that the inhabitants of captured cities were reduced to slavery (ἐξανδρᾰποδίζω),22 he more 
frequently chose to describe only the capture of prisoners, typically ‘taking alive’ (ζωγρία) in 
this later period.
23
 Polybius continues to use σωμάτα as referring to captured slaves. For 
example, Polybius noted that an Achaean naval commander “brought slaves back.”24 
Similarly Livy’s word choice seems to suggest that the captives taken from Pyrgos in Elis 
were, in fact, slaves.
25
 
The general leniency shown to defeated enemies was, of course, punctuated by incidents of 
severity so common in Greek and Roman warfare. We know that the Achaeans made slaves 
of some of their prisoners, as Polybius tells us they later released a captive without ransom in 
recognition of his proxenia, rather than being sold as a slave on the spot.
26
 Likewise, the 
Aetolians enslaved the inhabitants of Laconia,
27
 and Philip did the same at Phthiotic Thebes 
and Kios.
28
 Where the enslavements or utter reductions of cities are mentioned by Polybius, 
in the conflicts of Greece at the end of the third century, they are used as invective examples 
in speeches rather than Polybius’ account of the events in situ historiae.29 When the Romans 
entered the fray in Greece, they did so at first with a mind to refrain from any territorial 
acquisition and, although they were accused of carrying away Greeks as slaves, they seem to 
have largely abstained from doing so.  
The treaty between Rome and the Aetolians in 211 BC has been the basis on which it is 
believed the Romans enslaved Greeks captured in the First Macedonian War.
30
 The principle 
                                                 
22
 As at Polyb. 4.34.9; 5.100.8; 6.49.1; 8.93. We may also add here the kidnapping of undefended women and 
children at Lythus by the Cnosians in 219 BC (Polyb. 4.54.2). 
23
 As at Polyb. 4.69.7; 5.69.10; 5.86.5; 5.94.5; 5.95.10.  
24
 Polyb. 5.94.7 ἑκατὸν σωμάτων. To be read ‘slaves’ rather than ‘as slaves.’  
25
 Liv. 27.32.9 states that the captives were dividenti along with the booty. The captured totalled 4,000 people 
(hominum) and that more than 20,000 cattle were included in the spoils. The capture of cattle as a significant 
form of booty seems to suggest that slaves were also taken since the two are commonly paired in Livy’s 
account, see Chapter 5. Had the captives been free persons it would have warranted the mention of their sale 
as shown in many previous examples of Livy, see Chapters 5-6. 
26
 Polyb. 5.95.12. 
27
 Polyb. 4.34.9. ἐξηνδραποδίσαντο δὲ τὰς περιοίκους. Plut. Cleom. 18.3 mentions 50,000 taken in this incident 
ἀνδραπόδων ἐμβαλόντας εἰς τὴν Λακωνικὴν Αἰτωλοὺς ἀπαγαγεῖν, although this may be an exaggeration to 
emphasise Cleomenes’ recovery of them. 
28
 Polyb. 5.100.8. Although a charge that he enslaved the inhabitants of Phthiotic Thebes is not brought against 
him in the 205 BC Summit at Phoenice, as was the case with Kios (Polyb. 18.3.12). Small-scale naval actions 
may also have resulted in the enslavement or impressment of some crews (see Polyb. 4.6.1; 5.94.8) and the 
capture of slaves on board an Aetolian ship (Polyb. 5.94.7). Polyb.5.94.5 also mentions the capture (ζωγρία) 
of 2,000 Eleians by the Achaeans in 217 BC. 
29
 The invective against the Aetolians and Philip by Chlaeneas the Aetolian and Lyciscus the Acarnanian to the 
Spartans (Polyb. 9.28.3; 34.7; 38.9; 39.2). 
30
 For a definitive argument in favour of this date see Badian 1958b, 197-8. 
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terms of the treaty are given by Livy and partially preserved in a fragmentary inscription.
31
 
The treaty established a formal cooperative alliance between the Aetolians and Rome, in 
which the Romans would provide naval and marine support and the Aetolian’s land support. 
The division of booty, which is the germane point here, was designated so that the Aetolians 
received the cities and territory, and the Romans all other booty; as Livy states alia omnis 
praeda populi Romani esset. The inscription is more detailed, as it stipulates that cities taken 
by the Romans were to be turned over to the Aetolians, but the Romans would “take 
whatever else was captured beside the city and territory,”32 and if a city was captured jointly, 
then the city and territory belonged to the Aetolians, and the moveable booty was to be 
shared. The last clause further stipulated that cities who surrendered were to be given over to 
the Aetolians, specifically the “people, cities and land.”33 A lacuna corrupts the later portions 
of the inscription, but the appearance of αύτονόμων suggests these cities were perhaps to 
remained autonomous, as in keeping their laws in accordance with the regular concession 
granted to cities that surrendered voluntarily.
34
 It is generally assumed that the booty 
designated the Romans included captives,
35
 but the inclusion of free persons with the booty 
was not the case, as it is hard to identify a logic behind the transference of ghost towns. 
Polybius only refers to the treaty retrospectively.
36
 The first instance for which he suggests 
the terms were put to use was the reduction of Antikyra, the first city taken jointly by the 
Romans and Aetolians. Livy states that the Aetolians received the city in accordance with the 
treaty and the Romans took the booty.
37
 Polybius however, relates through a later envoy sent 
by Lyciscus, the Acarnanian envoy to the Spartans, that the city was ‘reduced to slavery’ 
(ἐξανδραποδίζω). The enslavement of the inhabitants as narrated by Polybius through the 
mouth of the Acarnanian envoy verges on the hyperbolic. The exaggeration of 
                                                 
31
 Liv. 24.26. 11; for the inscription see IG 9
2
.2.241 (SEG 25.626); McDonald 1956, 153-157), see also Bagnall 
& Derow 2003, 33; Austin 1981, 62. 
32
 SEG 25.626 [ὂ] δἐ κα παρἐς τᾶς πόλιος καἰ τᾶς χώρας Ῥωμα[ἰ]οἰ λἀβωντι, Ῥωμαἰοἰ ἐχόντωσαν. 
33
 SEG 25.626  ...[άνθ]ρ[ώ]πους καἰ τάς πόλιας καἰ τάς χώρας. 
34
 There is significant controversy regarding the later portion of this inscription. Cf. Sherk 1984, 2 n.4. 
McDonald 1956, 155 suggested that cities surrendering to the Aetolians probably joined the league, but were 
allowed to keep their laws (i.e. autonomy), and that cities who surrendered to the Romans (i.e. deditio) would 
become autonomous and could choose membership to the Aetolian league for themselves. This is supported 
by the later interpretation of the treaty by Flamininus (Polyb. 18.38.8-9). Badian 1958b, 204 however did not 
think a clause guaranteeing the autonomy of cities surrendering to the Romans was necessary and so rejected 
the interpretation of the fragmented section by McDonald.  
35
 Sherk 1984, 2; Volkmann 1990, 20; Walbank 1967a II, 179; 1967b, 84 first suggests that the booty was 
inclusive of slaves, and later (pg. 87) that free persons were enslaved.  
36
 Polyb. 9.39.1-3; 18.38.5-9; 21.20.3; 22.8.10. 
37
 Liv. 29.1.26 Itaque intra paucos dies recepta urbs per deditionem Aetolis traditur, praeda ex pacto Romanis 
cessit. 
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ἐξανδραποδίζω was a key facet of his portrayal of the Aetolians as inviting the destruction of 
fellow Greeks by barbarians.
38
 The enslavement of Greeks by non-Greeks was clearly 
thought to be a compelling enough argument to reserve it for the penultimate point in the 
speech persuading the Spartans against joining the Aetolians. It was, of course, a lamentable 
scene depicting women and children carried off by the Romans, who were barbarians and had 
no concern over whether the enslaved should remain in Greece or not.
39
 Polybius’ repetitive 
charges of greed against the Aetolians eventually gave way to sympathy as they were 
essentially the sheep that brought the wolves to the flock.
40
  
Polybius refers to the terms of the treaty in a later passage stating that of the enemies, “their 
bodies (or slaves) and property should belong to the Romans, and their cities and lands to the 
Aetolians.”41 Polybius uses the term σώματα again in identifying the living captives, but this 
does not necessarily indicate the ‘bodies’ of free persons, but the ‘slaves’ as Polybius has 
used the term previously.
42
 Again, when Polybius mentions the distribution of the booty it is 
reiterated: “of that seized in war the moveable booty was to go to the Romans, the cities to 
the Aetolians.” Here the term ἔπιπλα is used, which generally refers to inanimate moveable 
booty.
43
 Overall, the only instance in which we may find the enslavement of some captives 
during the First Macedonian War comes after the capture of the island of Aegina where the 
inhabitants, unable to flee, were taken, but after a plea was made that they be permitted to 
ransom themselves, it was allowed in accordance with Greek custom.
44
  
Aegina is a particularly pertinent example of how a single city and population could be 
repeatedly conquered despite repeated instances of enslavements.
45
 Aegina had changed 
hands several times since the late classical period. As an island in the Saronic Gulf, it was 
constantly at the heart of Peloponnesian and Achaean conflict. The Aeginetans, after years of 
                                                 
38
 Cf. Gruen 1984 I, 322. The charge of inviting the Romans to take Greece is again used by the Macedonians to 
persuade the Aetolains to break with Rome, Polyb. 10.25.1-5 and likewise by a Rhodian mediator between 
Aetolia and Macedon, Polyb. 11.5.1-2. On the fictitious nature of the speech see Mørkholm 1974, 127-132, 
contra Walbank 1957 I, 13-14; 1965, 7-18. 
39
 Polyb. 9.39.3 καὶ τὰ μὲν τέκνα καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας ἀπάγουσι Ῥωμαῖοι. 
40
 Aetolians brought Rome into Greek affairs, Polyb. 9.37.8. For Aetolian greed see Sacks 1975, 92-3. The 
inclusion of captives with booty is uniquely attributed to the Aetolians by Philip, Polyb. 18.5.1. Polybius was 
an Achaean and his view of the Aetolians is typically regarded as negative, see Champion 2010, 357-9. 
41
 Polyb. 11.5.4 Κατὰ τούτων πεποίησθε τὰς συνθήκας ἐφ᾽ ᾧ τὰ μὲν σώματα καὶ τἄπιπλα Ῥωμαίων ὑπάρχειν, 
τὰς δὲ πόλεις καὶ τὴν χώραν Αἰτωλῶν. 
42
 Discussed earlier, see Chapter 5. 
43
 Xen. Oec. 9.6 lists household goods as ἔπιπλα.  
44
 Polyb. 9.42.5. That they were in fact restored is reaffirmed later by Polyb. 22.11.9. cf. Volkmann 1990, 21 
n.1.  
45
 Cf. Volkmann 1990, 105. 
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conflict with the Athenians, were forcibly enrolled in the Delian league in 458/7 BC. Then, 
after persuading the Spartans to enter the Peloponnesian War, the Aeginetans were forcibly 
evicted from the island in 431 BC.
46
 The Aeginetan refugees settled on the Peloponnese at 
Thyrea, but were again conquered by the Athenians and brought to Athens in 424 BC where 
many were put to death.
47
 Finally at the conclusion of the war in 405 BC the remaining 
Aeginetans were repatriated and restored under a Spartan governor on Aegina.
48
 For the 
majority of the third century Aegina was under Macedonian control, before passing into the 
Achaean league in 229 BC.
49
 Then again in 211 BC, during the First Macedonian War, 
Aegina was taken by the Romans who transferred it to the Aetolian league, who in turn, sold 
it the following year to Attalus II of Pergamum. It remained attached to the kingdom of 
Pergamum until the entire kingdom was annexed by Rome in 133 BC. Aegina’s repeated 
misfortune could not have resulted in wholesale enslavements, as it continued to exist with a 
significant population. 
When the Roman commander Sulpicius took Aegina it was transferred to the Aetolians in 
accordance with the treaty, as mentioned above. Polybius offers us a contradictory account of 
the result of the ransom: whilst it is clear that Sulpicius allowed the Aeginetans to send for 
their ransom,
50
 their fate seems questionable in a speech made by a Rhodian envoy;
51
 and 
they are later said to have all been sold into slavery by Sulpicius by an Aeginetan envoy.
52
 
The indication that it was the Romans who enslaved the inhabitants is expressed in the term 
συναθροισθέντες, meaning “having been assembled on the ships.”53 Despite later assertions 
by Polybius, the Romans could not have sold all the inhabitants, or even a large number, 
since, after being handed over to the Aetolians by the Romans, it was then sold to Attalus of 
                                                 
46
 Thuc. 2.27. 
47
 Thuc. 4.57. Diod. Sic. 12.65.9 does not mention the execution of the Aeginetans at Athens. Cf. Pritchett 1991, 
419. 
48
 Xen. Hell. 2.2.9. That some of the original Aeginetans returned can be seen in the re-minting of old style 
coins, see Metcalf 2012, 109.  
49
 Switched allegiance peaceably to the Achaeans, Plut. Arat. 34.7. 
50
 At Polyb. 9.42.5. Eckstein 2012, 109 n. 123 notes that Galba soon recanted his initial decision to enslave the 
citizens of Aegina. 
51
 Polyb. 11.5.8. Polybius does not state specifically that the envoy was Rhodian, but Livy mentions that 
Rhodian envoys were received at Heraclea in 207 BC, 28.7.13.  
52
 The envoy was addressing the Achaean assembly. Polyb. 22.8.9 ὅτε Πόπλιος Σολπίκιος ἐπιπλεύσας τῷ στόλῳ 
πάντας ἐξηνδραποδίσατο τοὺς ταλαιπώρους Αἰγινήτας. See Welwei 2000, 120. One must question the truth of 
‘all’ or a literal interpretation of ‘slavery’ here since slaves could not send envoys. 
53
 Walbank 1967a II, 186; Polyb. 22.8.9. 
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Pergamum.
54
 Polybius remarked again that the people of Aegina were subjected to the 
horrors of being taken by foreigners, but this is found in a passage directed against the 
Aetolians.
55
 The city was sold for the sum of thirty talents to Attalus II of Pergamum in the 
following year.
56
 There is no mention of a resettlement of the site, which would be expected 
if it were, in fact, depleted by enslavement.  
In 207 BC Oreus and Opus were taken within a short span of time by the Romans and the 
forces of Attalus. The Romans had taken all the booty from Oreus, and so the booty taken 
from Opus was allotted to Attalus.
57
 There is no mention of the taking of captives at Oreus, 
but the enslavement of the populace is unlikely, given the short span of time between the 
respective falls of each city.
58
 The Romans did not even stay around long enough after the 
fall of Opus to assist Attalus against Philip’s reprisal. According to Livy, Philip caught 
Attalus at Oreus whilst he was disposing of the booty, specifically in “exacting money from 
leading citizens.”59 Roman support waned in Greece from 207 BC onwards and the Aetolians 
signed a peace treaty with Philip, contrary to the agreement of their alliance with Rome.
60
 
The Romans tried to re-enlist the Aetolians in the War with Philip, but they refused and 
Rome signed a peace treaty with Philip in 205 BC, the terms of which may have included the 
restoration of prisoners.
61
 
The focus upon Philip’s foreign policy has typically been on his treacherous severity, his 
rampant aggression and brutality shown at places such as Cius,
62
 Thasos
63
 and Abydus.
64
 
                                                 
54
 Polyb. 9.42.5; 11.5.8; 22.8.9-10, for the political link between Aetolia and Pergamum see Gruen 1984, 530 n. 
3. 
55
 Polyb. 11.5.8. 
56
 Polyb. 22.8.10. 
57
 Cass. Dio. 17.57fr.  
58
 Zon. 9.9 states that Oreus was betrayed, cf. Liv. 28.6f.  
59
 Liv. 28.6.5 pecuniis a principibus exigendis. Importantly not their sale.  
60
 See Eckstein 2012, 104-5. 
61
 Liv. 29.12.8-16 only lays out the terms regarding the cities of Illyria. The restoration of prisoners were 
repeatedly argued for in the conference held in the Melian Gulf between the parties involved in the Second 
Macedonian War (Polyb. 18.1.13-14; 2.2; 2.5; 6.1-2; 18.8.10). It stands to reason that a treaty conducted, on 
more equal grounds, may have included such provisions within its terms. In the treaty that concluded the 
Second Macedonian War, the restoration of prisoners was a distinct clause (Liv. 33.13.9-10). 
62
 Capture of Kios in 202 BC, Polyb. 15.22.3 remarks that with the capture of Kios σωμάτων δὲ καὶ χρημάτων 
εὐπορίαν ἐκ τοῦ δικαίου περιπεποιημένος. And later an envoy from Kios states: ἐξανδραποδισμὸν τῶν 
Κιανῶν καὶ τὴν ὠμότητα τοῦ Φιλίππου (Polyb. 15.23.3. cf. Strab. 12.4). 
63
 Polyb. 15.24.1 Θασίων πόλιν, καὶ ταύτην φιλίαν οὖσαν ἐξηνδραποδίσατο. 
64
 Polyb. 16.32.5; Liv. 31.17.11. The people fought fiercely at Abydus and this may have led to harsher 
treatment, although Polybius seems to suggest their enslavement was Philip’s motive from the start. The 
Roman envoy to the Achaean league also lists the cities of Aenus, Maronea, Thasos, Paros, Samos, Larisa and 
Messene as having claims against Philip for similar abuses (Liv. 31.31.4). 
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Polybius emphasised the treachery of Philip in taking both Kios and Thasos, who were 
presumably on good terms with the king.
65
 Philip’s abuse of friendly Greek cities, as well as 
his allies, is a common theme in Polybius;
66
 much was made of Philip’s ravishing of allied 
Thessaly in retreat from the Aous valley in 199 BC.
67
 Philip’s motives for enslavement in 
these cases appear to have been driven by a need for money. A Roman envoy to the Achaeans 
inadvertently showed how the maltreatment of captured cities could be skewed and 
hyperbolised in defending the charges levied by the Macedonian envoy against the Romans, 
specifically the reduction of Rhegium, Capua and Syracuse.
68
 By the same token, the 
Macedonians could defend their actions. Greece was caught between two major powers with 
hegemonic designs, both of whom generated propaganda to try and lure individual states and 
leagues to their side.
69
 Although the Achaeans snubbed Philip the second time around, he was 
not completely without friends amongst their league. In a meeting held amongst the members 
of the Achaean league, in which the league decided upon supporting the Romans, three 
member states walked out in respect of their friendship with Philip, including the Dymaei 
who had been ransomed and restored to their city by Philip.
70
 Despite the harsh treatment at 
the hands of Philip, it seems Greek fraternity was enough to ensure that those who fell into 
slavery were recovered. In the case of Cius, the city was transferred over by Philip to Prusias 
who restored the Cians.
71
 Abydus also was restored after the Peace of Phoenice, which settled 
the First Macedonian War.
72
 
The Peace of Phoenice prevented westward expansion by Philip, particularly towards Illyria, 
which had brought about Roman intervention in the first place, and to the south the status quo 
returned; as a result Philip’s attention turned eastward.73 Philip focused his efforts on 
conquering independent states in the Northern Aegean, but some of the cities were allied to 
the Aetolians. Attalus, Ptolemy and the Rhodians were angered by Philip’s brutality in taking 
free Greek cities, but this was bound to be, as they were allies of Rome. Roman intervention 
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 Polyb. 15.22.1 (Loeb trans.). “As though he had performed a glorious and honourable achievement.” Thasos 
was taken by treachery (Polyb. 15.24.1). 
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 Strab. 12.4. 
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 For the grand strategy of Philip, particularly in regards to his directional expansion see Walbank 1967b, 
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was pretty much assured and the Romans must not have placed much hope in a diplomatic 
resolution, for at the same time that the deputation was meeting with Philip, a Roman army 
was embarking in Illyria under the command of Sulpicius Galba.
74
 Hence began the Second 
Macedonian War. Roman intention, as far as the dictates of the Senate were concerned, was 
to remove Philip’s control over cities outside Macedon and so, according to Livy, war was 
declared by the Senate on Philip and the cities under him.
75
 However, the first two consuls to 
execute the war failed to do so in a matter compatible with the political aims and the 
promulgated position of Rome ‘freeing Greece,’ to the extent that both consuls were 
reproached for waging war too ruthlessly against Philip’s Greek allies.76  
During the Second Macedonian War the Romans used a two-pronged attack, one force under 
the consul operated on land and another joint force with Attalus that operated from the sea.
77
 
Sulpicius marched towards Macedonia and sent his lieutenant Lucius Apustius to take the 
city of Antipatrea, there an attempt to persuade the city to submit failed and the Lieutenant 
took the city by storm massacring all the men within.
78
 This action induced several other 
cities in the area to submit to Rome and Lucius Apustius returned to the main army, along 
with some captives taken during a skirmish.
79
 The brutality of the Romans in this case was 
meant to scare Philip’s allies into betraying him and, as a consequence, open the path for the 
Roman army into Macedon.  
Sulpicius then marched with his main force into Eordaea, and there took the city of Celetrum 
(with no mention of captives), before moving on to sack the city of Pelium.
80
 At Pelium, 
despite a resistance offered by the defenders, Sulpicius only took booty and the slaves; the 
citizens were allowed to remain on the condition they accept a Roman garrison.
81
 We hear 
later, during a meeting of the Achaeans to decide on joining the Romans, that the citizens of 
Dyme were also enslaved by the Romans.
82
 The later redemption of the Dymians by Philip 
suggests that they must have been sold locally in order for them to be recovered by Philip, 
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and it is possible that they were never enslaved at all.
83
 As Livy relates, the Dymians were 
redeemed ubicumque servirent. While servio typically referred to slavery, it could here imply 
subservient service, and it is possible that the sale of their property (which was also restored 
to them) forced them into relying upon their neighbours in a servile fashion. 
The other Roman force operating by sea, in conjunction with Attalus’ forces, landed in 
northern Euboea and there took the city of Oreus. The city had surrendered to the Romans 
previously in 207 BC and so, fearing a reprisal by Philip if they surrendered again, put up a 
stiff resistance retreating first to one citadel and then to a second where they were finally 
beaten into submission. Unlike the arrangement for the division of spoils with the Aetolians 
in the previous war, Attalus’ troops received the booty outright. Livy notes that the Romans 
received the prisoners, but he makes no further mention of their fate. It is probable that they 
were either ransomed or sold nearby, as the fleet was soon afterward involved in the capture 
of Gaurelum, which surrendered before a siege was laid and was subsequently turned over to 
Attalus. The inhabitants of Gaurelum were allowed to leave the city with a single garment 
each to Delium in Boeotia. However, Attalus wished the city to be inhabited, so he induced 
the inhabitants, including many that made the trip to Delium, to remain in the city under his 
protection.
84
  
Titus Flamininus (consul for 198 BC) took charge of the army in Greece and immediately set 
out to meet Philip head on in the Aous valley ,where Villius had hesitated.
85
 But, a decisive 
battle could not be fought, and during the stalemate the Epirotes, who had arbitrated the first 
Peace of Phoenice, sought to settle the war again.
86
 The terms proposed by Flamininus were 
in line with the position of protecting Greece from Macedonian imperialism.
87
 Philip could 
not accept the terms and so the war continued. With the self-proclaimed position of liberator, 
Flamininus could not execute the war in the same manner as his predecessors, the ruthless 
destruction of cities and reduction of Greek populaces that were allied to Philip was not 
compatible with such a strategy.
88
 We see the immediate change in this strategy at Carystus, 
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85
 Plut. Flam. 3.2. 
86
 Liv. 32.10.1-8.  
87
 See Frank 1914, 161; Walbank 1967b, 151-2. 
88
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where the citizens surrendered and were allowed to remain in the city and the Macedonian 
garrison was released on a ransom of 300 drachmae per head.
89
 Just before the surrender of 
Carystus, the city of Eretria, also in Euboea, was sacked; the townspeople and garrison 
surrendered from the citadel and, since no mention is made of what befell the captives, it is 
likely they too were dealt with in the same manner as Carystus.
90
 
Flamininus’ peace negotiations with Philip, also served the purpose of stalling the war until 
the prorogation of his command was confirmed.
91
 Once this was confirmed, the untenable 
demand was made that Philip give up Thessaly which had been under Macedonian control 
since Philip II, and thus Philip was forced to decline.
92
 Flamininus made sure to continue in 
the vein of liberator by keeping his troops from plundering the countryside.
93
 Philip’s 
weakening position and the amity of Flamininus caused most of Greece to flock to the 
Roman side. The Acarnanians put up a stiff resistance against the Romans, but were defeated 
and several captured without any mention of what became of them.
94
 With the security of 
allies to his rear, Flamininus felt able to engage Philip head on and defeated him at the battle 
of Cynoscephalae, Polybius says no less than 5,000 were captured,
95
 and Livy, who states 
that Polybius is the most trustworthy source in this, also lists 5,000 as captured.
96
 The battle 
proved a coup de grâce for Philip and he was forced to surrender on Roman terms. Roman 
aims can be seen plainly in the result of this peace: Macedonia was restricted to its own 
borders and all of Philip’s possessions were made autonomous.97 An Aetolian request that 
they receive several cities was denied by the Romans, and it is clear from this rejection that 
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Rome’s political aim was in limiting power in the East; they did not wish to replace the 
Macedonians with the Aetolians.
98
 
During the Second Macedonian War Rome played the part of liberator, and as such they, with 
a few exceptions, refrained from enslaving. The propaganda against Philip and, what we can 
only assume, also against the Romans by Philip,
99
 exaggerated the brutality of both sides in 
enslaving and slaughtering cities. Despite trying to keep up a guise of liberation, the Roman 
troops still took booty when taking cities. Even with the best intentions by the commanders, 
the soldiers were always motivated by the prospect of booty and a commander was 
essentially powerless to stop it, and generally unwilling to prevent it.
100
 For soldiers, captives 
had no immediate use, and the frequency of citadels in Greek cities ensured that surrenders 
could be made which preserved the lives, and often the liberty, of the inhabitants. On the odd 
occasion that enslavements were made, they seem to have been conducted on the spot. 
Buyers appear to be from nearby states - as we often hear of the captive’s later recovery. 
Roman captives were also recovered by Flamininus in Greece in 198 BC, and it can be 
inferred that a market for slaves, particularly of those taken in war, was present in Macedonia 
and Greece, both of which competed with Rome.
101
 
 
From the War with Antiochus to the Destruction of Corinth 
After Macedon was defeated, the next power to be diminished by Rome was the Seleucid 
kingdom. Whilst Rome was occupied to the West with Carthage and later with Philip V, 
Antiochus III was busy re-conquering territory that had traditionally been part of the Selucid 
empire. The expansion of Antiochus concerned Rome and when his forces crossed the 
Hellespont to ‘liberate’ Greece from Rome their fear of westward Seleucid expansion was 
justified.
102
 Unfortunately, books 20 and 21 of Polybius are highly fragmentary, and so the 
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only complete narrative is that of Livy.
103
 Though Livy drew upon the work of Polybius for 
this period, the taking of captives in his account is portrayed in his typical fashion; that is, 
battle casualties without much remark. When the taking of captives is mentioned in the war 
with Antiochus, it is characteristically only following an open engagement between armies, 
so that it is difficult to glean any details that could establish the fate of captives.  
In Thessaly Philip, now ally of Rome, assisted the Romans in pushing back Antiochus. There 
the city of Limnaeum surrendered without a fight,
104
 followed by Pellinaeum where again a 
surrender was made and Philip of Megalopolis was captured and sent ‘in chains’ to Rome.105 
Following the capture of these cities, several other Thessalian cities submitted without a 
fight, along with 4,000 allied and Seleucid troops garrisoned within them.
106
 All of these 
submitted directly to Philip, who had used the captives from Pellinaeum to convince the other 
cities to capitulate.
107
 
Antiochus then occupied the pass at Thermopylae with his main force where he was defeated 
in battle. Livy notes that many soldiers were captured, and Orosius gives a round figure of 
5,000.
108
 Meanwhile, the Roman navy under Gaius Livius in 190 BC conducted a raid upon 
Phocaea and there loaded up the ships with booty, which Livy remarks, included ‘especially 
people.’109 In the following year, Livy notes the Phocaeans rebelled and the Romans laid 
siege to the city, a settlement was reached “on the same terms as were granted when they 
submitted to G. Livius before.”110 Whilst not expressly clear on what these terms were, the 
events that follow indicate that they were not enslaved. After a failed plea to Antiochus to 
intervene, the gates were opened, but the soldiers were angered by the sparing of the 
Phocaeans who proved treacherous, and they pillaged the city against the general’s orders. 
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Eventually, order was restored and the Phocaeans were restored to their homes and farms, but 
they had to suffer the presence of the navy in their harbour for the winter.
111
 In 190 BC the 
consul L. Cornelius Scipio (with the added cognomen for his conquest Asiaticus) crossed the 
Hellespont and defeated Antiochus in the battle of Magnesia.
112
 Livy and Appian both 
suggest that the forces of Antiochus totalled 70,000, of which Livy says more than 50,000 
were killed and only 1,400 captured.
113
 With the defeat of his navy at Myonnesus and his 
land forces at Magnesia, Antiochus was forced to sue for peace and accept Roman terms.
114
 
With the war concluded against Antiochus, Gn. Manlius Vulso(Scipio’s replacement) decided 
to lead the Romans into central Anatolia against the Galatians since they had supported 
Antiochus during the war. Up until this point very little booty had been derived from 
campaigning: the march from Greece to Asia Minor was conducted peacefully,
115
 and the 
battle of Magnesia had been in the field rather than a city, where booty might have been 
taken. A tribe of the Galatians (the Tolistoboii) had taken refuge on the slopes of Mt. 
Olympus in Mysia, and there they were attacked and routed by the Roman army under 
Manlius. The number of captives taken was reported by Appian to be roughly 40,000, but the 
difficulty of the journey into Mysia, and in particular the track around Olympus, compelled 
the Romans to turn the captives over to neighbouring barbarians.
116
 Livy gives a more 
detailed account in which Manlius ordered his troops to abstain from plundering the camp so 
that they might pursue the fleeing Gauls. But the relief column pillaged the Galatian camp 
and took the spoils that were not earned by them. Livy notes that his sources differ 
concerning the specific events around Olympus in 189 BC, particularly the precise number of 
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116
 App. Syr. 42. 
 Chapter 6  
163 
 
engagements, but he felt confident enough in estimating that the number of Gauls captured 
amounted to roughly 40,000. This figure, he says, was inclusive of women and children.
117
 
Livy does not mention what became of the captives apart from the fact they were guarded 
under the direction of Manlius’ tribunes.118 A peculiar story concerning a Galatian queen 
hints at what may have happened. I have already related the story concerning Chimora.
119
 Her 
ransom was recounted by Polybius, who spoke with her directly; though the ransom itself 
might have been invented, it was a likely enough tale for it to be asserted as an anecdote for 
greed on the part of the soldier, rather than as a peculiar tale.
120
 Whilst her ransom is depicted 
as a private affair it is likely other captives were ransomed or sold to other Galatians, since 
Livy relates that the consul “ordered all his troops to bring in the rest of the booty and either 
sold that part of the booty which it was his duty to convert to public use or carefully 
distributed it to the soldiers so as to secure the greatest possible measure of equity.”121 As 
explained earlier,
122
 the money converted from the ransom, or auction of captives, was 
reserved for the state, and it is unlikely that the Romans brought any captives with them 
across the Hellespont.  
While Gn. Manlius was concerning himself with the Gauls, the other consul M. Fulvius was 
tidying things up in Greece. Having dealt with the mainland, he crossed to Cephalonia where 
the island’s three major cities surrendered.123 However, the city of Same recanted its 
surrender and was consequently taken by storm. At Same, Livy states that the inhabitants 
were sent sub corona and the city plundered, their sale into slavery being warranted by their 
volte-face.
124
 
Roman heavy handedness towards Greek cities in the Third Macedonian War was at times 
censured by the Senate.
125
 However, with the questionable support of Perseus, few Greek 
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cities that sided with Macedon could expect a reprieve from the Senate.
126
 The Boeotian city 
of Haliartus was sacked, and inside the soldiers killed all the men and boys they came across; 
since many of these were non-combatants the troops were evidently killed all males without 
distinction. At the citadel 2,500 combatants surrendered (deditio) and ‘went’ as opposed to 
being ‘sold’ under the crown.127 In the same year Perseus’ forces were defeated at Phalana 
and Livy states 2,800 were captured, with no mention of their sale.
128
 In the following year 
the city of Abdera was taken by Lucretius, there the leaders were beheaded and the rest sold 
at auction.
129
 But the Abderans did not all remain in servitude for long, as the Senate ordered 
them to be recovered.
130
 Zonaras suggests that those redeemed by order of the Senate were 
only recovered from within Italy, and it is unlikely captives sold elsewhere were freed.
131
 
With the war against Perseus concluded, it was time for Rome to punish those that had sided 
against them, and the full extent of a Roman reprisal was felt by Epirus.
132
 The example of 
Epirus in 167 BC is the pinnacle of Roman military enslavement, the figure of 150,000, 
though impossibly large is often cited as the high watermark of slave acquisition by the 
Roman armed forces.
133
 A closer inspection of the event highlights the absurdity of such a 
large-scale enslavement. Modern historians have focused on the motivation behind such a 
singularly brutal act without ever questioning its plausibility.
134
 The story is essentially the 
same in all the sources, who are largely based on the contemporary account of Polybius. 
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Unfortunately, Polybius’ version, as we have it, is confined only to the scholiast’s epitome, 
which simply states that 150,000 Epirotes were reduced to slavery ἐξανδραποδίσασθαι.135 All 
the Greek sources that record the event follow Polybius’ use of ἐξανδραποδίζω.136 The 
manner in which the Epirotes were enslaved was a remarkable feat. On a single day, and 
within a single hour, 70 cities (chiefly of the Molossians) were duped into bringing their 
goods into their respective town centres, where they were enslaved by a contingent of 
soldiers sent to collect the booty in each city.
137
 For modern historians, the repetition of this 
event in detail by many different sources validates it as real. However, the ability of the 
Roman forces to carry out such an action on the scale and the speed suggested in the sources 
makes this highly unlikely.
138
 Paulus had at his command no more than two legions with 
allies,
139
 at most 20,000 troops (probably closer to 12,000); this would have meant each 
contingent sent to a city comprised of only 285 men, who would have been responsible, on 
average, for collecting over 2,100 people together all at once. These figures stretch the 
limitations for the supervision of slaves, let alone the numbers in order to physically capture 
and compel so many to servitude. It may be that when Strabo later spoke of the desolation of 
Epirus, he was referring to the depopulation of the cities rather than from the land itself, the 
ruins he described suggest the collapse of infrastructure, caused by the removal of a 
comprehensive administration and the depletion of urban economies, rather than strictly the 
depletion of the populace.
140
  
Not all the sources were adamant that the Epirotes were sold into slavery. Livy states that 
150,000 were abducerentur, as in led or carried away. This of course could mean that they 
were enslaved as in ‘carried off into slavery,’ but the fact that Livy strays from his usual 
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 Polyb. 30.15.1. 
136
 Strab. 7.7.3; Plut. Aem. 29.3. 
137
 A similar incident is said to have occurred in Spain, where Cato received the submission of all the Celtiberian 
towns through letters sent at the same time, tricking each city into believing that attack was imminent and so 
they quickly submitted, see below. 
138
 Ignoring the political motivations, we might compare the concentrated violence at Epirus with Kristallnacht 
in November 1938, in which Jewish homes, businesses and Synagogues were targeted by rioters and storm 
troopers. Over the course of the infamous night and the following day 30,000 German and Austrian Jews were 
arrested. To get an idea of the scale of the enslavement of the Epirotes, a force significantly smaller than the 
Germans involved in Kristallnacht (Sturmabteilung and other civilian rioters may have exceeded 100,000), 
without automatic weapons, was apparently able to seize five times as many people, in roughly a tenth of the 
time. 
139
 Brunt 1971, 427-8. I purposely inflate the figures here to illustrate my point; a reduction of the figure only 
serves to better prove my point. 
140
 Strab 7.7.9. The decentralisation of Europe following the collapse of the Roman Empire and the subsequent 
reduction in city sizes illustrates how the collapse of a cohesive political entity can radically alter urban 
composition across a landscape.  
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indication of enslavement by stating they were sold, suggests the Epirotes may have been 
forced to leave the cities and quite possibly emigrate, either to the countryside or outside 
Epirus.
141
 The Elder Pliny remarks that seventy-two cities were plundered and sold, without 
specific mention of captives.
142
Appian too focuses on the destruction of the cities with no 
mention of the captives, and Dio cites Paullus’ turning over of the Epirote possessions to the 
troops as a blemish on his character.
143
 Livy at least provides a figure for the booty derived 
from the Epirus incident; he states that the booty was distributed to the soldiers with 400 
denarii going to cavalrymen and 200 denarii to foot soldiers.
144
 Roughly 4.8 million denarii 
for a force of 20,000.
145
 Had 150,000 captives been sold a price of only 32 denarii would 
have been realised, a considerably small price at the time,
146
 and this stipend to the troops 
was without counting the possessions and money taken from the Epirotes. Boese noted that 
Delos was made a free port at the same time suggesting the sale of the Epirotes prompted the 
distinction.
147
 However, this was merely coincidence, rather than a response to large numbers 
of slaves. Many city-states had been re-organised by the Romans following the Macedonian 
war and the removal of the tax served only to hurt the Rhodians, who Rome grew ever more 
suspicious of. 
Any semblance of true autonomy in Greece was crushed when Rome sent an embassy to 
arbitrate between Sparta and the Achaean league.
148
 The Achaeans were given a choice 
between submitting to their demand (effectively removing the purpose of their league in 
collectively managing foreign affairs) or fighting to maintain their autonomy. The terms of 
the Roman embassy were rejected, and war was declared on Sparta by the Achaens.
149
 Rome, 
in turn, declared war on the Achaeans.
150
 The Roman army crushed the Achaean forces at 
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 Liv. 45.34.5. So too his epitomist Eutrop. 4.8.1, who only mentions the capture of 70 cities. The depopulation 
of cities had been used before at Capua (see Chapter 6) and would be used in Spain, see below. 
142
 Plin. HN 4.39 LXXII urbes direptas vendidit. 
143
 App. Ill. 10 suggests the soldiers plundered the cities beyond what the Epirotes brought into their city 
centres. Cass. Dio 20.67.1. That this event was out of character for Paullus has led some to place the blame 
solely on the orders of the Senate, cf. Scullard 1945, 58-64; 1973, 213 contra Reiter 1988, 139-40. 
144
 Liv. 45.34.5-6. 
145
 I give 16,000 foot and 4,000 horse for a typical consular army of the time, with allied contingents and 
bolstered cavalry. This figure could easily be reduced to a more probable 12,000 (2,000 cavalry), but again 
this would only prove my point further. 
146
 We might note that at Carystus the Macedonians were ransomed for 300 drachmae each (roughly 360 
denarii), Liv. 32.17.2. See Ziolkowski 1986, 69-80. 
147
 Boese 1973, 76. 
148
 Embassy of Sex. Julius Caesar (Polyb. 38.10.1-13; Paus. 7.14.3-4).  
149
 Polyb. 38.13.6. 
150
 On the pretext of the maltreatment of the embassy under L. Orestes at Corinth Polyb 38.9.1-2; Paus. 7.14.2-
3; Liv. Per. 51; Vell. Pat. 1.12.1; Flor. 1.32.2; Strab. 6.23; Cass. Dio 1.72.1; Eutrop. 4.14.1. 
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Scarpheia, and then under the command of L. Mummius, laid siege to the city of Corinth. 
Most of the inhabitants had fled,
151
 but the few remaining were captured, and according to 
Orosius, these were sold as slaves.
152
 Pausanias relates a typical case of the Romans killing 
those they came across once they broke into the city, before capturing and enslaving the 
remaining women and children.
153
 Given the indication in the sources that the majority of the 
Corinthians fled the city before the Romans attacked, it is unlikely that those captured and 
enslaved amounted to more than a few thousand. Once the city was looted and emptied of 
inhabitants the Senate decreed that it should be demolished.
154
  
The nature of Roman warfare in Greece in the first half of the second century BC was not 
particularly conducive to large-scale enslavements, as booty was shared between Rome and 
her allies. Furthermore, the political landscape of Greece was such that Rome needed to 
operate in a manner that would not harden the neutral Greek states against them. The carrying 
off of Greek slaves to Rome, on a large scale, would have only strengthened the position of 
Macedon as champions of a ‘free Greece’ against Rome; an image the Romans sought to 
produce themselves. For captives taken in war there was the added possibility of redemption, 
and this occurred on a more regular basis in Greece than anywhere else. The Eastern 
Mediterranean already contained an extensive slave trade network, whereby a sudden 
injection of thousands of captives on the market could be absorbed rather than transferred en 
bloc to Rome. Greece itself, though not on the scale of classical Athens, was still a large 
consumer of slaves. From the above survey and analysis it is evident that the practice of 
enslavement by the Romans did not increase significantly, either in regularity or quantity, 
during the first half of the second century BC.  
 
Wars in Northern Italy and Spain 
Rome’s fighting in the West during the second century BC was primarily directed against 
Spanish tribes and the Celts in Northern Italy. With a resounding victory over the Boii in 191 
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 Paus. 7.16.8; Flor. 1.32.5; Cass. Dio 21.72.2fr.  
152
 Oros. 5.3.6 reliqua sub corona uendita est. 
153
 Paus. 7.16.8. 
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 CIL 1.626; Diod. Sic. 32.27.1; Flor. 1.32.1; Paus. 7.16.8-10; Polyb. 39.3.3; Strab. 8.381; Zon. 9.31. See also 
Cic. Agr. 2.87; CIL 1.630; Oros. 5.3.1; Plin. HN. 34.6; Plut. Mor. 737a. Corinth was later the site of a Roman 
colony established by Caesar in 44 BC (Cass. Dio 43.50.3-5; Diod. Sic. 32.27.1; Paus. 2.1.1; Plin. HN. 4.10; 
Plut. Caes. 57.8; Strab. 8.379).  
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BC,
155
 conflict in sub-Alpine Italy commonly took the form of rebellion, such as those of the 
Ligurians and Histrians. In these conflicts a number of captives were enslaved as punishment 
for their uprising. The first example of this punishment was in 185 BC, the consul Appius 
Claudius captured six Ingaunian towns and made a number of men prisoner, executing the 
ringleaders of the rebellion.
156
 Four years later, Aemilius Paullus was sent against the 
Ligurians, whom he soundly defeated, capturing 2,500 of them and by this action compelled 
the Ingaunians to submit to Rome.
157
 In 178 BC the Romans went to war with the Histrians, 
against whom the first major engagement was at Nesattium, where the consul Ti. Claudius 
Pulcher took the city. The Histrians struck down their own women and children to deny them 
from being taken by the enemy as an act of defiance, of the remainder Livy says they were 
captured with no further details.
158
 From Nesattium the towns of Mutila and Faveria were 
decisively captured by Claudius Pulcher with 5,632 captives sold at auction and again the 
ringleaders were executed.
159
 The precision of this figure hints at truth, or at least a concern 
for an exact figure in Livy’s unknown source. These captives likely ended up in Rome, as 
their proximity would have allowed easy transport to markets there.
160
 It is possible that this 
precise figure was that recorded in application for, or as the number present in, the triumph of 
Claudius Pulcher.
161
 The fighting in the North of Italy was intense enough for two further 
triumphs to be gained after that of Pulcher’s.162 The Ligurians were finally subdued in 173 
BC, when the consul M. Popilius defeated them in a land engagement killing over 10,000 and 
capturing 700 prisoners;
163
 the remaining 10,000 surrendered in hope of being spared, but 
were sold by the consul.
164
 The Senate, however, found Popilius had instigated the fight 
against a tribe (the Statellati) that had not taken up arms, and he was ordered to restore them 
along with their property.
165
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 Liv. 36.38.6 3,400 capta, no mention of their fate. 
156
 Liv. 39.32.4.  
157
 Liv. 40.28.6 capta, no mention of the captive’s fate. 
158
 Liv. 41,11.7 capta aut occisi. We might compare the mass suicide with that of the Numantines in 133 BC, 
App. Iber. 97; Diod. Sic. 34.4.1; Liv. Per. 59; Val. Max. 3.2.7. 
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 Liv. 41.11.8 sub corona vendere. The towns were destroyed. 
160
 Istria, south of modern Venice. 
161
 Degrassi 1954, 103.  
162
 Degrassi 1954, 104. 
163
 Liv. 41.12.8. 
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 Liv. 42.8.3. cf. Polyb. 27.11.1-7; App. Mac. 13; Oros. 4.20.30-2. Again the round figure of 10,000 be 
doubted as it was only used to signify a large victory, see Chapter 5. 
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 Liv. 42.8.7, see Chapter 2. Imperial gvernments are often drawn into conflict by the overzealous actions of 
their agents in the field. Such was the case of French expansion in Africa, see  Porch 1982; 2005. 
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The lack of clarity in regards to the fate of captives makes it impossible to make a reliable 
quantitative analysis of the slaves acquired through warfare in Northern Italy at this time. The 
numbers of captives taken were generally small. Apart from the 10,000 Ligurians (a 
questionable figure in the first place) who were ordered to be recovered, the largest figure 
given is the precise 5,632 captured by Pulcher. Although it is likely most of the captives that 
were sold as slaves ended up in Rome (considering its proximity to the theatre), their overall 
numbers could not have been as large and certainly only a fraction of later conflicts in the 
area.
166
 
The fighting in Spain resembled that of suppression, as it did in Northern Italy, but it was 
accompanied by punitive aggression into the Iberian heartland and westwards into modern 
Portugal, resulting in a more consistent presence of Roman troops into the Meseta and a 
clearer and more pronounced assertion of authority over the Lusitanians and Celtiberians 
beyond the coastal provinces.
167
 The areas on the Mediterranean coast of Spain, namely 
Andalucía, Murcia, Valencia and Catalonia had been transformed into a Roman province 
after their acquisition in the Second Punic War from Carthage.
168
 In 199 BC Roman Spain 
was divided into two provinces with annual praetors as governors.
169
 In contrast to the East, 
Roman military presence was continuous with typically four legions split between the 
provinces.
170
 With the removal of Carthage the political situation in Spain shifted, from one 
of a divided allegiance between two foreign powers, in which Iberian tribes were autonomous 
allies, to sudden disarmament and the loss of their autonomy in controling their own external 
affairs. At least this was how the Romans saw the relationship, but it is unlikely the Iberian 
tribes, particularly of the interior fully understood Rome’s control over them. Most wars in 
Spain during the second century BC can be viewed in the context of imperial exertion on the 
part of the Romans and resistance on the part of the Iberians. This resulted in repeated 
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 Most notably the capture of defeated Teutones and Cimbri by Marius in 102 and 101 BC. 60-80,000 at 
Aquae Sextiae in 102 BC (Dio. Cass. 94.1; Eutrop. 5.1; Flor. 1.38.15; Liv. Per. 68; Oros. 5.1620; Plut. Mar. 
21.2; Polyaen. 8.10.3) also 8,000 are said to have been captured before the major engagement (Flor. 1.38.15; 
Oros. 5.16.12) and a further 60,000 at Vecellae in 101 BC (Eutrop. 5.2; Liv. Per. 68; Oros. 5.16.21; Plut Mar. 
27.3). 
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 For Wiseman 1956, 16 the expansion into these areas was a conscious decision by the Romans to reach the 
clear geographical boundaries for empire (i.e. the whole Iberian peninsula, the Elbe, the Tigris and Britain). 
Such a theory of a coherent ‘grand-strategy’ was forwarded by Luttwak 1976 passim, whose theory of a 
planned and consistent empire-wide expansion was rejected in favour of ad-hoc responses to regional 
demands by Mann 1979 passim, cf. Whittaker 1989 23-50; Fulford 1992, 294-305.  
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 Cf. Curchin 1991, 28-9; Wiseman 1956, 17. 
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 Hispania Ulterior and Citerior. See Jashcmski 1950, 41 -7; McDonald 1953, 143-4. This was an important 
constitutional change in favour of administrating a territorial empire by increasing the number of praetors 
from four to six. 
170
 Both Afzelius 1944, 40-1 and Brunt 1971, 423 argued that this was reduced to two legions from 179 BC. 
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campaigns to subdue various Iberian tribes and repetitive insurrection once the Romans left. 
Even after regular military resistance was crushed by Rome, guerrilla warfare continued on 
the peninsula, as result, Spain was the first permanent posting of legions outside of Italy.
171
 
The constant fighting on the peninsula made it a particularly fertile ground for aspiring 
commanders and politicians.
172
 
A presence following the Second Punic War was necessitated by a large uprising in 197 BC, 
which resulted in the defeat of the army in Hispania Ulterior and the death of the praetor C. 
Tuditanus.
173
 As a response, two praetors were sent with a reinforcing legion each to 
strengthen the garrison in Hispania Citerior and to quell the rebellion in Hispania Ulterior.
174
 
During the rebellion, there is no mention of enslavements by the Romans, but the situation 
may have been too critical to employ an aggressive strategy that would have allowed for the 
capture of prisoners. By 195 BC the situation was deemed critical enough for the consul, the 
Elder Cato, to be assigned Spain.
175
 Following his first defeat of the rebels near Emporiae,
176
 
Cato delivered a speech to his troops suggesting a manifest control beyond the traditional 
coastal areas, over which he would “compel this nation… to accept again the yoke which it 
had cast off.”177 Despite the reference to the yoke, there is no mention of the enslavement of 
captives following Cato’s victory at Emporiae; Roman strategy in Spain was initially to gain 
submission through force of arms only, rather than punish through enslavement. Cato 
followed up his victory with an invasion of Celtiberia (comprising Modern Castilla La 
Mancha and Castilla y Leon), and there he received the submission of several tribes.
178
 It is 
only after a second insurrection by the same people that they were punished with slavery; 
Livy relates that all of these were sent under the crown.
179
 Cato campaigned rigorously in 
Spain up to 193 BC,
180
 and he is said to have bragged that he captured more cities than he 
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 First emphasised by Mommsen 1887 III, 220-1. 
172
 Cato the Elder, Tib. Gracchus (the elder), Aemilius Paullus, Scipio Nasica all held commands in Spain.  
173
 Liv. 33.21.6-9; App. Hisp. 39. Defeat of Romans and the death of Tuditanus (Liv. 33.25.9; Val. Max. 3.7.1; 
Oros. 4.20.10). For the limitations of Livy regarding the scope of the rebellion see Briscoe 1973, 290. 
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 Liv. 33.26.1-4. The praetor Cn Cornelius Blasio was awarded an ovatio, (Degrassi 1954, 102. Liv. 33.27.1-
5). Cf. Harris 1989, 122 contra Briscoe 1973, 299. 
175
 Cato arrived at Emporiae in 195 BC (Liv. 34.9.1-13.3; Plin HN. 14.91; App. Hisp. 39-40; Zon. 9.17). 
176
 App. Hisp. 40; Liv. 34.16.2-3; Zon. 9.17.  
177
 Liv. 34.13.10 temere quam constanter bellantemiugum quo se exuit accipere rursus cogatis. 
178
 Liv. 34.16.4-9. 
179
 Liv. 34.16.10 sub corona veniere omnes. It seems less likely that many of these slaves would have entered 
Italy, as pointed out by Mommsen 1887 III, 220 the Romans had difficulty in transporting their troops, and 
this difficulty would have appliedto traders as well. The trade in slaves could just as easily have been 
conducted in Gaul, Africa and Spain itself. 
180
 For Cato’s own claims see ORF 40; 41. 
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spent days there.
181
 Despite this, there is no further mention of captives being enslaved by 
him; this was likely due to the nature of the conflict which was geared towards suppression 
rather than territorial acquisition, but it could also be attributable to the deficiency in Livy 
who is concerned primarily with events in the East for this period.
182
 
The effectiveness of Cato’s command in Spain, though overstated by Cato himself and Livy, 
was enough for the Senate to hold off from sending another consul as replacement.
183
 Since 
Cato’s raid into Celtiberia was enough to end the threat in the Spanish interior, his 
replacement, the praetor P. Scipio Nasica waged a campaign in modern Portugal against the 
Lusitanians. This culminated in a large pitched battle near Ilipa in which Livy states 12,000 
were killed and 5,400 captured, with no further mention of their fate.
184
 The success of the 
Spanish guerrilla tactics forced Aemelius Paulus to gather an emergency force to meet the 
Lusitanians in 189 BC, where again Livy refrains from details other than stating that 2,300 
were captured.
185
  
In 184 BC the Romans eventually took the offensive and laid siege to Suessetarian Corbio. 
According to Livy the praetor Aulus Terentius captured (expugno) the city and sold the 
captives.
186
 No sooner had the tribes of Hispania Ulterior been suppressed when the 
Celtiberians took up arms again and raided Roman territory in Hispania Citerior. As a 
response, Q. Fulvius Flaccus, the praetor of Citerior, invaded the Celtiberian heartland.
187
 
There he captured and destroyed (direpta) the city of Urbicna, from which the booty was 
given to the troops.
188
 Whilst there is no mention of captives, it is likely that this victory 
produced at least some slaves, since the city was destroyed and all the wealth carried off. The 
fact that the Roman army then retired to winter quarters suggests that they could deal with the 
reduction of any captives at their leisure, and many of the refugees from a destroyed city 
would have found slavery their only recourse for survival. In 181 BC Flaccus, whose 
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 Plut. Cat. mai.10.3. 
182
 Livy was following the history of Polybius in this focus. For Livy’s sources concerning Spain, including 
Cato, see Astin 1978, 302-7; Briscoe 1981, 63-4. 
183
 Cato celebrated a triumph for his achievements in Spain, see Degrassi 1954, 102. Trouble brewing in the 
North of Italy by the Boii also called for the attention of a consular army under Scipio Nasica (Liv. 36.39.3; 
Oros. 4.20.21; Zon. 9.19).  
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 Liv. 35.1.10 capti. 
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 Liv. 37.57.5 capti. 
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 Liv. 39.42.1 captivos vendidit.  
187
 Harris 1989, 125 suggests that a raid was clearly the intent of the Senate at this point because Flaccus’ army 
was strongly reinforced and two ex-praetors were assigned to it as military tribunes (cf. Liv. 40.1.7). 
188
 Liv. 40.16.4-11. 
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command was prorogued for another year, fought a significant field engagement against the 
Celtiberians, capturing around 4,000.
189
  
For the year 180 BC it was decided to send a consul to Spain and Tiberius Sempronius 
Gracchus was assigned the province. However, he was late in arriving and the praetor Flaccus 
met a Celtiberian army and defeated it with heavy losses, Livy reports 17,000 killed and 
3,700, specifically ‘captured alive.’190 After Gracchus assumed command of the army, the 
Roman camp was attacked by the Celtiberians, but these were so thoroughly repulsed that the 
Romans ended up seizing their camp, taking 320 captives.
191
 After this the Romans perused 
and engaged the Celtiberians outside the city of Alce taking several more prisoner.
192
 With all 
resistance crushed, the Romans took the city capturing several nobles, who sought refuge 
within its walls; this clarification suggests that these were taken as hostages or reserved for 
triumph.
193
 Gracchus’ suppression of the Celtiberians culminated in the final year of his 
command in 178 BC at a major battle at Egravia where 22,000 of the enemy were killed and 
a paltry 300 captured, again these were likely reserved for the triumph.
194
 Gracchus’ victories 
were enough to temporarily subdue the Celtiberians until they again rescinded and raided 
Roman territory in 175 BC. As a response, Ap. Claudius was sent against them, and he 
soundly defeated them in a major engagement in which 15,000 were either killed or 
captured.
195
 With this last act of resistance quashed, Spain would remain quiet until a brief 
revolt by the Lusitanians and Celtiberians in the late 150’s BC.196  
As in Northern Italy the number of prisoners captured was considerably smaller than those 
noted either in the East or especially in the engagements fought during the second Punic War. 
For the instances in which captives are said to have been taken, Livy was reluctant to state 
that they were sold en masse, and Cato’s campaigns, in particular, stand out as having 
produced very few slaves.
197
 The number of troops Rome could (or was willing to) commit to 
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 4,700 (Liv. 40.32.6); 4,000 (Oros. 4.20.31). 
190
 Liv. 40.40.11 vivi capti. 
191
 Liv. 40.48.7 capti vivi. 
192
 Liv. 40.49.4 no specific figure. 
193
 Liv. 40.49.4 multi captivi nobiles. Hostages were often marched in triumphs, see Allen 2012, 96-101. 
194
 Liv. 40.50.4, see Degrassi 1954, 103. 
195
 Liv. 41.26.5. This victory was enough to quieti deinde paruerunt imperio. 
196
 Three instances of captures here resulting in the sparing of 5,000 Celtiberians (App. Hisp. 50), along with the 
infamous massacre of Lusitanians at Cauca (App. Hisp. 52), where Cato brought charges to impeach Galba, 
see Wiseman 1956, 18-9. Also the capture, and possibly the enslavement, of many Lusitanians encircled on a 
hill (App. Hisp. 59). For a history of Rome’s later military involvement in Spain see Simon 1962 and Keay 
1988. 
197
 Only at Liv. 34.16.10, see above. 
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Spain was not great enough to handle a full blown rebellion in concurrence with another 
major conflict. Even if we are to accept Livy’s statement that the whole of Spain was 
rebellious as an exaggeration, it is clear that the situation was critical enough to require a 
consular army in order to significantly bolster their military presence.
198
 Roman policy 
regarding the treatment of captives in Spain, was reactive and often lenient. In examples 
where we are not expressly told that the captives were enslaved we may infer that the 
Romans probably treated the defeated with some leniency, choosing to punish particular 
firebrands, so as to prevent a large scale popular uprising against them. Rome’s hesitance in 
enslaving can also be seen in their choice to garrison often with small forces over a large and 
spread out area. As Robert Knapp showed, this garrison policy was implemented during the 
Second Punic War and certainly continued well into the second century.
199
 Furthermore, a 
concern to spread out the burden of garrisons would be odd if they were equally uncaring of 
carpet punishments for whole populaces; a desire to reduce friction between the Roman army 
and the Iberian populace is clearly evident. Rome’s desire to occupy Spain was clear in the 
foundation of an auxiliary colony at Luscutana (from slaves of the Hastenses) and in the first 
overseas colony founded by Tiberius Gracchus in 179 BC.
200
 
The Senate and by extension the provincial governors were not concerned with the direct 
administration of financial exploitation. The spoils, including captives,
201
 were a by-product 
of conquest, but beyond this the only financial extraction from Spain (at least not on a 
personal level) was fixed stipends.
202
 The obvious wealth was of course through precious 
metal deposits, particularly in Andalusia, which had first attracted the Carthaginians to Spain. 
It has been an easy assertion that these mines were conveniently worked by the captives taken 
in Spain.
203
 Diodorus’ observation that Italian businessmen bought up slaves to work the 
mines does not indicate that the slaves were war captives.
204
 Given the evidence, it is likely 
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 Liv. 34.11.6 see also App. Hisp. 40. 
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 For a detailed overview of these possible garrisons see Knapp 1977, 16-19. 
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 Liv Per. 41. Possibly another at Iliturgis, see Keay 1988, 32; Knapp 1977, 19. 
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 Curchin 2004, 137. 
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 Cf. Wisemann 1956, 18-9.  
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 Notably by Mangas 1971, 109 and Blázquez Martínez 1987, 556 who suggested the 40,000 slaves (according 
to Polybius preserved in Strab. 3.2.10) employed in the mines outside of Carthago Nova were war captives, 
see also Westermann 1955, 72. But, there is no actual evidence of this, see Haley 1991, 94 n. 295; Curchin 
2004, 137. Strabo does not specify that the miners were slaves only ἀνθρώπων. 
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 Diod. Sic. 5.36.4, see Rickard 1928, 130-1. The mines were operated by publican, perhaps as early as 195 
BC, when Cato the elder granted contracts to collect tax from the iron and silver mines (Liv. 34.21.7), cf. 
Gruen 1992, 300 n. 64 for further references to modern debates. Domergue 1990, 247 has argued that the 
mining operations in Spain were initially conducted privately and on a small scale, for an extensive analysis of 
the transference form private to public hands see Hirt 2010, 274-83. 
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that the mines were worked primarily by locals (free or slave) and by damnati ad metallum, 
rather than servi publici.
205
 Leonard Curchin has suggested that many of the captives 
enslaved in Spain were transported to Italy, although he admits a lack in supporting evidence 
for this.
206
 Curchin’s belief is based on the understanding that the Roman countryside was 
devoid of workers and thus needed slaves; a need to identify a work force for the mines has 
also led scholars to leap to a similar conclusion.  
 
Sardinia and the Destruction of Carthage 
Outside of Spain, Sardinia also suffered a renewed interest by Rome.
207
 In 177 BC Tiberius 
Sempronius Gracchus was sent to bring the island to heel.
208
 According to Livy, after several 
actions, 15,000 of the enemy were killed and the island fully submitted.
209
 Livy makes no 
mention of the enslavement of captives at this point, but concludes his forty-first book by 
recording an inscription set up in the temple of Mater Matuta by Gracchus commemorating 
his victory in Sardinia. In the inscription, Gracchus is credited with either killing or capturing 
80,000 Sardinians.
210
 The inscription does not explicitly indicate that these captives were 
enslaved and any such conclusion must be inferred from the (probably later) phrase Sardi 
venales literally Sardinian slaves,
211
 but interpreted as the expression ‘cheap as a Sardinian.’ 
Plutarch gives an alternative meaning, stating that the phrase was popular during the 
Capitoline games and that somehow this was a throwback to when the Veians fought against 
Romulus, who were archaically known as Lydians with their city named Sardis rather than 
Veii.
212
 Plutarch’s theory for the origin of this phrase is discredited, in part because of his 
historical inaccuracy in attributing the sack of Veii by the Romans to Romulus’ time.213 The 
phrase may also be in reference to the later re-subjugation of Sardinia by the younger 
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 See Haley 1991, 294; Hirt 2010, 97-8. That the mines were worked by local slaves is argued by Domergue 
and Hérail, 1978 252; Haley 1991, 95. For further references see Haley 1991, 295 n. 296. 
206
 Churchin 2004, 137. 
207
 The Carthaginians had ceded the island to Rome in 238 BC under threat of renewed war, the island had 
mutinied under Carthage’s unpaid mercenaries (App. Hisp. 4; Pun. 2-5; Polyb. 1.88.11-12; Liv. 21.1.5; Strab. 
5,225; Zon. 8.18). 
208
 Cf. Smith 1955, 59.  
209
 Liv. 41.17.1-2. 
210
 Liv. 41.21.8 caesa aut capta supra octoginta milia. 
211
 Aur. Vict. Caes. 57; Cic. Ad Fam. 7.24; Fest. Lindsay 1913, 322 (=Sinnius Capito Gramatica 20fr.). The 
phrase is also used as a heading in the fragmentary Menippean Satire of Varro 449t. 
212
 Plut. Quaest. Rom. 53. 
213
 Liv. 6.21-3 places the sack in 396 BC. 
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Tiberius Gracchus in 138 BC.
214
 In either case, a low regard for the value of Sardinian slaves 
is poor evidence for the mass enslavement of the island. 
The damage inflicted on Italian soil during the Second Punic War left an indelible mark upon 
the Roman psyche so that, even when the Carthaginians were weakened to the point that they 
would never recover beyond Africa, there was always a strong movement amongst the 
Romans to finish Carthage off. No one called for the destruction of Carthage more than the 
Elder Cato who personally visited Carthage as an ambassador and saw first hand what he 
believed to be significant militarisation.
215
 Eventually, this doctrine of destruction won out 
and the Romans went to war for a third and final time with Carthage, and once Carthage was 
taken it was utterly destroyed by orders of the Senate.
216
 As Nicholas Purcell has shown, the 
Corinth and especially Carthage symbolically evoked the paradigm of Troy, and the 
symmetrical destruction of these was as much literally inevitable given their preceding 
history as it was competition with Rome.
217
 The Third Punic War was a brief and one-sided 
affair and there were only two major engagements, both of which resulted in the taking of 
captives. The Carthaginians under Hasdrubal met the Romans in a field battle outside the city 
of Nepharis in 147 BC. Appian, who is our only extant source for the battle, states that 
70,000 of the Carthaginians were killed and a further 10,000 were taken captive.
218
 
Afterwards, the Romans took the enemy’s camp along with the city of Nepharis, from which 
we may assume at least some captives were taken. The victory at Nepharis was strategically 
significant because it cut off all support for Carthage by land, and with the Roman navy 
blockading the two ports, Carthage was effectively sealed off from any would be aid. The 
isolation of Carthage compelled the other major cities in the area to submit. Often the 
submission of cities on their own accord was motivated by the treatment of a previously 
captured city; in this case Nepharis, where they were either released or enslaved. Given the 
lenient treatment of the Carthaginians in the following year, it is unlikely those at Nepharis 
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 Cf. s.v. Ludi ‘Capitolini’ Smith 1875. 
215
 Cato supposedly called for the destruction of Carthage after every public speech Carthago delenda est (Plut. 
Cat. Mai. 27). The rise in Carthage’s prosperity was enough for them to attempt to pay the indemnity (spread 
over 50 years) in advance after only a few years (Liv. 36.4.7), this was refused. In either 152 or 153 BC Cato 
was sent along with other Roman ambassadors to arbitrate between Caryhage and their Numidian neighbours 
(App. Lib. 69; Plut. Cat. Mai. 26). The ambassadors were struck by Carthage’s prosperity and growth in their 
infrastructure to facilitate war, Liv. Per. 47. See further Lancel 1995, 410f. 
216
 App. Pun. 135; Zon. 9.30; Vell. Pat. 1.12.5; Flor. 1.31.18. the sack of Carthage is also mentioned by Cic. 
Agr. 2.51; Polyb. 39.8.6; Dig. 7.4.21; Jerome Hieron. Chron. 1871. 
217
 Purcell 1995, 133-48. 
218
 App. Pun. 126. See also Zon. 9.30 and Liv. Per. 51. 
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were enslaved, and considering the lack of detail regarding their fate it is less likely that they 
were treated in any exceptional manner. 
With the Carthaginian army defeated, Scipio Aemilianus went about laying siege to the city 
where Hasdrubal and a few nobles had fled from Nepharis. Appian provides the most 
consistent account of the siege, which can be summarised in three stages: the initial siege of 
the walls, the battle for entrance into the fortified district of Byrsa and the final act of 
defiance in the temple of Aesculapius by the last holdouts amongst the defenders.
219
 It was 
after the gruesome taking of the district of Byrsa, and a brief siege of the citadel, that the 
majority of the Carthaginians surrendered to the Romans. According to Appian 50,000 men 
and women surrendered to the Romans and these were furnished with a guard.
220
 Orosius 
states that first 25,000 wives (mulieri) submitted, followed by 35,000 men. Florus puts the 
figure at 36,000 but states that his sources believed these to have been led by Hasdrubal, a 
detail which he finds less than credible.
221
 The fact that a guard was furnished for the 
surrendering civilians in Appian’s account suggests they were released, and there is no 
indication in the other sources that these were sold.
222
 Appian states that Scipio later gave up 
the city to be pillaged by the soldiers, with only the gold, silver and temple votives being 
reserved for deposit with the state. He importantly neglects to mention the sale of captives.
223
 
The amount of silver listed as being carried in the triumph was far too small had the captives 
been sold as slaves.
224
 In fact, Zonaras is explicit in stating that only a few of the captured 
nobles were inevitably sold and some others died during their incarceration.
225
  
Even in the dominant seat of empire, Rome by the mid second century BC had not yet 
developed a consistent strategy in asserting control over conquered areas. In Italy an 
incorporation of conquered communities into Rome’s army ensured Roman suzerainty 
through shared interest in future conquest. Outside of Italy the aims of Rome were less clear, 
overseas expansion was distinctly ad hoc in design, as Roman foreign policy was reactive 
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 For the siege of Carthage up to its eventual destruction App. Pun. 126-135. 
220
 App. Pun. 130. 
221
 Flor. 1.31.16. Florus suggests this was unlikely given the tradition that Hasdrubal surrendered himself, while 
his wife chose to commit suicide along with their children, a few last defenders and the Roman deserters 
(App. Pun. 131. Liv. Per. 51. Flor. 1.31.17. Zon. 9.30). 
222
 Contra Harris 1989, 160. When guards were furnished, it was only then by treachery that the populace was 
enslaved, e.g. Lucullus at Cauca (App. Hisp. 52) and the Jews marched from Tericheae to Tiberias (Joseph. 
BJ. 3.339-341). A Guard over captives was necessary to protect them from abuse by the common soldiers. 
223
 App. Pun. 130 καὶ οὗτοι μὲν ἐφυλάσσοντο. 
224
 4,370 lbs of silver (Plin. HN 33.141, cf. App. Pun. 135), see Astin 1967, 342.  
225
 Zon. 9.30. 
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and piecemeal rather than the consequence of a predetermined strategy. One major result of 
this haphazard expansion was the lack of a clear motivation for the enslavement of captives. 
There is no evidence that the Romans enslaved captives with the intention to supply their 
economy with cheap labour.
226
 Despite a disparate approach to imperialism across the various 
theatres, and throughout the wars of the mid Republic, there is a certain consistency in the 
enslavement of captives. Enslavements generally occurred in the early stages of major 
conflicts and when cities were particularly defiant, requiring a lengthy siege - or were 
rebellious. The desire for empire was displayed most in the destruction of political autonomy 
rather than the enslavement of individuals by the Romans. Most illustrative of this is the 
destruction of Carthage and Corinth, neither of which resulted in the enslavement of entire 
populations, but rather the annihilation of their existence as a political identity, and it has 
been put forward here that it was also the case for the Epirotes in 167 BC. 
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 Harris 1980, 124 only gives the example of a reduced tariff on slaves (CIL 8.4508) in support of a conscious 
effort on the part of the state to affect the slave supply. With regards to acquisition through warfare he 
questions the financial motives behind trans-Danube/Rhine conquests and the conquest of Britain along with 
occasional frontier raids. 
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Chapter 7 
Markets, Merchants and Transports 
Rome was not the only destination for slaves, as the theatres of war spread further from 
Rome the slaves thus acquired entered a more complex web of world markets. Several 
examples of large numbers of Romans being enslaved abroad testify to extensive slave 
systems outside of Italy.
1
 This was especially so in the Eastern Mediterranean where the 
Roman demand for slaves competed with the already pre-existing markets of the Aegean, 
Syria and Anatolia.
2
 Specific and permanent markets were certainly not the only means of 
processing captives, as the market patterns of Italy demonstrate, temporary and calendar 
markets operated throughout the Mediterranean,
3
 and it is important to note that the transfer 
of slaves did not predicate markets specific to their sale. Larger urban centres may have had 
more permanent markets, and smaller towns and villages may have been visited by travelling 
merchants who at least carried some slaves.
4
 Overall the archaeological evidence for the sale 
and transport of large numbers of captives is limited, this is in part due to the limited nature 
of the surviving material, but it may also indicate that large numbers of captives were not 
‘disposed’ of in the manner typically suggested by the written sources and interpreted by 
modern historians. What follows is an analysis of the practical application of trade and 
transport as pertaining to the transmittance of war captives. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 See Chapter 3. Specifically in the East: 1,200 Romans recovered in Achaea in 194BC (Liv. 34.50.3-7); in 
Crete (Liv. 37.60.3); many held by Antiochus in Asia Minor (Polyb. 21.43.10; 38.38.7). 
2
 For a discussion of specific markets in these areas see Harris 1980, 126-30, see also Trumper 2009, 34-74. 
Most notable markets date to the late republic and the imperial periods. 
3
 Market patterns see MacMullen 1970, 33-41; Gabba 1975, 141-63; Andreau 1978, 104-26; De Ligt 1993, 61-
71. Harris 1980, 126 n. 87 cites the example of Baetocaece in Syracuse which held a twice-monthly market 
OGIS 262= IGLS 4028. Garlan 1988, 54 has suggested that a slave market was set up in the agora at Athens 
once a month, based on Arist. Kn. 43. Rihll 2012, 72 is sceptical of this interpretation.  
4
 Harris 1980, 126; Scheidel 2011, 301-2. 
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Markets 
The existence of slave markets is irrefutable, but beyond this very little can be said with any 
certainty. Our evidence for slave markets is sparse and fleeting, as a topic of consideration it 
is virtually non-existent in narrative histories and we find only the setting of slave markets 
and the character of the dealer in comedies; the latter, although fictional, gives us a unique 
insight into the practice of slave dealing.
5
 Even in encyclopaedic works such as Strabo’s 
Geographica we find very little mention of slave markets apart from the extraordinary traffic 
in slaves at Delos.
6
  
The thin evidence for slave markets makes it difficult for modern historians to come to any 
justifiable conclusions regarding the trade. Polybius states that Prusias I of Bithynia 
purchased the area around Byzantium so as to protect the slave trade from the Black Sea out 
of which an active trade of slaves entering Greece had taken place since the archaic period.
7
 
Onomastic evidence supports an extensive trade in near eastern slaves to Attica from the 
classical period and Herodotus identified Ephesus and Sardis as places where a eunuch dealer 
sold his slaves.
8
 Varro’s remark on the naming of slaves suggests that Ephesus continued to 
have a major slave market well into the first century BC.
9
 Like Byzantium, Ephesus, Delos 
and even landlocked Sardis, the few places identified as focal points of the slave trade were 
key trading posts, making them ideally situated for any commodity, not just slaves.
10
 Specific 
markets that have been identified through archaeology as purveying slaves typically date to 
later periods than this study. The first phase of building at the Agora of the Italians in Delos 
for example is the earliest major slave market that has been identified, and has been dated to 
the late second century BC.
11
 Strabo is quite clear that its importance as a slave selling centre 
stemmed from the rampant piracy of the area rather than from warfare.
12
 F. Hugh Thompson 
noted that after the sack of Delos by pirates in 88 and again in 69 BC, and the subsequent 
                                                 
5
 Typical in Plautus, cf. Stace 1968, 64-77. Lucian portrays the sale of philosophers by Zeus and Hermes in his 
Vitarum auctio, for how elements within this comedy may have reflected real life sales, see Bradley 1992, 
125-38. Likewise a fictitious slave market is portrayed in a mural described by Petron. Sat. 29. 
6
 Specifically the σταταρίον attributed to the Agora of the Italians (Strab. 14.5f.). 
7
 Polyb. 4.50.2-3. For the slave trade from the Black Sea, see Finley 1962, 53; Braund and Tsetskhladze 1989, 
114–25. For references relating to other ‘barbarian’ regions connected with the Greek slave trade see Lewis 
2011, 91-2. 
8
 Hdt. 8.105. For the trade in slaves from the Near East see Lewis 2011, 91-113.  
9
 Varro Ling. 8.21. Cf. Finley 1962, 55. 
10
 Bruneau 1988, 41-52 highlights the centrality of Delos as the basis of its prominence in the slave trade and 
earlier in the trade of precious metals. 
11
 Coarelli 2005, 210 suggests that the first building phase dates to the 120s BC. Cf. Trümper 2009, 37f. 
12
 Strab. 14.5f. 
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suppression of the Cilician pirate’s activities in the Aegean, the slave centres of Asia Minor 
filled the void.
13
  
Archaeological excavations have also revealed the possible locations of slave markets at 
Magnesia-on-Menander and Phrygian Acmonia dating to the first century BC,
14
 at Sardis 
based on a recycled dedication to the patrons of the slave-market (late first century AD)
15
 and 
the Serapeum in Ephesus which was unlikely to have been earlier than the mid first century 
AD given a dedication of a statarium there.
16
 Other possible markets identified in the West 
have been dated to the imperial period; the only dateable evidence found at Lepcis Magna 
suggests the first century AD,
17
 likewise the Tempio Rotondo in Ostia has been identified by 
Elizabeth Fentress as an early first century AD market.
18
 To these may be added the 
Eumachia at Pompeii,
19
 the Basilica in Herculaneum,
20
 and the Crypta Balbi in Rome,
21
 as 
possible slave markets, all of which date no earlier than the first century BC. However, 
Fentress’ identification of these sites as slave markets is based on limited and tenuous 
evidence, to which Monika Trümper has provided a clear refutation, and so a discerning 
historian must be wary of the identification of these sites as specifically slave markets.
22
 
As Trümper has argued, most markets may have been relatively inconspicuous and the 
transfer of large numbers of slaves between buyer and seller did not require particularly large 
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 Thompson 2003, 42. 
14
 Acmonia as a slave market is based on an inscription, see Varinlioglu 2006, 355-71. Cf. Bosworth 2002, 354-
5; Thompson 2003, 42; Thoneman 2011, 105. For Magnesia-on-Menander see Braconi 2005, 213-19; Fentress 
2005, 228-231; Trümper 2009, 68. For slave markets in the Asia Minor in general see Bussi 2001, 25-34. 
15
 SEG 46.1996. Trümper 2009, 24 provides an interpretation and English translation.  
16
 A dedication on a statue honours the construction of the statarium to Gaius Sallustius Crispus Passienus who 
was a two time consul under Tiberius and Claudius and a relative of Sallust (I.Eph. 3025-6). Cf. Bodel 2005, 
183 n. 7; Trümper 2009, 21-22; Coarelli 1982, 137-8. Other possible eastern markets are based on evidence 
dating to the Imperial period and so need not be listed here, these are identified by Harris 1980 128, cf. Bussi 
2001, 25-34; Thompson 2003, 42. 
17
 The addition of a chalcidicum, which Braconi 2005, 217-9 identified as a slave market, was recorded in an 
inscription of c.AD 11-12, cf. Trümper 2009, 62-3. The association of a chalcidicum with a slave market is 
tenuous, and Braconi remains cautious in saying so. Festus Lindsay 1913, 45 simply states that it was a 
building of which the design originated from Chalcis. The chalcidicum  resembled a chamber and so they 
have sometimes been identified as slave holding cells (particularly at the Agora of the Italians at Delos and the 
Eumachia at Pompeii CIL 10.811, Fentress 2005, 225-229), but these have also been identified as possible 
mints, naves and judge’s chambers, cf. s.v. ‘Chalcidicum.’ Smith 1890. 
18
 Fentress, 2005, 231 dates the market’s construction to AD 6 based on Licordari 1984, 351 n. 5. 
19
 Fentress 2005, 229.  
20
 Ibid, 230. 
21
 Ibid, 232. 
22
 Trümper 2009, 31-34, 51-62, specifically the refutation of the Eumachia at Pompeii as a slave market. 
Westermann 1955, 37 noted that essentially any agora could suffice as a market for slaves.  
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markets or necessarily markets that were explicitly designed for the sale of slaves.
23
 
Searching for markets with the criteria of objects identifiable with slave sale, as attempted by 
Fentress, turns up only a few concrete examples.
24
 Although holding cells (such as vestibulae 
chalcidicae or cryptae) and auction blocks (catasatae) can identify a possible slave market, 
they are not necessarily pre-requisites for one. Inscriptions reveal more slave markets, 
although the precise locations of these markets and their sizes are impossible to identify since 
none of these inscriptions have been found in a location that could be identified as a market.
25
 
A number of inscriptions dating to the second century AD suggest a slave market in Rome, 
although the dedication to the ‘genius of the slave market’ is problematic in that it refers to a 
guild of traders rather than a market per se.
26
 A number of slave markets within Rome itself 
are also mentioned by Roman writers, most notably a market near the Temple of Castor and 
Pollux referred to by the younger Seneca.
27
 Martial also mentions markets located on the 
Campus Martius, which included some catering to elevated patrons that were hidden away, 
and near the votaries of Serapis thousands of people were said to be kept in cages.
28
 Boese 
also cites the island of Aesculapius as a possible mart, but the exposure of sick slaves on the 
island does not necessarily indicate a market was there.
29
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 Trümper 2009, passim who draws a clear comparison with the relatively small markets of the American south 
which handled similar numbers of slaves. Markets were not necessarily conspicuous even in operation, such 
as the hidden market frequented by Mamurra in Mart. Ep. 9.59. 
24
 Fentress 2005, passim. Block platforms seem less common in the Arab slave market, but facilities certainly 
required the holding of slaves, cf. Trümper 2009, 3-12, pl. 4-5; Pucci 2005, 237-40. Evident in painted 
depictions of slave markets favoured by 19th century Orientalists. For example ‘Slave Market in 
Constantinople’ 1838 Sir William Allan (Scottish National Gallery, Edinburgh). This comparison can be seen 
from the Slave Market painting of Jean-Léon Gérôme 1861 (Clark Art Institute, Williamstown, MA), who 
favoured classical scenes – famously ‘Phryne before the Areopagus,’ 1861 (Kunsthalle, Hamburg). Likewise, 
cells were present at American markets, notoriously during the Civil War at Alexandria Virginia, see Library 
of Congress Collections LC-B811-2297-9, cf. Trümper 2009, 110 fig. 8. 
25
 Trümper 2009, 27. 
26
 Genio venalicii CIL 6.396; 397; 398; 399. Cf. Trümper 2009, 25-7; Harris 1980, 130; Joshel 2010, 95-6. The 
dedications begin with Jupiter Optimus, the only relevance of Jupiter to the slave market that I can see is 
perhaps an association of Jove with manumission notices as at Delphi, Liv. 7.3 states that this temple was 
used as a bulletin by dictators. Another inscription from Rome, CIL 6.22355a, mentions a slave market from 
which a slave met a life-long-friend whom he commemorates, cf. Joshel 2010, 109 for an interpretation and 
translation. 
27
 Mart. Ep. 9.29; Sen. Dial. 2.13.4. There is no logical reason why a slave market would be specifically 
associated with the dioscuri, it seems the association is nothing more than proximity. 
28
 Mart. Ep. 9.29 non illam mille catastae vincebant, nec quae turba Sarapin amat. Serapis was worshiped in 
Iseum Campense in the sanctuary of Isis in the Campus Martius. Boese 1973, 149 also suggests slaves were 
sold on the via Sacra based on Mart. Ep. 2.63. 
29
 Boese 1973, 149. Suet. Claud. 25; Dig. 40.8.2. Claudius banned owners who exposed sick slaves to die on the 
island of Aesculapius from reclaiming them. 
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Of the slaves traded in the markets there is little in particular that relates specifically to 
captives.
30
 Newly imported slaves, and certainly newly acquired captives, were required to 
have their feet whitened to indicate that they were aliens and it was the law that the origin of 
a slave be known to the purchaser.
31
 According to Gellius slaves whose origin was unknown 
and came without a guarantee for their service were sold with a felt cap (pileatus) to indicate 
to buyers that their origin was unknown,
32
 but the donning of such a cap was more commonly 
recognised as a mark of manumission.
33
 Ulpian informs us that the origin (natio) of a slave 
was important as some nations were of better repute than others.
34
 Not all captives would 
have made ideal slaves; the Cantabrian captives sold into slavery in 22 BC notoriously killed 
their masters.
35
 Newly acquired slaves and slaves whose origin and previous occupation were 
unknown posed a greater risk at not meeting the expectations of the purchaser and 
presumably this placed a lower value on them. No distinction was made between a slave 
captured in war and one brought into the empire by traders. Newly enslaved people who 
required constant supervision could not have been expected to perform highly skilled tasks 
right away and so the prices paid for these labourers were justifiably not as high.
36
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 For practices used in the sale of slaves see Boese 1973, 149-50; Joshel 2010, 95-100; Thompson 2003, 43-6; 
Westermann 1955 98-99. For legal aspects of the sale see Buckland 1908, 39f. 
31
 The ‘chalking’ of the feet (Plin. HN 35.199; Prop. 4.5.52; Tib. 11.41; Juv. Sat. 1.111; Ov. Am. 1.8.64) 
Information about slaves was usually displayed on the tituli worn about their necks. The indication of a 
slave’s natio or ἐθνικος was a legal requirement (Dig. 21.1.31.21). So too in Egypt (BGU 1. 316.13; 3.887.3, 
c.f. Westermann 1955, 96 n. 15). Onomastic analysis cannot be relied upon for the origin of slaves, the 
Romans tended to use stock names and the preservation of freedmen names are overwhelmingly of Greek 
origin, not necessarily because this was the main region of supply, but because Greek names were fashionable 
so that even non-Greek slaves were given Greek names cf. Bruce 1938, 44-5. Onomastics were the basis of 
the slave origin study first propounded by Bang 1910, 242-44 whose survey turned up an average of Italian 
based slaves over other origins. Likewise an analysis of the magistri-magistrae from Miniturnae revealed a 
majority of Greek names, Johnson 1933, 106-113. See also Gordon 1924, 96-101 and the comments of 
Westermann 1955, 61-2 who attributes a greater proportion of the Roman slave trade from the East on the 
basis of onomastics.  
32
 Gell. NA 6.4.1 states that this establishment was recorded by Sabinus, cf. Huschke; De Manc. fr. 19. 
33
 Liv. 24.16.18; 33.23.6; Val. Max. 5.2.6; Petr. 40.3; Suet. Nero 57.1. Also pilleus Liv. 24.32.9; 30.45.5; Val. 
Max. 5.2.5; Mart. 2.68.4; Sen. Ep. 47.18; Suet. Tib. 4.2. 
34
 Dig. 21.1.1.2. 
35
 Cass. Dio 54.11.2. 
36
 Frier and Kehoe 2007, 120 the deceitful practices of slave-dealers led to a ‘lemon market’ which brought 
down slave prices across the board. 
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Slave Traders 
Captives were generally purchased by traders nearer the site of battle rather than transported 
by the armed forces to markets.
37
 That mercatores followed the army is clear,
38
 and many of 
the traders following the Roman army during the Republic were Roman or Italian, but 
judging by the alacrity with which they travelled beyond the borders of the empire, it cannot 
be said that the slave wares would be solely reserved for Italian and Roman markets.
39
 
Merchants often intermingled with the soldiers
40
 to the point that Sallust remarked that 
soldiers and merchants together pillaged the Numidian countryside.
41
 Though the merchants 
followed closely with the army, even sharing some of their occupational hazards,
42
 they were 
not controlled by the general. Publius Decius Mus suggested that his soldiers sell off their 
booty immediately (and presumably, in doing so, at prices favouring the traders) so that the 
traders might be induced to follow the army into Samnium.
43
 In an exceptional case Caesar 
gave orders for the merchants following his army to take refuge within the ramparts, but this 
was only to ensure the safety of the merchants.
44
 Whilst the general could issue orders to the 
merchants in his presence, he could not compel them under law to trade or to follow the 
army, with the exception of restricting the sale of captives; although it was rare to do so, 
restrictions were placed on the terms of the sale and where they could be sold.
45
 The 
independence of merchants from the armies they followed can be seen in the example of the 
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 Merchants- mercatores, φορτηγόι or variants of ἐμπολεύς specifically slave traders or traders of other 
disreputable goods- mangones, σῶματεμπόροι or ἀνδρόποδοκαπέλοι. 
38
 Merchants were also contracted to supply the army, merchants of this type were known as publicani or 
classified as socii, see Badian 1972, 158-60; Roth 1999, 230-1. Mercatores and negotiatores are well attested 
for following the Roman army (App. Pun. 18.117; Caes. B Gall. 6.37; Liv. 10.17.6; 28.22.4. So too Greek 
armies ex. Xen. Aes. 1.21). It should be noted that mercatores were not necessarily the same as the suttlers 
(lixae) who followed the army and occupied a number of supplementary and auxiliary roles, see Vishnia 2002, 
265-272. Cf. Le Bohec 1994, 226 who suggests the lixae differed from private merchants and camp followers 
in that they were recognised, and to a certain degree employed, by the army as ‘licensed purveyors.’ Although 
Tacitus generally associates lixae with servants (Tac. Hist. 1.49; 2.87; 3.20; 3.33 cf. Frontin Str. 2.4.8), they 
seem to be free men, though of lowly origin (Liv. 31.49.11; Sall. Iug. 44.5; Amm. Marc. 18.2.13; Cod. Theod. 
7.1.10), see further Vishnia 2002, 267f.  
39
 Caesar frequently remarked on the extensive travels of merchants (B Gall. 1.39.1; 3.1.2; 4.3.3; 4.5.2; 4.20.4). 
40
 Feasted together Liv. 33.48.5; spectators of battle Liv.44.35.10. 
41
 Sall. Iug. 44.5.7. 
42
 Caes. B Gall. 6.37.3; Liv. 28.22.4; 39.26.4. 
43
 Liv. 10.17.6. 
44
 Caes. B. Gall. 6.36.3. 
45
 Augustus stipulated that captured Salassi males in 25 BC were to be sold, but they could not be liberated 
before 20 years (Cass. Dio 53.5.4; Suet. Aug. 21 gives 30; cf. Strab. 4.6.7). Captive Panonian males in AD 12 
were to be sold outside Pannonia (Cass. Dio. 54.31.3).  
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Numidians during the Second Punic War who had to journey to the coast to sell off their 
Carthaginian booty.
46
  
Despite the significant trade in slaves in antiquity there are only a few examples of actual 
slave traders. This is partly because of the disreputable nature of the trade and as a result 
people dealing in slaves tended not to advertise their profession.
47
 Certainly the Romans, who 
only tolerated large scale traders, found the trade in slaves a seedy if not disgraceful 
profession.
48
 The stigma attributed to the trade in slaves has rendered the evidence for the 
traders rather conspicuous. From the legal texts we know that traders sometimes operated in 
partnerships.
49
 Many traders may have dealt in slaves, but refrained from identifying solely 
with the trade and so, despite a distinction between slaves and other goods, were able to 
retain the title of mercator as they did not deal exclusively in slaves.
50
 As most merchants 
were independent and operated on a small-scale we may assume slave dealers too generally 
operated on a small-scale.
51
  
Boese remarked that captives were “frequently given to the soldiers,” but this statement is 
uncorroborated, he cites only the cases of Fidenae in 425 BC and Caesar’s distribution of 
captives amongst his soldiers after the siege of Alesia.
52
 In both cases the distribution of 
captives was an exceptional reward, beyond the regular gift of booty.
53
 Of course many 
captives were reserved for triumphs, special works, and a few as slaves for individuals. The 
vast majority of the captives however, taken with the intent of being enslaved were sold to 
                                                 
46
 Liv. 29.31.11. 
47
 With the exception of three inscriptions (CIL. 13.8348; ILS 4833; a votive tablet Walser 1984 78 no. 11). Cf. 
Boese 1973, 189 n. 12-13; George 2011, 394 n. 10. Surprisingly these inscriptions use the pejorative ‘mango’ 
rather than venalicius, it seems these traders displayed humour in adopting the nickname. The Greek trader A. 
Capreilius Timotheus clearly took pride in his profession as his gravestone commemorates not only him as a 
σοματεμπορος, but also has a relief of chained slaves being led to market, cf. Duchêne 1986, 513-30. 
48
 See the comments of Bosworth 2002, 350-7 regarding the stigma placed on Vespasian who may have been 
involved in slave trading. 
49
 Dig. 17.2.60.1.  
50
 Dig. 14.4.1.1; 50.16.207. See Buckland 1908, 39 n. 2. 
51
 Though shipping lanes by their inevitable destinations suggest shipping in the manner of grand trafic 
maritime the total of goods transportation in the Mediterranean must have been made up of vessels who 
operated on a smaller scale, see Heers 1958, 107-17 ; Braudel 1972, 296f. Horden & Purcell 2000, 140-1; 
Harris 2007, 533-5; Boese 1973, 170 also believed the majority of slave traders to be small scale. Though the 
number of slaves traded by individuals may have been small, their networks were certainly extensive, and the 
movement of slaves may have been from trader to trader, much like in the later trans-Atlantic system within 
Africa so that vast numbers could have been traded over great distances. See also the comments of Bradley 
1994, 46. This movement from hand to hand over a long distance was also important in a captive/slave’s 
‘natal alienation’ according to Patterson 1981, 111-2. 
52
 Boese 1973, 146-7. Fidenae (Liv. 4.34.4; Caes. B. Gall. 7.89.5). 
53
 For what the soldier’s might then have done with the captives see Boese 1973, 147. 
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traders on the spot. A sudden influx of slaves in a single area would have driven the price of 
slaves very low. The Sardinians captured in 238 BC notoriously fetched such a low price it 
became a quip sardi venales.
54
 Josephus relates that after the fall of Jerusalem the sum 
received for slaves was pitiful due to the glut of captives and the scarcity of traders.
55
 The 
dearth of traders was apparently due to their capacity for purchasing or transporting slaves 
being reached. Once in the hands of these traders, slaves could be sent a long way to various 
markets, thus the father trying to buy back his son in Plautus’ Captivi had such a difficult 
time finding his son because he awaited the merchants carrying captives in dribs and drabs.
56
 
The taking of captives has left no physical evidence. Certain articles of restraint such as 
shackles and chains could be preserved and such items for domestic use have been recovered 
by archaeological excavations.
57
 Given the supposed preference for slaves in Roman 
agriculture, surprisingly few objects of restraint have been found in Italian excavations, by 
contrast more have been recovered in Greece than anywhere.
58
 Fetters are one of the only 
distinguishing characteristics of a slave ship that may be preserved and thus far none have 
been recovered from Roman shipwrecks. From written sources we know that armies carried 
shackles with them to take captives away in, and both Spartan and Carthaginian armies are 
noted as doing so.
59
 In Greece fetters were sometimes preserved as a memorial to victory.
60
  
Josephus noted that Roman soldiers carried an implement known as an ἅλυσις essentially for 
chaining captives.
61
 And Thompson has suggested that these were used to bind the captives to 
their captor so as to prevent escape.
62
 Chains were often cited as the implement of restraint 
                                                 
54
 Aurel. Vict. 57.2 ; Cic. Ad Fam. 7.24; s.v. ‘Sardi venales’ Festus. There is an alternative version to the story 
mentioned by Festus that sardi (Sardinia) referred to the Veientines as they were thought to have originated 
from Lydian Sardes and so the ‘cheapness’ may have been a running joke for any recent enemy of Rome. See 
Chapter 6. 
55
 Joseph. BJ. 6.384. 
56
 Plaut Capt. Prologue. 27-9. 
57
 Cf. Thompson 2003, 217-238. The types of chains and the means of restraining slaves is well attested in 
American slavery and the finds suggest that the basic principles of the articles had not evolved much since the 
Roman period. 
58
 Thompson 2003, 220. A chain with an attached skeleton was discovered outside of Pompeii, this could be a 
slave or a prisoner, see Etani et al. 2003, 312-14; George 2011, 395 n. 12. 
59
 Spartans 1.66.4, Carthaginians Diod. Sic. 20.13.1-2. Both examples proved poetic justice to those that carried 
them. 
60
 Tegean victory over Spartans the fetters seen by Hdt. 1.66.4 and Paus. 8.45.3; Athenian victory over 
Chalcidians and Boeotians, fetters seen by Hdt. 5.77.3 at Athens. 
61
 Joseph. BJ 3.5.5. Thompson 2003, 41 fig. 10 identifies the chain used to hold a Parthian captive depicted on 
the arch of Septimus Severus as an ἅλυσις. 
62
 Thompson 2003, 220-1, who bases this on the fact that the halusis had manacles at both ends of the chain. 
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for captives.
63
 In Plautus, the captives purchased from the market were laden with chains 
during their transport, presumably to prevent them from running away,
64
 and Ammianus tells 
us that an imperial notary of his time was nicknamed Paulus Catena because he so heavily 
burdened his prisoners with restraints when travelling.
65
 There is ample visual evidence for 
the Romans restraining their captives and from these examples it appears that the Romans 
preferred neck-shackles in transporting captives.
66
 A Roman captive taken by the Germans in 
AD 9 was able to kill himself with the weight of the chains binding him to other prisoners.
67
 
The tombstone of a slave dealer namedTimotheus likewise depicts a troop of slaves chained 
at the neck.
68
 Of course rope also served as an implement of restraint and we find many 
depictions of captives in both Greek and Roman contexts with their hands bound behind their 
backs.
69
 
Once captured, prisoners may also have been enclosed within temporary pens as Diodorus 
suggests for the Carthaginian intentions concerning Greek captives in Sicily.
70
 Stocks, 
presumably for the holding of slaves were discovered at the Boscotrecase Villa,
71
 such 
implements could be used to contain large numbers of captives in the open, but there is no 
evidence that this was the case. For numerous captives it seems larger more permanent 
structures were favoured. The Athenians captured after their failed expedition to Sicily were 
kept in the stone quarries outside Syracuse.
72
 In 144 BC the Roman commander Sulpicius 
Galba had his troops construct camps to contain the Lusitanians, in this instance it was for the 
purpose of slaughter, but it was a common enough practice for the Lustanians not to be wary 
of it.
73
 During the first Judean revolt (AD 66-70) the Terichaean captives were marched to the 
                                                 
63
 Ov. Ep. 10.89; Sen. Dial. 6.20.2; Ep. 85.27; Sil. Pun. 17.169. 
64
 Plaut. Captiv. 1.107. 
65
 ‘Paul the Chain’ Amm. Marc. 15.3.4; 3.10, cf. Quint. 5.15. 
66
 For plates relating to this visual evidence see Bradley 2004, plates 5 and 6; Joshel 2010, 85 fig. b. For a 
textual reference see Lucilius 854. Slave collars may have been used for more trusted captives, though none 
uncovered have revealed a captive was tagged in such a way, see Thurmond 1994, 459-93. 
67
 Vell. Pat. 2.120.6 complexus catenarum quibus uinctus erat seriem, ita illas illisit capiti suo, ut protinus 
pariter sanguinis cerebrique effluuio expiraret. 
68
 See Duchêne 1986, 517 fig. 3. 
69
 For plates relating to visual evidence see Bradley 2004, plates 1,2,3,14,16. For numismatic examples see also 
references in Chapter 2. 
70
 Diod. Sic. 20.13.1-2, the pens are referred to as συνεργᾰσία. This seems also to refer to a workhouse of slaves 
as Diod. Sic. 34/35.2.36. later refers. The working aspect of a συνεργᾰσία is also emphasised by its alternative 
use as referring to a company or guild see SIG 704H26. The closest Latin equivalent is an ergastuum, for 
which Columella’s description (RR 1.6.3) clearly indicates was a work house of a permanent build. 
71
 Not. Scav. 1922, 459-67 fig. 3, see also George 2011, 395. 
72
 Thuc. 7.86. 
73
 App. Hisp 60, see Chapter 2. 
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arena in Tiberias where they were contained before being divided for various means of 
‘disposal.’74 It is unlikely that captives remained in the possession of the army for an 
extended period of time, their containment was simply to allow for ‘processing’ and once the 
slaves were auctioned it seems probable that they were then the sole burden of their 
purchasers.
75
 
 
Trade and Transport 
Whilst metropolitan Rome may have been the largest consumer of slaves it was not the only 
consumer. Slavery was a ubiquitous institution in the ancient world, though no society 
current with Rome could be considered a ‘slave-society’ in the strict economic sense;76 all 
required at least a limited supply of slaves to maintain their slave population. Slaves could be 
generated from the internal mechanics of a state whereby free people were reduced to 
slavery.
77
 Where reproduction amongst the slave population could not meet the demand of 
maintaining (or growing) the slave population, criminals, orphans and debtors amongst the 
free population could serve to supplement the shortfall. One might consider the replacement 
of agricultural slaves with serfs in Europe as exemplifying the replacement of a dependant 
labour shortfall on a mass scale.
78
 These practices were by no means limited to Rome. 
Furthermore, just because the Romans were the most successful imperialists should not imply 
that they were the only ones with imperial aspirations, nor were they the only producers of 
slaves as a by-product of successful war.
79
 Slavery was so prevalent in ancient societies that 
Strabo remarked on the spectacular absence of slaves amongst the Sacae Scythians and the 
Indians.
80
 The result was a wide range of markets for slaves where a sudden injection of 
                                                 
74
 Joseph. BJ  3.532-542, see Chapter 2. 
75
 Vishnia 2002, 270 has suggested that the lixae operating as a paramilitary group may well have participated in 
the act of ‘captive-taking,’ in Greek ληστεία (see Gabrielsen 2003, 390). She further suggests that the lixae 
may also have been contracted to aid in the disposal of captives. Unfortunately, there is no evidence to 
substantiate these suggestions and so they remain hypothetical, but given the difficulty of supervision, 
maintenance and transport of large numbers of people, it is not unlikely that the Roman army turned to 
‘contractors’ to facilitate the transfer of captives from the battlefield to the merchant. That the lixae operated 
closely with the legions is evident in epitaphs identifying an individual with both a lixa and a legion, CIL 
16.35; CIL 13.8732; and possibly CIL 3.11259), see Speidel 1984 I, 203-5. 
76
 A ‘slave society’ as defined by Hopkins 1978, 100-1.  
77
 See conclusion chapter. 
78
 See also the comment of Hopkins 1978, 100 n2 in pointing out the ‘Asiatic mode of production’ which 
allowed for an alternative means of dependant labour. 
79
 Taylor 2001, 28. For slavery amongst the Iron Age Gauls see Daubigney 1979, 145-93; amongst the Germans 
see Grünert 1969, 501-15; and the Scythians see Taylor 2001, 36f. 
80
 Strab. 7.3.9; 15.1.54. 
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captives into the economy could see a wide disbursement of chattels rather than a single flow 
from battlefield to Rome. According to Livy the Lusitanian captives taken in 151 BC were 
actually sold in Gaul,
81
 and the Cantabrians captured by Gaius Furnius in the late 20s BC 
were presumably sold in Spain as they went on to kill their masters and re-join the rebellion 
there.
82
 Roman traders were prolific by the end of the Republic and these cannot have 
capitalised solely on the trade between Rome and outlier regions.
83
  
The state was never interested in controlling the slave trade beyond the protection of Roman 
consumers.
84
 The only strict intervention by the state concerning any supply was that of the 
grain to Rome from North Africa and Sicily.
85
 It seems to have been a natural market in 
which the demand enticed traders to bring slaves to Rome, but there was no reason that the 
basic principles of demand also led traders to go elsewhere. Evidence from the imperial 
period demonstrates that Syria and Asia Minor were particularly important suppliers of slaves 
because they had, supposedly, few qualms about selling their own kind into slavery,
86
 and 
exposed children could be found throughout the ancient world.
87
 Whilst specific slave routes 
are hard to pinpoint in the manner of later slave systems, we can determine that there was a 
general trend of importing from beyond the Mediterranean in exchange for luxuries such as 
oil and wine which could not be produced (at least not of the quality demanded) in the 
regions beyond the Mediterranean.
88
  
                                                 
81
 Liv. Per. 49. 
82
 Cass. Dio 54.5.2 (enslaved); 54.11.2 (killed their masters). 
83
 Mithridates ordered the execution of all Italians and Romans within his domain, Memnon fr. 22.9 (FGrH 434) 
puts the figure at 60,000 executed by Mithridates orders in Asia, inclusive of the families. These must have 
been merchants capitalising on the trade from the Black Sea into the Mediterranean thereby serving all the 
markets therein.  
84
 Harris 1980, 124 suggested that the low tariff on slaves according to an inscription at Zraia in Numidia (CIL 
8.4508) indicates that the state may have tried to improve the slave supply to Italy, but he admits (p.137, n. 
81) this could also be reflective of a low price for slaves in the region. 
85
 Andreau 1994, 83-98. Harris 2007, 517 n. 20 remarked that heavy state involvement in the grain trade may be 
overestimated. Egypt was only a significant supplier during the Imperial period, see Garnsey 1983, 119-20. 
86
 In Asia Minor, Philostr. VA 8.7.12. Selling of children in Asia Minor under the early empire, Plin. Ep 10.65-
66, Bang 1910, 247, Westermann 1955, 97. The commonality of the East as a source of slaves is emphasised 
by Juv. Sat. 7.15. See Lewis 2011, 105-10 for an argument (contra the orthodox view set by Finley 1962, 51-
9) concerning the importance of slavery in Near Eastern (Persian influenced) regions. A region does not need 
to be devoid of slavery to be a significant producer of slaves, most notably West Africa in the 17
th
-19
th
 
centuries. 
87
 In Egypt as exemplified by wet-nursing contracts (P.Mich 121; 123; 238). Germans (Tac. Ann. 4.72) Asia 
Minor, ( Plut. Luc. 20). In law (Dig. 3.5.10; 21.1.65; 39.4.16.3), see Alföldi 1972, 125f.; Harris 1980, 123-4; 
and especially 1994, 1-22; Scheidel 1997, 164-6; 2011, 298-9. So too in the Greek world, see Tarn 1952, 100-
2; Cameron 1932, 105-14, contra Engels 1980, 112f.; Bennett 1923, 341-51. For exceptions to this practice 
see Strab. 17.2.5; Tac. Hist. 5.5. 
88
 Evident in a number of examples from early on: to Chios (FGrH 572); to the Balearics (Diod. Sic. 5.17.2-3); 
Gallic slaves were traded at the rate of an amphora per slave (Diod. Sic. 5.26.3); the Frisians traded their 
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Land routes certainly comprised a large portion of the slave trade, inevitably all journeys of 
origin to sale required at least a limited journey to a sea or river before an alternative means 
of transport could be used, although this may not have been necessary.
89
 Some strictly land 
trade routes are mentioned by our sources.
90
 The relief depicting a troop of slaves on the stele 
of Timotheus gives some indication of how slaves may have been transported over land. The 
men are depicted as chained at the neck, with the women and the children following and a 
single guard or trader leading the collared males along.
91
 Although one must be careful in 
drawing conclusions form a single depiction, it is likely that a smaller slave to guard ratio 
was favoured.
92
 The nature of overland travel also favoured multi-agent trading in which 
goods were passed between multiple merchants on the journey to the item’s final destination. 
Bradley, in considering the movement of slaves from Britain to Italy, envisioned a similar 
process of the slaves being passed from trader to trader.
93
 This sale from person to person and 
place to place served to alienate the slaves more and more from their homeland; furthermore, 
with each sale, the slave was less able to attribute their predicament to any one person.
94
 
Once cargo reached the Mediterranean the easiest means of transport over long distances was 
via the sea.
95
 The transport of large numbers of captives would have been a major logistical 
issue, demanding considerable resources in terms of manpower, ships and supplies for the 
functions of transportation and supervision. Despite the considerable need imposed on 
merchant vessels to transport slaves of the 1,189 examples in A.J. Parker’s survey of ancient 
shipwrecks there is no evidence of a slave ship, nor is there any archaeological evidence for 
specifically transport ships; even though ships of this type were evidently used for overseas 
                                                                                                                                                        
children for wine Tac. Hist 5.5; Gallic slaves into Italy (Afrani Gram. Lat. 1.119; Cic. Quinct. 6.2); cf. Horden 
& Purcell 2000, 390-1; Nicolet 1978, 684-93; Tchernia 1983, 97-8; Goudineau 1983, n.7. In the case of Gauls 
this was often analogous to their penchant for wine and drunkenness. Strab. 4.5 listed slaves as a chief export 
of Britain. 
89
 See below. Slaves in particular were well suited for land transport as they could move by their own propulsion 
and carry other goods and supplies. For injured, weak or difficult slaves a cart could also be used, perhaps 
with an affixed cage.  
90
 From Gaul into Italy (Cic. Quinct. 24f.), from the modern day Czech Republic and Slovakia across the 
Danube and Alps into northern Italy (Strab. 5.214) and later under the empire across the Rhine from Germany 
into the Roman empire (Tac. Agr. 28.3), cf. Harris 1980, 124. 
91
 Duchêne 1986, 513-30; Joshel 2010, 90-1. 
92
 The ratio in the trans-Atlantic slave trade aboard ships was 10:1. The stele of Timotheus shows 12 (8 males, 2 
females, 2 adolescents):1, but this may be a focus on the trader and his wares with the exclusion of any help.  
93
 Bradley 1994, 46. 
94
 Joshel 2010, 94; Bradley 1994, 46-7. ‘Natal alienation,’ Patterson 1981, 11-2. 
95
 The advantage of water transport was emphasised by earlier (primitivist) historians of the ancient economy 
such as Yeo 1946, 221-44; Finley 1973, 126-7; Duncan-Jones 1974, 1f). This has been challenged, notably by 
Hopkins 1978, 107 and more recently by Laurence 1998, 129-48 and Adams 2007, 1f. The slave trade, when 
carried out over significant distances, must have utilised sea transportation, but it cannot be said, one way or 
another, what means of conveyance slave traders preferred.  
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campaigns and in transporting people on heavily trafficked sea lanes such as from 
Brundisium to Dyrrachium.
96
 However, it must be said, wrecks are typically identified only 
through their cargo with storage vessels (mostly amphorae) being the only material that 
survives, the ship timbers rarely survive. Large-scale transport of slaves over the 
Meditteranean cannot be excluded through a lack of material evidence, but it can be 
demonstrated that this was not the only means of moving captives by sea, nor the most 
logical.
97
 
The typical means of travel by sea, with the exception of campaigning armies, was by 
merchant vessel. Such is the case in Petronius’ Satyricon when Encolpius and Giton boarded 
a ship transporting passengers as well as trade goods.
98
 The regular transport of grain from 
Egypt along the Levant and Turkish coast via Rhodes, Crete, the Peloponnese and Sicily 
made these ideal ferries for people wishing to travel between these destinations.
99
 So we are 
informed that Paul journeyed on a grain ship along with 297 other passengers from Caesarea 
to Rome.
100
 Since the hold of these ships was filled with grain, the passengers aboard these 
vessels seem to have spent the journey above the deck.
101
 Likewise, when Josephus was first 
brought to Rome, he lived above deck with the crew, although this may have been a privilege 
rather than a necessity.
102
 
There is no specific ship design which is preferable for the carrying of slaves. Despite a 
highly specialised trade in slaves with specific functional requirements, there was never any 
from of standardisation in the ships used in the Atlantic slave trade. Ship records of 
Guineamen sailing from Liverpool reveal that varying types of crafts were used and on 
average a Guineaman of the 18
th
-19
th
 centuries sailing from British ports was between 100-
                                                 
96
 Rougé 1966, 76-77 notes that the Brundisium-Dyrrachium route is the only known route which used 
specifically passenger ships rather than making auxiliary transports out of multipurpose merchantmen.  
97
 See below. The sporadic nature of largescale enslavements favoured the use of many small traders and a 
consortium of traders in other goods who could quickly disperse from the enslavement site to sell slaves many 
markets further away. The alternative of large scale transport to large market sites would not make sense 
economically for the traders as they could only command low prices through a flooded market. 
98
 Petr. Satyr. 99f. 
99
 Boese 1973, 169 -70 suggested that the grain ships were the most obvious means of transporting captives. He 
cites the possible financial backing of the negotiatores for large scale slave trade operations upon the sea. 
There is, however, no evidence to suggest this and it is far more likely that the involvement of the grain 
merchants was nothing more than allowing passage upon their ships without distinction between free and 
slave or dealers carrying slaves. That heavily trafficked sea-lanes were present is evident in the remark of Cic. 
Prov. cons. 12.31 that the cursus maritimi was freed up by Pompey’s clearance of the pirates from the 
Mediterranean. 
100
 Paul 27: 33-44. 
101
 Hirschfeld 1990, 28-29. 
102
 Joseph. Vit. 416. 
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250 tonnes.
103
 Ancient ships were comparable in size to those of the great age of sail, the 
grain ship Isis described by Lucian was large even by modern standards and grain ships were 
regularly larger than 300 tonnes.
104
 The Syrakusia as described by an otherwise unknown 
writer named Moschion (preserved through Athenaeus) is the largest known ship from the 
ancient world estimated at over 1,700 tonnes.
105
 In his survey of ship wrecks Parker found 
that the most common vessels were under 75 tonnes and large vessels, those exceeding 250 
tonnes, were considerably more rare and generally confined to the first centuries BC and 
AD.
106
 Whilst the shipwright capabilities could produce large vessels, harbour limitations 
meant the largest freighters could not exceed 500 tonnes.
107
 
Military transports are the only examples which can give any indication of the average 
number of passengers per ship: in 81 BC Pompey sent 7 legions from Sicily to Africa in 800 
Transports.
108
 In Caesar’s first channel crossing he used 80 ships to transport two legions 
with an additional 18 ships to carry the cavalry,
109
 and in his second crossing he used 800 
ships to carry 5 legions with 2,000 additional horses.
110
 Accepting a notional average of 
6,000 men per legion (allowing for both the attrition of regular forces and the addition of 
support personnel) we find that the typical number of men per ship from these journeys is 
80.
111
 If the average ship size was 75 tonnes then the ratio of soldiers to tonnage was 
approximately 1:1. 
                                                 
103
 Derived from the Lord Liverpool Papers of 1798 which recorded the size of ships and the number of slaves 
that were to be carried upon departure from Africa. The specific average is 209 tonnes. MSS #384i6, items 
300-30I British Library. An accessible table of the record was produced by Garland and Klein 1985, 244-246. 
104
 Luc. Nav. 4-7. Estimates have always varied, see Casson 1950, 52-6 who gives an estimate of roughly 1,200 
– 1,300 tonnes, equivalent to a medium sized frigate of the early 19th century.   
105
Athenaeus 206d-209e For the passage with a translation see Casson 1971,191-99. The ship was built under 
Heiro II of Syracuse in the later the third century BC. For estimates of its size see Casson 1971: 184-186; 
Duncan-Jones 1977: 331-332; Torr 1964: 27. For a list of large ancient ships including the Syracusia see 
MacIntosh 1991, 106 table 1. 
106
 Parker 1992, 26. For a brief overview of Parker’s findings see Rauh 2003, 105-107. See also the comments 
of Patterson 1998, 152-3 on the interpretation of the economy through shipwrecks, particularly the difficulty 
in interpreting scale. 
107
 Casson 1971, 171-173. 
108
 Plut. Pomp. 11.2. 
109
 Caes. B Gall. 4.22. 
110
 Caes. B Gall. 5.8. 
111
 7 legions (42,000)/ 800 ships = 52.5 per ship; 2 legions (12,000 ignoring additional ships for cavalry)/ 80 = 
150 per ship; 5 legions (30,000 + 2,000)/ 800 = 40 per ship. A mean of the averages = 81. Interestingly, the 
ratio of men to ship for Caesar’s second crossing was similar to that of the invasion force of Normandy in 
1944 when 160,000 troops were transported in approximately 5,000 ships yielding an average of 32 per craft, 
but the division of squads into platoons and the carrying of armoured vehicles pushed it to 40 per craft. 
Likewise Caesar’s forces may have been divided along the lines of half centuries with a centurion or optio 
leading the men in each craft. 
 Chapter 7  
192 
 
In the specialised trade of slaves across the Atlantic an average slave to crewman ratio of 
10:1 was observed at the end of the 18th century.
112
 Unfortunately, there is no surviving 
evidence from the ancient world (as far as I am aware) which could suggest such a ratio, but 
it can safely be asserted that it would have required at least as many crewman as the well-
established trans-Atlantic slave trade which utilised firearms and transported slaves who were 
largely ignorant of large sailing vessels.
113
 Furthermore, the maintenance of passengers 
required food stores and water which took up considerable stowage space. The slave ships of 
the British slave trade generally had a ratio of 2.5 slaves per tonne which included both room 
for the slaves and stowage.
114
 The long transatlantic voyage required more of the ship’s hold 
to be devoted for the stowage of supplies, in contrast the coastal routes favoured in the 
Mediterranean allowed for more frequent revictualing and so more space could be spared for 
slaves. However, crew sizes were also larger, with galleys requiring far more men than 
vessels that relied primarily on sails; slim war galleys were therefore unsuitable for the 
transport of people, at least below deck.  
Undoubtedly the transport of slaves by sea required a considerable amount of manpower and 
resources. As seen above, the ratio for supervision to captives requirement was at least 10:1, 
the typical slave to ship tonnage ratio was roughly 3:1 and the average ship was around 75 
tonnes meaning the average capability for the transport of human cargo per ship was 225. 
These figures are certainly not exact, but they are conservatively favourable to the Romans 
ability to carry slaves across the sea. In the table below are examples of where Roman 
historians suggested captives were brought en masse across the sea and how many ships and 
guards would have been required based on the calculations above.  
 
 
 
                                                 
112
 Eltis 1999 # 90350. 
113
 See the compelling recreation of an African’s journey from the coast to a slave ship in the introduction of 
Rediker 2007, 1-4.  
114
 Tonne is used here in regards to space within the hold, not the weight of supply. Tonnes are used to measure 
ship size; tonnage refers to the dead weight capacity of a ship. Measuring a ship’s dead tonnage capacity is a 
difficult and by no means finite process, and it was not until the 19
th
 century that accurate calculations could 
be made of existing ships. 3 slaves per tonne was not unheard of (see Clarkson 1786, 128) and legislation tried 
to bring the ratio down for humanitarian reasons, the Dolben Act of 1788 (Donnan 1930-1935, 582-589) 
reduced the ratio to 1.6 per tonne and a more precise limitation based on square footage in 1799 gave 8 ft
2 
per 
slave, which equated to generally 2 per tonne (cf. Garland & Klein 1985: 239-240; Anstey 1975, 330-331). 
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Number of Slaves/Source Reference Ships          Guards 
20,000 
(Africa 256 BC) 
Polyb. 1.29.7 89 2,000 
8,000 
 (Africa 204 BC) 
Liv. 29.29.3 36 800 
c. 40,000  
(Sardinia 177 BC) 
Liv. 41.51.10 
Zon. 8.20 
178 4,000 
50,000  
(Carthage 146 BC) 
App. Pun 130 222 5,000 
III. Ship and Guard Requirements for Sea Transport 
 
What can be drawn from the few examples above is that the direct transport of large numbers 
of captives back to Rome required a considerable number of ships as well as substantial 
manpower. The preoccupation of the state in transporting and supplying its troops as well as 
bringing back the booty that would be deposited directly into the treasury, meant that the 
transport of captives would have been a noteworthy encumbrance to the already burdened 
logistical vessels of the navy; but there is no indication from the sources that the navy was 
ever over-burdened by captives, which would be expected if, indeed, all the captives 
mentioned in the sources were transported back to Italy by the navy. As explained above, the 
transport of captives, particularly in small quantities per ship was not limited to any specific 
type of merchant vessel, and so the transport of captives by sea for the purpose of sale as 
slaves was likely made by smaller merchant ships who, driven by market demand, visited 
many different markets before reaching Rome.  
So far none of the 1,000 plus wrecks of the Greco-Roman period have revealed anything that 
would indicate they carried slaves.
115
 The lack of evidence does not negate the fact that slaves 
were transported by sea as, according to the written sources, some clearly were.
116
 This 
                                                 
115
 Only one wreck of the Roman period included chains: the well preserved wreck of Madrague De Giens of 
the mid first century BC. The chains of this wreck are thought to be part of the rigging, cf. Parker 1992, 249 
#616. In contrast, for the trans-Atlantic slave trade fetters and chains have been discovered at the wreck off 
Florida which has been identified as the Henrietta Marie, a known slave ship, which sunk around the year 
1700, see Palmer 2002, 77-99. The only other known shipwreck of the trans-Atlantic slave trading period is 
the Danish slaver Fredensborg which sunk in 1789, see Svalesen 2000, passim.  For the difficulty of 
identifying slave ships of the trans-Atlantic trade see Webster 2005, 245-58. 
116
 See examples in table above. Most wrecks are identified by the remains of amphorae rather than the 
remnants of the actual vessel. For the most part, organic material does not survive, and human beings, free or 
slave, were not likely to go down where the ship sank. As a result human remains are rare within ancient 
shipwrecks. Only a couple of wrecks actually contain human remains: Parker 1992, 263 #661; 451 #1230.  
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absence of evidence only indicates that the transportation of slaves upon the sea was unlikely 
to have been dependent upon specific slave ships. Merchants like Petronius’ fictional 
Trimalchio probably dealt with a variety of goods including slaves rather than specialising.
117
 
In the beginning of the Atlantic slave trade (roughly the 16
th
 and early 17
th
 centuries) slaves 
tended to be shipped via different agents from point to point so that a slave taken in West 
Africa may be sent to the Cape Verde Islands, then to the Canary Islands, then to 
Spain/Portugal, then to the Azores and then finally to the New World where a similar series 
of short haul journeys would conduct them to the interiors of South America.
118
 Some factors 
made this method of transporting slaves along a staggered journey, calling at several ports 
(cabotage) advantageous over a long haul method. First, the technology for long sea voyages 
was less developed than later periods and the shorter the journey the better the condition of 
the ship before it could be repaired in port. Second, there were still many places that used 
slaves in Europe and the Atlantic islands where at this time important manufacturers of cash 
crops such as sugar, which used slave labour for farming these crops. Third, only certain 
people were permitted to trade in certain places such as the Lanςados in Africa, Portuguese in 
the Cape Verde Islands or the Spanish in the Canary Islands. Eventually, advancements in 
long voyage seafaring; the establishment of British, French and Dutch colonies; and the 
decrease in slave consumption in Europe and the Atlantic islands meant single trading vessels 
were able, and willing, to undergo the notorious triangular trade route.
119
 Like the slave 
traders of the 16
th
 and early 17
th
  centuries, the mariners that traded between India and Egypt 
practiced a system of cabotage. According to the Periplus Maris Erythraei traders passed 
through several different ports trading slaves in both directions.
120
 The common factor for the 
preference of the cabotage method of trading slaves was the existence of several different 
markets dotted along a single journey.  
                                                 
117
 Petr. Satyr. 76.6. Joshel 2010, 91-2. It is important to note that the shipwreck survey of Parker 1992, passim 
reveals that in roughly half the wrecks only a single commodity was identified, but this could be due to 
preservation. Wine, oil and, on occasion, other foodstuffs were kept in amphorae which are typically all that 
remains of wrecks, other items such as lentils, grains, livestock and slaves would not be preserved or 
necessarily sink with a deck-less ship. 
118
 Cf. Thomas 1997, 116f. For African conflicts contributing towards the supply of the trans-Atlantic slaves 
trade see Thornton 1999. 
119
 Thomas 1997, 116f. 
120
 For a translation and commentary of the text see Casson 1989. Ports that traded slaves included Malaô on 
which exported slaves on rare occasions (8.30); from Opônê better-quality slaves were exported mainly to 
Egypt (13.4); an island named Dioscuridês imported female slaves due to a shortage from India and the Greek 
traders operating in the region (30.23-4); Omana exported slaves to Arabia and Barygaza (36.11-2). Ozênê 
imported female slaves to serve as concubines for the king of Barygaza along with slave musicians (49.1). 
 Chapter 7  
195 
 
Inevitably the lack of written and material evidence limits our current understanding of the 
Roman slave trade.
121
 Furthermore it is difficult to differentiate between material evidence 
associated with the trafficking of captives and that of other sources of slaves. Slave 
merchants are also hard to identify, and it is likely that the vast majority of human traffickers 
were not specialists in human wares. The conditions following a mass enslavement favoured 
smaller traders who were used to trading small numbers of slaves in multiple markets. The 
sudden flood of slaves in one area may have compelled them to take on more slaves than they 
typically would have, but these would have been purchased for considerably less, and they 
could have fanned out from the area of capture to bring the slaves to markets more 
advantageous to the seller.
122
 What is clear is that mass enslavements did not require large or 
permanent markets. Instead a number of buyers from a range of nationalities and a myriad of 
intended markets converged on the auction of captives creating a highly ramified market that 
spread throughout the Mediterranean with Rome as a central rather than a sole market.
123
 
 
                                                 
121
 Finley 1968, 231; George 2011, 391. 
122
 It is also worth noting that slaves carried in fewer numbers were less likely to perish. In the editor’s notes to 
the 18
th
 century essay on the British slave trade of Thomas Clarkson 1786, 129 it was noted that slave 
mortality was generally believed to be one in five aboard English vessels, whereas French slave ships, which 
were typically larger, the mortality rate was far worse.  
123
 So Braund 2011, 113 also summarises the Greek slave supply as a “much-ramified” market. I can see no 
reason why the Roman period would dry up the slave systems already in place apart from its superior draw 
upon the market.  
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Conclusion 
The War Captive Contribution to the Slave Supply 
 
The paucity in the sources relating to captures, specifically the lack of consistentcy in 
reporting the numbers taken, as well as the outcome of their capture, makes it difficult to 
assess the significance of this source of supply.
1
 Given our inability to accurately estimate the 
number of slaves at any one time, we cannot, even if reliable evidence for enslavement 
numbers were available, equate (with any real accuracy) the contributing value of captives to 
the slave supply. However, if the figures are taken in total and can be significantly reduced 
(cut in half by my estimate), then something, albeit more algorithmic in style, can be said 
regarding the captive slave supply – it was considerably less important to the maintenance of 
slave numbers in Italy then most historians have believed. 
Demographers have attempted to produce total figures for slaves in Italy and the Empire as a 
whole. Figures for the slave population in Italy have been developed comprehensively from a 
range of data, but for the Empire the total population has been speciously built on a mediation 
between the high numbers assumed in Italy and the low figures evidenced in Egypt, the only 
province outside Italy for which we have enough material evidence to construct a quantifiable 
slave population.
2
 Demographic evidence outside of metropolitan Rome is very limited in the 
period covered in this study, and is generally restricted to later remarks on the findings of 
censuses from the Imperial period.
3
 For modern demographers the analysis of the Roman 
population, and particularly of the slave population, has been confined to the first century BC 
and the early Imperial period, as there is a greater range of data concerning populations in the 
ancient sources from this time. Since the extent of Roman dominion was limited to peninsular 
Italy and Sicily for much of the Republican period to 146 BC, only the slave population for 
Italy, rather than the wider Empire figure, needs to be considered here. Fortunately, the work 
of Beloch and Brunt also included Sicily, the islands of Corsica and Sardinia and Cisalpine 
Gaul, and so a more accurate picture of the slave and free populations within Roman 
                                                 
1
 Noted by Scheidel 2011, 294-9. 
2
 The slave population is calculated based on the slave presence in the census returns preserved at Oxyrhynchus, 
see Bagnall et al. 1997, 98; Bagnal & Frier 1994, 49-71. 
3
 For references in the sources to these returns and a summation of their figures see Frank 1930, 313-24; Brunt 
1971, 61-99. 
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controlled territory up to the mid second century can be made. The demand for slaves in 
Sicily, which was well known to have utilised slave labour in agriculture, would greatly 
affect the demand for slaves during the period covered in this study.
4
 For the later half of the 
second century BC assessing the demand for slaves within Roman territory is complicated by 
the acquisition of North Africa, which from the end of the second century, was also known 
for estate style farming.
5
  
Unlike the free population, which can be determined (at least roughly) through the census 
data, there is no straightforward means of estimating the number of slaves. Overall slave 
numbers for Rome or Italy are never mentioned by written sources. Instead, the slave 
population must be determined by establishing the proportion of slaves in the total 
population. Establishing a correct proportionality is also difficult. Though we have at least 
some indication of the number of slaves in specific locations, it is difficult to establish the 
proportion for a wider region, inclusive of multiple rural and metropolitan populations. At 
least ancient writers give us some rough figures to work with. In the second century AD the 
physician Galen noted that the city of Pergamum contained 40,000 citizens and that if 
‘women and slaves’ were added to the citizens, the total came to about 120,000.6 This led 
Brunt to estimate that slaves comprised 1/3 of the Pergamene population, considering 
Pergamum’s wealth, it is likely they had a higher proportion of slaves than most 
Mediterranean cities; Brunt believed Rome to have an even higher total.
7
 Dionysius had 
commented that in 493 BC the citizens of Rome amounted to 110,000 and represented around 
a quarter of the total population.
8
 Brunt took this figure as supportive of an early presence of 
the 1/3 slave proportion. However in doing so, Brunt may have equally underestimated the 
size of the free ‘non-citizens’ (women and children).9 Free males not counted as citizens 
would also imply a higher proportion of women and children within this undefined group so 
that the proportion of slaves may be significantly reduced in Dionysius’ observation.  
                                                 
4
 For farming methods in Sicily and the common use of slave labour see White 1967, 75; 1970, 75-6; Finley 
1968, 131. 
5
 For farming and slave use in North Africa (circum Carthage) see Diod. Sic. 20.8.3-4; Kehoe 1988, 24-7. A 
Carthaginian agronomist named Mago was known to have influenced Roman studies on the subject (Varro 
Rust. 1.1.10; 2.1.27), cf. White 1970,18. 
6
 Galen. 5.49. Ignoring children in this estimate (Mattern 2013, 125), the ratio is equal between citizens, women 
and slaves, see Brunt, 1971, 124; Westermann 1955, 87. 
7
 Brunt 1971, 124. 
8
 Dion. Hal. 6.96.4. 
9
 Brunt 1971, 124 suggested that Dionysius was comparing fifth century Rome to equivalent Greek cities of his 
day.  
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Evidence for an extensive slave population in the later Republic is supported by the size of 
Spartacus’ army, which Beloch estimated at around 120,000 and Brunt at 150,000.10 
Surprisingly the sudden loss of so many slaves was never commented on in the sources and 
Brunt felt that the loss of such a large number of slaves would only pass comment if the total 
population was high enough that 150,000 represented only a minor fraction. Apart from these 
grandiose statements, smaller, and decidedly less boastful, examples of slave numbers 
contribute empirically to give us some indication of the overall slave population. This has 
been especially the case from papyrological evidence in Egypt, from which regional census 
for the purpose of tax collection recorded the number of slaves in households; this provides 
ample evidence for slave holding by individuals from the first century BC outside Italy.
11
  
The total number of slaves has been calculated by estimating the number of citizens and then 
identifying a proportion of slaves in relation to this figure, this is usually equal to the number 
of citizens and is useless when accounting for widespread granting of citizenship as occurred 
from the first century onwards.
12
 Another approach has been to analyse the subsistence 
capacity of Italy thereby calculating the number of people which could be supported, again 
with an assumed slave to free ratio. This second approach proposed by de la Mallé in 1870 
was a significant check on Blair’s presumed total of nearly 21 million slaves to 7 million 
free.
13
 Based on the amount of food produced and imported to Italy and a tax imposed on 
slaves,
14
 Beloch estimated that the slave population was approximately 2 million out of a 
total of 4.5 million inhabitants (excluding Gallia Cisalpina).
15
 Brunt rejected this, but then 
tenuously and without supportive evidence suggested that the slave population was closer to 
3 million out of a total of 7.5 million (including Gallia Cisalpina).
16
 More recently Scheidel 
has calculated slave numbers through more aggregated methods and arrived at an estimate of 
between 1 and 1.5 million for Roman Italy.
17
 The reduction of slave numbers from Brunt’s 
estimate to Scheidel’s is a result of a decreased allowance for the proportion of slaves in rural 
Italy. Traditionally it was argued that the majority of slaves were occupied in farming, 
                                                 
10
 Beloch 1886, 415-418; Brunt 1971, 122; 287-8. 
11
 For examples see Westermann 1955, 887-89; Scheidel 2011, 291-2. 
12
 Particularly the increase of 463,000 in 85 BC (Jerome 61.173.4) to 900,000 in 69 BC (Liv. Per. 98) and 
4,063,000 in 28 BC (August. Res Gest. 2.2).  
13
 Blair 1833, 15 n. B; de la Mallé 1840, 252. See also Scheidel 2001, 5; 2005, 64. The difficulty in this method 
is quantifying the efficiency and capacity of Roman farming methods. 
14
 Tax on slaves (Cass. Dio 47.14.16), cf. Brunt 1971 123. 
15
 Beloch 1886, 415-18; cf. Brunt 1971, 122-4. 
16
 Brunt 1971, 124. 
17
 Scheidel 2005, 77. Though Scheidel is more comfortable with an overall figure of roughly 10% of the 
empire’s population. 
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particularly in plantation style farming.
18
 However, more recently the extent of slaves within 
the rural population, particularly in a disproportionate manner with the metropolitan Rome 
has been questioned by Jongman, who believes our interpretation of the Roman model has 
been too heavily influenced by American plantation systems.
19
 Jongman points to the rich 
epigraphic evidence for slaves and freedmen over variant professions making them prevalent 
at all levels, not to mention the large staffs of Rome’s elite and middle classes which could 
have accounted for the interpretation of such a significant population.
20
 
Of course a figure of between 1 and 3 million slaves in Italy represents the high watermark of 
slaves in Italy.
21
 Figures for the slave population earlier than the first century BC are highly 
conjectural, if we are to accept the slave to citizen ratio (evident in a 1/3 slave populace) then 
there were approximately 250,000 slaves in 323 BC (during the Second Samnite War)
22
 and 
270,000 in 234 BC. As a comparison with this method, Brunt estimated that the slave 
population around 225 BC was 500,000,
23
 and Scheidel with more scientific deduction 
reasoned that the population was more likely to be around 300,000 in 225 BC.
24
 Precision 
aside, all demographic studies indicate that the slave population increased substantially from 
a small population in early Rome to a very large population in the first century. Such a 
growth would see, at the lower end, 300,000 rise to 1 million over 200 years at a annual rate 
of 0.6%, and at the higher end, from 500,000 to 3 million at a rate of 0.9%.
25
 
                                                 
18
 Brunt 1971, 124-5; Harris 1999, 69; Hopkins 1978, 105f.; Rathbone 1983, 160-8. Martin 1972, 267-98. White 
1970, 350f. Too much has perhaps been made of the pervasiveness of chained field hands (compediti) Cato 
Agr. 56 Columella Rust. 1.18.6; Plin HN 18.4, cf. Wiedemann 1981, 130. For a re-evaluation fo this see 
Launaro 2011. Likewise a reassessment of villa farming favourable to reproduction and the employment of 
women has been made by Roth 2007. 
19
 Jongman 2003, 116. See also Launaro 2011. 
20
 Jongman 2003, 116-119. 
21
 Hin 2008, 187-238 and Lo Cascio 1994, 23-40 estimates of 1.5 and 1.8 million slaves in Italy also fall within 
this range. However, Lo Cascio importantly argued that Italy had a free population in the first century BC of 
nearly 12 million, making the proportion of slaves significantly lower than other estimates. Few have agreed 
with Lo Cascio’s high estimate of the Italian population. 
22
 Liv. 9.19.2. If we reverse the calculation below to show -0.6% then the population size in 323 BC would be 
approximately 167,000 slaves. 
23
 This keeps with his favoured 40% proportion of slaves in the population. The free population is deduced from 
the census figure of 234 BC and the manpower of Rome and her allies in 225 BC according to Polyb. 2.24.1-
17, see Beloch 1886, 413f. 
24
 Scheidel 2005, 76, based on 7% of the population being slaves as evident in the census records for the 
population outside of Alexandria, deduced from P. Oxy  984, cf. Scheidel 2001, 149 n.2. .For doubts over this 
figure and the use of Egypt as a rural model see Harris 1999, 64-5. 
25
 The annual increase must take into account exponential growth, therefore the calculation I have used is the 
standard equation: P(t)=P0e
rt
.
 
End population=P (1 or 3 million), time expressed in years = t (200), Initial 
population=P0 (300,000 or 500,000), growth rate=r. But this is of course a steady growth rate and useful only 
as a hypothetical guide. We might compare the growth rate assumed for the slave population in Rome to the 
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Boese believed that the large scale acquisition of war captives to be the impetus behind 
increasing the slave population, and the chief means of supply during the early to mid-
Republic.
26
 According to him, enslavement through capture in war amounted to 1.8 million 
slaves between 200 BC and 31 BC, nearly 2/3 his estimated total slave supply.
27
 More 
recently Scheidel compiled a list of enslavements beginning with the Third Samnite War to 
illustrate how the Roman slave supply was conducted on a large scale from the beginning of 
the third century BC.
28
 For the period spanning 297-167 BC he estimates that between 
672,000 and 731,000 captives were enslaved.
29
 Taken together the tallies of Boese and 
Scheidel suggest the enslavement of nearly 2.4 million captives.
30
  
Boese’s estimates favour the inflated figures given in the sources, his total takes into account 
one million enslaved in Gaul by Caesar
31
 and 150,000 captured at Aquae Sextiae by Marius 
in 102 BC;
32
 the figures given for Greece account for the enslavement of all persons captured, 
including those that were said to be recovered as well as the extraordinary figure of 150,000 
enslaved at Epirus (which I have earlier cautioned against accepting).
33
 It is difficult to 
establish how he derives the tally of 85,000 for Spain and 145,000 for Sardinia, Sicily and 
Africa without considerable inflation of the number of captives taken in the rare instances 
where figures were actually given by the sources.
34
 In the previous chapters the interpretation 
that the Romans enslaved all the prisoners of war has been argued against, particularly the 
wholesale enslavement of captives during the Third Samnite War and the First and Second 
                                                                                                                                                        
staggering growth rate of the world’s population at the turn of the 21st century (2000-5), which according to 
the CIA fact book of 2009, was roughly 1%. 
26
 Boese 1973, 51-3.  
27
 Boese 1973, 81 gives a breakdown of these figures (p.87-8): 225,000 from Illyria, Greece and Macedon; 
200,000 from Asia minor; 75-150,000 in Northern Italy; 85,000 in Spain; 1 million from Gaul; 85-145,000 
from Sardinia, Sicily and Africa.  
28
 Scheidel 2011, 295.  
29
 Scheidel 2011, 295 estimates: 58-77,000 Third Samnite War; 107-133,000 First Punic War; 32,000 Gallic 
War; 172-186,000 Second Punic War; 153,000 Wars in Spain, Macedon, Gaul and Asia; 150,000 from Epirus.  
30
 150,000 from Epirus and 153,000 from various wars cited by Scheidel 2011, 295. These overlap with Boese’s 
totals.  
31
 App. Gall. 2. 
32
 150,000 according to Liv. Per. 68; interestingly Eutrop. 5.1.4 only puts the figure at 80,000 capta, and Oros. 
5.16.20 at 60,000; Plut. Mar. 21.2 gives a figure of over 100,000 either killed or captured. Westermann 1955, 
62 was also sceptical of Livy’s figures. We could add 8,000 captured in a prior skirmish, Flor. 1.38.15; Oros. 
5.16.12.  
33
 For my scepticism of this figure in general see chapt. 6.  
34
 Boese 1973, 87 cites Beloch’s population estimates for these regions as the basis for his calculations. This 
may be an exaggeration of the size size of Spanish cities captured, as well as the number of Numidians taken 
during the war with them. Sallust is not forthcoming with figures. For captures in the Jugurthine war see Sall. 
Iug. 69.3; 74.2; 91.6; 101.11. For enslavements in Spain calculated by Boese, but not covered in this study, 
see App. Hisp 68;77; 98; 99; Plut. Sert. 3.5. The only raw figure we have for Spain is from Oros. 5.5.12 6,000 
Lusitanians captured in 137 BC. 
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Punic Wars. It has been put forward that only a small fraction of the captives taken by the 
Romans were, in fact, enslaved during these three conflicts. A tentative figure of 100,000 will 
be used to reflect this reduction (and I would be happy with a lower figure). Boese’s 
estimates for eastern enslavements and those in Spain, Africa and Sardinia could also be 
reduced by as much as half. The figure of 150,000 enslaved Epirotes has been rejected as 
impossible and likewise the million enslaved Gauls, which has been questioned by others, 
should perhaps be reduced to 150,000.
35
 In total, for a period approximately 300 – 100 BC, it 
is not unreasonable to believe that fewer than 1 million captives were actually enslaved with 
500,000 serving as a conservative benchmark.  
In order to understand the implication of this much reduced figure, it is necessary to 
understand what the slave demand was. A reduction in the slave population, ipso facto the 
minimum slave demand, was affected by two key factors: death and manumission. Mortality 
rates in the ancient world are not easy to identify, we know that they are low by modern 
comparison, but this is, in part, skewed by the high infant mortality rate.
36
 Likewise 
class/wealth may have played a more significant role, particularly with regards to the servile 
class who may not have been as well-nourished as other classes.
37
 The highest death rate in 
New World slavery was 15% amongst new arrivals to the West Indies during the eighteenth 
century, but generally the death rate was closer to 5%; death rates amongst slaves in the ‘New 
World’ were typically 1-3% higher than that of the free population.38 It is unlikely that the 
mortality rate for slaves in Rome would fall below the 19
th
 century average, and so it may 
serve as a base estimate (a higher mortality rate would increase the need for imports, only 
further proving the point to be made). Manumission rates are similarly difficult to establish, 
the rate of manumission and the affect upon slave reproduction have been frequently debated 
                                                 
35
 Westermann 1955, 62; Boese 1973, 84 is sceptical. For enslavements in Gaul: 53,000 Aduatuci sold (Caes. B 
Gall. 2.33.7); Venetti sold into slavery (3.16.4); few escape capture at Genabum (7.11.8); and captives from 
Alesia given to soldiers (7.89.5). Also Ceasar ordered his troops to leave their slaves behind when leaving 
Italy to confront Pompey (Caes. B.Civ. 3.6), these were not necessarily acquired through war and cannot have 
amounted to enough to justify a million slaves, contra Boese 1973, 102 n.170. Cf. Volkmann 1990, 51-2. 
36
 See Parkin 2013, 40-61; 1992, 93; Harlow & Laurence 2002, 7-8. In America in 1850, the only antebellum 
census for which infant mortality can be assessed, the infant mortality for the white population was 21.6 % 
and for the black population (mostly slaves) 34%, see Steckel 1986, 427-65. 
37
 Harris 1980, 118; Schumacher 2001, 42, contra Scheidel 2005, 74. 
38
 For slave mortality in the West Indies see Ward 1988, 127. Arriving at overall mortality rates is difficult given 
the reporting of deaths during the 19
th
 century, see Pope 1992, 267-8. For19th century population statistics see 
Klein 2004, passim. As a comparison the current death rate in the United Kingdom is 0.93% (9.33 
deaths/1,000 population). Mortality rates may also have varied between urban and rural populations, see 
Scheidel 2005, 74.  
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by scholars.
39
 There was obviously variance in the rate of manumission from year to year,
40
 
which would have changed the annual shortfall of slaves, however a rough estimate still 
demonstrates the point being made, as it is not affected by a significant drop or increase in the 
annual need for slaves. For the purpose of moderation, Scheidel’s intermediate estimate for 
manumission is used, which suggests 10% of slaves were manumitted by the age of 25 with a 
further 10% every five years, is used.
41
 Overall Scheidel used 0.57% for determining the 
annual manumission rate,
42
 but for easier estimation, a figure of .5% is used. The 
manumission rate added to the mortality rate would produce an annual deficit of 5.5%. With 
the annual increase in the population added, we may hypothetically interpret the annual need 
for slaves during the first three centuries BC between 5-6%. With an initial population of 
300,000 slaves, the annual need would have been 18,000 and a population of 1 million would 
have required approximately 60,000 per annum. The table below shows the annual slave 
demand and the contribution of war captives towards that demand over the period 299 – 50 
BC. 
IV. Captive Contribution to the Slave Supply 
Years Slave Pop. 
(Median)
43
 
Annual Need 
(6%) 
War Captives per annum 
     High                             Low 
Contribution % 
299-250 BC 262,000 15,720 5,000 2,500 31.8-15.9% 
249-200 BC 354,000 21,240 6,000 3,500 28.3-16.5% 
199-150 BC 478,000 28,680 7,000 3,000 24.4-10.5% 
149-100 BC 645,000 38,700 8,000 4,000 20.7-10.3% 
99-50 BC 870,000 52,200 22,000 8,000 42.2-15.3% 
 Total: 2.4 million 1.05 million  
 
                                                 
39
 Cf. Wiedemann 1985, 162-175. Alföldi 1972, 114 suggested that almost all slaves could expect to be 
manumitted. See Harris 1999, 70. 
40
 Restrictions placed on manumission by Augustus suggest a high rate of manumission at the end of the first 
century BC necessitating its regulation through the Lex Fufia Caninia in 2 BC (Gaius Inst. 1.42) and the Lex 
Aelia Sentia in AD 4 (Gaius Inst. 1.1.17). 
41
 Scheidel 1997, 160. 
42
 Scheidel 1997, 163 (5.7 per 1,000). He has since adjusted this to a higher manumission rate of 0.7% and 
1.75% for the rural and urban populations respectively, see Scheidel 2005, 76. 
43
 Assuming an end population of 1,000,000 in 50 BC and rounded to the nearest 1,000 using the equation 
P(t)=P0e
rt
,
 
with intervals of 50 years. 
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The table above illustrates the importance of alternative supplies of slaves apart from capture 
in war. Importantly this also shows that war captives, even by the highest estimates (ignoring 
the anomaly created by Caesar’s million), only contributed at most a third of the necessary 
slaves, and by the lower estimate, favoured in this study, only about a sixth. Furthermore, the 
acquisition of war captives were not as well spread out as the above table implies. Warfare 
enslavements were sporadic, even from the third century, when there is ample evidence 
regarding warfare, there are still considerable gaps of time between enslavements.  
Such gaps include: ten years elapsed between the enslavement of the women and children of 
the Senones in 284 BC and the possible enslavement of Pyrrhus’ soldiers after Beneventum.44 
During the First Punic War over a decade elapses between the capture of Punic soldiers at 
Himera in 252 BC and the sea battle of the Aegates Islands in 241 BC.
45
 During the second 
century twelve years elapsed between the supposed enslavement of Epirus in 167 and the 
capture of Delminium in 155 BC.
46
 After the siege of Numantia in 133 BC it is more than a 
decade before the next possible enslavement at Vindalium in 121 BC.
47
 The gaps between 
enslavements increase during the First century so that it is more than 20 years between the 
reduction of Mithridates followers in 86 BC and the possible enslavement of Jews at 
Jerusalem by Pompey in 63 BC,
48
 likewise the enslavement of Lycians by Brutus in 42 BC is 
not repeated until the enslavement of the Salassi by the general Varro in 25 BC.
49
 Minor 
raiding or unrecorded enslavements could have made up some shortfall, but these cannot 
have negated the fact that the demand for slaves was more steady than their acquisition 
through Roman war efforts.  
This significant reduction in the supply of slaves through war captives increased the demand 
upon other sources of slaves, these included: self-sale, child exposure, enslavement for debt 
or as punishment, trade from outside the empire, kidnapping/piracy and reproduction.
50
 It is 
                                                 
44
 Senones, App. Sam. 13; Gall. 9; Liv. Per. 12; Oros. 3.22.12-15; Polyb. 2.19.11; Beneventum Oros. 4.2.6. 
45
 Himera Diod. 23.21.1; Zon 8.14. Aegates Islands Diod. 24.11.2; Eutrop. 2.27; Oros. 4.10.7; Polyb. 1.61.6-8. 
46
 Epirus App. Ill. 29.4; Liv. 45.34.5; Polyb. 30.15; Strab. 7.7.3. Delminium Zon. 9.25. 
47
 Numantia App. Hisp. 98. Vindalium Oros. 5.13.3. 
48
 Followers of Mithridates App. Mithr. 61; Jerusalem Philo legatio ad Gaium 23. 
49
 Lycian cities reduced by Brutus (App. BC 4.80; Plut. Brut. 31.6) similarly Cassius had reduced Tarsus to raise 
funds the year before (App. BC 4.63-4; Cass. Dio 47.31.1-4). The Salassi (Cass. Dio 53.5.4; Strab. 4.6.7; Suet. 
Aug. 21). 
50
 Other sources of slaves: cf. Harris 1980, passim 1999, passim Scheidel 2011, 297-300 Boese 1973, 51-71; 
Harril 1995, 31-42. Dio Chrs. Or. 14-15 discusses the sources of slaves in his discourse on the stoic concept 
of freedom. August. De Civ. 1.4-6 emphasises the enslavement of war captives. Reproduction as the 
paramount source of slaves has been extensively argued by Shtaerman 1964, particularly 70, see further 
Shtaerman & Trofimova 1975, 17-24; Scheidel 1997, 2005. Contra De Martino 1979, 76-8, 263-91. Harris 
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beyond the scope of this study to analyse the individual contributions of each of these. 
Indeed, Scheidel has recently noted that such studies “run the risk of circularity; yet in the 
absence of comparative contextualisation, they invite arbitrary implausibility; it may be hard 
if not impossible to link broad models to qualitative source references; and models may at 
best produce a range of competing probabilities instead of a single authoritative 
reconstruction.”51 
Whilst enslavement directly through war was limited, the disruption caused by warfare would 
have rendered alternative sources more plausible. An increase in orphans, the destruction of 
property (particularly the destruction of food supplies) and opportunistic predation in the 
unsettled wake of a war would have made child abandonment, along with self-sale and 
kidnapping far more common than during normal conditions. At the same time, Rome would 
have been enriched by booty making it an ideal market for the traders capitalising on the 
aforementioned unfortunate people. Beyond the reduction of the overall contribution of war 
captives to the slave supply, another implication of this study is the widespread reduction of 
captured women and children, as compared to the adult men. In repeated examples detailed in 
the preceding chapters, the male population within enemy cities was systematically reduced 
through a siege and often slaughtered in the taking of cities. The enslavement of women and 
children was more common, and considering the biological trend of adult men representing 
30% of any given population, it is difficult to see how the minority, further diminished by 
war, would somehow represent the majority of captives.
52
 There is not a single reference to 
men being enslaved whilst the women and children were explicitly said not to have been.  
Overall the idea that there was an imbalanced sex ratio amongst the slave population is based 
on the highly circumstantial prevalence of inscriptions commemorating male rather than 
female slaves.
53
 Harris presumes a gender bias on the part of all slave owners so that a 
                                                                                                                                                        
1999, 62; 1994, 1-22 has suggested that child abandonment represented a considerable contribution to the 
supply (Scheidel 1997, 165 accused Harris of over emphasising these as a source of slaves. cf. Harris’ rebuttal 
1999, 62f.). For imports see Kolendo 2001, 39-52. Some studies have emphasised the role played by pirates 
and kidnappers such as Boese 1973, 61-71; Avidov 1997, 5-55; De Souza 1999, 97-148. Alföldi 1972, 125 
stresses the importance of self-sale as a major contribution to the supply, believing Dio Chrys. Or. 15.23.  
51
 Scheidel 2011, 287.  
52
 Pace Harris 1999, 70 who states that male war prisoners were likely more numerous without any evidence to 
support such a statement. Cf. Scheidel 2005, 72 n. 56. Scheidel draws a comparison to West African captor 
societies in which women were more prevalent amongst those taken (pg. 72 n. 58). Cf. Manning 1990, 41-6. 
53
 Harris 1999, 69 n. 57, based on the commemoration of slaves from the household of Livia, the servi publici of 
the Statilii and Volussi (Treggiari 1975, 58f) and the servi familia Caesaris (Weaver 1972, 172). Harris 1999, 
69 admits that the “slaves of the super-rich might be atypical,” but nonetheless he uses the gender imbalance 
in commemorations as the basis for his theory on a disproportionate sex ratio. At the same time he plays down 
the suggestion of ste. Croix 1981, 588 that Columella showed a balanced consideration for male and female 
Conclusion 
  
205 
 
preference towards male slaves is further factored by the exposure of more female slave 
infants than males, along with a predilection for the importation of men over women. If this 
prejudice is removed, it is more likely that a balanced gender ratio was present; if not, a ratio 
favourable towards women, which was surely augmented by occasional introduction of war 
captives of a female majority.
54
 
Our interpretation of the Roman slave supply over the Longue durée is very similar to that of 
American slavery. In the American system the demand for slaves was filled primarily from 
African imports for the period preceding 1808, but with the closure of slave importations, a 
strict reliance upon natural reproduction became necessary.
55
 Despite the closure of a major 
contribution to the supply, the slave population actually grew in America from roughly 
890,000 in 1800 to 4 million in 1860. This striking statistic has been the most supportive 
example for theories regarding reproduction as the chief means of supply in maintaining the 
Roman slave population.
56
  
Virtually all historians have accepted the idea that prior to the first century BC the demand 
was met through contributions of captives to the supply.
57
 Whilst some historians have tried 
to demonstrate that war captives still represented a significant contribution to the slave supply 
in the late Republic and Principate,
58
 it is generally agreed that, by the establishment of pax 
Romana, and through it the effective cessation of wars of conquest; the supply of captives 
dwindled, thereby forcing reliance upon other means of supply. The difficulty of this is that 
                                                                                                                                                        
labour on plantations.The comments of Bradley 1984, 73-6 regarding the bias of the agronomists towards 
traditional female activities seems pertinent here. 
54
 Scheidel 2005, 71 has emphasised the fact that a natural balance between the sexes will inevitably occur 
sighting the example of the 18
th
 century slave population of South Carolina. For the population data see 
Morgan 1998, 82.  
55
 The United States Constitution (Article 1.9) protected the slave trade for 20 years (1776-1706) and was then 
prohibited by an act of congress (Congress 9.2.22) effective in 1808. Likewise the trade was banned by an act 
of Parliament in 1807 (47, George III Sess. 1 c.36) The treaty of Paris 1814 also held a provision banning 
French trade, followed by a ban for slave trading by the Spanish north of the equator in 1820. Various other 
countries banned the trade by their nationals in the early 19
th
 century including Denmark, Sweden and the 
Netherlands. 
56
 On purpose by Scheidel 1997, 2005, 2011; and by circumstance Shtaerman & Trofimova 1975, 17-24. For 
slave numbers in America see US Decennial Census Statistics which recorded slave numbers in all states and 
recognised territories from 1790-1860 the last census prior to abolition. The rise in slaves was greatest 
between 1800 and 1810 at 38% (perhaps speculation over the impending ban on the trade, however the 
population rose on average by 26% every 10 years. This average is lower than the rise in the free population 
which was on average 36% every 10 years. This figure neglects to account for immigration. Between 1851 
and 1860 over 2.5 million immigrants became naturalised citizens contributing a 13% increase in the 
population so that the reproduction rate of free persons was very close to that of the slave population (24.5% 
free verses 22.1% slave). For immigration see the US Department of Homeland Security 2008 Yearbook of 
Immigration statistics, 5 Table 1.  
57
 Wallon 1847, 397-398; Westermann 1955, 84; Harris 1980 121-2; 1999 Scheidel 1997. 
58
 Bradley, 2004, 298-318 (particularly his argument at pg. 299); Boese 1973, 104-42; Scheidel 2011 295-6. 
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during the period of a steady reduction in captives the number of slaves steadily grew so that 
at the peak of slave population there was almost no supply from captives. The above analysis 
indicates that, even if the high figures for wartime enslavements are accepted, the supply of 
slaves needed to maintain (and grow) could have only been met fractionally through war 
captives. A reduction in the number of captives taken during the Republic, and a sex ratio 
tipped towards females of those enslaved, would suggest a greater reliance upon 
reproduction.  
 
* * * 
 
In Conclusion, war captives were a less significant contribution to the slave supply of Rome 
than has been commonly believed by historians. As demonstrated in this study, captivity did 
not always result in enslavement. Repeated examples show that ransom, release and 
execution were alternative measures carried out by Roman captors. During the early 
Republic, the Romans often released captives, albeit with the humiliation of passing sub 
iugum, with an understanding that leniency to the defeated eased the transition of 
incorporation into their hegemony.
59
 Leniency continued throughout the Republic to be an 
attribute the Romans wished to portray to other nations. According to Pausanias, the 
destruction of the Greek cities by P. Villius Tappulus in 199 BC was against the orders of the 
senatus consultum, and as a consequence Flamininus was sent to replace him.
60
 Greek 
‘freedom’ became the casus belli for Roman involvement in Greece after the First 
Macedonian War. On fifteen separate occasions the Romans released their captives without 
ransom before 146 BC.
61
 
Ransom was also far more common in Roman warfare than is typically portrayed. Though 
there are only five clear-cut examples of wholesale ransom following the capture of prisoners 
prior to 146 BC, there is ample evidence that ransom took place more frequently below state 
level. Even in Rome, where ransom was looked down on, there was still a system of 
redemption, and thus a considerable amount of interest by Roman jurists in explaining it.
62
 
                                                 
59
 For release see Chapter 2. For Roman policy in the treatment of captives in the early period see Chapter 5. 
60
 Paus. 7.7.9. Flamininus proclaimed the ‘liberation’ of Greeks from Macedon, see Eckstein 2012, 289-97.  
61
 See Appendix. 
62
 Dig. 49.15 Ius Postliminii. 
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Ransom was also authorized at the conclusion of treaties,
63
 and the Romans were even 
willing to exchange prisoners with the enemy.
64
  
Furthermore, instances of capture did not necessarily lead to the same wholesale disposal of 
all the captives. Many examples given above, indicate that captives were commonly sorted by 
the Roman forces, either in rooting out rebel leaders,
65
 isolating political factions or 
nationalities, or often in separating men, women, children and slaves from each other. As 
clearly demonstrated at New Carthage in 209 BC, where P. Cornelius Scipio (soon 
Africanus) released, without ransom, the Spaniards and kept the strong Carthaginians to man 
the Roman fleet; the latter were promised, after good service, that they would be released.
66
 
An important aspect of Roman warfare, during the period covered in this study, is that 
Roman military strategy which led to outward expansion was directed towards the capture of 
towns and cities. The frequency of sieges and battles near metropolitan centres, meant the 
Roman forces acquired civilian captives as often as they took enemy troops. Women and 
children were frequently enslaved where their male counterparts were killed or executed. The 
fear of the capture and abuse of women and children after the men were slaughtered, led 
some communities to take drastic measures to deny themselves to Romans the human booty 
through their mass suicide.
67
 For the most part, as so often in history, the women and children 
were ignored by ancient writers, but in occurrences of enslavement, where women are 
neglected by the sources, it can be inferred that they were very likely enslaved.  
The enslavement of women and children suggests that the slave population of Rome was 
more reliant on reproduction to maintain itself. Too much of our understanding of the slave 
population, and our understanding of the development of Roman plantation style farming, is 
based upon a large influx of slaves. However, as Welwei has shown, the number of enslaved 
captives given by the sources cannot be trusted, and the figures for captives, as well as for 
                                                 
63
 For example following the First Punic War (Zon. 8.17; Eutrop. 2.27.4-5) and with Hiero in 264 BC (Polyb. 
1.16.9). 
64
 Exchange with Pyrrhus (Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 19.13.1), First Punic War (Liv. 22.23.6; Cass. Dio 57.15f.; 
57.35f.) and during the second Punic War (Liv.30.43.8; Per. 19b; Zon. 8.16). 
65
 Commonly led to their execution, see Chapter 2.  
66
 Liv. 26.49f.; Polyb. 10.17f. 
67
 The Cantabrians (Cass. Dio 54.5.2-3), Xanthians (App. BC 4.80), at Astapa the citizens burned their 
possessions before committing mass suicide (App. Iber. 33; Livy 28.22.2-23.2). Likewise at Amisus, 
Callimachus set fire to the city (Plut. Luc.19). Mass suicide to evade capture by the Romans was a common 
feature in the Jewish Revolt according to Joseph. ( BJ. 3.132; 304-6; 338-9; 4.553; 6.414-419, most notably at 
Masada: Joseph. BJ 7.389-406). 
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other battle statistics, should be consistently reduced by modern historians.
68
 Furthermore, as 
this study has shown, the result of capture was not always enslavement, and even 
enslavements were not necessarily permanent or long enough for a captive to be effectively 
utilised in Italian production. Thus, the contribution of wartime enslavements towards the 
growth and eventual maintenance of slavery in Italy was significantly less than has been 
traditionally believed.
69
   
This reduction in the number of enslaved also indicates that the Romans, throughout the 
Republican period, did not actively seek to acquire slaves. Therefore, the Veians captured in 
393 BC were not enslaved simply for the sake of maintaining an early slave population 
labouring on plantations, and it has been argued above that none were actually enslaved.
70
 
Likewise, the removal of debt bondage (nexum) at the end of the fourth century did not 
predicate the enslavement of captives during the Third Samnite War in the beginning of the 
third century.
71
 By the second century BC, when large scale farming, utilising slave labour, 
was prevalent on the Italian Peninsula, the Roman forces were less eager to possess captives 
as slaves, and more eager to display leniency through release and ransom. It is hard to justify 
why the Romans would continually forsake the chance to acquire large numbers of slaves if 
there was a strong and essential demand for them in Italy. Even those captives unfortunate 
enough to fall into slavery were not necessarily utilised in and around Rome. The ubiquitous 
use of slaves in ancient societies meant Rome was never the sole market for slaves. North 
Africa, Sicily and Greece were also significant consumers of slaves.
72
 Once Rome’s conquest 
pushed eastwards, they also entered a long standing slave trade network in which captives 
could be distributed throughout the Mediterranean and hinterlands, rather than directly to 
Rome.
73
 
Instances of large scale enslavement were sporadic and could not be counted upon to 
consistently supply the demand for, and the maintenance of, the slave population. The 
detracting factors aforementioned indicate that war captives were less important in driving 
                                                 
68
 Welwei 2000, passim, cf. the review of Rich 2005, 242-3. 
69
 Bradley, 1984, 7-8; 1987, 43-4; 2004, 299; Brunt 1958, 166; 1971, 707; Hopkins 1978 8-15; Nicolet 1976, 
214; ste. Croix 1981, 228-36; White 1970, 368-70. 
70
 Contra Harris 1979, 59; Eder, 1990, 546f.; Volkmann 1990, 38. Cf. Cornell 1995, 320; Ogilvie 1965, 677; 
Welwei 2000, 32-5, see Chapter 4. 
71
 Contra Harris, 1979, 59f.; Cornell 1989,389; Oakley 2005a IV, 194; Scheidel 2011, 294-5. 
72
 See Chapter 7 and Epilogue. Carthaginian farming in North Africa (Diod. Sic. 20.8.3-4, see Kehoe 1988, 24-
7), Sicily (see White 1967, 75; 1970, 75-6; Finley 1968, 131), Greece (Hdt. 6.23; Thuc. 3.73; Xen. Hell. 
3.2.26), see Kyrtatas 2011, 96-100.  
73
 Braund 2011, 112f., see Chapter 7. 
Conclusion 
  
209 
 
the demand for slaves and for maintaining the slave population. Thus it can be seen that it 
was never a clear policy of Rome to wage war for the purpose of acquiring slaves. 
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Appendix 
References to Captives 
 
Below is a list of instances of capture by the Roman forces as included in this study. Notable 
instances of capture beyond 146 BC are also included, some of which are discussed within 
the above work. No guesses have been made regarding the outcome of capture. Unless it was 
explicitly remarked by a source that the captives were enslaved, ransomed, 
massacred/executed or released, they are by default listed as captured. With regards to 
captive numbers, the pertaining reference is cited (but not indicated) under the far right 
column. Multiple outcomes are listed vertically under the same city. Some citations are listed 
which are not necessarily informative with regards to the number of captives or outcome of 
their capture, but are included for context and comparative purposes. 
 
Date 
--BC-- 
Place/ 
Opposition 
Outcome Number Relevant References 
502 Cures (Sabines) Captured 4,000 Dion. Hal.  Ant. Rom. 5.49.1 
502 Cameria Enslaved - Dion. Hal.  Ant. Rom. 5.49.5; Val. Max. 
6.5.1; Zon. 7.13 
498 Lake Regilus Ransomed 6,000 Liv. 2.22.5 
495 Pometia Enslaved - Liv. 2.17.6; 2.25.5; Dion. Hal.  Ant. 
Rom. 6.29.5. 
467 Antium Enslaved - Dion. Hal.  Ant. Rom. 9.56.5; 10.21.6; 
Liv. 3.6.1 
457 Corbio Released - Dion. Hal.  Ant. Rom. 10.24.7-8; Liv. 
3.28.10; Flor. 1.5.13. 
443 Ardea 
(Volscians) 
Spared - Liv. 4.10.4 
431 Volscians Captured - Liv. 4.29.4 
426 Fidenae Enslaved All Liv. 4.34.4 
425 Aequi Enslaved - Diod. Sic. 12.64.2 
405 Auxur Captured 2,500 Liv. 4.59.7 
393 Veii Enslaved All Diod. Sic. 14.93.2; Liv. 5.22.1 
388 Sutrium Enslaved All Liv. 6.4.2; Plut. Cam. 35.1-36.1.  
356 Etruscans Captured 8,000 Liv. 7.17.9 
356 Volscians Enslaved c.4,000 Liv. 7.27.8 
320 Luceria Spared 7,000 Cass. Dio 32.22; Eutrop. 2.9.1; Flor. 
1.11.1; Liv. 9.15.6-9; 22.14.12; 25.6.12; 
Oros. 3.15.9 
319 Satricum Executed - Liv. 9.16.9; 26.33.10; Oros. 3.15.9-10 
318 Canusium Spared - Diod. Sic. 19.10.2; Liv. 9.20.4 
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318 Teanum Spared - Liv. 9.20.4 
314 Luceria Executed all Liv. 9.26.3 
313 Nola Executed 200 Diod. Sic. 19.101.3; Liv. 9.28.6. 
311 Cluviae Massacred  Liv. 9.31.3 
311 Talium Captured 2,200 Diod. Sic. 20.26.3 
310 Etruscans Captured many Diod Sic. 20.35. 4 
310 Perusia Killed/ 
Captured 
60,000 Diod. Sic. 20.35.4; Liv. 9.37.11; 40.19 
308 Ocriculum  Captured Captured > 
Slain 
Liv. 9.41.19 
308 Allifae Enslaved 7,000 Liv. 9.42.7-8 
306 Silvium Captured 5,000 Diod. Sic. 20.80.2;  
305 Falernitas Captured >2,000 Diod. Sic. 20.90.4 
305 Bovianum/ Bola Captured - Diod. Sic. 20.90.4; Liv. 9.44.13 
302 Aequi Spared - Cic. Off. 1.32; Liv. 10.1.9; Strab. 5.3.4 
301 Marsi Spared - Liv. 10.3.5 
297 Samnites Captured 830 Frontin. Str. 2.4.2; Liv. 10.14.21 
296 Cimetra Captured 2,900 Liv.10.15.6 
296 Murgantia Captured 2,100 Liv.10.17.4 
296 Samnium Captured 1,500 Liv. 10.18.8 
296 Samnites Captured 2,120 Liv. 10.19.22 
296 Samnites Captured 2,500 Liv. 10.20.15 
295 Sentinum Captured 8,000 Liv. 10.29.17; Diod. Sic. 21.6.1 (FGrH 
76 .56); Flor. 1.12.5-7; Frontin. Str. 
2.1.8; 4.5.15; Juv. 8.254-8; Oros. 3.21.6; 
Polyb. 2.19.6; Zon 8.1 
295 Perusia Ransom 1,740 Liv. 10.31.3 
295 Samnites 
(Caiatia) 
Captured 2,700 Liv. 10.31.7 
294 Samnites Captured 4,700 Liv.10.34.3 
294 Interamna Spared 7,800 Liv. 10.36.14 
293 Rusellae Captured 2,000 Liv 10.37.3 
293 Amiternum Captured 4,270 Liv. 10.39.3 
293 Duronia Captured 4,270-7,000 Eutrop. 2.9. Liv.10.39.4 
293 Aquilonia Captured 3,870 Liv. 10.42.5 ; Val. Max. 7.2.5; Zon. 8.1 
293 Cominium Captured 3,000-11,400  Liv. 10.43.8; Oros. 3.22.4. Frontin. Str. 
2.4.1; Zon. 8.1 
293 Velia, Palumbinum & 
Herculaneum  
Killed/ 
Captured 
>5,000 Liv. 10.45.11 
293 Saepinum Captured <3,000 Liv. 10.45.14 
292 Samnites Captured 4,000   Oros. 3.22.10; Liv. Per. 11 ; Plut. Fab. 
Max. 24.3; Cass. Dio 36.31;  
291 Venusia Captured 6,200 Dion. Hal. 18.5.1 
284 Senones Enslaved  Women & 
Children 
App. Sam. 13; Gall. 9; Liv. Per 12; 
Oros. 3.22.12-15; Polyb. 2.19.11 
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-  Massacred Men Dion. Hal.  Ant. Rom. 19.3.1 
275 Beneventum Captured 33,000 Flor. 1.13.7; Liv. Per. 14; Oros. 4.2.6; 
Plut. Pyrrh. 25.5; Zon. 8.6 
272 Tarentum Spared - Frontin. 3.3.1; Liv. Per. 15; Zon. 8.6 
270 Rhegium Executed 300 App. Sam. 21; Dion. Hal. 20.16; Liv. 
Per. 12; Polyb. 1.7.12; Val. Max. 2.7.15 
269 Samnites Executed All Dion. Hal. 20.17.2; Zon. 8.7 
265 Volsini Executed All Flor. 16.1; Liv. Per. 16; Plin. HN 31.31; 
Zon. 8.7  
261 Arcagas (Agrigentum) Enslaved 
(Slaves?) 
25,000 Diod Sic. 23.9.1; Oros. 4.7.6; Polyb. 
1.19.15; Zon. 8.10 
260 Mylae Captured 7,000 CIL 6.1300; Eutrop. 2.20.1-2; Oros. 
4.7.10; Polyb. 1.23.7-10; Zon 8.11 
260 Mazarin Enslaved All Diod. Sic. 23.9.4. 
259 Corsica and Sardinia Enslaved - CIL 6.1287; Flor. 1.18.16; Frontin. Str. 
3.9.4; 10.2; Oros. 4.7.11; Zon 8.11 
258 Mytistratus Enslaved All Diod Sic. 23.9.4; Zon. 8.11 
258 Camarina Enslaved Most Diod. Sic. 23.9.5; Polyb. 1.24.12; Val. 
Max. 6.5.1; Zon. 8.12 
257 Tyndaris Captured c.1,400 Polyb. 1.25.4; Zon. 8.12; Diod. Sic. 
23.10.2; Polyaen. 8.20.1. 
256 Encomus Captured c.9,100 Polyb. 1.28.14 ; Aur. Vict. 63; Eutrop. 
2.21.1; Oros. 4.8.6. 
256 Countryside around 
Aspis/Clupea 
Enslaved 20-27,000 Eutrop. 2.21; Oros. 4.8.9; Polyb. 1.29.7 
255 Hermaeum Captured 5,400 – 22,000 
 
Polyb. 1.36.11; Diod. 23.18.1 
255 Sea outside 
Aspis/Clupea 
Captured 30 crews Oros. 4.9.6; Zon. 8.14 
255 Aspis/Clupea Captured 15,000 Eutrop. 2.22.1; Oros. 9.4.7; Zon. 8.14 
254 Panormus Enslaved c. 13,000 Diod. Sic. 23.18.5; Flor. 1.18.12; Polyb. 
1.38.9-10 
  Ransom - Diod. Sic. 23.18.5. 
252 Himera Captured - Diod. Sic. 23.21.1; Zon 8.14 
-  Released  
(Elephant 
Keepers) 
- Zon 8.14 
241 Aegates Islands Captured 4,040 – 32,000 Diod. Sic. 24.11.2; Eutrop. 2.27; 
Philinus (FGrH 174); Nepos 22.1.4-5; 
Oros. 4.10. 7; Polyb. 1.61.6-8 
241 Falerii Captured  Slaves Eutrop. 2.81; Liv. Per. 20; Polyb. 1.65.2; 
Zon. 8.18 
238 Gauls Captured 2,000 Oros. 4.12.1 
229 Illyrians Executed - Flor. 1.21.4 
225 Rusellae/ Telamon Enslaved 10,000 Diod. Sic. 25.13.1; Eutrop. 3.5.1; Polyb. 
2.31.1-6; Zon 8.20 
224 Insubres Captured 5,000 Oros. 4.13.11 
219 Pharsus Spared - App. Ill. 8; Polyb. 3.18.12 
218 Istria Captured - Eutrop. 3.7.1 
218 Lilybaeum Captured 1,740 Liv. 21.50.5 
218 Cissa Captured >2000 Liv. 21.60.7; Polyb. 3.76.5-6 
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218 Malta Enslaved 2,000 Liv. 21.51.2 
217 Hamae Captured - Liv. 23.35.19 
215 Hirpini Enslaved 
 
>5,000 Liv. 23.37.13 
215 Ibera Captured 10,000  Eutrop. 3.11; Liv. 23.29.13-15; Oros. 
4.16.13; Zon. 9.3  
215 Macedonians and 
Carthaginians 
Enslaved - Liv. 23.38.7 
215 Sardinia Enslaved 1,500  Eutrop. 3.13; Flor. 1.22.35; Liv. 23.41.7 
215 Grumentum Captured 280 Liv. 23.37.6-10 
215 Intibili Captured > 2,000 Liv. 23.37.10; 12 
215 Ilurgeia Captured >3,000 Liv. 23.49.10 
214 Carthaginians Captured c.1,000 Liv 24.41.10 
213 Arpi Executed - App. Hann. 31 
-  Spared - Liv. 24.47.10; Frontin. Str. 3.9.2 
213 Henna Massacred - CIL 6.1281; Frontin. Str. 4.7.22; Liv. 
24.39.4-6; Polyaenus 8.21. 
211 Engyium Spared - Plut. Marc. 20.7 
212 Beneventum Captured >7,000 Liv. 25.14.10; Val. Max. 3.2.20 
212 Saguntum Enslaved - Liv. 24.42.11; Zon. 9.3 
211 Antikyra  Enslaved All Polyb. 9.39.2; Liv. 26.26.3. 
211 Syracuse Spared - August. De Civ. 1.6; Cic. Ver. 2.2.4; 
4.116; 120; Diod. Sic. 26.20.1-2; Liv. 
25.31.8; Oros. 4.17.1; Plut. Marc. 21.4; 
Polyb. 9.10; Tzetz. Chil. 2.136-49; Val. 
Max. 5.1.4; 8.7.7; Zon. 9.5 
  Enslaved Slaves  
211 Capua Enslaved - App. Hann. 43; Liv. 26.14.1-4; 16.6; 
34.1-13; Oros. 4.17.12; Zon. 15.6 
  Executed -  
210 Salapia Captured 50 Liv. 26.38.14; Zon. 9.7 
210 Agrigentum Enslaved - Eutrop. 3.14; Liv. 26.40.13; Oros. 
4.18.2; Zon. 9.7 
210 Aigina Ransom  -  Polyb. 9.42.5 
-  Enslaved  -   
209 New Carthage Enslaved 10,000 App. Hisp. 23; Cass. Dio 16.57.42; Diod 
26.21.1; Eutrop. 3.15; Flor. 1.22.37-40; 
Liv. 26.49f.; Polyb. 10.17.6; 19.8; Oros. 
4.18.1; Zon. 9.8 
-  Released -  
209 Manduria - 3,000 Liv. 27.15.4 
209 Tarentum Enslaved 25-30,000  App. Hann. 49; Brut. 72; Diod. Sic. 
26.21.1; Eutrop. 3.16; Liv. 27.16.7; 
Oros. 4.18. 5-6; Plut. Fab. Max. 22.4; 
Mor. 195f; Polyaenus 8.14.3; Zon. 9.8 
208 Baecula Captured c. 10,000 Eutrop. 3.15; Polyb.10.40.1; Oros. 
4.18.7 
207 Oreus Captured - Cass. Dio. 57.57; Liv. 28.6.5; Zon. 9.11 
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207 Grumentum Captured >700 Liv. 27.42.7 
207 Spain Captured - Liv. 28.2.11; Zon. 9.8 
207 Orongis Enslaved Many Liv. 28.4.4; Zon. 9.8 
207 Metaurus Captured 5,400  App. Hann. 52; Eutrop. 3.18; Flor. 
1.22.50-52; Hor. Od. 4.4.37-48; Liv. 
27.49.6; Oros. 4.18.14; Polyb. 11.3.1-3; 
Val. Max. 3.7.4; Zon 9.9 
-  Massacred -  
206 Ilipa Captured - Liv. 28.16.6 
205 Locri Enslaved - App. Hann. 55; Liv. 28.19.4-6 
204 Bruttium Captured <300 App. Hann. 56; Liv. 29.36.8;  
204 North Africa Enslaved 5-8,000 Liv. 29.29.3; Oros. 4.18.19; Zon 19.12 
204 North Africa Spared - Cass. Dio. 17.57.70 
204 Locha Spared - App. Pun. 15;  
203 Cirta Captured - Liv. 30.12.3; Oros. 4.18.21; Zon 9.13 
203 Bruttians Enslaved All App. Hann. 61 
202 Zama Captured 4,000 App. Pun. 36 
202 Zama Captured 8,500-20,000 App. Pun. 48; liv. 30.35.2; Polyb. 
15.14.9;  
200 Cremona Captured - Liv. 31.21.16 
200 Antipatrea Massacred All Liv. 31.27.4 
199 Pelium Captured 
(Slaves) 
-  
-  Spared All Liv. 31.40.5 
199 Dyme Enslaved - Liv. 32.22.10 
198 Carystus Ransom 
(Macedonians) 
 
All Liv. 32.17.2 
  Spared 
(Citizens) 
 
All  
197 Cynoscophale Enslaved 5,000 Liv. 33.10.7; 11.2; Oros. 4.20.3-4; Plut. 
T. Flam. 8.5; Polyb. 18.27.6; 34.1 
193 Bergistani Enslaved All Liv. 34.16.10 
193 Ilipa Captured 540 Liv. 35.1.12 
191 Thessaly Captured 4,000 App. Syr. 17; Liv. 36.14.5 
191 Thermopylae Captured >5,000  Liv. 36.19.6; Oros. 4.20.20 
191 Boii Captured 3,400 Liv. 36.38.6 
190 Magnesia Captured 1,400 App. Syr. 36; Liv. 37.44.2 
189 Lusitanians  Captured 3,300 Liv. 37.57.10 
189 Mt. Olympus Captured 30-40,000 App. Syr. 42; Liv. 38.23.9; Plut. 
Virtuous Deeds of Women 22;  
189 Mt Magaba Captured - Liv. 38.27.7; App. Syr. 42; Polyb. 
21.39.1-9 
189 Same Enslaved All Liv. 38.29.11 
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185 Liguria Captured  -  Liv. 39.32.4 
  Executed 40  
184 Corbio Enslaved All Liv. 39.42.1 
181 Liguria Captured 2,500 Liv. 40.28.6 
180 Celtiberians Captured 4,000 Liv. 40.40.11 
179 Alce Captured 320 Liv. 40.48.7; Flor. 1.33.9; Strab. 3.163 
179 Alce Captured Many Liv. 40.49.4 
179 Egravia Captured >300 Liv. 40.50.5 
178 Istrians Massacred All Liv. 41.4.7 
177 Istrian Towns Enslaved 5,632 Liv.41.11.8 
177 Sardinia Enslaved 80,000 Liv. 41.21.10 28.4; Zon. 8.20; Aur. Vict. 
Caes. 57; Liv. 41.28.4  
177 Scultenna Captured 700 Liv. 41.12.8 
174 Caeltiberians Captured c. 7,500 Liv. 41.26.5 
173 Liguria Captured 700 Liv. 42.7.8 
173 Liguria Enslaved 10,000 Liv. 42.8.3 
171 Haliartus Enslaved 2,500 Liv. 42.63.11; Strab. 9.411 
171 Phalanna Captured 2,800 Liv. 42.66.9 
170 Abdera Enslaved All Liv. 43.4.10; Diod. Sic. 30.6 
170 Greeks Enslaved -  Liv. Per. 43; Zon. 9.22 
167 Epirus Enslaved 150,000 App. Ill. 29.4;Liv. 45.34.5; Polyb 30.15; 
Strab. 7.7.3 
155 Delminium Enslaved Many/ 
Most 
Zon. 9.25 
154 Aigitna Enslaved All Polyb. 33.10.3 
152 Nergobriges Captured - App. Hisp. 48 
151 Celtiberians Spared 5,000 App. Hisp. 50 
151 Cauca Massacred All App. Hisp. 52 
151 Lusitanians  Captured Many App. Hisp. 59 
148 Macedonians Enslaved - Ampel. 16.5; Flor. 1.30.5 
147 Nepheris Captured 10,000 App. Pun. 126;  
146 Carthage Captured 50-60,000 App. Pun. 130; Oros. 4.23.3; Zon. 9.30 
146 Corinth Enslaved - Oros. 5.3.5; Zon. 9.31; Paus. 7.16.8 
  Massacred Some Paus. 7.16.8 
146 Tezga Captured 7,000 Oros, 4.22.8 
144 Lusitanians Executed Most App. Hisp 60 
143 Lusitanians  Enslaved 9,500 App. Hisp. 68 
141 Sedatania Captured - App. Hisp. 77 
137 Lusitanians  Spared - App. Hisp. 71 
137 Lusitanians  Captured 6000 Oros. 5.5.12 
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133 Numantia Enslaved - App. Hisp. 98; Eutrop. 4.17; Vell. Pat. 
2.4.2 
121 Vindalium Captured 3,000 Oros. 5.13.3 
121 Arverni Released  Caes. B Gall. 1.45.2 
118 Styni Enslaved - Oros. 5.14.6; Liv. Per. 62 
109 Numidians Massacred - Sall. Jug. 54.6 
109 Numians Enslaved - Sal. Jug. 69.3 
108 Numidians Captured - Sall. Jug. 74.2 
107 Capsa Massacred Men Sall. Jug. 91.6; Flor. 1.36.14 
  Enslaved Women & 
Children 
 
106 Cirta Captured - Sall. Jug. 101.11; Oros. 5.15.8-9 
102 Aquae Sextiae (I) Captured 8,000 Flor. 1.38.15; Oros. 5.16.12 
102 Aquae Sextiae (II) Captured 60-80,000  Cass. Dio 94.1; Eutrop. 5.1; Flor. 
1.38.15; Liv. Per. 68; Oros. 5.16.20; 
Plut. Mar. 21.2; Polyaenus 8.10.3 
101  Vercellae Captured 60,000 Eutrop. 5.2; Liv. Per. 68; Oros. 5.16.21; 
Plut. Mar. 27.3 
98 Colenda Enslaved All App. Hisp. 99 
98 Celtiberians Massacred All App. Hisp. 100 
96 Castulo Enslaved All Plut. Sert. 3.5;  
89 Asculum Enslaved 
(Slaves) 
- Liv. Per. 76; Oros. 5.18.26 
86 Athens Enslaved 
(Slaves) 
- Liv. Per. 81; App. Mith. 38 
86 Cities in Asia Minor Enslaved - App. Mith. 61 
63 Jerusalem Captured - Philo Legatio ad Gaium 23 
57 Aeduatuci Enslaved 53,000 Caes. B. Gall. 2.32.7 
56 Venetti Enslaved All Caes. B. Gall. 3.16.4 
-  
Executed 
  53 Genabum Captured Few Caes. B. Gall. 7.11.8 
53 Taricheae Enslaved 30,000 Joseph. AJ. 14.120; BJ. 1.180 
52 Pindenissum Enslaved All Cic. Att. 5.20.5; Fam 15.4.10 
52 Alesia Enslaved - Caes. B. Gall. 7.89.5 (1 million Gauls 
enslaved in total according to Plut. Caes. 
15.3) 
43 Tarsus Enslaved - App. B. Civ. 4.63-4; Cass. Dio. 47.31.1-
4 
42 Lycians Spared - Plut. Brut. 30.4; Vell. Pat. 2.69.6 
42 Xanthus Enslaved - App. B. Civ. 4.80; Plut. Brut. 31.6 
42 Patara Enslaved - Cass. Dio. 4.34.4 
-  Spared  App. B. Civ. 4.81; Plut. Brut. 2.8; 32.1 
42 Anriace Spared - App. B. Civ. 4.82 
25 Salassi Enslaved - Cass. Dio 53.5.4; Strab. 4.6.7; Suet. Aug. 
21 
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22 Astures and 
Cantabrians 
Captured - Cass. Dio 54.5.2-3 
12 Pannonians Enslaved All Cass. Dio 54.31.3 
11 Bessii Enslaved - Cass. Dio 54.34.7 
 
--AD-- 
     
 
4 Sepphoris Enslaved - Joseph. AJ. 17.288; BJ. 2.68 
67 Gadara Massacred - Joseph. BJ. 3.132 
67 Gadaran villages Enslaved - Joseph. BJ. 3.133 
67 Japha Enslaved 
(Women & 
Children) 
2,130 Joseph. BJ. 3.304-306 
-  Massacred 
(Men) 
2,130  
67 Jotapata Massacred - Joseph. BJ. 3.338-339; Vit. 414f 
-  Enslaved 1,200  
67 Taricheae Esnlaved 30,000 Joseph. BJ. 3.339-341 
67 Judean rebels Captured 2,200 Joseph. BJ. 4.436 
67 Betaris & Caphartobas Enslaved 10,000 Joseph. BJ. 4.448 
67 Garasa Captured - Joseph. BJ. 4.488 
67 Hebron Massacred - Joseph. BJ. 4.553 
70 Jerusalem Enslaved 
(Non-
Combatants) 
97,000 Joseph. BJ. 6.414-419 
  Executed 
(Combatants) 
-  
102 Dacians Captured 50,000 Cass. Dio 67.8.15; Ioannes Lydus, De 
Magistratibus 2.25 (FGrH 200.1) 
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